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The aims of the current thesis were, firstly, to explore and characterise the effects of 
safety culture and climate on decision making in the presence of risk within the Royal 
Navy’s Fleet Air Arm (FAA). Secondly, from the perspective of organisational learning, the 
thesis aimed to provide insight into ways to enhance resilience to failure through 
exploring the scope for developing sector-specific, quantifiable leading indicators with the 
capacity to detect weaknesses in safety climate and identify priorities for improvement.  
 
Purposively adopting a sequential mixed method approach, four empirical studies were 
undertaken. The first study adopted a qualitative approach, aiming to explore structural 
and socio-technical influences on workplace safety culture. Use of focus groups to 
generate data that was thematically analysed led to identification of seven salient 
themes: policy & procedures, pressure, leadership & safety ownership, individual & 
collective responsibility, communication, training & experience and organisational 
commitment. The second empirical study compared three alternative methods for 
eliciting employee perspectives on priorities for intervention to enhance the safety 
culture/climate of their workplace (Q-Sort, direct ranking and the method of paired 
comparisons). No significant differences in the ranking of priorities were detected. The 
method of paired comparisons afforded greater insight into the relative weighting of 
culture/climate elements, however the additional value of the interval scale produced 
needs to be balanced against associated respondent frustration relative to Q-Sort and 
direct ranking methods. Human resources (staffing levels), priority of safety and 
competency & experience were identified as potential areas of concern amongst 
participants.  
 
Study 3 aimed to elicit employee perspectives on safety climate in the FAA, using a self-
complete survey.  Exploratory factor analysis indicated the presence of six components. 
A confirmatory factor analysis in Study 4 refined this to five elements: management & 
organisational learning, normative behaviour, training & experience, reporting and 
process & bureaucracy. Study 4 further examined the scope for developing the climate 
components into a five-factor measure of FAA safety climate.   
 
The research added to the body of military aviation research in relation to safety culture 
and climate, as well as to the body of mixed methods research within the safety culture / 
climate domain. Findings highlighted a number of implications for the FAA which were 
translated into practical recommendations for enhancing safety climate with the potential 
to improve safety culture, including: removal of barriers to compliance with procedures; 
14 
 
review of policy to consolidate in a central location and provide signposting; engaging 
users in development of procedures; examining the effects of a lack of human resource 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis, firstly with an overview of high-profile 
organisational accidents and incidents instrumental in shaping contemporary interest in, 
and perspectives on, workplace safety culture and climate. This is followed by an outline 
of the context in which the research reported in this thesis was situated through a 
description of changes to the regulation of safety in the United Kingdom (UK) Defence 
aviation environment, which prompted the Royal Navy's (RN) interest in supporting the 
research. This is supplemented by a description of the military naval aviation 
environment and research challenges, culminating in an overview of the thesis. 
1.1  Organisational Accidents 
In many respects the history of risk regulation and structural changes within the major 
hazard sectors reflects institutional responses to major events. Examples include 
chemical processing (Flixborough disaster of 1974, Parker, Pope, Davidson & Simpson, 
1975), on-shore oil processing (BP’s Texas City refinery explosion of 2005, Baker et al., 
2007), offshore oil and gas (Piper Alpha disaster of 1988, Cullen, 1990), and the UK 
railway industry (Ladbroke Grove train crash of 1999, Cullen, 2001a, 2001b) each of 
which led to significant changes in the ways safety and risk were managed within the 
respective sectors. A common feature of investigations into these incidents was the 
identification of deficiencies in many of the layers of defence put in place to guard 
against accidents (Baker et al., 2007). How these defences interact with the cultural and 
psychological factors which influence employee safety behaviour has been suggested as 
key organisational learning with respect to understanding causality and the scope for 
future resilience (Taylor, van Wijk, May & Carhart, 2015). This interaction is often broadly 
referred to as the 'safety culture' of the organisation.   
 
1.2 The Nimrod Review and the Defence Air Environment 
For the UK military aviation sector, the key stimulus for significant structural and 
regulatory change was the crash of the Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 
2006. The resultant two-year review led by Charles Haddon-Cave QC culminated in a 
wide-ranging report (The Nimrod Review, Ministry of Defence, 2009) which highlighted a 
range of organisational failings which were concluded to have contributed to the disaster. 
These were described in the Nimrod Review as shortcomings in the airworthiness 




a. "A failure to adhere to basic Principles [of airworthiness]; 
b. A Military Airworthiness System that is not fit for purpose; 
c. A Safety Case regime which is ineffectual and wasteful; 
d. An inadequate appreciation of the needs of the Aged Aircraft; 
e. A serious weakness in the area of Personnel; 
f. An unsatisfactory relationship between the MOD and industry; 
g. An unacceptable Procurement process leading to serial delays and cost- 
overruns; and 
h. A Safety Culture that has allowed 'business' to eclipse Airworthiness" 
(Ministry of Defence, 2009 p 13). 
 
Point (h) echoed findings from other major accident reports (Baker et al., 2007; Cullen, 
1990) which cited deficiencies in organisational safety culture. When used in the context 
of organisational accident reports, this introduction of poor 'safety culture' as a 
contributory factor has often been attributed to the report produced after the Chernobyl 
disaster of 1986 (INSAG, 1991).  
 
The Nimrod Review (Ministry of Defence, 2009) advocated the development of a 'new' 
safety culture for UK Defence aviation, with definition of a vision for this ‘new’ safety 
culture falling to the newly created Military Aviation Authority (MAA). This organisation 
was set up to regulate all aspects of aviation across the three Armed Services (the Royal 
Air Force (RAF), RN and British Army), broadly known as Defence Aviation 
organisations. The RN's aviation branch is known as the Fleet Air Arm (FAA).  
 
The MAA proposed that safety culture was an important factor in supporting the Air 
Safety Management System which each Defence Aviation organisation was regulated to 
have. The MAA therefore proposed a model of Engaged Air Safety Culture that is 
reproduced in Figure 1, based on a model widely attributed to James Reason (1997), a 





Figure 1. Components of an Engaged Air Safety Culture (taken from the Manual of Air 
Safety, Military Aviation Authority, 2014a p 29).  
 
The MAA define an Engaged Air Safety Culture as 
 “that set of enduring values and attitudes, regarding Air Safety issues, shared by 
every member, at every level, of an organisation. It refers to the extent to which 
each individual and each group of the organisation: seeks to be aware of the 
risks induced by its activities; is continually behaving so as to preserve and 
enhance safety; is willing and able to adapt when facing safety issues; is willing 
to communicate safety issues; and continually evaluates safety related 
behaviour” (Manual of Air Safety, Military Aviation Authority, 2014a p 29). 
   
1.3 The Context of Military Aviation 
While civilian and military aviation sectors may share similarities regarding engineering 
and technical perspectives, there are several key differences between them which may 
have an influence on how safety and risk are conceptualised; these include both 
structural and socio-cultural differences.  
 
It is perhaps each sector’s view on risk that most distinctly separates them. Haddon-
Cave stated that “A military organisation must be risk sensible but not too risk averse” 
(Ministry of Defence, 2009, pg 499) as it is required to deliver a certain military capability, 
and balance the safety of operators and the system with hazards that are often extreme 
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and unpredictable (Falconer, 2006a).  For example, under operational conditions, 
personnel may need to consider risk to personal safety in the context of more 
fundamental threats to achievement of the operational mission (Börjesson, Lajksjö & 
Enander, 2007). Whilst this imperative is perhaps less applicable to non-operational 
situations, the requirement remains for military personnel to be willing and able to take 
calculated risks when required in pursuit of activities that are seen to support the wider 
organisational goal (Borjesson, Osterberg & Enander, 2011; Page, 1987). Indeed, a 
positive attitude toward safety and willingness to take risk are both compatible and 
desirable in military personnel (Borjession Osterberg & Enander, 2011). It might be 
argued that this is similar to productivity-safety trade-offs but is perhaps of a more 
fundamental and immediate nature.  In most industries, the higher the level of safety 
exhibited by organisational members, the higher the level of safety for others. However, 
this might not hold true for the military as it reportedly does not for the fire service 
(Pessemier & England, 2012).  
 
Risk is an integral part of military working life; while personnel may not be trained per se 
to take risks, it is expected that they understand and balance the risk with the potential 
benefit, and make a sensible decision (Page, 1987). Personnel in the UK Armed Forces 
are selected and trained to take calculated risks while simultaneously reconciling this 
with legislative and regulatory requirements to reduce risk to as low as is reasonably 
practicable (ALARP). The military approach to risk management, where higher risks are 
often determined to be tolerable if the possible operational gain is high (Liwang, Ericson 
& Bang, 2014), has also been suggested to differ from the civilian approach (in which risk 
is often not determined to be tolerable to any degree).  
 
The nature of tasks and the working environment are also suggested to differentiate 
civilian and military aviation sectors. Military personnel often operate in challenging 
environmental conditions, which reduces the ability to control for risks in the physical 
environment, thus increasing the importance of safe behaviour (Luria, 2010). The 
complexity of military aviation missions implies high risk activity (Iordache & Balan, 
2016), making safety behaviour of personnel of prime importance. The exceptional 
nature of the military maritime operating environment often places resource and temporal 
limitations on personnel working in these situations (Luria, 2010; Saward & Stanton, 
2015).  
 
A further difference between the nature of tasks undertaken in military and civilian 
sectors is the dominant aircraft type in each, and the ways in which these are utilised. 
While commercial civilian sectors tend to utilise predominately fixed wing aircraft (for 
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commercial air travel), the military is often characterised by rotary wing aircraft 
(helicopters) which are considered more agile. Commercial aircraft are typically used for 
transportation of passengers and cargo, whilst military aircraft are utilised for a far wider 
range and variety of activities (including search and rescue, tactical operations and 
combat).   
 
The demographic profile of military organisations exhibits contrasts when compared to 
civilian organisations.  The RN is typically comprised of approximately 90% male 
personnel, most of whom are relatively young, 22% are between 18 and 24 years old, 
43% between 25 and 34 years, and only 35% older than 35 years of age (Dempsey, 
2017). This relatively young, predominately male workforce does not reflect the wider UK 
working population, but shows similarities with other high risk emergency services such 
as the fire service,1 and police.2  
 
Unlike most civilian aviation workers, UK military aviation personnel typically live and 
work together, for periods of approximately two years; in effect the military is a fully 
functioning community with doctors, drivers, cooks, and police amongst others. It has 
been suggested that this context strengthens the inculcation of the military culture 
(Redmond et al., 2015). Most military personnel, if not directly engaged in combat, will 
have careers focussed on supporting the overall military mission (Redmond et al., 2015). 
While the military's principle role is war, individuals are acknowledged to differ in the level 
to which they are involved in direct combat (Redmond et al., 2015); some may therefore 
be more directly involved in humanitarian missions, training and support roles.  
 
Structurally, military organisations generally differ from those in the civilian sector in that 
their strict hierarchy, high reliance on regulations and cultures of control (rules, 
procedures, norms) have been suggested to be strong enough to influence subordinate 
behaviour to a degree which may not, generally, be reflected in civilian organisations 
(Martinez-Corcoles & Stephanou, 2017). Military personnel are bound by military laws 
and traditions that do not apply to civilians (Redmond et al., 2015), while the opposite is 
rare. Mechanisms/policies designed to encourage voluntary safety participation in civilian 
contexts are thought to be harder to introduce in a military setting (Martinez-Corcoles & 
Stephanou, 2017).  
 
                                               
1 95% male, 62% under the age of 45  
2 In the UK Police, approximately 71% of personnel are male, 51% of Police Officers are between the ages of 18 and 39  
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The factors outlined above make the military context one in which the concepts of safety 
and risk might be viewed differently to the civilian context (Borjesson, Osterberg & 
Enander, 2015; Iordache & Balan, 2016).  However, given the aviation focus of the FAA, 
it may also be expected that there would likely be some similarities with the civil aviation 
sector, and so research relating to this was included within the review of literature 
(Chapter 2).  
1.3.1 Emergence of the Thesis 
A review of the safety culture and safety climate literature (Chapter 2) revealed a number 
of interesting theoretical questions relating to how these concepts might be characterised 
in different contexts, and the degree to which differences between organisations/sectors 
might influence the dimensions of safety culture and climate. The variability in findings 
amongst studies conducted in various contexts might suggest that constructs are prone 
to vary between populations which exist in various regulatory, structural and socio-
technical contexts (Jeffcott et al., 2006; Reiman & Rollenhangen, 2011). To date, there 
has been relatively little research into defining influences on safety culture/climate in 
military populations (O’Conner et al., 2011b).   
 
Interest in the concepts of safety culture/climate within RN aviation pre-dated the 
Engaged Air Safety Culture model shown in Figure 1, however the research sponsors 
were of the opinion that the FAA had not as yet derived significant benefit from 
contemporary insights. This highlighted the requirement for further research to be 
conducted and formed the basis of the case for funding for this PhD studentship, with the 
remit of deriving a better and more complete understanding of the prevailing safety 
culture(s) and defining influences, underpinned by critical reflection upon the suitability 
and utility of methods currently employed by the FAA to understand and monitor safety 
culture.  
 
The author is a civilian, based within the Human Factors Department at the Institute of 
Naval Medicine (INM). The INM is the RN's centre of excellence for occupational health 
advice information, training and research. The alignment between this thesis and the 
FAA's safety management objectives provided a research context with the potential real 
world application of findings, but brought with it challenges with respect to managing 
stakeholder expectations and interests and gathering empirical evidence. The following 
section provides an overview of the organisation in which the research was conducted, 
followed by a brief outline of some challenges and benefits of applied research as 
experienced during this research.  
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1.3.2 The Sponsor Organisation 
The RN is comprised of five ‘arms’ which include the Surface Fleet, the Submarine 
Service, the Royal Marines, the civilian Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the aviation FAA. The 
focus of the current research was on the FAA.  The FAA is responsible for the co-
ordination and operation of naval aircraft, and is comprised of approximately 4620 
personnel.3 Operating predominately rotary wing aircraft (i.e. helicopters), the FAA 
undertakes a wide range of roles which include providing maritime security, surface and 
sub-surface warfare and surveillance roles, providing disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance, as well as a wide range of training and specialist support and air displays 
across the UK. This wider range of roles means that FAA personnel can operate in a 
wide array of environments, from particularly challenging maritime or operational 
contexts through to more benign training environments.  
Military Naval Aviation Population: The Research Focus 
Roles within RN aviation typically fall within the categories of aircrew, engineering, air 
traffic control (ATC) and support roles. Aircrew are comprised of pilots and observers 
who fly the aircraft and perform navigational/system control roles; engineers are 
responsible for maintaining, servicing and inspecting the aircraft and weapons; ATC 
perform air traffic control roles, and support roles can vary widely from logistics 
(storekeepers, pay clerks, chefs, stewards) to aircraft handlers (who are responsible for 
the safety of the aircraft when on the ground). Most personnel within the FAA are 
employed within either the aircrew or engineering trades and these personnel are those 
who have most frequent physical interaction and contact with the aircraft. The research 
only focused on personnel who were involved in the operation of aircraft, and therefore 
this did not include people involved with aspects of either designing or procurement of 
aviation-related equipment. 
 
As with most military organisations, a hierarchical rank structure is in place, with 
personnel typically being identified as either Officers or Other Ranks/Ratings. A full 
outline of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) rank structure across the UK 
armed forces is contained within Appendix A.   
1.3.3 Applied Research: Challenges and Benefits 
Given the theoretical question of how safety culture/climate concepts may be 
characterised in a military context, addressing this required undertaking research in an 
applied setting. This necessitated alignment between what was theoretically desirable 
                                               
3 In October 2017 
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(i.e. academic objectives) and what was practically possible (i.e. what constraints 
existed), and resulted in a number of both challenges and benefits. 
 
Applied research is often characterised by dual aims; firstly, contributing to academic 
knowledge within the established body of research while, secondly, generating practical 
insight relevant to the organisation/sector in which the research is based. Examples of 
challenges faced in the current research included sampling and ethics, both of which are 
outlined below. For robustness, probability and purposive sampling are often preferred 
for quantitative and qualitative research respectively (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). However, 
much of the sampling within this thesis was convenience sampling, due to limitations on 
the availability of serving military personnel. However, if the research is underpinned by a 
sound understanding of philosophical assumptions and a well thought out design, 
challenges such as these do not need to compromise applied research (Jones, 2014).  
 
Regarding ethics, research in military environments can be complicated by the tendency 
of military personnel to follow orders. Thus, it was very important to ensure that 
volunteers were properly informed, and were not coerced into participating.  The author 
addressed this challenge through ensuring the research was ethically approved (either 
by the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee (MODREC) and/or the University 
of Bath, as required) and that the research was conducted within the bounds of these 
ethical protocols. This also required significant education and briefing of military gate-
keepers to (i) ensure that participant information was distributed freely prior to inviting 
volunteers to participate in the research and (ii) ensure that data collection was 
conducted away from the chain of command to minimise any pressure felt by potential 
participants to volunteer. The fact that the author was a civilian, and not a ranking officer 
or member of the RN, is likely to have assisted in this. 
 
In the RN/FAA, personnel typically move job postings every two years, so maintaining 
continuity during a multi-stage research program was an important challenge to address. 
This was achieved through the author ensuring that details regarding the research 
program were contained within handovers and briefs between outgoing and incoming 
stakeholders. Access to personnel for data collection in applied settings such as this was 
also often a challenge. Data collection often had to be scheduled into operational 
programs, which themselves are fluid and subject to short notice changes. This required 
a degree of flexibility and responsiveness from the author to ensure that data collection 
targets could be achieved within the timeframe of the doctorate. The military setting also 
occasionally limited the type of information or documentation that could be reviewed or 




Despite the challenges, there were a number of benefits associated with situating the 
research within an applied setting. Firstly, access to a military population afforded insight 
into the unique context in which military personnel operate (as described in Section 1.3), 
and how this might influence safety and risk decision making. Access to military 
personnel for the purposes of research is often limited, and as most of the established 
aviation safety culture research is sited within the civilian sector, insights into the military 
context had the potential to offer a different perspective to that already captured in the 
established literature.  Furthermore, applied research enables the 'testing' of theoretical 
perspectives for face validity and relevance in a real life setting, thereby determining the 
ability of the abstract safety culture and climate concepts to achieve practical utility.   
1.4  Overview of Empirical Chapters  
This thesis has been structured around four empirical studies which were conducted to 
address the aims and objectives of the research. The respective aims of each, and how 
the studies link together, is as follows:   
Study 1 (Chapter 4), Exploring and understanding employee attitudes to safety 
culture, behavioural norms and risk decision making in a military naval aviation 
organisation  
The aim of this qualitative study was to gain a rich and detailed insight into FAA 
personnel perspectives on how prevailing safety climate, notably structural, socio-
technical, and normative elements impacts on the values, attitudes and behaviour of 
operational personnel in relation to safety, particularly shared perspectives. The key 
contribution of this foundation study is held to be in its embeddedness within the 
accounts of personnel, to produce a data driven, methodologically bottom-up 
perspective. This insight informed decisions over the focus for more structured 
investigation in later stages of the research. 
Study 2 (Chapter 5), Ranking priorities for safety improvement  
To complement findings from Study 1, Study 2 set out to determine FAA personnel 
perspectives on priorities for enhancing safety culture / climate within their workplaces. 
The output from three widely applied ranking techniques was compared and produced 
closely aligned profiles. Each emphasised the primacy of human resources (staffing 
levels), priority of safety and competency/experience as headline issues that were 




Study 3 (Chapter 6), Quantitative exploration of variables impacting on employee 
perceptions of safety climate in military naval aviation   
Building on insights from Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 aimed to distil the constituent themes 
into a set of statements (referenced to a simple agree-disagree scale) to produce an 
employee safety climate survey. Study 3 aimed to triangulate findings from Study 1, in 
particular, to quantitatively examine relationships between identified variables, with a 
view to developing a finite set of components considered to characterise headline 
influences on safety climate.  
 
Study 4 (Chapter 7), Toward the development of a safety climate tool for use in 
military naval aviation  
The aim of the final study was to use confirmatory techniques to determine the validity of 
the model developed in Study 3, and to explore the scope for developing an employee 
survey-based safety climate assessment tool, with the capacity to profile and benchmark 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlined the evidence base relating to organisational safety culture and 
climate and how this applied to military aviation organisations. Given the notable overlap, 
both philosophically and methodologically, between organisational culture and climate 
research and safety culture and climate research, only a brief synopsis of the former was 
given, with an in-depth critique saved for the latter. Given the military aviation context, a 
specific focus of this review was on existing military research. However, the scarcity of 
studies meant that civilian research was also included. The evidence supporting or 
refuting a relationship between safety culture/climate and safety performance was 
critiqued and a short overview of safety, risk management and organisational learning, 
specific to the military context, concluded the chapter.  
 
The purpose of the review of the literature was to determine what is known in this area, 
and identify knowledge gaps, the latter of which were used to inform thinking over the 
design and focus of the research reported here. Whilst research on organisational 
(safety) culture and (safety) climate has been of interest to anthropologists, political 
scientists and sociologists (Guldenmund, 2010a), this review is bounded to insights from 
applied psychology, organisational psychology and human factors domains. While other 
domains are acknowledged, they are considered to fall outside the scope of the review 
because they do not contribute to the overall aims of the current research.   
2.1 Background 
For many industries, a large scale/high consequence organisational accident is often the 
catalyst for a major industry-wide review of how safety is regulated and managed. Some 
of the most widely known and high profile of these include the UK railways (Ladbroke 
Grove rail crash, Cullen, 2000a, 2000b), both on-shore oil processing (BP's Texas city 
refinery explosion, Baker et al., 2007) and offshore oil extraction (Deepwater Horizon Rig 
explosion and fire, US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board report, 2010) 
and spaceflight (Challenger, 1986 & Columbia, 2003). For the UK military aviation sector, 
such a catalyst occurred in 2006 when the Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 crashed in 
Afghanistan, resulting in fourteen fatalities (Ministry of Defence, 2009).  
 
A common feature of these large scale incident reports is that deficiencies were identified 
as being present despite multiple layers of defence (Baker et al., 2007). Systematic 
analysis of how the boundaries between the various defences interact with the cultural 
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and psychological factors which shape human behaviour have been identified as key to 
understanding and supporting safety and organisational learning (Taylor, van Wijk, May & 
Carhart, 2015). Increasingly, the typically complex web of interactions in accident reports 
tend to be referenced to the prevailing 'safety culture'. Indeed, many industries appear to 
implicitly accept that a positive safety culture is a key aspect of safety management 
without which safety interventions may be ineffective (Farrington-Darby et al., 2005).  
 
The term, and to some degree the concept, of safety culture has achieved the status of 
having become embedded in the safety management discourse of the nuclear power 
production (Harvey et al., 2002; Rollenhagen et al., 2013), aviation (O'Conner et al., 
2011b), oil and gas (Mearns et al., 2001), railway (Morgan et al., 2016), healthcare 
(Chesters et al., 2016; Nixon et al., 2015) and maritime sectors (Havold, 2005), amongst 
others. However, few accident investigation reports make a clear distinction between 
safety culture and its allied concept, safety climate, with the terms often being used 
interchangeably. Fewer still acknowledge linkages to the broader concepts of 
organisational culture and climate (Guldenmund, 2010a). Perhaps, because the field has 
been described as fragmented (Schneider et al., 2013), achieving consensus over the 
core concepts of either culture or climate has proved elusive.  
2.2 Organisational Culture and Climate 
The term organisational culture has been used to describe numerous concepts, from 
behaviours through to corporate values (Schein, 1984; 1990), and gained popularity in 
the 1980s when it was marketed to managers pursuing a competitive edge (Bellot, 2011). 
Interest in organisational culture attracted the attention of sociologists and organisational 
psychologists through the work of Andrew Pettigrew (1979), who focussed on the 
evolution of organisations and how these might 'create' a culture within themselves.  
 
Although there is significant disagreement between scholars and disciplines as to how 
organisational culture may be defined or assessed (Bellot, 2011) most definitions 
incorporate reference to shared values and assumptions creating a collective identity 
which might help to explain why organisations "do what they do and focus on what they 
focus on" (Schneider, Gonzalez-Roma, Ostroff & West, 2017, p 468). Edgar Schein 
defined organisational culture as "the perceptions, language and thought processes that 
a group comes to share...the ultimate causal determinant of feelings, attitudes, espoused 
values and overt behaviour" (Schein, 1990 p 111). Many definitions also share the 
premise that organisational culture reflects a learned set of values that may take the form 
of practices interpreted through rules and norms of behaviour (Harvey et al., 2002). The 
focus on cognitive components referenced to organisational culture such as beliefs, 
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values or perspectives has prevailed within organisational psychology (Sackmann, 
1992).  
 
Despite the popularity of the concept of organisational culture, organisational climate has 
the longer research tradition (Moran & Volkwein, 1992; Schein, 1990). Research in this 
area has, for the most part, adhered to the notion that organisational climate is the 
integration between peoples' perceptions of their experiences with organisational 
practices and procedures which become meaningful and shared (Schneider et al., 2017). 
Organisational climate has been described as 'functional' because it provides a frame of 
reference against which employees can model their behaviour (Schneider, 1975) through 
their observations of overarching priorities and acceptable behaviours.  Cox and Flin 
(1998) likened climate and culture to mood and personality, with the former being 
transient and sensitive to external pressure and the latter reflecting the stability of 
systems, procedures and behaviours within the organisation. 
 
Despite significant academic and practitioner interest over the years, there is limited 
consensus with respect to understanding the concept, appropriate methods, or value and 
validity of enquiry into organisational culture (Bellot, 2011; Chatman & O'Reilly, 2016; 
Jung et al., 2009; Schneider et al., 2017).  This situation is thought to have, in part, 
arisen due to the influence of consultants having eclipsed empirical academic insight and 
constructive debate in this area (Bellot, 2011; Chatman & O'Reilly, 2016). This criticism 
resounds with the current state of safety culture research and was discussed in Section 
2.3 in greater detail. In contrast, organisational climate appears to be more coherently 
defined within the established literature.  
 
Despite the terms often being used interchangeably, the history of culture and climate 
research shows that, viewed simplistically, the concepts appear to have developed from 
different research paradigms. Organisational climate has typically been sited within the 
positivist paradigm in which "causes probably determine effects or outcomes" (Creswell, 
2003, p7), generally using quantitative methods (Jung et al., 2009) and hinges upon the 
premise that functional reification can reduce climate to a set of potentially malleable 
causal components. In contrast, studies of culture tend to reflect the 
constructivist/interepretivist underpinnings where knowledge and consciousness are 
argued to be socially constructed (Cohen & Manion, 1994; Mertens, 2005). Thus, early 
insight into culture was almost wholly gained using qualitative methods (Jung et al., 
2009), although a tendency to favour the use of 'culture' when referring to both qualitative 




The rise of quantitative methods applied to studies of culture in organisational 
psychology in the 1980s and 1990s has further served to blur boundaries between the 
concepts of culture and climate (Chatman & O'Reilly, 2016; Jung et al., 2009). This era 
gave rise to a burgeoning number (> 70) of measurement instruments used for exploring 
organisational culture (Jung et al., 2009). Much of this appears to have been driven by 
the need from within organisations to diagnose and facilitate comparisons between 
groups to inform organisational strategies (Yauch & Steudel, 2003). This era led to what 
Denison (1996) referred to as the 'paradigm wars', where differences in epistemology, 
methodology and level of analysis were emphasised by both organisational culture and 
climate camps, and epistemology become a focus for academic debate.  
 
As early as 1975, Schneider posited that a more strategic and focused view of climate 
(rather than culture) may be applicable, dependent on the purpose of the study. Rather 
than attempting to develop an omnibus measure of 'organisational climate' he suggested 
that assessing the concept in a specific situation may be more useful. Consequently, it 
was posited that multiple 'climates' could concurrently exist within a single organisation, 
examples of which include service climate (Walumbwa, Hartnell & Oke, 2010), ethics 
climate (Dickson, Smith, Grojean & Erhart, 2001) and safety climate (Zohar, 1980, 2010).  
2.3 Safety Culture and Climate  
2.3.1 Background  
As with organisational culture and climate, some have used the terms safety culture and 
safety climate interchangeably (Cooper, 2000; Cox & Flin, 1998; Dejoy, Smith & Dyal, 
2017; Health & Safety Executive, 2005), while others have explicitly separated them 
(Mearns & Flin, 1999). The organisational psychology literature has been criticised for 
the ambiguity with which the terms are used (Baram & Schoebel, 2007) and measures of 
safety culture (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007; Grabowski et al., 2010; Morrow et al., 2014, 
Varmazyar et al., 2016) often appear functionally equivalent with those of safety climate 
(van Nunen, Reniers & Ponnet, 2016). 
 
The popularisation of safety 'culture' in favour of safety 'climate' (Hale, 2000) appears to 
have arisen from its use in investigations of high profile accidents. In many reports of 
these accidents, poor or deficient organisational safety culture was said to exist prior to 
the disasters, being identified post hoc as a contributory factor. Whilst accident reports 
have given a notable platform to safety culture, these views are those of the accident 
investigators and are not empirically based; accident reports have been criticised for 
using safety culture as a 'catch all' concept (Silbey, 2009).  Rarely have these accident 




The rise in popularity of the term safety culture was thought to be related to an increasing 
awareness that social factors are likely to impact on how people behave. However, 
although intuitively appealing, the concept of safety culture also runs the risk of 
becoming so inclusive as to lose conceptual meaning (Moran & Volkwein, 1992) or be 
seen as a 'philosopher's stone' (Cox & Cox, 1991; Flin & Cox, 1998) with which 
organisations can cure all their safety problems. Reiman and Rollenhagen (2011) 
recommended caution in taking the view that there is an 'ideal' safety culture to which all 
organisations should aspire, as this has yet to be empirically demonstrated, however 
intuitively appealing it may be. To determine the evidence for considering the utility of the 
terms safety culture and climate, a summary of the research in the areas of both areas to 
date is presented in the following sections. 
2.3.2 Safety Culture 
Common usage of the term safety culture is widely cited as having arisen in the nuclear 
domain, after the disastrous events occurring at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the 
(then) United Soviet Socialist Republic in 1986 (Choudrey et al., 2007; Cooper, 2000; 
Cox & Flin, 1998; Gherardi, Nicolini & Odella, 1998; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Pidgeon, 
1998). One of the earliest definitions of safety culture was drafted by the International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG, 1991, p1); "Safety culture is that assembly of 
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as 
an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance". This statement was comprised of both structural and attitudinal 
components, and contained organisational and individual connotations, all of which have 
endured through many of the later definitions of safety culture.  
 
Subsequent research in other major hazard industries such as oil/gas and aviation gave 
rise to further definitions of safety culture. Shared beliefs and attitudes (Cox & Cox, 
1991) as well as shared perceptions (Cooper & Phillips, 1994) were included within many 
definitions, while others have included the presence of underlying assumptions (Edwards 
et al., 2013), and their associated practices which underpin beliefs about danger and 
safety (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000).  The addition of practices (Silbey, 2009) and safety 
behaviour (Lee, 1996) to safety culture definitions reveals the assumption that this 
concept can be observed in employee's patterns of behaviour and thus can become 
tangible and observable (INSAG, 1991). However, Silbey (2009) cautioned that 
definitions which include behavioural emphases might be erroneously used by 
management to focus the attention on frontline workers. Silbey (2009) argued that this 
focus may be misplaced given the relative lack of authority and influence over process 
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safety issues that frontline staff have; rather this is potentially self-serving on the part of 
management.  
 
The influence of process safety issues were acknowledged in some definitions of safety 
culture which referred to the influence of the work organisation, policy and practices on 
perceptions (Cabrera et al., 1997; Niskanen, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1993) and highlighted 
the importance of the organisationally driven context in which employees developed 
safety attitudes and in which safety behaviours were promoted (Grabowski et al., 2010). 
These definitions might be categorised as relating to normative beliefs as they focus on 
how people think and behave in relation to safety and risk (Cooper, 2000), but also 
reflect interpretive aspects in relation to how these beliefs are reciprocally created by 
group members (Hale, 2000).  
 
The variety of foci within definitions of safety culture has given rise to confusion 
surrounding what safety culture encompasses, and what it does not. Some definitions 
are so broad that they become almost universal; for example, where "safety is regarded 
by everyone as being an issue that concerns everyone" (Choudrey et al., 2007, p 1003) 
or "the way we do things around here". When considering the breadth of safety culture 
definitions, Guldenmund (2000) and Weigmann et al. (2004) identified some common 
areas, including the view that culture was an abstract concept, was stable, was shared 
by groups and was multi-dimensional.  Weigmann et al. (2004) added that safety culture 
is affected by, and affects, both employee behaviour and the formal safety structure, is 
manifested in employee practices in the workplace and is often reflected in the 
relationship between reward systems (either formal or informal) and safety performance, 
as well as the organisation's willingness to learn from adverse events. Although 
numerous definitions of safety culture have attempted to link culture to tangible variables, 
Lee and Harrison (2000) posit that the intangibility of the concept might in fact negate 
attempts to capture it in a definition.  
 
2.3.3 Safety Climate 
Safety climate has been defined by various authors as "a summary of molar perceptions 
that employees share about their work environment" (Zohar, 1980 p96), the "perceived 
quality of an organisation's internal environment', (Glendon & Stanton, 2000 p198), and 
the shared perceptions of policies and practices related to workplace safety (Neal & 
Griffin, 2006). Others have defined the term more loosely as a 'snapshot' of the state of 
safety (Flin et al., 2000) or the visible manifestations of the culture of the organisation 
(O'Conner et al., 2011b).  Weigmann et al. (2004) suggested that the definitions of safety 
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climate found in the literature have achieved some degree of commonality, namely that 
safety climate was: 
i. A psychological phenomenon relating to perceptions of the state of safety at a 
point in time, 
ii. Reciprocally affected by situational and environmental factors, 
iii. A more unstable and temporary phenomenon than culture.  
 
Safety climate has evidenced a longer research tradition than has safety culture; Dov 
Zohar conducted seminal quantitative work in the 1980's into safety climate on which 
much of the modern safety climate/culture literature is based.  Zohar (1980) suggested 
that the importance of the concept of safety climate lay in the fact that it served as a 
frame of reference for guiding safety behaviour, being shaped in turn by cues in the work 
environment.  
2.3.4 Summary: Integration of Safety Culture and Climate 
The paradigm wars described in Section 2.2 (Denison, 1996) have had long lasting 
effects on how organisational culture and climate have been conceptualised.  However, 
the more contemporary view is that the differences between culture and climate are in 
interpretation, rather than phenomenon (Denison, 1996). Indeed, the proposition has 
been made that the differences might be more apparent than real and that integration of 
the concepts might best serve the study of organisational contexts (Askanasy, Wilderom 
& Peterson, 2000; Denison, 1996; Schein, 2010; Schenider et al., 2017). Advocates of 
this integrated view have described culture as that which underpins climate (Williamson 
et al., 1997), with climate being the surface manifestation of the underlying culture 
(Guldenmund, 2000; Lofquist et al., 2011; Schein, 2010). Olive, O'Conner and Mannan 
(2006) referred to safety climate as the structural/socio-technical context on which 
culture persists, and culture as a stable and abstract concept. It follows, then, that 
climate has been suggested to be easier to influence in terms of safety improvement 
strategies (Nielson, 2014).  
 
Both the safety culture and climate concepts have been described as multi-layered and 
multi-dimensional (Pettigrew, 1990; Reichers & Schneider, 1990), and both deal with the 
ways in which employees make sense of the organisational environment (Reichers & 
Schneider, 1990). Furthermore, both have been used to understand psychological 
phenomena and behaviour within organisations (Chatman & O'Reilly, 2016), notably 
socialisation processes, team processes and leadership. The effects of these are widely 
viewed as central to shaping both climate and culture (Schneider et al., 2017).  From this 
integrated perspective, culture is a more global and encompassing concept than climate 
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(Denison, 1996; Jung et al., 2009), with culture conceptualised at the organisational level 
and climate at the individual or group level (Harvey et al., 2002). 
 
Based on the evidence presented above, the conceptualisation of safety culture and 
climate as two interpretations of the same phenomenon (in line with Guldenmund, 
2010a; Schnieder et al., 2017) was adopted in this thesis. Culture was conceptualised as 
a deeper, harder to access facet, while climate was considered to be that which was 
more easily observable and amenable to quantitative measurement. While this 
interpretation was utilised throughout this thesis in the empirical and discussion chapters, 
this is not the view of all researchers cited therein. Therefore, where literature was cited, 
the authors' original use of the terms safety culture/climate was maintained; where these 
diverged from the interpretation used in this thesis, this was highlighted.  
 
Although there is a large body of safety culture and climate literature, the theoretical 
development of the field remains poor (Guldenmund, 2000; Kim & Wang, 2009). Much of 
the research has attempted to identify the various dimensions of safety climate (which 
are described in Section 2.5), however no stable model showing the relationships of 
these dimensions exists (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). To explore this further, the following 
section outlined some of the existing theoretical models of safety culture.  
2.4 Models of Safety Culture  
2.4.1 'Levels of Culture' 
Edgar Schein's multi-level conceptualisation of organisational culture (Schein, 1990; 
2010) provided the basis for many later models of safety culture (e.g. Glendon & 
Stanton’s & Guldenmund's models) and so merits mention here. Schein's model (1990, 
2010) contained three layers, each of which differed according to (i) how easily they 
could be observed and deciphered (ii) what they might say about the organisation and 
(iii) how they might be observed or measured.  The first of these levels was that of 
artefacts; easily observable within the organisation, these were said to have included 
physical layout, dress code, formal management structure, as well as documentary 
evidence such as mission statements. Schein (2010) sited organisational climate at the 
level of artefacts and suggested that the best way to interpret these artefacts was for the 
researcher to live and work amongst the group for some time, during which the meaning 
of the artefacts might become clear. In the absence of this he suggested that speaking to 
employees and considering the day-to-day operating procedures which guide their 





Espoused beliefs and values, characterised as relating to what the organisations 'says' it 
does, was said to be potentially accessed through a combination of interviews, 
questionnaires and observations (Schein, 2010). Akin to the innermost core of an onion, 
Schein's final layer was that of underlying assumptions, the most difficult to access. 
These, he proposed, were the unconscious processes which underpinned perceptions 
and attitudes, and therefore may reflect the culture. Schein further described the 
underlying assumptions as being taken for granted, thus not being immediately apparent 
to insiders (Schein, 2010). Johnson (1992) suggested that these underlying assumptions 
were likely to evolve over time, potentially being more obvious to outsiders than those 
within the organisation. 
Guldenmund's 'Levels of Culture' 
Guldenmund (2000) adapted Schein's layered model in relation to safety culture and 
described the outer layer (Schein's artefacts) as being characterised by posters, 
personal protective equipment (PPE), accidents or near misses and safety behaviour. 
The middle layer (espoused values/norms) were suggested to manifest as the employee 
attitudes toward the artefacts such as hardware (e.g. PPE), software (e.g. procedures, 
training), people (e.g. management, supervisors, colleagues) and behaviour (e.g. 
responsibility, safe working). These therefore were said to be determined through 
studying policies, training manuals, accident reports, safety minutes and employee 
attitudes. The innermost layer of basic assumptions, Guldenmund (2000) suggested, 
could only be deduced from the outer two layers, accompanied by observation 
(Guldenmund, 2000).  
 
Cooper (2000) reviewed these layered models of culture and suggested that it was 
sensible to assume that the underlying assumptions of an organisation were reflected in 
policies, structure and control mechanisms and styles of management, and that 
examination of these might provide insight into culture. However, as culture was said to 
be reflected in the innermost basic assumptions i.e. those which are difficult to decipher, 
when utilising this layered model of culture, Cooper (2000) argued that researchers could 
not hope to 'measure' culture. Criticisms of the layered model of safety culture have 
included its simplistic assumption of a linear relationship between the three layers and 
the lack of instruction about how these might affect safety behaviour (Cooper, 2000). 
Glendon and Stanton's 'Levels of Culture' Conceptual Model 
Glendon and Stanton (2000) also utilised Schein's layered model as a basis for their 
conceptual model of safety culture and climate, but added an extra axis of time, reflecting 
36 
 
these author's view that culture is created in the past while climate is measured in the 
present. These additions were held to highlight the need to consider the extent to which 
culture is shared between organisational members (breadth axis) and the fact that 
culture can change over time (past-future axis). Glendon and Stanton (2000) used this 
conceptual model to suggest that climate was a measure/indicator of current (or very 
recent past) culture, but, when administered repeatedly over time, might more strongly 
and accurately represent the underlying culture.  
2.4.2 INSAG's Safety Culture Model  
In their report on safety culture, INSAG (1991) outlined a conceptualisation of what they 
suggested to be the major components of safety culture. At the highest level, safety 
culture was separated into two general components: 
i. The framework within the organisation which reflected the responsibility of the 
management hierarchy (called Management's commitment) and 
ii. The attitude of staff at all levels in relation to this framework (called Individuals' 
commitment).  
 
While these higher-level phenomena were acknowledged to be intangible (INSAG, 
1991), each was sub-divided into a number of areas which themselves represented 
tangible manifestations. These included, for example; qualifications, training, audits, 
attitudes and communication. These could, therefore, be observed through consideration 
of the environment created by local management, the attitudes of employees and the 
actual safety experience within the organisation (Sorensen, 2002). INSAG (1991) listed 
143 questions, or 'safety culture indicators' to encourage self-examination in 
organisations. These questions encompassed the sub-divisions of their proposed model, 
but were more posed to encourage reflection and discussion around pertinent safety 
points, than providing a measure of safety culture per se.  
 
This list of indicators was extensive and embracing, and has been criticised for giving no 
guidance on overall criteria for acceptability nor providing a mechanism to assess culture 
(Sorensen, 2002). However, this was never a stated aim of INSAG (1991), rather this 
model was intended to provide nuclear installations with a starting point from which to 
reflect on their own safety.  The relationship between these indicators and improved 
human performance, as well as organisational safety performance, was at this point 
assumed by INSAG. However more recent research has sought to clarify these 
relationships (see Section 2.7 for an outline of empirical investigations into the 
relationship between safety culture/climate and outcome measures), with some degree 
of success.  
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2.4.3 Cooper's Reciprocal Determinism Model 
Cooper (2000) proposed his reciprocal determinism model which was based on prior 
work on goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990) and the work of Bandura (1986). 
The reciprocal determinism model was based on Cooper's assertion that safety culture 
might be created or enhanced through the deliberate goal-directed manipulation of 
organisational variables which were thought to affect safety management practices. If 
safety culture was visualised as the super-ordinate goal, therefore, sub-goals could be 
created to direct employee attention and actions to the management of safety (Cooper, 
2000).  However, this view might be criticised for being over deterministic, underplaying 
the inherent complexity of organisations and cultures, and resting upon the capacity to 
identify suitable goals that employees support.  
 
Cooper's model (shown in Figure 2) was said to have reflected a holistic and dynamic 
approach to the consideration of safety within an organisation, reflecting thinking within 
the human factors domain. In this model, Cooper (2000) stated that a reciprocal 
relationship between the person, the job (or task) they perform, and the situation 
(context) existed.   Each aspect of the model was proposed to affect the remaining two 
aspects, however Cooper (2000) cautioned that this may not occur simultaneously, so 
should not be interpreted as static in its causality. Cooper's (2000 p118) definition of 
culture reflected the main aspects of the model shown in Figure 2 as being "reflected in 
the dynamic reciprocal relationships between members' perceptions about, and attitudes 
towards, the operationalisation of organisational goals; members' day-to-day goal 
directed behaviour; and the presence and quality of the organisation's systems and sub-






























Figure 2. Reciprocal safety culture model (adapted from Cooper, 2000). 
 
Cooper (2000) claimed that the strengths of the reciprocal safety culture model were that 
it supported a triangulated measurement methodology for multi-level analysis, that it 
allowed a multi-faceted view of safety culture and that it represented an integrated way of 
thinking about the processes that impact on safety culture. A key tenet of this model was 
that to effect change, each of the different factors should be considered; trying to change 
attitudes with no requisite change in organisational systems or ignoring the effect that 
change initiatives may have on people's attitudes or behaviours was said to be likely to 
fail (Cooper, 2000). 
 
This model has been influential in studies developing behavioural measures of safety 
culture (such as the Safety Organising Scale, Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), known broadly as 
behavioural based safety (BBS). Unlike previous safety culture models, Cooper's 
reciprocal determinism model has received some empirical support. Fernandez-Muniz et 
al. (2007) interpreted Cooper's model as identifying management's commitment to safety 
(person), employee involvement (behaviour) and policies and procedures (situation) as 
being mutually dependant. Using a multi-dimensional questionnaire, including measures 
of safety climate, self-reported injuries, lost time and motivation, these authors attempted 
to test the nature of the relationship between the elements of the model. Management 
commitment was found to have a significant, direct and positive influence on both 
employee involvement and the safety management system (SMS) whilst the SMS 
significantly influenced employee involvement. The SMS and employee involvement 
were found to have a significant impact on safety performance (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 
2007).  
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Utilising Cooper's model, it is reasonable to suggest that accident prevention might be 
achieved through attitude modification (person/safety climate domain) through behaviour 
modification (behaviour domain) or through structural modification (situation/SMS 
domain). In a meta-analysis of intervention studies using a range of these measures, 
Lund and Aaro (2004) concluded that behaviour modification programmes showed mixed 
results; those aimed at a single behaviour were more effective, as were studies using 
rewards. Changes to structural/situational factors were seen to be most effective with 
regard to influencing behaviour, with regulation, product modification and enforcement 
having a generally strong positive effect on reducing accidents and injuries (Lund & Aaro, 
2007).  
 
The reciprocal nature of the model was not, however empirically supported, as 
behavioural modification (behaviour) was often not accompanied by changes in attitude 
(person) and changes to the situation sometimes negated the behavioural element by 
directly influencing the risk situation (Lund & Aaro, 2007). Cooper's (2000) reciprocal 
model of safety culture has therefore received some empirical support for the person (i.e. 
safety climate) and behaviour sections of the model. However, criticisms of Cooper’s 
(2000) model have related to the resource intensive nature of the behavioural 
observation aspect (Anderson, 2005) and the tendency to focus on behavioural aspects 
to the detriment of (less easily observable) process factors. Indeed, numerous elements 
in complex socio-technical environments do not lend themselves to observation, 
potentially limiting the application of Cooper's model of safety culture.  
2.4.4 Grote and Kunzler's Socio-Technical Model 
Grote and Kunzler (2000) criticised safety culture models for a lack of integration with 
general models of organisations, and lacking a connection between safety-related and 
more general aspects such as job and organisation design. By separating safety from the 
rest of the organisation's functions, these authors argued that important influences on 
safety would be ignored. Grote and Kunzler (2000) therefore proposed a socio-technical 
model of safety culture that they claimed linked safety management and safety culture 
with more general organisational design. The socio-technical model suggested that there 
were various material characteristics of the organisation (such as ways of integrating 
safety into organisational structures and processes) and immaterial, intangible 
characteristics such as norms, values and beliefs.   
 
Many of the concepts articulated in Grote and Kunzler’s model appear to have been 
drawn from Schein's (1990) early work; the material characteristics (which are visible and 
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difficult to decipher) were akin to Schein's (1990) artefacts and Grote and Kunzler's 
(2000) value consciousness/norms are akin to the underlying assumptions (i.e. hidden 
and taken for granted).  In an attempt to support this model empirically Grote and 
Kunzler (2000) developed a questionnaire, utilised in conjunction with interviews and 
workplace observations, to analyse safety management and safety culture. The 
questionnaire contained items which were very similar to those contained in safety 
climate questionnaires. In conclusion, this model is not markedly dissimilar to Schein's or 
Cooper's models, and has not received any further formal testing. Choudhry et al. (2007) 
criticised the socio-technical model for being schematic, saying it lacked any mechanism 
to improve and assess safety culture. However, arguably the same could be said for 
most of the safety culture models described so far. 
2.4.5 Safety Culture Maturity Models 
Based on Westrum's (2004) typology of cultures (pathological, bureaucratic and 
generative, with Fleming, 2001, later adding reactive and proactive levels), several 
authors (Fleming, 2001; Hudson, 2007; Parker et al., 2006) have proposed that 
organisations might exist on a continuum of safety culture 'maturity' (which equate to a 
continuum of bad to good, expressed in various forms). According to the safety culture 
maturity model organisations should aim to increase their maturity from pathological to 
generative safety culture on a number of different safety dimensions. These dimensions 
have variously included aspects of the SMS (reporting systems, safety audits, work 
organisation), safety climate (attitudes, commitment) and some apparently cultural 
factors (behaviours that get rewarded, who causes accidents) against which the 
organisation is scored on the maturity scale.  The intention of the safety culture maturity 
model was that tools developed using it would be used by employees to generate 
discussion about their organisation's safety culture and would then be provided with a 
'road-map' on how to improve safety (Fleming, 2001).  
 
While intuitively attractive, safety culture maturity models have had very weak empirical 
support.  Lawrie et al. (2006) presented some evidence of the internal consistency of a 
sub-set of seven safety-related categories by forming a questionnaire which reflected the 
safety culture maturity framework. These authors claimed to demonstrate some reliability 
for a sub-set of scales. Furthermore, they suggested that their findings showed some 
discrimination between the highest (generative) and lowest (pathological) maturity levels. 
However, the sample size (59 participants) of this study appeared inappropriate for the 
statistics applied (principle components analysis on over fifty items) and the results are 
decidedly mixed. The authors themselves suggested that, in an industry with some 
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regulation, pathological indicators might already be removed, whilst generative indicators 
might be unrealistic and unattainable (Lawrie et al., 2006). 
 
Filho et al. (2010), tested the concept of a safety culture maturity model in a study based 
in Brazil, and reported high correlations between questionnaires and interviews on a 
sample of 23 people. However, there was little information within the publication 
regarding how this was completed, without which reproducing these findings would be 
challenging. Fleming (2001) cautioned the use of the safety culture maturity model as a 
diagnostic tool until it had been tested empirically, which has not yet been undertaken. 
Beyond creating a focal point for discussion, the utility of this model as a basis for 
understanding safety culture is suggested to be limited to date.  
2.4.6 Reason's Elements of Safety Culture 
When considering the causes of organisational accidents, Reason (1997) identified four 
components that he suggested comprised an 'informed culture', where the organisation 
effectively shares information and actively supports safety. This has often been cited as a 
model of safety culture, although Reason does not directly suggest this himself. These 
components included:  
1. A reporting culture, where people readily report problems, errors and near 
misses.  
2. A just culture, where people are encouraged and supported to provide safety 
related information in a context where acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is made 
clear. 
3. A flexible culture, which can adapt to changes while retaining a safety focus. 
4. A learning culture, where the organisation is willing and able to draw conclusions 
from safety information and uses this knowledge to improve safety. 
 
This model is intuitively appealing, particularly to safety managers, for whom 
management of information in the form of safety reports is often a key aspect of the role. 
This model has subsequently been adopted by numerous organisations such as the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (whose most recent strap-line is 
"NASA safety culture...it's in our DNA"4). However, despite being widely used, this model 
has been criticised for being in many respects underspecified (Cooper, 2000) and is not 
yet empirically supported. This may, in part, be due to how Reason's cultural components 
are defined and their lack of amenability to measurement. While increasingly used in 
accident analyses, Reason's model provides only a narrow focus around organisational 




culture. Reason's model was advocated in the Nimrod Review (Ministry of Defence, 
2009) and was also therefore the basis for the model of safety culture set out by the 
military aviation regulator (Manual of Air Safety, Military Aviation Authority, 2014a) 
described in Chapter 1. 
2.4.7 Summary  
The preceding review of safety culture and climate models revealed that no single model 
appeared to adequately account for the complexity of the concept, nor were any 
sufficiently empirically supported. It was Guldenmund (2000) who described these 
theoretical models as providing direction on the content of safety culture and broad 
categories of interest, rather than forming theoretical models per se. The various safety 
culture models detailed here reflected some agreement in that various workplace factors, 
as well as individual views and shared experiences, are thought to interact in a dynamic 
and complex fashion to influence safety behaviours, which can in turn impact the 
workplace and shared views. Cooper's reciprocal determinism model (2000) appears to 
be the most holistic theoretical model, while Reason's (1997) model is noted to be the 
one most widely cited within an increasing number of accident reports which cite safety 
culture as a causal factor. Schein's multi-layered model of culture is perhaps the most 
reflective of many culture/climate definitions, with artefacts and espoused beliefs being 
congruent with the conceptualisation of safety climate and the underlying assumptions 
congruent with the conceptualisation of safety culture. 
2.5 Dimensions/constructs of Safety Culture and Climate 
Section 2.4 detailed some of the core concepts and constructs around which researchers 
in the safety climate/culture literature appear to agree. Suggestions that safety 
climate/culture is a multi-dimensional phenomenon (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000) 
have consistently been supported through the development of multi-dimensional safety 
culture/climate scales, as well as through identification of various themes and constructs 
in the qualitative safety literature. However, despite considerable research there is, as 
yet, no conclusive answer to Flin et al.'s (2000) question as to whether these dimensions 
are generic features of safety culture, or should be considered context-specific.  
 
The following section outlined findings from both quantitative and qualitative studies of 
safety culture and climate to explore which dimensions or constructs they may be 
comprised of. It should be noted that the following section refers to both culture and 
climate in the context of how the original authors have applied the terms. Where authors 
have specifically addressed either, this will be stated.  The methods used to gather 
quantitative and qualitative data are considerably different, and so it is difficult to directly 
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compare results from qualitative and quantitative studies. There are several key reviews 
which have considered the similarities and differences arising from the numerous 
quantitative safety culture or climate tools (such as Choudrey et al., 2007; Clarke, 2000; 
Farrington-Darby et al., 2005; Flin et al., 2000; O'Conner et al., 2011b; Seo et al., 2004; 
Weigmann et al., 2004). These reviews have not typically included any qualitative 
studies. Therefore, the current review attempted to address this shortcoming by not only 
considering quantitative research findings (Table 1) but also results from qualitative 
research (see Table 3). In addition, a number of studies which proposed safety culture 
dimensions derived from observations of high reliability organisations (HROs) were 
critiqued as well (see Table 4). 
2.5.1 Quantitative  
Early quantitative studies predominately considered safety climate, although some 
contemporary studies also describe the use of quantitative measures of safety culture.  
Studies of safety climate, predominately taking a positivist orientation, often focused on 
trying to capture a universal set of dimensions or constructs. Zohar's (1980) safety 
climate questionnaire was the first of its kind; the forty items were based on a review of 
safety literature. Subsequent analysis of these items revealed eight safety climate 
dimensions; training programmes, management attitudes toward safety, effect of safe 
behaviour on promotion and social status, perceived risk at the workplace, effects of 
work pace and status of the safety officer and safety committees (Zohar, 1980). Zohar's 
work formed the basis for a number of subsequent safety climate measures, such as the 
NOSACQ-50 (Kines et al., 2011) and the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (Sexton et al., 
2006). Attempts to replicate Zohar's (1980) dimensions have, however, met with limited 
success (Brown & Holmes,1986; Coyle et al., 1995; Glennon, 1982).  
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Table 1.  
Summary of common safety culture/climate dimensions identified in systematic reviews. 
Authors Notes Dimensions/categories 
Flin et al. 
(2000) 
Meta-analysis of 18 safety climate 
surveys, in which 100 dimensions 
were thematically analysed; this 
led to a small number of common 






Clarke (2000) Review of 16 safety climate/culture 
studies (many of which were 
common with Flin et al., 2000). 
Work task/work environment 
Personal involvement and 
responsibility 
Management attitudes 
Safety management system 
Management actions  
Weigmann et 
al. (2004) 
Review of safety culture literature 
up to 2004, refers to 
'organisational indicators' of safety 







Seo et al., 
(2004) 
Systematic review of 16 safety 
culture/climate studies to inform 









Darby et al. 
(2005) 




Individual and behavioural factors 
Reporting systems 





Literature review for construction 
safety; authors suggest that 
positive safety culture comprised 
of these components. 
Management commitment to 
safety 
Management concerns for the 
workforce 
Mutual trust and credibility  
Workforce empowerment 




Review of commercial and military 











After a thematic analysis of over one hundred dimensions identified in eighteen safety 
culture studies, Flin et al. (2000) reported a reduced set of thirty-five dimensions. Of 
these, they identified five as occurring in more than one third of the studies (see Table 1). 
In parallel, Clarke (2000) reviewed many of the same studies as Flin et al. (2000), but 
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reported some additional 'core' dimensions to Flin et al., including work task/work 
environment and personal involvement /responsibility (Table 1). 
 
Weigmann et al. (2004) summarised five 'global' components or indicators of safety 
culture. However, uniquely, this review also identified dimensions of organisational 
commitment, reward systems and reporting systems. Seo et al.'s (2004) review 
highlighted five common dimensions, of which employee participation had not been 
previously identified as a core component. Additional core dimensions were then added 
in 2005 by Farrington-Darby et al., including communication, rules procedures and 
supervisor relationship with subordinates (see Table 1). Choudrey et al.'s (2007) review 
cited mutual trust and credibility as well as continuous monitoring and corrective action 
as core dimensions while finally, O'Conner et al. (2011b) reported operational personnel, 
resources and training/education as core dimensions not previously been made explicit 
in previous reviews (Table 1).   
 
Each of the seven studies summarised in Table 1 reviewed a similar literature base, 
however each proposed at least one unique dimension.  To some degree this may be 
attributable to differences in the method and focus of each; Flin et al. (2000) thematically 
analysed their reviewed dimensions, while the remainder of the studies shown in Table 1 
identified core dimensions by the frequency with which they were identified. The later 
reviews would also inevitably have drawn from a greater number of studies than earlier 
reviews. Some of the differences may further be down to interpretation of the 
dimensions, which were not always uniformly described within source studies 
(Guldenmund, 2000). It is interesting to note, however, the variety in 'core' concepts 
which have been identified across the systematic reviews. The dimensions that were 
identified across multiple reviews included: 
• Management/supervision 
• Safety management system 
• Pressure 
• Hazard or risk level 
• Communication 
• Procedures/rules.  
 
This may indicate that there are likely to be some dimensions of safety culture/climate 
which reflect commonality across a variety of sectors and organisations. However, 
beyond these, there were a notable array of dimensions identified that did not fall into the 
common dimensions detailed above; these are summarised in Table 2. Where 




Table 2.  
Summary of unique/uncommon safety culture/climate dimensions identified in systematic 
reviews. 
Authors Cited authors-organisational sector Dimensions/categories 
Flin et al. 
(2000) 
Lee (1998)-nuclear reprocessing 
 
Cox and Cox (1991)-gas company 
 
Rundmo (1992, 1994)-oil company 
 
Mearns et al. (1997)-offshore oil and 
gas 
Zohar (1980)-manufacturing 
Williamson et al. (1997)- manufacturing 












Clarke (2000) Donald & Canter (1994)-chemical 
processing 
Alexander, Cox & Cheyne (1994)-
offshore oil and gas 
Mearns et al. (1998)- offshore oil and 
gas 
Lee (1998)-nuclear 
Passive and active safety 
behaviour 
Conflict and control 
Overconfidence in own safety 
Personal interest and 
satisfaction with job 
Personal authority 
Seo et al. 
(2004) 




O'Toole (2002)-not described 
Satisfaction with salary 
General morale 
Job insecurity 
Risks of multi-skilling 
Drugs and alcohol 
Emergency response 
Off the job safety 
O'Conner et 
al. (2011b) 
Gibbons et al. (2006)-civil aviation   
 
Ek & Akselsson (2007)-civil aviation, 
ground handlers 
Patankar (2003)-civil aviation 
 
 
Gill & Shergill (2004)-civil aviation 
 
Desai et al. (2006)-military aviation 









Command and control 
 
2.5.2 Qualitative  
Only six qualitative studies of safety culture were identified in the literature; the results of 
which are summarised in Table 3. Some similarities between some of the 
elements/dimensions/themes identified in Table 3 and those in Tables 1 and 2 can be 
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seen. These included the safety systems, fatalism, responsibility for safety, trade-off 
between productivity and safety, communication and the work environment.   
 
Table 3. 
Summary of safety culture/climate dimensions identified in qualitative research. 
Authors Study type/population Elements/dimensions/themes 
Brooks 
(2005) 
Ten-week ethnographic study 
of safety management in 
Australian commercial lobster 
fishing industry.  
Safety procedures, policies and safety 
equipment 
Physical risks and injuries 
Role and status in social organisation 
Workplaces as transactional 
environments 
Adapting to external environments 
Power 
Group boundaries 




Existence of safety culture 
Walker 
(2010) 
Two-year ethnographic study 
of grain processing 
organisation. 
Fatalism/danger/injury 





Effects of formal accountability 
Szymczak 
(2014) 
Two-year ethnographic study 
of a hospital's experience of 
implementing a patient safety 
program. 
Culture as individual behaviour 
Culture as talk of obfuscation  






Focus group interview study 
of employees in steel 
manufacturing organisation, 
using thematic analysis. 
Acceptance of risks  
Danger tolerance 
Fatalistic beliefs 
Individual responsibility for safety  
Low company commitment 





Importance of communication  
Thinking about safety 
Collaboration between colleagues 
Reporting incidents 










with twenty employees of gas 
distribution organisation, 
using discourse analysis. 
Group relationship with organisation's 
safety policy 
Perceptions of rules 
Perceptions of risk 
Perceptions of safety policy 
Perceptions of what a 'good gasman' is 





Interviews with thirty-eight 
senior UK railway 
representatives and 
interviews/focus groups with 




The Performance Regime 





Homogeneity of culture  
 
2.5.3 Theorised Dimensions 
There have been numerous attempts to define the features of a good/positive safety 
culture (summarised in Table 4). These have typically come from studies of either high 
reliability organisations (HROs) such as air traffic control, military aircraft carrier 
operations, or from reviews of organisational preconditions to accidents. INSAG (1991) 
was one of the first to propose 'universal features' of safety culture based on HROs. 
These components included individual awareness, knowledge and competence, 
commitment, motivation, supervision and responsibility.  Pidgeon and O'Leary (2000) 
further suggested that a 'good' safety culture might be promoted by senior management 
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commitment to safety, shared concern and care about hazards, realistic norms and rules 
about hazards and organisational learning through monitoring, analysis and feedback. 
Hale's (2000) description of elements required for a good safety culture are similar and 
included commitment to the importance of safety, worker involvement at all levels, the 
role of the safety staff, caring trust (employees actively look out for each other), 
openness in communication, belief in safety improvements and integration of safety into 
the organisation.  
 
Table 4. 
Summary of theorised safety culture/climate dimensions.  
Authors Notes Dimensions/categories 
INSAG 
(1991) 
Suggested 'universal features' 
derived from observations of high 
reliability organisations. 
Individual awareness 







HS(G) 65  - the HSE's 'core 
elements'  for managing effective 
health and safety. This formed the 
basis of thinking for the HSE safety 
climate tool development. 







Commentary on special issue on 
safety culture, included his elements 
for a good safety culture. 
The importance given to safety as a 
goal 
Aspects of safety and priority given to 
these 
Involvement of all parties  
Creative mistrust in the risk control 
system 
Caring trust of each other 
Openness of communication 
Safety is not just down to individuals 





Examining safety culture from the 
perspective of organisational 
accident investigation, a 'good' 
safety culture was reflected by four 
facets. 
Senior management commitment 
Shared care and concern for hazards 




It is notable that many of the dimensions detailed in Table 4 are similar to those 
contained in Table 1 and Table 2. Many of the theorised dimensions that comprise a 
'good' safety culture are reflected across commonly identified safety climate dimensions 
(Table 1), with management, leadership, risk, competence and worker involvement 
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appearing key to both empirically derived and theorised models. The challenge with 
defining a 'good' safety culture as those characteristics which are displayed by HROs 
(such as several of those in Table 4) is that this becomes seen as an ideal to strive for, 
which once achieved, will guarantee future safety. However, only a small number of 
organisations at particular points in time have been studied to generate the theorised 
dimensions in Table 4, and whether these conditions can persist through an 
organisation's lifecycle is as yet unknown (Boin & Schulman, 2008). Furthermore, these 
characteristics have not been definitively tied to the reliability of performance of the 
organisation (Boin & Schulman, 2008) and the role that these play in creating safety is 
therefore poorly defined. 
2.5.4 Summary  
Quantitative research (Section 2.5.1) has shown some degree of consistency in findings 
and these show particular overlap with the dimensions proposed from the HRO-derived 
elements (Section 2.5.3). Findings from qualitative safety culture research (Section 2.5.2) 
have revealed limited dimensions in common with the quantitative/theoretical 
perspectives in relation to: 
 
• Hazard or risk level; danger/injury (Walker 2010), acceptance of risks (Nordloff et 
al., 2015), perceptions of risk (Blazsin & Guldenmund, 2015) and allocation of 
responsibility for risk (Szymczak, 2014). 
• Management/supervision; low company commitment and management 
expectations (Nordloff et al., 2015) and resistance to authority (Walker 2010). 
• Communication; workplaces as transactional environments (Brooks, 2005), 
importance of communication (Nordloff et al., 2015). 
• Pressure; adapting to external environments (Brooks, 2005), trade-off between 
productivity and safety (Nordloff et al., 2015) and relationship between time and safety 
(Blazsin & Guldenmund, 2015). 
• Safety management system; group relationship with the organisation's safety 
policy (Blazsin & Guldenmund, 2015). 
 
However, there remains a high degree of variability across studies with respect to the 
additional dimensions which have been identified (see Table 2). Cox and Cox (1991) 
concluded that differences in the breadth and depth of coverage, variations in researcher 
judgement of item wording/selection and cross-cultural/inter-industry variations were 
such that striving for a universal structure was unlikely to succeed. The lack of stability of 
factor structures in climate measures might also suggest that constructs are prone to 
vary between study populations which exist in different regulatory, structural and socio-
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technical contexts (Jeffcott et al., 2006; Reiman & Rollenhangen, 2011). Indeed, while it 
may be that some aspects are common across industries, this does not suggest that 
these are the only dimensions which must be measured as this may result in important 
'local' issues being neglected (Jeffcott et al., 2006). 
 
2.6 Safety Culture/Climate in Aviation or Military Populations 
As there were relatively few published articles in the area of military safety 
culture/climate research the review was broadened to encompass civil aviation studies 
as well.  
2.6.1 Military Aviation  
Command Safety Assessment Survey (CSAS) and Maintenance Climate Assessment 
Survey (MCAS) 
In 1996, the United States (US) Navy, in response to a spate of naval aircraft accidents, 
began work on ways to measure safety culture to afford insight into why these accidents 
were happening. From this early research (Baker, 1998) two measures were developed, 
the CSAS and the MCAS. The former was designed for pilots and the latter for 
maintenance personnel, with both still in use by the US Navy today. These surveys were 
originally based on a theoretical Model of Organisational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) 
that identified five areas as important in managing risk and reducing accidents in high 
risk organisations (O'Conner et al., 2011a). These included process auditing (checks to 
identify hazards and correct safety issues), reward system (expected social rewards and 
disciplinary actions), quality control (policy and procedures to promote high quality work), 
risk (identify hazards and control operational risk) and command and control (safety 
climate, leadership effectiveness, safety management policies).  
 
Baker (1998) used cluster and factor analysis to determine whether the sixty-seven item 
MCAS clustered according to the five original MOSE components. The factor analysis 
did not support the original categories, and the survey was reduced to 35 items; further 
independent testing of the MCAS has subsequently revealed inconsistent results.  
Stanley (2000) proposed that although an analysis revealed only one factor, each of the 
MOSE categories was represented within it. However, Brittingham (2006) subsequently 





Two published studies have used the CSAS for measuring safety climate; Gaba et al. 
(2003) compared responses of health care professionals (completing the patient safety 
culture in healthcare organisation, PSYCHO measure) and naval aviators (completing 
the CSAS), on aggregated responses to twenty-three items which partially overlapped 
(the PSYCHO was partly adapted from the CSAS). Gaba et al. (2003) identified 
differences between the two populations however, these authors did not aim to 
determine the psychometric properties of the twenty-three items and treated each item 
as independent, therefore the results should be interpreted with caution (Oppenhiem, 
1992). 
 
More recently, Desai et al. (2006) aggregated all sixty-one items from the CSAS into a 
single measure of safety climate, and used this to explore relationships with Navy 
mishaps. Limited evidence was found that results from the CSAS related to mishaps 
(safety incidents). Buttrey et al. (2010), aimed to establish the construct validity of the 
CSAS, but found that they could not replicate a stable factor structure using the original 
components, and therefore questioned the validity of the CSAS. High levels of non-
random variance were posited as possible reasons for this lack of replication, potentially 
arising from the fact that participation in the survey was mandatory rather than voluntary. 
Of the original CSAS items, O'Conner et al. (2011b) retained only twelve items within two 
factors, personnel leadership and availability of resources.  
 
On balance, few of the latter investigations of the MCAS and CSAS have shown support 
for the psychometric robustness of either tool. The online portal for these tools suggests 
that validation work has been conducted in relation to US Navy mishaps. However, this 
validation has not benefitted from peer-reviewed publication and rests on correlations 
between survey results and accident rates, the highest of which was -0.175 (Schimpf, 
2004).  
Australian Defence Force Aviation Questionnaire  
In an unpublished PhD thesis, Falconer (2006a) reviewed an attitude questionnaire, the 
Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ), which was adapted for the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF). Falconer (2006a) argued that this measure was not 
applicable to a military population as it was developed based on a sample of civilian 
pilots. Based on a synthesis of existing research on organisational behaviour, culture and 
human factors, Falconer (2006a) proposed a new forty-five item survey based on four a 
priori themes - military efficiency, organisational confidence, adaptive focus and safety 
perception. Falconer's thesis did not explore the factor structure of the survey, although 
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the a priori themes displayed some internal consistency. No published studies could be 
found which used the questionnaire detailed in Falconer's thesis.  
 
The lack of empirical evidence to support either the reliability or validity of any of these 
military aviation based safety climate tools dissuaded use of either within the current 
study, although individual items were considered for inclusion in development of the tool 
detailed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
2.6.2 Civilian Aviation  
Diaz and Cabrera (1997) developed an organisational safety climate questionnaire 
(based on items from existing questionnaires) under five dimensions; strategy/company 
policy toward safety, company philosophy, individual/group attitude, 
supervisors/management and level of risk/safety. A principle components analysis of data 
from three aviation-related organisations resulted in six components; company policy, 
productivity vs safety, group attitudes, prevention strategies, and perceived safety levels.  
Besides an overall consistency (Cronbach alpha) of 0.93, these authors did not detail 
either the items on each dimension or the psychometric properties of each scale.  
 
McDonald et al. (2000) adapted the safety climate scale developed by Diaz and Cabrera 
(1997), subjecting the original items to factor analysis and item reduction. McDonald et 
al. (2000) compared different companies and functional groups on mean scale ratings 
and reported significant differences between groups. Despite the presence of significant 
differences, however, it was noted that the group sizes varied considerably (334 in one 
group and 29 in another, for example) and safety climate was considered here to be a 
one-dimensional scale. Neither the factor analysis nor detail of the items were reported 
by McDonald et al. (2000), restricting further critique.  
 
Patankar (2003) created the Organisational Safety Culture (OSC) questionnaire, based 
on items and dimensions from several existing questionnaires. These included the 
Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ), the Maintenance Resource 
Management/Technical Operations Questionnaire (MRM/TOQ), and the CSAS 
(discussed above in Section 2.6.1.1). Subsequent factor analysis identified eight scales; 
pride in company, professionalism, safety, supervisor trust and safety, effects of stress, 
need to speak up, safety compliance and hazard communication (Patankar, 2003). The 
lack of detail regarding the output of this factor analysis made it difficult to critique the 
psychometric underpinning of this scale, but Pantankar (2003) did use the constituent 




Gibbons et al. (2006) created a database of over 1000 items from safety climate 
questionnaires to develop their 81-item Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS). 
Based on their judgement these authors clustered these items into five dimensions; 
organisational commitment, management involvement, reward/accountability, pilot 
empowerment and reporting systems. However, Gibbons et al. (2006) were unable to 
demonstrate adequate model fit indices and suggested that conceptual overlap between 
the various scales was to blame.  
 
Evans, Glendon and Creed (2007) developed the Aviation Safety Climate scale using a 
two-step process. Firstly, a literature review produced several safety themes which were 
then ranked by ten aviation safety experts in order of importance. Evans et al. (2007) did 
not detail how many themes were initially included, nor how (or if) agreement between 
the safety experts was determined. Six themes were taken forward into the 
questionnaire; management commitment, communication, rules/procedures, 
shifts/schedules, training, and equipment/maintenance. Secondly, items from other 
safety climate tools were then matched to these safety themes. A subsequent exploratory 
factor analysis resulted in a three-factor structure; management commitment and 
communication (10 items), safety training and equipment (4 items) and maintenance (4 
items). This three-factor model was then subjected to a confirmatory factor analysis, 
initially returning a poor model fit. Iterative re-specification of the model did, however, 
result in an acceptable model fit. The scale was therefore considered as one of the more 
psychometrically robust safety climate questionnaires, however the authors did suggest 
caution in the use of it due to the exclusion of factors such as safety policy, 
rules/regulations and work pressure. Furthermore the top-down methodology employed 
during the development of the questionnaire meant that one could not  judge the 
relevance of the proposed themes to the individuals completing the questionnaires, nor 
determine whether there may be other important factors which were not identified by the 
researchers.  
 
In a recent meta-analysis of twenty-three aviation safety climate studies (including many 
of those studies discussed above), O'Conner et al. (2011b) concluded that quality of 
management and supervision represented the only unifying theme across all studies. 
Beyond this they cited safety systems, procedures/rules, training/education, risk, 
communication, resources and operations personnel as additional themes which were 
common across many studies. These findings were broadly in line with research from 
other sectors, however, the lack of convergence on a common set of constructs, even 
within this single sector, was noted (O'Connor et al., 2011).   
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2.6.3 Summary and Implications for Current Research 
The preceding sections have outlined a variety of safety culture/climate dimensions that 
were identified across a number of sectors, and then specifically focused on military and 
civilian aviation research. Identification of a core set of generic features of safety 
culture/climate through several meta-analyses has resulted in some consensus as to 
features which may be broadly applicable across industries. Use of a core, generic set of 
dimensions is appealing, particularly to safety managers who might want to profile their 
own organisations and then 'benchmark' themselves against others in the form of a 
league table. Inherent in this, however, is the danger that generic approaches may 
remove the richness of understanding and detail to such a degree so as to make any 
output lack utility (Guldenmund, 2007; Walker, 2010); one size may not fit all.  
 
The evidence of factor structures which are unstable and vary both across and within 
industries (Cox & Flin, 1998; Pidgeon, 1998, Guldenmund, 2010a) has been 
compounded by a lack of consistency in findings or the approach to their exploitation. 
Some authors have attributed this to methodological issues, including differences in 
applying measures (Guldenmund, 2000), differences in questionnaire design and item 
selection issues (Coyle et al., 1995) and researcher-created bias (Coyle et al., 1995). 
Lee and Harrison (2000) argued that inter-industry differences in structure, purpose and 
activity might render the quest for a generic factor structure premature.   
 
Beyond methodological issues, some authors have proposed that salient constructs are 
prone to vary between study populations (Jeffcott et al., 2006; Weyman et al., 2006) and 
question the existence, or even relevance, of a generic set of defining constructs. 
Waterson et al. (2010) warned against the dangers of too readily generalising about 
safety culture and climate across industries with differing characteristics, forms of 
hierarchy and work practice.  In line with earlier concerns regarding safety culture 
becoming a catch-all concept (Cox & Cox, 1991; Cox & Flin, 1998), the conceptualisation 
of a general 'ideal' model with core concepts arguably does not take into account 
differences in the regulatory, structural, socio-technical and historical architecture within 
which employees operate (Reiman & Rollenhangen, 2011; Weyman et al., 2006). Thus 
generic tools and a fixation with 'core' concepts could be considered to remove the focus 
on safety culture being a contextual phenomenon. This does not sit well with many of the 
safety culture models outlined in Section 2.4 in which context (the work environment) 
was proposed to play a key role.  While it may appear desirable to create a generic tool 
to apply across organisations, Gibbons et al. (2006) warned that this might not be 
possible, or desirable, as safety is likely to be closely tied to the structure of the 




The current review of safety culture and climate literature showed a large variety in 
identified dimensions, particularly when using qualitative methods. These, which have 
taken a 'bottom up' approach to identifying safety culture factors, may arguably provide a 
greater level of contextualisation (Cox & Flin, 1998; Weyman et al., 2006; Reiman & 
Rollenhangen, 2011). While a small number of common 'components' of safety 
culture/climate have been identified across various studies, these might afford only 
limited insight into what factors are important in shaping the safety culture of an 
organisation.   
 
Various tests of the construct, content and concurrent validity (via psychometric testing) 
of safety culture/climate have been undertaken by researchers during measurement 
development, however the evidence of predictive validity also requires attention. For 
organisations to consider allocating resources to collecting information on safety culture 
or climate, it is important to demonstrate that these measures are related to some form of 
organisational safety outcome measure. The following section therefore considered the 
available evidence related to the concepts of safety culture, safety climate and safety 
performance.  
2.7 Safety Culture, Climate and Safety Performance  
The validity of safety culture/climate as leading indicators relies on evidence of the 
relationship between measures of culture/climate and safety performance. Christian et al. 
(2009) suggested that safety performance may refer to either (i) an organisational metric 
for safety outcomes, such as injuries, accidents or incidents per year or (ii) a metric of 
individual safety behaviours. The following sections considered the degree to which 
these relationships have been empirically supported. 
 
Although often considered 'traditional' measures of safety performance, accident and 
incident rates have been described as poor performance indicators because they ignore 
the different levels of risk associated with certain tasks, they suffer from both under and 
over reporting, are not sensitive enough to show quick changes over time (Choudrey et 
al., 2007) and are highly chance related. Known as lagging, reactive or downstream 
indicators, accidents/incidents arguably reflect levels of system failure. In many aviation 
organisations, the low numbers of occurrences have meant that the utility of these as 
indicators of safety has been limited (O'Conner et al., 2011a). Many authors (such as 
Choudrey et al., 2007; Cooper, 2000; Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Flin et al., 2000; O'Conner 
et al., 2011a) have recommended  use of safety culture or climate measures as leading 
(or proactive, upstream) indicators, in addition to monitoring of lagging indicators. The 
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Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2006) defined leading indicators as measures of 
process or inputs which were vital to delivering desired safety outcomes. Leading 
indicators have been postulated to rely on current safety activities to determine the 
success of the safety management system and could, therefore, be said to reflect its 
functioning (Choudrey et al. 2007). 
2.7.1 Safety Outcomes: Accidents and Incidents  
The safety culture models in Section 2.4 appear to have made the implied assumption 
that a positive safety culture would reduce the occurrence of accidents through its effect 
on safe behaviour (Clarke, 2006). Indeed, the identified presence of safety culture as a 
contributing factor to major accidents implicitly suggests that a 'better' safety culture may 
have helped to avert the accident from occurring. However, the literature contains few 
attempts to link safety culture to safety performance.  In contrast, there are several meta-
analyses which consider the effect of safety climate on safety performance. For this 
reason, the following sections will predominately refer to safety climate, other than where 
cited authors specifically refer to culture.   
Organisational Accidents 
The predictive validity of safety climate to organisational accidents as outcome measures 
has not yet been analysed empirically (Antonsen, 2009b), despite its suggested 
prominence as a causal/contributory factor in major accidents. When one considers the 
rarity, complexity and unpredictability of organisational accidents it is perhaps 
unsurprising that a link between these has not been the focus of much research (Yule et 
al., 2007). Antonsen (2009b) presented a unique, opportunistic case study involving two 
safety culture surveys issued prior, and subsequent to, a very serious incident. The 
author concluded that the initial safety culture survey (which depicted benign results) 
failed to detect the organisational problems later identified in the accident investigation 
and so suggested that this indicated that the survey provided an incomplete view of the 
culture.  
 
These findings should be interpreted with caution; it is perhaps ambitious to assume that 
the views of personnel on their workplace (as gathered during safety culture/climate 
surveys), even when aggregated, could provide the same overall view (in hindsight) of 
organisational functioning as occurs during accident investigations. On the contrary, 
investigators have a broader and deeper view into an organisation than could reasonably 
be expected of any single individual (with the exception perhaps of select senior 
management personnel). Although intuitively appealing (and generally assumed in many 
accident reports), it is perhaps a step too far to expect safety culture/climate surveys to 
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demonstrate predictive validity with organisational accidents. However, there may be 
utility in examining the link between safety climate and the root causes of these 
accidents in future.  
Occupational Accidents 
Occupational accidents have, conversely, received a great deal of attention as outcome 
measures, with several studies having considered the relationship between safety 
climate and accidents/injuries. A summary of findings from these studies is contained in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  
Summary of studies considering relationship between safety climate and 
accidents/injuries. 
p= corrected mean, r=correlation, pe=path estimate, sig= significant, ns=non-significant. 
 
Table 5 shows a number of significant relationships detailed between safety climate and 
safety outcomes (Beus et al., 2010; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Johnson, 2007; Zohar & 
Luria, 2005), although many were typically weak or moderate in strength. Others have 
shown no significant relationship (Johnson, 2007; Mearns et al., 2003). Interestingly, 
when Beus et al. (2010) concluded that injuries were predictive of safety climate (p=-
0.29) to a slightly higher degree than safety climate was predictive of injuries (p= 0.24), 
suggesting that employees may 'recalibrate' their perceptions of organisational safety 
following an injury. Several authors have advised against attempts to use 
accidents/injuries recorded in incidents management systems as outcome measures as 
these often have acknowledged under-reporting (Cooper, 2000; DeJoy 1994; Thompson 
et al., 1998) and the limitation of common method bias (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996).  
Relationship Type Authors Result (sig/ns) 
SC - accidents Cross-sectional  Hofmann & Stetzer (1996) r=-0.61 (sig) 
Cross-sectional Zohar (2000) r= -0.16 (sig) 
Longitudinal Mearns et al. (2003) (ns) 
Meta-analysis Clarke (2006) r=0.22 (sig) 
Meta-analysis Clarke (2010) r=0.14 (sig) 
SC-injury severity Cross-sectional Johnson (2007) r= -0.50 (sig) 
SC-injury frequency Cross-sectional Johnson (2007)  (ns) 
SC-injury Meta-analysis Beus et al. (2010) p=- 0.24 (sig) 
Injury-SC Meta-analysis Beus et al. (2010) p=- 0.29 (sig) 
Safety performance-
accidents 
Meta-analysis Christian et al. (2009) pe=-0.31 (sig) 
SC-safety audit scores Longitudinal  Zohar & Luria (2005) r=0.46 (sig) 
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2.7.2 Safety Behaviour  
In contrast to outcome performance measures such as accidents/incidents, which Beus 
et al. (2010) argue may indicate the absence of safety, employee safety behaviours may 
be more easily observable, and infer the presence of safety. As most accident models 
now attest, an array of organisational factors have been implicated (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 
2000; Reason, 1997; Taylor et al., 2015) and, therefore, a lack of accidents may simply 
indicate that these factors have not yet combined to result in an event. Non-compliance 
with procedures may be routine in organisations where the incident rate is low, yet this 
low incident rate does not mean the organisation is somehow 'safe'. Unsafe behaviour 
(when observable), either volitional or not, is thought to imply a greater likelihood of 
adverse events, and thus an absence of safety (Cooper & Phillips, 2004).  Safety 
behaviours have been separated into several types, including: 
 
1. Safety compliance, which involves carrying out prescribed activities such as 
following procedures (Griffin & Neal, 2000), 
2. Safety participation, which involves voluntary safety related behaviours such as 
helping co-workers (Clarke, 2006), 
3. Safety motivation, which refers to an individuals' willingness to apply effort to 
demonstrate safe behaviour and 
4. Standards of safety knowledge, i.e. knowing how to work safely (Christian et al., 
2009). 
 
Table 6 contains a summary of findings from studies which have considered the 
relationship between safety climate and safety behaviours. This showed that safety 
climate was positively associated with safety behaviour across most studies (Clarke, 
2010; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Johnson, 2007; Zohar & Luria, 2005), but not all 
(Glendon & Litherland, 2001). Relationships have also been demonstrated between 
safety climate and compliance (Clarke, 2006; Griffin & Neal, 2000), participation (Clarke, 
2006; Griffin & Neal, 2000), safety knowledge and safety motivation (Christian et al., 









Summary of studies considering relationship between safety climate and 
accidents/injuries. 
  
The relationships shown in Table 6 tended to be stronger than those detailed in Table 5, 
suggesting that there may be a more definitive link between safety climate and safety 
behaviours, than with outcome measures such as accidents and injuries. Christian et al. 
(2009) hypothesised that safety behaviours (knowledge and motivation) may moderate 
the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes, and tested this hypothesis 
using a meta-analysis of 477 research articles. Safety climate was found to be positively 
related to safety knowledge and motivation and that both were related to safety 
performance which, in turn, was moderately positively related to the outcome measures 
of accidents and injuries. Christian et al. (2009) concluded from this that workers could 
be trained and supported through positive safety culture to influence safe behaviour and 
ultimately therefore lead to fewer accidents and injuries. 
 
More recently, a review paper by Beus et al. (2015) synthesised findings from 697 
research articles related to indicators such as safety behaviour. These authors concluded 
that there was strong evidence to suggest that an individual's safety knowledge and 
motivation positively impacted their safety behaviours. Context factors, such as the job, 
safety culture/climate and leadership, were found to be moderately related to knowledge 
and motivation while both previous accident experiences and personal attributes were 
only weakly related to safety knowledge and motivation (Beus et al., 2015).  
 
Relationship Type Authors Result (sig level) 
SC-safety 
behaviour 
Cross-sectional  Hofmann & Stetzer (1996) r=-0.66 (sig) 
Cross-sectional Glendon & Litherland (2001)  (ns) 
Longitudinal Zohar & Luria (2005) r=0.38 (sig) 
Cross-sectional Johnson (2007) r=0.78 (sig) 
Meta-analysis Clarke (2010) r=0.31 (sig) 
SC-compliance Cross-sectional Griffin & Neal (2000) pe=0.57 (sig) 
Meta-analysis Clarke (2006) r=0.43 (sig) 
SC-
participation 
Cross-sectional Griffin & Neal (2000) pe=0.75 (sig) 
Meta-analysis Clarke (2006) r=0.50 (sig) 
SC-safety 
knowledge 
Cross-sectional Neal et al. (2000) pe=0.58 (sig) 
Meta-analysis Christian et al (2009) pe=0.24 (sig) 
SC-safety 
motivation 
Cross-sectional Neal et al. (2000) pe=0.43 (sig) 
Meta-analysis Christian et al. (2009) pe=0.45 (sig) 




In summary, although early empirical attempts to discern a link between safety climate 
and safety outcomes such as accidents and incidents were somewhat mixed, with weak 
to moderate relationships (see Table 5., there is increasing evidence to suggest that 
safety climate is an antecedent to individual safety behaviour, including safety 
compliance and safety participation (see Table 6). Meta-analyses of empirical studies 
have however shown that this relationship may be moderated by other variables such as 
safety knowledge and motivation (Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009). The 
preceding findings would suggest that the safety culture/climate concepts have shown 
some relationship with safety performance outcome measures, whether conceptualised 
as organisational safety outcomes or individual safety behaviours and may therefore 
have merit as leading indicators of safety. Consequently, it was important to further 
consider how this information about safety culture/climate has been used within 
organisational risk management to enhance organisational learning.  
 
2.8 Safety, Risk Management and Organisational Learning 
At the centre of the concept of safety culture, Pidegon (1998) theorised, is the way in 
which information about safety, risk and danger are managed within organisations. There 
is a need to selectively gather high quality information, amongst the inevitable noise of 
organizational day-to-day functioning, in response to an uncertainty about risks and 
hazards (Pidgeon, 1998). This information was considered useful for learning from 
incidents and other relevant experiences, a process known as 'organisational learning'. 
Organisational learning is a safety-relevant goal; to meet this objective the organisation 
must have a means by which to achieve this (i.e. incident reporting/analysis system) and 
supportive social arrangements (e.g. a shared understanding of how blame and 
retribution are handled). However, learning is often said to be hampered by the inability 
to cope with the vast amounts of data and meta-data which require collating and analysis 
(Pidgeon, 1998). 
 
Safety related information may variously be gathered through mechanisms such as 
safety management audits, analyses of accident/incident databases, analyses of 
technical issues and through safety culture/climate measures. Indeed, each may form a 
partial view of the whole state of safety, with culture/climate thought to reflect an 
important aspect of the reality of working life in the organisation (Lee & Harrison, 2000). 
Given that not all failure modes can be anticipated in advance, research into high 
reliability organizations has suggested that culture somehow 'fills in the gaps' in formal 
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procedures in complex environments (such as air traffic control or aircraft carriers, 
Pidgeon, 1998).   
 
Organisations are rarely static - they adapt to changes in local conditions, are influenced 
by previous events and are shaped by both leaders and employees (Reason, 1998). To 
adapt and improve, organisations typically try to learn from what works, and what does 
not. Allegorically, Reason (1998) referred to safety culture as the 'engine' which drives 
organisations toward learning to prevent operational hazards. Arguably, an organisation 
may demonstrate some commitment to safety by investing resources not just in 
collecting the information relating to how it might learn, but further in enacting this 
learning process by using the information to make changes to improve safety. 
 
In this way, this thesis would argue, organisations can collect information from which they 
can learn by gaining insight into the assumptions and beliefs that employees have about 
safety and how this interacts with the organisational structures and processes. Safety 
does not operate in a vacuum, and an appreciation of the wider non-safety related 
activities, processes and systems are required (Cooper, 2000), particularly in systems 
where safety may be a dominant, but perhaps not overarching, goal. As described by 
Aurino (2000), an unacceptable risk for one organisation might be completely acceptable 
to another, supporting the suggestion that there is a strong cultural element related to 
safety activities. 
 
The premise that volitional risk taking might reflect prevailing safety standards and norms 
cited within risk management literature has obvious links to the area of safety 
culture/safety climate (Weyman et al., 2003). A traditional focus on understanding 
individual risk perception has given way to a broader focus on organisational structures 
and their impact on safety behaviour (Weyman et al., 2003). Contemporary views of risk-
taking have acknowledged that, despite an intuitive conclusion that risk taking is driven 
by a lack of risk understanding, there is evidence to suggest that this conclusion is too 
simplistic (Weyman et al., 2006). Rather, embodied within the safety culture/climate 
literature is the implied importance of a broader range of influences which give direction 
as to what behaviours are acceptable and therefore have the potential to impact 
individual and organisational decision making and risk taking (Aurino, 2000). Studies 
showing differences in safety perceptions amongst sub-cultures within organisations 
(Ostberg, 1980; Weyman & Clarke, 2003) have been seen to support the suggestion that 
divergent conceptualisation and understanding of risk may interact with contextual 




2.8.1 Military Risk Management 
The goals of military organisations are realised by balancing the safety of operators and 
the system with hazards that are often extreme and unpredictable (Falconer, 2006b). 
Combined with the strict hierarchical structure, these conditions make military 
organisations unlike civilian industry, in which much of the safety research has been 
based; this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Understanding attitudes to risk and 
safety in the military is thought to be essential as an important aspect of military training 
is to be able to deal effectively with potential dangers (Börjesson et al., 2011). A positive 
attitude toward safety and willingness to take risk are both compatible and desirable in 
military personnel (Börjesson et al., 2011), but this must be reconciled with legislative 
and regulatory requirements to reduce risks to as low as is reasonably practicable 
(ALARP) when dealing with proposed or existing hazardous systems. There are few 
studies relating to how risk and safety in military organisations might compare to civilian 
counterparts and given these fairly unique circumstances, and their potential influence on 
safety and understanding of risk (Turner & Gray, 2009), it is of theoretical interest to 
consider characterisation of safety culture/climate in a military organisation.  
2.9 Critical Findings 
• There is limited shared agreement regarding the theoretical basis of the safety 
culture and climate concepts. However, various workplace factors, as well as individual 
views and shared experiences, are thought to interact in a dynamic and complex fashion 
to influence safety behaviours. These, in turn, can reciprocally impact the workplace and 
shared views on safety. 
• There is ongoing debate as to whether the terms safety culture and safety climate 
should be separated or used interchangeably. Within this thesis they are taken to 
represent two interpretations of essentially the same phenomenon, however these 
concepts are separated in terms of the use of different research methods to investigate, 
explore and understand them. 
• While a component related to management commitment to safety is the only 
component of safety culture/climate which has been identified across all research 
studies, there is a wider range of potentially unique and important dimensions/constructs 
which may be central in understanding safety within organisations (detailed in Section 
2.5). 
• Context has increasingly been acknowledged to be an integral factor when 
considering safety culture and climate, as has the importance of local issues on 
employee safety behaviour. 
• To date, military safety climate measures have been developed utilising a 
theoretical, top down approach (Section 2.6). Resultant factor structures from these 
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measures have been shown to be unstable, with little psychometric integrity or empirical 
support for the proposed theoretical models. 
• Safety climate has been shown to be significantly correlated with individual safety 
behaviours, and to a lesser degree safety outcomes such as occupational 





Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design 
 
This chapter details the purpose of the research, along with the aim and arising 
objectives. This is followed by an overview of the epistemological and theoretical 
underpinnings of the research design. The case is made for the merits of adopting a 
mixed methods approach with respect to the methodological strengths of triangulation. 
Finally, a description of the rationale for the research and the contribution of the thesis to 
knowledge in the safety culture and safety climate domain is given.  
3.0 Introduction 
Although safety climate has the longer research tradition, the term safety culture has 
become more embedded in modern safety management lexicon. In many cases safety 
culture has been used as a broad brush term in an attempt to capture the socio-technical 
aspects within organisations which shape human behaviour but, in doing so, has been 
said to run the risk of being so inclusive as to lose conceptual meaning (Cox & Cox, 
1991; Cox & Flin, 1998; Moran & Volkwein, 1992). There is often little differentiation 
between the concepts and measures of safety culture and climate (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 
2007; Grabowski et al., 2010; Morrow et al., 2014; Varmazyar et al., 2016), thus they 
have been described as ambiguous (Baram & Schoebel, 2007). With respect to 
measures, it has been observed that while an array of measurement tools have been 
developed, there is modest consistency in either their content or exploitation (Cox & Flin, 
1998; Pidgeon, 1998). 
 
Despite a significant body of empirical investigation, the scientific insight into the 
constructs of safety culture and safety climate has not kept pace with increased applied 
interest in the field (Guldenmund, 2007). Research methodologies vary widely within 
published studies, seemingly reflecting divergent conceptual understandings and 
characterisations of culture and climate. Whether researchers and practitioners intend to 
either measure or provide deep insight into the concepts appears to have affected 
method choice (Jung et al., 2009), although the paradigm underpinning this choice is 
often not made explicit (Guldenmund, 2010a). The review of the relevant literature 
(Chapter 2) highlighted some shortcomings of the approaches used in the past to 
develop safety culture or climate tools in the military aviation context, and the current 
chapter considered the potential for a military sample to provide unique insight into the 
concepts of risk decision making, safety culture and safety climate.  
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3.1 Purpose of Research, Aims and Objectives 
The purpose of the current research was to contribute to the safety culture and climate 
literature, while providing the sponsor organisation (the RN’s FAA) with practical 
knowledge and insight. The aims therefore were twofold: 
 
1. To explore and characterise the effects of safety culture on decision making in the 
presence of risk in the FAA. 
2. From the perspective of organisational learning, to achieve enhanced resilience 
to failure by exploring the scope for developing sector-specific quantifiable leading 
indicators with the capacity to detect weaknesses in safety climate and identify priorities 
for improvement.  
 
To achieve these aims the research involved the following objectives: 
 
1. Undertake a review of published findings on organisational culture and climate, 
focusing specifically on safety culture and climate and its relationship with safety 
performance and risk management. Existing military and civil aviation research were of 
particular interest for this review. 
2. Undertake a qualitative study of military aviation personnel's perspectives of 
influences on safety and risk decision making to provide insight into the safety culture. 
3. Compare the performance of alternative methods of ranking personnel beliefs on 
the relative salience of influences on risk decision making in the FAA to determine the 
degree to which the method used may influence the rank order of these influences.  
4. Informed by, and triangulating insights from 1, 2 and 3, develop a quantifiable 
personnel survey to explore the underlying factor structure of variables impacting on 
safety climate. 
5. Validate the factor structure identified in 4 using confirmatory analysis techniques, 
based on a second sample of personnel. 
6. Explore the scope for developing a set of construct scales from the factor 
structure identified in 5 to produce a measure of FAA safety climate.   
7. Using the scales developed at 6, explore and profile safety climate across a 
range of FAA demographics. 
3.2 Research Design 
Research is a systematic investigation whereby data are collected, analysed and 
interpreted with the purpose of understanding, describing, predicting or controlling 
phenomena that are influenced by the researcher's theoretical framework (Mertens, 
2005). This theoretical framework, or paradigm, influences the way that knowledge is 
67 
 
studied and interpreted and shapes the intent, motivation and expectations of the 
research (Bogdan & Biklen). Paradigms are characterised through both their 
epistemology, which is the perceived relationship with the knowledge being discovered, 
and their methodology, which is the strategic approach one uses to discover this 
knowledge. The perspective adopted within this thesis reflected consideration of the 
relative merits of positivism, interpretivism and pragmatism, and the associated 
implications for methodology, with respect to their fit with the subject matter and potential 
for achievement of the research aims. These considerations were informed by 
precedents within the safety culture and climate research domains. While it is 
acknowledged that other paradigms exist (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006), these were not 
considered applicable to the current thesis, and so were not discussed here. 
3.2.1 Epistemology and Methodology 
The following account summarised how contemporary safety culture and climate 
research variously reflected alignment with positivist, interpretivist and pragmatic 
perspectives. 
Positivist Paradigm 
The positivist paradigm assumes that an objective reality exists independently of the 
researcher, reflecting a "deterministic philosophy" (Creswell, 2003 p7) in which causes 
lead to effects or outcomes (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). Positivist research generally 
aims to test pre-conceived theories or propositions through systematic observation and 
measurement, often with the aim of predicting or controlling the phenomena under 
investigation (Creswell, 2003). The emphasis on quantification reflects the desire to 
compare, contrast and demonstrate causal effects, using standardised statistical and/or 
mathematical methods to determine the strength and generalisability of derived 
relationships (Cabrera et al., 1997; Clarke, 2006; Cox & Cox, 1991; Glendon & 
Litherland, 2001; Zohar, 1980). Given the predominance of organisational psychology-
based research in this area, many studies of safety culture and climate, particularly so in 
the case of climate, reflect a positivist orientation (Guldenmund, 2010a).  
 
Adopting the positivist approach, safety culture is characterised as the product of 
individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviour regarding 
safety (Olsen et al., 2009), and is viewed as an independent variable (Maull, Brown & 
Cliffe, 2001) that influences safety-related outcomes. The tendency of research 
conducted within this paradigm has been to focus on the detection (good or bad) and 
strength (strong or weak) of a particular feature of culture (Schultz & Hatch, 1996), which 
allowed consideration of normative differences between groups (Edwards et al., 2013), 
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thus having the potential to highlight areas of concern. Viewing safety culture from a 
positivist viewpoint has been particularly useful for safety management professionals as 
it suggests that this is something that can be quantified, monitored and directed in order 
to lead to positive safety behaviour; in effect, a risk reduction strategy (Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000). Support for this approach has been evidenced in the empirical links 
between safety climate and behaviour (Beus et al., 2010;Christian et al., 2009). However, 
critics argued that this perspective diluted and over-simplified the concept of culture 
(Antonsen, 2009; Edwards et al., 2013), often assuming that an organisation has 'a' 
culture, rather than plural cultures, which can be defined using a universal set of 
variables. Others have argued that cultures are unique and only through deep immersion 
in the organisation can this hope to be uncovered (Chatman & O'Reilly, 2016).  
Interpretivist Paradigm  
In contrast to the positivist paradigm, the interpretivist paradigm considers knowledge 
and consciousness to be constructed by scientists, rather than deriving from the world, 
and that subjective meaning plays a crucial role in social actions (Walliman, 2006). 
Studies underpinned by this paradigm typically have the intention of understanding 
human experience (Cohen & Manion, 1994) within a socially constructed reality 
(Mertens, 2005). Here, the researcher and their object of inquiry are inseparable and the 
researcher's values influence their scientific inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Often used 
to generate theory through a pattern of meaning (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006), knowledge 
derived within this paradigm can never be completely removed from the context in which 
it is based. Methodologically, the interpretivist paradigm favours qualitative methods, 
such as ethnography or case studies. However, use of quantitative methods is said by 
some to be permissible within this paradigm, with the aim of supporting or expanding 
qualitative data and deepening the understanding of the phenomena under consideration 
(Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006).  
 
While studies of safety climate have not typically aligned themselves with this paradigm, 
some studies of safety culture have (Brooks, 2005; Szymczak, 2014; Walker, 2010), 
taking an anthropological or sociological stance. Supporters of this approach have 
suggested that conducting interpretivist research in the safety arena engenders a deeper 
understanding of the beliefs underlying assumptions toward safety and incidents, with 
the focus being on understanding, rather than evaluating, culture.  Maull et al. (2001) 
referred to organisations as culture producing phenomena, rejecting the notion that 





Claimed strengths of the interpretivist approach have related to its ability to provide 
insight into the implicit assumptions which form the basis for norms and values that may 
exist within organisations. However, due to its highly contextualised focus, critics have 
pointed to the potential for limited generalisability, claiming that this restricts its utility in 
organisational research (Chatman & O'Reilly, 2016; Guldenmund, 2010b). The inability to 
support evidence of a relationship with organisational outcomes (Guldenmund, 2010b) or 
allow normative comparison (Chatman & O'Reilly, 2016) have also been cited as limiting 
factors of safety research conducted within the interpretive paradigm. The deep insight 
afforded by this approach may, however, be of value in understanding how and why 
norms and beliefs toward safety develop in an organisation; something that positivist 
researchers have yet to address (Guldenmund, 2010a).  
 
When taken in isolation, both positivist and interpretivist approaches have significant 
limitations, particularly in social science research. Here, there is often a requirement to 
both measure and interpret findings, to ensure that information is of adequate depth, but 
also support generalisable conclusions to wider situations. While intuitively it would 
appear that safety culture might best be investigated within the interpretivist paradigm, 
and safety climate within the positivist paradigm, this would not be compatible with 
considering them as different views of the same phenomenon. From the perspective of 
application therefore, a combination of the strengths of these approaches, while taking 
cognisance of the fundamental tensions over the conceptualisation and characterisation 
of social phenomena, affords strong intuitive appeal. To a large degree, this reflects the 
perspective of the pragmatist paradigm.   
Pragamatist Paradigm 
Dogmatic adherence to the diametrically opposed viewpoints of the positivist and 
interpretivist paradigms has been held by some as partially responsible for limiting the 
advancement of knowledge (Howe, 1988). The pragmatic tradition is said to reject the 
forced choice between either a positivist or interpretivist paradigm, and allows a shift of 
focus toward how the combination of these paradigms may be accomplished.  
 
The pragmatist paradigm is not committed to any single philosophy, a claimed strength 
being that this allows researchers using this paradigm to focus on the 'what' and 'how', 
as well as the 'how much' elements of the research problem (Creswell, 2003). 
Methodologically, pragmatism has the advantage that qualitative and quantitative 
methods are viewed as complementary rather than mutually exclusive (Jick, 1979) and 
mixed methods are commonly used (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). This paradigm is not 
as well described or defined as either positivism or interpretivism but has the advantage 
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of allowing researchers to mix and match research design components that offer the best 
chance of answering specific research questions (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Pragmatism uses induction (discovery of patterns), deduction (testing of hypotheses) and 
abduction (uncovering the best explanation for specific results) as means of advancing 
knowledge (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
 
Consideration of the conclusion drawn in Chapter 2 that culture and climate reflect 
different viewpoints of the same phenomena (Denison, 1996; Guldenmund, 2010a; 
Schnieder et al., 2017) appears to be well sited within the pragmatic paradigm. The 
position taken by this thesis in relation to safety culture and climate was that they may 
best be accessed using different methodologies that complement their definitions. Here 
safety climate was seen to refer to the surface manifestations of the underlying culture 
(aligned with Brondino et al., 2013), thus is likely to be amenable to quantitative 
measures. In contrast, insights into the underlying culture were considered best 
approached using deeper qualitative enquiries, which might reflect better alignment with 
the interpretivist paradigm. However, as the purpose of the research was to gain a 
holistic view and to consider both safety culture and safety climate within the FAA, 
adoption of either the positivist or interpretivist paradigms appeared limiting.  In contrast, 
the pragmatic paradigm actively encouraged the combined use of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods in a complementary fashion (Yauch & Steudel, 2003) to address 
the research aims, and thus was considered the most appropriate paradigm in which to 
situate the current research.  
Mixed Methods Research  
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in mixed method research 
allows for the strengths and limitations of each to complement the other. This in turn 
promotes triangulation (the collection of multiple independent, compatible sources of 
information) which is acknowledged to improve the analytical power of research findings 
(Fellows & Lui, 2013). Bergman (2008) described triangulation as the use of different 
methods to examine a phenomenon by considering it from different viewpoints, thereby 
gaining a more comprehensive view than any one method alone.  Although triangulation 
has sometimes been used as a validation technique (such as suggested by Fellows & 
Lui, 2013), the current research would not claim to have attempted this. In contrast, by 
utilising the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative methods, this research aimed to 
illuminate different aspects of safety culture, climate and risk decision making. Beyond 
triangulation, mixed method research can also be used to clarify and corroborate results 
from one method to another, to inform one another and expand research findings beyond 




The term mixed methods tends to be applied when referring to situations when there is a 
qualitative phase and a quantitative phase within an overall research study and is distinct 
from mixed model research, which involves qualitative and quantitative approaches 
being mixed within the stages of research (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Bergman 
(2008) discriminated in a similar way between research designs whose purpose it was to 
merge parallel/concurrent qualitative and quantitative data, and those in which one 
method built on another. Supporters of a mixed method approach have laid claim that it 
allows researchers to benefit from being able to explore issues and inform the generation 
of hypotheses (through qualitative modes of enquiry), test these hypotheses and validate 
findings more formally (using quantitative methods), thus minimising the weaknesses of 
each approach (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Furthermore, mixed methods have 
been suggested as resulting in a richer data set and providing a higher degree of 
confidence in the results than may be the case with utilising any single method (Manzoor, 
2016). 
 
The premise that safety culture and climate may be measured using quantitative 
methods, and somehow used to infer safety behaviour, has been said to be compatible 
with the premise that it may be influenced by shared perceptions and shaped by the 
social and structural environment of the organisation, thus also amenable to 
characterisation using qualitative methods (Glendon & Stanton, 2000). Such an 
integrated approach would permit recourse to a combination of methods to support the 
approach to inquiry including, but not limited to, interviews, surveys, audits and 
document analysis (Choudry, Fang & Mohamed, 2007), with demonstrable utility in 
contemporary safety culture research (Brondino et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2013; Mearns 
et al., 2013). The current thesis was therefore conducted within the pragmatic paradigm, 
adopting a mixed method approach, the rationale for which is further outlined in the 
following section. 
3.2.2 Approaches to Measuring Safety Culture and Climate 
The safety culture and climate tradition refers to consideration of employee beliefs, 
attitudes and perceptions about how the organisation, managers and co-workers 
prioritise and practice safety (Mearns & Flin, 1999). Ultimately, however, the focus is not 
on individuals but on the shared beliefs, perceptions and practices which shape how 
employees interpret their work environment and behave on a daily basis.  These shared 
safety beliefs, perceptions and practices include norms and rules for dealing with risk, 
safety attitudes and reflection on safety practices (Pidgeon, 1998). Therefore, although 
both qualitative and quantitative measures of safety culture and climate utilise individual 
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responses, the focus is on groups and the socio-technical context in which these groups 
operate.   
 
Quantitative methods of inquiry into safety climate have been dominated by the use of 
self-administered questionnaires, developed in the psychometric tradition (Cox & Flin, 
1998; Guldenmund, 2007). Questionnaires tend to be popular because they are a quick 
and cost-effective way to assess an organisation's state of safety, and in some instances, 
have been shown to possess predictive validity in relation to safety performance lead 
indicators (Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009). However, while questionnaires offer 
insight into what safety climate may look like within an organisation, this tends to be a 
shallow and broad perspective (Guldenmund, 2007; O'Connor et al., 2011b) that offers 
little insight into why, how and in what ways the climate may reflect the culture. This 
deeper insight is arguably best supported through methods such as ethnographies (for 
example into commercial fishing, Brooks, 2005; grain processing, Walker, 2010 and 
hospital safety, Szymczak, 2014) and interview studies (for example in steel 
manufacturing, Nordloff et al., 2015; gas distribution, Blazsin & Guldenmund, 2015; and 
UK railways Weyman et al., 2006).  
 
The continued use and popularity of questionnaires demonstrates their utility and 
longevity in applied safety research (Harvey et al., 2002; Guldenmund, 2007, 2010a). 
However, early quantitative safety climate research was focused toward identifying and 
refining a core set of dimensions that could be used to assess organisations and allow 
comparison both within and across sectors (Guldenmund, 2000). Arguably, this may 
reflect the positivist orientation of these researchers where there is a presupposition that 
safety climate lends itself to reduction to a generic set of constructs. However, this is at 
odds with more contemporary views that safety climate and the understanding of risk is 
inherently contextually bound (Blazsin & Guldenmund, 2015; Huang et al., 2013; Tinoco 
& Arnaud, 2013; Zohar, 2010).  
 
Much of the early quantitative safety climate work can be characterised as 
methodologically top-down, mirroring the approach taken in other areas such as risk 
research aimed at deconstructing the basis of public concerns (Slovic, 1986) 
organisational leadership research (Tejeda, Scandura & Pillai, 2001) and team climate 
research (Kivimaki & Elovanio, 1999). This top-down approach was typified by 
researchers who determined the components/constructs of interest either through a 
review of the existing literature or through being directed by the organisation's 
management to reflect organisational priorities. This top-down approach was evident in 
the three military safety climate measurement tools reviewed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6) 
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and the HSE’s Safety Climate Tool which was designed to align with the safety 
management principles set out in HS(G) 65 (Health & Safety Executive, 1991). Once the 
components of interest have been determined a priori, items were typically generated to 
reflect these components, with psychometric techniques then being applied to identify 
latent components of the construct. Whilst remaining exploratory, many safety climate 
measures developed in this way were based on the array of components that had been 
measured previously, relying solely on quantitative statistical techniques to inform 
thinking around underpinning latent variables. Effectively, the variables that emerged 
tended to be bound by established insights/perspectives.  
 
Critics of this approach have suggested that it runs the risk of imposing theoretical 
concepts and making unreasonable assumptions of the universality of defining influences 
(Weyman et al., 2006; Reiman & Rollenhangen, 2011) and omitting observations which 
are unique to certain organisations (Yauch & Steudel, 2003).  Questions have also been 
raised about the ecological validity of measurement tools developed using this top-down 
approach because it may only represent the best guesses of researchers (Cox & Flin, 
1998) and may therefore be prejudiced by their preconceived biases (Schein, 1990) and 
reflect a bounded rationality. Here the danger is that safety climate becomes defined by 
what questionnaires say it is (Guldenmund, 2010a), an arising implication being that 
unique observations relating to an organisation or workplace context may be 
underplayed or go unnoticed (Yauch & Steudel, 2003).   
 
The widespread feature of lack of stability of factor structures in safety climate studies 
and measures (Cox & Cox, 1991; Jeffcott et al., 2006; Reiman & Rollenhangen, 2011), 
combined with modest consensus over their nature (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; 
Weigmann et al., 2004) may arguably reflect the shortcomings of top-down methodology. 
Importantly, these shortcomings imply that there may be added value from taking a more 
bottom-up, organic and contextual orientation to developing safety climate question sets 
and assessment tools dedicated to a defined organisation or sector (Blazsin & 
Guldenmund, 2015; Huang et al., 2013; Reiman & Rollenhangen, 2011; Tinoco & 
Arnaud, 2013; Weyman et al., 2006; Zohar, 2010). The construct of management 
commitment to safety appears the only construct germane to all safety culture and 
climate studies, adding further weight to the conclusion that it would be prudent to 
assume that local differences might be present unless it can be determined that this is 
not the case. This more critical perspective challenges the completeness of knowledge, 
understanding and assumptions of the phenomena of safety culture and climate, and 




In pursuit of contextualised measures, the intuitive benefits of using qualitative, 
exploratory data-driven techniques that are grounded in employee perspectives have 
been cited by a number of authors (Brondino et al., 2013; Cox & Flin, 1998; Huang et al., 
2013; Mearns et al., 2013; Weyman et al., 2006). Proponents claimed that this allowed 
participants to raise issues that mattered to them (Yauch & Steudel, 2003) and, when 
used prior to quantitative method development, qualitative inquiry could allow 
determination of the most important influences on culture which merit measurement 
(Schein, 1990, 2010).   
 
An example of a qualitative approach having demonstrable utility in the safety 
culture/climate literature was provided by Lee and Harrison (2000), who reported that an 
initial qualitative inquiry showed unexplored, important areas beyond that contained in 
their safety climate questionnaire. These authors suggested that this qualitative phase 
then afforded them the opportunity to add variables to capture these additional areas of 
interest.  Thus, it is arguably important to first consider what is important before trying to 
quantify it (Brondino et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2013; Mearns et al., 2013). Failure to do 
so risks important influences being missed or addressed too superficially to gain 
sufficient insight into the pertinent issues.  
 
Tailored safety climate measures are thought to embody the potential to tap relevant, 
context-dependent elements to provide a deeper understanding of the phenomena 
(Zohar, 2010) and avoid the pitfall of missing important factors (Cox & Cox, 1991). They 
also allow for more specific recommendations to be made (Huang et al., 2013) and allow 
determination of the impact of distinct organisational practices on task performance 
(Brondino et al., 2013). Each of these are advantageous for organisations seeking to use 
measures of safety climate to inform safety management. Furthermore, contextualised 
measures allow the structural and socio-technical contextual influences on safety to be 
considered (Jeffcott et al., 2006; Reiman & Rollenhangen, 2011). Therefore, the current 
research adopted an initial, qualitative exploratory approach to determine what factors 
were most important to employees within the sponsor organisation, prior to any attempt 
at quantification and development of a tailored safety climate tool.  
3.2.3 Determining the Relative Salience of Safety Priorities for Improvement  
Safety climate tools have typically been used to identify the impact of organisational 
practices on safety performance; to highlight latent vulnerabilities to safety systems and 
employees. However, used in this way questionnaire measures of safety climate typically 
treat each component as orthogonal, i.e. discrete and unrelated, with each being 
represented by a sub-scale on the questionnaire. Here the relative performance of each 
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component can only be inferred from the comparison of averaged ratings from each sub-
scale. When comparing the averaged ratings from the sub-scales, safety managers 
make some inference about the relative importance of each sub-scale - potentially 
focusing, for example, on constructs which show relatively negative scale ratings.  
 
However, this approach affords only inferential conclusions to be drawn with respect to   
the relative importance of the constructs as each is treated as an independent entity. 
Such measures are therefore effectively silent with respect to the relative salience of the 
constructs under consideration. To compare constructs directly with each other, relative 
ranking techniques are more appropriate.  Relative ranking methods have been used in 
the areas of risk perception (Ostberg, 1980), mining (Weyman et al., 2003), pest control 
(Barnett & Weyman, 2016), nuclear (Cromer et al., 1984) and food/consumer research 
areas (Gacula & Singh, 1984; van der Fels-Klerx et al., 2017) to variously capture expert, 
managerial and employee perspectives on the relative salience of the entities under 
consideration. Risk ranking takes into account the socio-cultural elements of risk 
assessment and might lead to a different priority set to that derived from purely 
technological data (van der Fels-Klerx et al., 2017). This socio-cultural element of risk 
assessment is the movement that gave rise to the concept of safety culture and, as such, 
it appears useful to consider what other methods from these associated fields may be 
useful to expand knowledge around safety culture and climate (Sawhney et al., 2011). 
This research therefore determined to explore the utility and practicality of using 
comparative ranking techniques to determine safety priorities, using as a starting point 
the tool which is currently used by the FAA to monitor influences on safety.  
 
A desirable feature of ranking techniques is that they should permit determination of the 
degree of agreement between respondents, something which safety climate tools 
utilising ratings scales have typically been criticised for (Guldenmund, 2007). In addition, 
ranking of data eliminates individual differences in rating scale usage and response 
category numbers and labels, yet these techniques remain underused in applied work 
(Bockenholt, 2001). Therefore, it is argued that techniques which allow determination of 
the degree of consensus over priorities for safety improvement might afford additional 
and valuable insight beyond that offered by typical safety culture and climate 
approaches. However, empirical findings indicate that the choice of ranking technique 
can produce notable differences in the ordering of entities, dependent on how the ratings 
are manipulated and combined (Ali & Ronaldson, 2012; Fisher et al., 1968; Mullen, 1999; 
van den Fels-Klerx et al., 2017).  
76 
 
3.3 Rationale for the Current Approach 
The research detailed in this thesis aimed to contribute to the established body of safety 
culture and climate knowledge through exploring, investigating and characterising 
variables which impact on safety and risk decision making in a military naval aviation 
context and exploring methods by which to determine priorities for safety improvement. 
This was determined to provide insight into:   
 
1. The structural and socio-technical contextual influences on safety in a military 
naval aviation context, 
2. The extent to which components of safety climate reflect civilian-based research 
findings, or represent a discrete armed-forces profile, 
3. The extent to which there was a shared perspective across militarily job roles / 
functions and / or of sub-cultural or sub-climate profiles,  
4. The extent to which safety improvement priorities can be determined through 
employee experiences.   
 
The research purposively utilised a sequential mixed method design (Creswell, Plano 
Clark, Gutmann & Hanson, 2003) where later phases built on earlier work (Bergman, 
2008; Manzoor, 2016), allowing for a more informed and holistic consideration of the 
research aims. This approach acknowledged that quantification of safety culture / climate 
was important to support safety management systems, whilst recognising the importance 
of the social construction of safety by employees, and the contextual factors imposed by 
the organisational structure and functioning. This research made use of a consolidated 
theoretical framework, rather than setting out to test a single model or theory (see 
Chapter 2). The research aimed to provide some clear direction to the FAA as to what 
aspects of the structural and socio-technical context (with reference to safety) were 
important to their employees which, if appropriately addressed, might play a role in safety 
management. This was achieved through four empirical studies, which were outlined in 
the following section.  
3.3.1 Outline of empirical studies  
A qualitative inquiry into military aviation safety culture as construed from the accounts of 
employees allowed insight into the insider perspective about how safety manifested itself 
in their daily work contexts (Study 1, Chapter 4). Findings from Study 1, referenced to 
insights from published findings allowed development of Study 2 (Chapter 5) in which an 
exploration of alternative techniques to provide insight into relative priorities for safety 
improvement (using comparative ranking methods) was undertaken. This was intended 
to triangulate and build on the findings from the exploratory qualitative research (Study 1) 
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through use of novel methods to the safety culture and climate arena. The research then 
looked to distil these exploratory insights into the development of a tailored, quantitative 
safety climate measurement tool (Study 3, Chapter 6), being guided by well-established 
psychometric practices to investigate the underlying constructs.  Following this, a further 
quantitative study supported the development of proto-scales which were capable of 
distinguishing between groups with different safety profiles (Study 4, Chapter 7).  
3.4 The uniqueness of the PhD project 
While there were a significant body of studies of safety culture and climate in civilian 
aviation organisations identified in Chapter 2, there were few published accounts of 
research into military aviation safety culture and climate. Chapter 1 detailed several ways 
in which military aviation organisations might differ from the civilian aviation sector 
including; the nature of tasks undertaken, dominant aircraft types, living and working 
conditions/situations, the purpose of the organisation, traditions/laws and views on risk 
taking. Given these features, it is proposed that insight from a military population may 
provide a unique perspective on safety culture and risk decision making (supporting 
conclusions by Turner & Gray, 2009). Therefore, this PhD research being sited within a 
military setting has the potential to contribute to the knowledge in this area.  
 
As described in Chapter 2, the few studies of published safety culture or climate research 
in the military domain have typically adopted a theoretically driven, top-down approach to 
measure development, and have been criticised for this (O'Conner et al., 2011b). In 
contrast, the current research adopted a 'bottom-up' approach utilised in contemporary 
civilian safety culture and climate research through use of a sequentially mixed method 
research design (in line with recommendations made by, for example, Guldenmund, 
2010a). Using multiple methods and gaining a variety of workforce perspectives is held 
to result in a more comprehensive view of climate and culture (Cooper, 2000). In 
addition, the research explored the utility of comparative approaches to provide insight 
into priorities for safety improvement, utilising methods that have shown merit in the risk 
research domain. Comparative approaches have, as yet, to receive much consideration 
in relation to safety culture or climate, despite their potential to provide insight beyond 
that offered by the traditional safety climate questionnaire approach.  
 
The research provided deep insight for the sponsor organisation into which factors were 
most important in shaping and propagating a shared set of beliefs toward the level of 
importance of safety when compared to other organisational goals. By developing a 
tailored safety climate tool, as well as exploring alternative comparative techniques, the 
research has provided a firm grounding with which to refine a measure of safety climate 
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for on-going monitoring within this military aviation context. Furthermore, the research 
afforded insight into various areas of concern for military aviation employees, providing 
avenues which the organisation could pursue to try and improve safety in the 
organisation. Through triangulation of findings, the research contained both practically 
useful insights for the sponsor organisation, as well as contributing to the wider academic 
safety culture and climate knowledge base.   
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Chapter 4: Exploring and Understanding Employee Attitudes to 
Safety Culture, Behavioural Norms and Risk Decision Making in 
a Military Naval Aviation Organisation (Study 1) 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Purpose of the Project and Rationale 
Aviation has traditionally benefitted from the input of safety researchers; from technology 
and engineering through to social and cognitive psychology and ergonomics. The pursuit 
of safety improvement has prompted sustained interest in this sector. Over recent 
decades technological advances have significantly increased equipment reliability and 
the focus has moved toward understanding the 'human factor' in relation to accidents. 
Consequently, understanding and managing safety culture and climate within 
organisations has become an accepted facet of aviation safety management systems 
(Atak & Kingma, 2011). However, despite extensive research there remains little 
consensus about key salient contextual factors in this area (Guldenmund, 2007; 
O'Conner et al., 2011b).  
A qualitative approach was initially adopted here to gain an exploratory insight into 
military aviation employees' perspectives of phenomena related to safety culture and risk 
decision making. This approach reflected an organic means of investigating safety 
culture (as utilised by Brondino et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2013; Mearns et al., 2013; 
Weyman, Clarke & Cox, 2003) and enhanced the researcher's insight and familiarity with 
the subject matter. Importantly it embodied the potential to provide a rich and 
contextually focused basis for quantification at a later stage (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
4.1.2 Aim 
To explore participants accounts of norms, values, attitudes and behaviour in relation to 
safety, particularly shared perspectives as well as structural and socio-technical 
elements that could be considered to characterise core influences on workplace safety 
culture in naval aviation. 
4.1.3 Objectives 
The objectives of the research were to: 
1. Identify and configure an approach to engagement and elicitation with a sample 
of military aviation personnel that sponsors open and free discussion of the prevailing 
safety culture(s) and variables that impact on personnel decision making and behaviour 
in relation to risk.  
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2.  Identify and articulate a set of core constructs that can be considered to 
characterise headline influences on military aviation workplace safety culture. 
3. Compare and contrast these headline influences with published findings within 
the safety culture and climate domain.  
4.1.4 Background 
The core strength of exploratory qualitative approaches rests with their capacity to afford 
insight into which variables are important, and additionally elaborate on why, how, and 
under what circumstances. The latter is central to understanding the volition behind 
behaviour, underpinning sense-making, and associated rationale. It also tends to be key 
to informing thinking over interventions to achieve behaviour or cultural change. 
 
Qualitative methods embody the potential to explore meaning behind experiences and 
how people use these to comprehend the world around them (Frost, 2011). This can be 
important for understanding how employees interact with, and make sense of, the socio-
technical environment in which they work, including the cultural value and emphasis 
placed upon personal and system safety.  
 
Qualitative approaches potentially provide a deeper understanding of employee 
behaviour in relation to risk that can be interactively probed and explored. Critically, not 
simply to determine what is important, but how and in what ways phenomena are salient 
and how they operate, which conventional quantitative methods traditionally cannot 
achieve (Caronna, 2010).   
 
The capacity of qualitative approaches to tap into multi-dimensional insights relating to 
the complexities of the social world is said to be advantageous, allowing for diverse and 
possibly contradictory perspectives (Caronna, 2010), thereby addressing the aim of 
exploring the extent to which employees exhibit a shared perspective in relation to 
safety.  
 
Finally, qualitative approaches are well suited for the identification of behavioural norms 
and collective sense making. These might, otherwise, be inaccessible to an external 
researcher, thus being of particular importance when considering cultural factors within 




4.2.1  Ethical Approval  
Ethical approval to conduct the study was granted by the MODREC (reference 
444/Gen13). 
4.2.2 Perspective and Approach 
To address the aim of the study, a qualitative approach was adopted. This was designed 
to deal with criticisms raised in Chapters 2 and 3 that much of the existing safety 
culture/climate research might impose theoretical concepts and make assumptions about 
the universality of defining influences. Rather, an exploratory data-driven technique, 
grounded in military naval aviation employee perspectives was adopted, reflecting 
alignment with contemporary approaches within research on civilian populations 
(Brondino et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2013; Mearns et al., 2013; Weyman et al., 2003).  
4.2.3 Method of Elicitation 
Two options for data gathering were considered, one-to-one interviews or group 
discussions (focus groups). Both have been widely used for exploratory research and 
can relatively quickly identify early indications of participants' opinions toward specific 
topics (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999). Of the two, a focus group approach was chosen as it 
held a number of advantages above one-to-one interviews in relation to the study aim:  
• One-to-one interviews are useful for exploring individual views on specific matters 
(Gill et al., 2008) as they allow researchers to focus on the personal perspectives, history 
and context (Lewis, 2003). In contrast, focus groups facilitate and encourage dialogue 
(Frith, 2000; Gill, Stewart, Treasure & Chadwick, 2008), allowing participants to build 
upon the responses of other group members, creating a ‘synergistic effect’ (Stewart & 
Shamdasani, 1990) which may not occur during individual interviews (Stokes & Belgin, 
2006).  
• Unlike one-to-one interviews, focus groups can be used to help to identify group 
norms, meanings and processes (Gill et al., 2008) through exploring agreement or 
disagreement amongst members (Kitzinger, 1995). Indeed, it is this participant 
interaction during focus groups that is held to illuminate shared perspectives, allowing 
the opportunity to display differences between participants (Lewis, 2003). Stokes and 
Bergin (2006) suggested that focus groups were pertinent for eliciting why a particular 
issue was salient, where consideration of individual interviews could restrict judgement of 
the level of consensus of opinion/experience across individuals. Given that Study 1 
aimed to explore issues of safety culture, which is assumed to reflect a shared view, 
focus group discussions were considered more appropriate than one to one interviews.  
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• Focus groups have been criticised for their potential to allow inhibition of 
individuals in the face of seeming group consensus (Stokes & Bergin, 2006), however 
they are also held by others to be less prone to eliciting socially desirable responses 
(Kitzinger, 1995), which is especially important when dealing with sensitive topics that 
might implicate the individual (such as lack of adherence to procedures). 
• Focus groups hold greater scope for verification of responses by allowing the 
researcher to identify whether other group members concur with discussions, or provide 
alternative views. By facilitating group discussion on a specific topic, focus groups are 
advantageous for eliciting debate over contrasts where members have different 
experiences of a common phenomena (Kitzinger, 1995). 
The context in which the focus groups were to take place was negotiated with the FAA. 
To limit disruption to operational activities, timetabled breaks in human factors training 
sessions were identified as suitable times during volunteers to participate in data 
collection. Personnel that attended these training sessions were predominately drawn 
from the engineering and aircrew functions (these groups comprise the majority of the 
FAA population) although a small number of ATC personnel also attended.  The 
research was commissioned and endorsed by the FAA's Safety Centre, which was 
advantageous as it allowed personnel paid time during their normal working hours to 
participate, thus minimising additional burden on participants.  
4.2.4 Role of the researcher 
The researcher was employed by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), and thus was 
introduced to participants as a MOD civilian, independent of the Chain of Command. 
Given the topics under discussion, for example rule infringement, it was important for the 
researcher not to be seen to 'police' safety policy to allow and encourage open 
conversation. Thus the researcher stressed the independent scientific research viewpoint 
of the study during all briefing and de-briefing. However, the effect of the position of the 
researcher being an employee of the MOD, as opposed to an independent 
consultant/student is unknown and it must be acknowledged that despite efforts to the 
contrary, this may have affected personnel's responses during the focus groups.  
A group scenario, as compared to individual interviews, was adopted to limit the 
likelihood of the research being perceived as a formal interview, and more as an open 
discussion forum. As a civilian, the researcher was occasionally unfamiliar with some of 
the idiosyncrasies of the military idioms and the group scenario encouraged participants 
to speak between themselves. This created a more natural flow of conversation, and any 
queries that the researcher had about terminology could be noted and followed up after 




It was important to develop a set of questions that would help to stimulate discussion of 
topics related to the research question while allowing participants to reveal the pertinent 
points in an open and associative manner. It was also important to allow scope for topics 
that may be related, but not initially considered by the researcher, as potential topics of 
interest. To identify topics that would stimulate discussion, a number of sources of 
information were consulted to develop the focus group topic guide. These included: 
1. Insights from mainstream safety culture and climate literature, 
2. Findings from a FAA tool administered annually to a number of personnel related 
to concerns about flight safety (details of this tool can be found in Section 5.1.5 of 
Chapter 5), 
3. Annual reports published by the RN and FAA relating to safety performance 
(internal RN documents which are not contained within the public domain and so could 
not be presented in this thesis), 
4. Safety related promotional literature published by the RN and FAA, including a 
quarterly magazine (called 'Cockpit'), safety bulletins (internal documents), and leaflets 
issued by the FAA Safety Centre (examples of these publications cannot be given as 
they are not in the public domain).   
Using these resources, a short focus group topic guide, containing headline themed topic 
areas and prompts was developed (see full detailed proforma in Appendix B). The final 
headline questions included were: 
• Tell me about safety within the Fleet Air Arm. 
o Has it changed over time, and if so, how? 
• What are the main barriers to safety within your workplaces? 
o What do you consider to be the main factors that mean you cannot work 
safely? 
• What are the main contributors to accidents/incidents? 
o Can you give me an example of an accident you know about and what 
caused it? 
• How important are safety procedures to the way you work? 
• Do people bend/break the rules-can you give any examples? 
o What makes them bend/break rules? 




4.2.6 Pilot Study Sessions 
Two pilot study sessions (involving personnel from the two main functional groups, 
aircrew and engineers) were conducted in order to: 
1. Improve the familiarity of the researcher with the research materials, 
2. Assess the appropriateness of the question set, 
3. Assess the level of engagement of the personnel with the question set. 
The questions contained in the proforma were well received by the two pilot groups, and 
several commonly used acronyms and phrases were explained to the researcher by 
participants. Personnel remarked that they found it interesting to discuss the topics, 
especially where individuals within the group had different opinions. As the question set 
was found to be useful for generating discussion, no changes were made and the data 
from the pilot study sessions were included in the data analysis phase.   
4.2.7 Data Collection 
Each data collection session lasted between forty-five and sixty minutes, each involving 
between five and eleven personnel (see Table 7) in line with existing recommendations 
which range between three and fourteen participants (Gill et al., 2008; Kitzinger & 
Barbour, 1999; Lewis, 2003; Weyman et al., 2006). In accordance with the ethical 
protocol, participant information sheets (see Appendix B) were emailed (along with 
course joining instructions) to those attending the course approximately one week prior 
to attendance. These personnel were fully briefed by the researcher prior to participation 
and signed informed consent forms (Appendix B) indicating voluntary participation. With 
the permission of all volunteers, the proceedings of the focus groups were audio 
recorded. An assistant to the main researcher took observation notes during the 
sessions for discussion with the researcher later. The audio files were fully transcribed by 
the researcher verbatim prior to analysis, with all personal identifiers removed.  
4.2.8 Sample 
A convenience sample of volunteers was sought from personnel attending monthly 
human factors training courses. Course participants were not mandated to attend the 
focus groups, however, time was set aside within the course to accommodate any 
participants who volunteered to attend. The courses provided access to a diverse sample 
of personnel, representing a range of ranks and specialisations (although predominately 
aircrew and engineers), as well as individuals drawn from a variety of training and front-
line units, from units both at sea and ashore.  
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When considering the composition of each group, thought was given to conducting 
discussions with a single function at a time (e.g. engineers), or to have a mix of functions 
(aircrew/engineers). To encourage insight into team dynamics as well as synergies and 
contrasts between individuals, constructing groups with members who might normally 
discuss the topic under consideration on a daily basis was considered important 
(Kitzinger, 1995; Morgan, 1988). Aircrew and engineers have very different roles (aircrew 
pilot and navigate the aircraft while engineers maintain it) and hierarchical structures 
within the organisation (aircrew tend to comprise the senior management in a squadron) 
and so it was determined that the groups were more likely to discuss issues freely if 
separated by function.  
In some groups there was a mix of ranks across the group, the aim of which was allow 
for similarities and differences in ideas and perceptions to be discussed by personnel 
within the same trade, but at different stages of employment and experience (Frith, 
2000). Other groups contained participants from a single rank, the aim of which was to 
allow for unexplored topics to arise, in the event that some participants were reluctant to 
voice opinions in a mixed rank group. Due to the composition of the training course, 
participants were typically from a range of squadrons and locations, and so no 
participants were in groups with others who were in their direct Chain of Command or 
work team. Demographic information (age, rank, length of service and gender) was 
gathered to determine the characteristics of the research sample in relation to the overall 
population structure. Table 7 shows a breakdown of the participant sample.  
Eight focus groups were conducted between December 2013 and March 2014 (Groups 
1-8, Table 7). As the study was exploratory, it was considered to be important to obtain 
views from a wide range of personnel with varying degrees of experience of the 
organisation. In groups 1-8 it was noted that there was an under-representation of junior 
participants from the engineering trades. This cadre is tasked with the majority of the 
routine and operational maintenance of airframes and therefore were considered 
important to include within the sample. To address this potential imbalance, four 
additional focus groups (Groups 9-12 in Table 7) were undertaken during November and 
December 2014, using the same recruitment approach as for the initial eight groups, but 
in locations that were known to have higher proportions of junior staff. In total, 89 
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1 Air 8/ 0 41 (6) 19 (7)   8  
2 Air 9/0 39 (5) 18 (5)   8 1 
3 Air 9/0 40 (7) 17 (9)  2 6 1 
4 Air 4/2 31 (8) 12 (9)   4 2 
5 Eng 9/0 37 (10) 17 (12) 4 4 1  
6 Eng 6/0 32 (10) 11 (11) 2 4   
7 Eng 2/3 37 (1) 15 (4)   5  
8 Eng 5/2 35 (7) 14 (7) 2 2 3  
9 Eng 6/0 24 (3) 4 (3) 6    
10 Eng 5/0 34 (5) 13 (7)  5   
11 Eng 11/0 28 (3) 5 (3) 11    
12 Eng 7/1 39 (5) 17 (5)  8   
Total     25 25 35 4 
Where Air=aircrew, Eng= Engineers, N = number of participants in group, M= male, F=female, 
sd = standard deviation.  
4.2.9 Data Analysis 
Selection of the Method for Data Analysis 
Consideration was given to the relative merits of a number of alternative textual analysis 
techniques, referenced to the aims of the study and the research objectives. A summary 
of arising deliberation, culminating in the rationale for the chosen analysis method is 
provided below.  
Discourse Analysis  
Discourse analysis is underpinned by the assumption that language is a constructive 
social reality tool, rather than language simply reflecting reality (Coyle, 2007). Its primary 
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focus is on examining how people use language to construct their understanding of their 
world(s) (Coyle, 2007). Paltridge (2012) described discourse as the social construction of 
reality, both shaping and being shaped by the world, thus analysis of discourse as 
considers the relationship between language and the social context in which it is used. 
Typically divided into discursive, Foucauldian and critical discursive psychology 
approaches, discourse analysis is said to be particularly applicable to research questions 
which focus on construction, rhetoric, ideology and action (Coyle, 2007). Given that the 
aim of the current study was to explore participant accounts of safety culture and identify 
over-arching themes from participant accounts, discourse analysis was determined to be 
too linguistically focused, and therefore incompatible with the aim. 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
This method explores personal and lived experience in detail to examine how 
participants make sense of their world (Frost, 2011). IPA has been described as being 
particularly useful when focusing on a small number of homogenous participants in order 
to understand how people perceive significant events in their lives (Smith & Eatough, 
2007). Although the method of IPA includes identification of themes from the data, the 
strong individual focus of the approach to data collection and analysis (Frost, 2011) was 
considered to be contrary to the fundamental assumption of safety culture, namely that it 
is a shared concept.  
Content Analysis 
Content analysis is arguably the most commonly used analysis method in qualitative 
psychology research (Carrera-Fernandez, Guardia-Olmos & Pero-Cebollero, 2014) and 
involves making inferences from text through using both qualitative and quantitative 
operations (Weber, 1990). Initially, this analysis method appeared to support the aim of 
the study in identification of themes from the focus group transcripts, however content 
analysis was ultimately considered less appropriate as it focused predominately on the 
frequency of concepts within a data set rather than deriving meaning from it (Biggs et al., 
2013). Fruhen et al. (2013) provided an example of the use of content analysis in 
examining safety culture, however they integrated this with linguistic analysis due to the 
limitations of the deductive nature of content analysis. These authors suggested that 
artefacts, such as the language people use, are difficult to decipher quantitatively. 
Content analysis also required pre-set themes to code the data by, which did not suit the 
exploratory nature of the study. 
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Thematic Analysis  
The methodical, staged process of thematic analysis was chosen to explore the 
transcripts in the current study as it is well suited to identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  Thematic analysis presented a number of 
further advantages; it allowed for interpretation of the research topic (Boyatzis, 1998), 
while being unconstrained by a pre-existing theoretical framework (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). A recognised strength of thematic analysis was its capacity to detect patterns 
across data; it is held to be particularly well suited to exploratory studies (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). This was considered to be important for the current study, where the focus was on 
the work context and how it might interact with, and influence, worker safety behaviour. 
Thematic analysis allowed for consideration not just of what people said, but also the 
meaning behind what was said, and has previously shown utility in the study of safety 
culture (Conchie, Moon & Duncan, 2013; Lofquist, Dyson & Tronnes, 2017; Pidgeon et 
al., 2003; Weyman et al., 2006). 
The process described by Braun and Clarke (2006) was used to inform the approach to 
the thematic analysis (Table 8). While it might appear that the process is undertaken step 
by step, in reality this was more appropriately cast as an iterative process, where 
previous steps and categorisations are returned to, to assess the fit of new material as it 
was identified from the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Through the analysis, the constant 
comparison technique (see Glaser & Strauss, 1967) proved useful; this involved the 
researcher taking each piece of data and comparing it with others that were similar or 




Process of thematic analysis (adapted from Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Stage Description of activities 
Familiarisation with the data  Transcription and repeated re-reading of the data, 
actively searching for themes and patterns 
Generating initial codes Organisation of data into meaningful groups, ensuring 
context is maintained 
Searching for themes Refocusing analysis on overarching themes 
encompassing the codes from the previous stage 
Reviewing themes Refinement of themes considering internal 
homogeneity and external heterogeneity 
Defining and naming themes Considering themes themselves and in relation to other 
themes, define scope and content of themes 
Reporting  Reporting on the process of coding and theme 
development, showing systematic process 
4.2.10 Initial Coding of Transcripts 
The transcribed data were imported into the software program Nvivo (9), a computer 
assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) programme. A combination of deductive 
and inductive coding in line with the approach described by Fereday and Muir-Cohcrane 
(2006) was applied to generate initial themes. This involved identification of themes as 
they arose, while interpretation was guided through reference to published findings 
(Chapter 2). So, although the process was fundamentally inductive, there was a degree 
of deductive interpretation of themes. The breadth of existing research made 
identification of known concepts likely (e.g. Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000) but as 
this military naval aviation population had yet to be the focus of safety culture research, it 
was expected that this also embodied the potential to identify previously unrecognised or 
under-articulated constructs.  
The process of generating initial codes involved small sections of text being allocated 
with a phrase or word to describe what the text was referring to; this allowed assembly of 
the data into meaningful groups (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Each transcript was 
analysed systematically, with equal attention given to all parts (in line with Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Some of these initial codes were coded and recoded in an iterative 
manner according to the surrounding contextual data, using constant comparison. Initial 




Initial codes from the transcript data (N=12). 
Pressure from 'above' Fatigue 
Team and peer support important Importance - saving lives, defence 
Individual responsibility Conflicting priorities  
Military ethos-acceptance of rules and 
procedures 
Strong identity, pride-'can do' attitude is 
key to FAA organisation 
Need for training and experience to adapt 
to situations  
'Them and us' regards e.g. RAF and Army 
Peer review and cross checking as normal  Management and supervisors 
Frustration with change in policy and 
procedures 
Training 
No, or delayed, feedback when technical 
changes are requested (paperwork) 
Communication 
High situation awareness required Reporting/feedback 
Information overload Policy & procedures have to be there for 
safety 
Hierarchy-trust in terms of box ticking Working environment - hazardous by 
nature 
Risk averseness due to 'covering one's 
back' 
Blame / just culture 
Pressure-varying demands Equipment resource 
Manpower  Operational pressure 
Operational requirements big driver Time (not operational) pressure 
Reporting of incidents Implications of making a mistake/having an 
accident 
Managing risks as part of the job Supervisor responsibility -PPE 
Wearing of correct PPE important Norms get taught from supervisor to junior 
Not able to practice as often (pilots) so 
skills may fade 
Can't access IT to read policies and keep 
up to date 
Threat of working weekends if jobs are not 
finished 




Health and safety vs flight safety  Generic training-usefulness of manual 
handling training 
Sign off work, now your responsibility Aircrew need engineers to do their jobs 
before they can fly  
Managing risks as part of the job Supervisor responsibility 
Wearing of correct PPE important Norms get taught from supervisor to junior 
 
As a check on coding reliability, the codes shown in 
Table 9 were independently generated by the researcher and a colleague, following 
which the content, meaning and boundary of each of the codes was discussed between 
the two researchers. As during qualitative analysis pieces of data can be coded in more 
than one way, exploration of these potential codes was suggested to be an important 
aspect of the data analysis phase (Liamputtonong, 2009).  This process of initial 
independent data coding gave the opportunity to articulate common and divergent 
interpretations, serving to challenge the researchers' perspectives and hone the codes 
and their boundaries.  
4.2.11 Searching for Themes 
On completion of initial coding, the process of searching for themes was undertaken 
(detailed in Table 8).  This involved grouping together intuitively associated initial codes 
into categories of inter-related codes, the over-arching themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A 
core focus of this stage was on how the initial codes were similar and semantically 
related to each other, but also to determine their differences and boundaries. For 
example, some data indicated positive supervisor behaviour ("My PO [Petty officer] is 
pretty good if I need to stop because I don't know all the process"), while others detailed 
negative behaviour ("Yeah they say work safely, but they mean work fast and don't make 
a mistake"). However, both related to some components of supervisor behaviour and so 
were grouped together in a category labelled 'Supervisor- safety priority'. This stage 
required the researcher to consider not just what was being said in the text, but also the 
meaning behind the participants' words.  
Any codes that did not initially appear to be related to any others were grouped together 
under the category 'Other'. These codes were revisited and all codes within the 'other' 
category were subsequently assigned to identified categories. The identified themes from 




Initial themes developed from the codes. 
Theme Aspects included in theme 
Pressures Time, supervisor and reputation, fatigue, manpower 
Operational capability Need to be safe but can't be completely safe, would never 
leave hanger 
Team and peer support 
important 
Pride and 'can-do', importance - saving lives, defence of the 
nation, them vs us (army, RAF) 
Acceptance of rules and 
procedures 
Peer review and cross checking as normal, frustrations and 
barriers to following procedures, constant changes to process 
and procedures. 
Training Need for training and experience to adapt to situations- 
specific vs generic training 
Individual responsibility Risk management is part of the job although at junior levels, 
just follow procedures. Personal culpability more so now than 
before (legislation). Everybody watches out for each other 
Risk perception Consequences of making a mistake/accident. Working 
environment hazardous by nature 
Senior management Box ticking and risk averseness 
Supervisors Role for training and mentoring, looking out for staff, checking 
Communication Feedback through publications, reporting and technical 
changes to publications, just vs blame culture in dealing with 
reports, reporting as teaching tool 
 
4.2.12 Reviewing, Defining and Naming Themes 
When reviewing themes, particular consideration was given to those which were only 
sparingly supported with data, or themes in which the codes were notably diverse. 
Patton's (1990) criteria of internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity were used to 
guide this stage. Here, data within each theme should fit together meaningfully, and be 
distinct from data in other themes. Several iterations of mind maps were used to 
understand the relationships between the themes in Table 10. During this process the 
content of each theme became increasingly consistent, allowing definition and naming of 
the themes. The content of each theme was summarised in a single sentence that aimed 




Themes and categories prior to inter-rater reliability testing. 
Theme Definition  Categories (sub-themes) 
Policy, rules and procedures Relates to policy, rules and procedures, including aspects of acceptance that rules 
are required, barriers to following procedures and situational effects on 
compliance and interpretation or rules. 
Cultural legitimacy 
Barriers to compliance  
Interpretation of rules 
Situational effect on rule compliance 
Pressure Refers to any pressure, perceived or real, that is caused by the need to achieve 
organisational goals, including a lack of resources (human and equipment), 
secondary roles, or pressure caused by one function on another 
(aircrew/engineers). 
Goal achievement: organisational 
pressure 
Interdependence of functions e.g. 
aircrew and engineers 
Leadership and management 
ownership of safety  
Relates to issues of how safety is managed, specifically role and effect of 
supervisors as well as issues relating to senior management ownership of safety 
under the Duty Holder construct. 
Supervisory ownership of safety 




Refers to identification of self as a part of the greater organisation and pride to be 
identified as such, including references to safety being a part of ‘who they are’ as 





Individual responsibility: role in 
safety management 
Includes aspects of looking out for each other and ensuring safety within the group 
because they are part of it. 
Camaraderie and social policing 
Risk perception and 
consequences 
Relates to risks associated with work roles, function or the environment they work 
in, situations in which they would take risks or be risk averse and individual role as 
managers of risk. This also relates to consequences associated with making 
errors or causing an accident. 
Perceived consequences 
Role as risk managers 
Just culture, reporting and 
feedback 
Refers to how safety communication flows around the organisation, up, down and 
across, this includes reporting and feedback as well as barriers to reporting. 
Included in this are explicit references to just culture; whether they are willing to 
own up to a mistake, the consequences of owning up or what happens to people 
after they have been found to have made an error. 
Communication of reporting 
Barriers to reporting 
Sub-cultures 
Training and experience Refers to issues of training and experience, including aspects of competency and 
currency, erosion in training requirements and effects of this on personnel 
confidence. 




4.2.13 Inter-Coder Reliability 
Once the thematic framework had been developed, it was important to establish its reliability 
with a view to minimising bias (Daly, McDonald & Willis, 1992). Three transcripts, chosen to 
reflect a mix of functions and taken from the start, middle and end of the data collection 
phase, were coded independently by the author and an associate using the coding 
framework (Table 11). Cohen's kappa (k) statistic (Cohen, 1968) was calculated as an 
indicator of inter-rater reliability.  An initial kappa of 0.62, below the acceptable threshold of 
0.70 (Field, 2005) prompted a discussion regarding the definitions and boundaries of the 
themes amongst the author, the associate researcher and the primary thesis supervisor. 
Particular consideration was given to themes that displayed the lowest concordance. These 
themes were individual responsibility and risk perception. The interrelation and overlap 
between these themes was identified; personnel appeared to consider safety a personal 
responsibility, and looked out for colleagues because they considered them to be a ‘team’, 
due to being acutely aware of the risks associated with their work and what the consequence 
of behaving unsafely might be. These themes were ultimately truncated into a single theme 
called 'Individual and collective responsibility’. A second inter-rater reliability assessment (on 
a further two transcripts which were selected in a similar manner to the original three) 
produced a kappa of 0.72, an acceptable level of inter-rater reliability. The final thematic 
framework is shown in Table 12 and an indication of the spread of these themes across the 




Final thematic framework with seven themes and twelve categories/sub-themes. 
Theme  Definition  Categories (sub-themes) 
Policy & procedures 
(T1) 
Relates to policy, rules and procedures, including aspects of acceptance that 
rules are required, barriers to following procedures and situational effects on 
compliance and interpretation or rules. 
Legitimacy 
Barriers to compliance 
Bureaucracy & accountability 
Pressure (T2) Refers to any pressure, perceived or real, that is caused by need to achieve 
organisational goals, lack of resources (human and equipment), secondary 
roles, or pressure caused by one function on another (aircrew/engineers). 
Goal achievement: organisational 
pressure 
Interdependence of functions 
Leadership & safety 
ownership (T3) 
Relates to issues of how safety is managed, specifically role and effect of 
supervisors as well as issues relating to senior management ownership of 
safety under the Duty Holder construct. 
Supervisory/line management 




This includes aspects of looking out for each other and ensuring safety within 
the group because they are part of it. This includes how this has an effect on 
risk perception, situations in which they would take risks or be risk averse and 
individual role as managers of risk. This also relates to consequences 
associated with making errors or causing an accident 
Perceived consequences  
Camaraderie   
Communication (T5) Refers to how safety communication flows around the organisation, up, down 
and across, this includes reporting and feedback as well as barriers to reporting. 
Included in this are explicit references to just culture; whether they are willing to 
own up to a mistake, the consequences of owning up or what happens to 





Refers to issues of training and experience, including aspects of competency 





Refers to identification of self as a part of the greater organisation and pride to 
be identified as such, including references to safety being a part of ‘who they 











Theme 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
T1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 12 
T2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 12 
T3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 12 
T4 ✓ 
 





























✓ ✓ ✓ 8 
Note: ✓ = theme identified in data from focus group. 
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4.3 Findings and Interpretation of Identified Themes 
The focus groups provided a detailed insight into participants' commentaries about flight 
safety. The themes in Table 12 are considered to characterise headline influences on 
workplace safety culture and risk decision making amongst naval military aviation personnel. 
The following section discussed and interpreted the themes, making reference to identified 
phenomena in published findings. Illustrations from participant accounts were evidenced as 
direct quotations which are "italicised", with participant demographic information contained in 
(parentheses) where possible.  
4.3.1 Policy & Procedures 
Identified in all twelve focus group discussions, the theme of policy and procedures was 
portrayed as playing a key role in how safety was perceived and implemented throughout 
the organisation. The inherently procedural nature of aviation activities was apparent 
amongst both aircrew “Nearly everything that we do in aviation is very procedural” and 
engineers “Everything that we do is laid down in procedures –there is always a reference or 
a book you can look in if you’re unsure”. Rules and procedures were described as being 
particularly key in two situations. Firstly, less experienced personnel would typically utilise 
checklists and printed procedure cards until they gained sufficient experience to complete 
tasks through skill. Secondly, the proceduralisation of tasks in emergency situations, and the 
repeated training of these procedures, were said to prompt almost instinctive reactions. This 
was held to allow personnel to deal with rapidly escalating events safely, particularly in the 
case of aircrew during flight. For both functions, strong organisational disapproval of a 
'failure to follow procedures' was articulated as a driver for compliance; "so [if] you’re 
knowingly stepping away from those SOPs (standard operating procedures), I don’t think 
many people, if any, would knowingly do that in this day and age" (Engineer, senior). 
These descriptions of rule/procedure use were congruent with published findings within 
aviation where procedures are often used as a means of organisational control to minimise 
risk. They do this by restricting operator behaviour to that which the organisation considers 
to be safe and efficient (Reason, Parker & Lawton, 1998) and by reducing ambiguity in 
decision making (Lawton & Parker, 2002). Employee freedom of action is restricted, while at 
the same time they are supported by being provided ready solutions to known problems 
(Weichbrodt, 2015). 
There were three sub-themes identified within the theme of policy and procedures; 
legitimacy, barriers to compliance and bureaucracy/accountability. These sub-themes 
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provided interesting insight into the sense making of naval aviation employees and the 
practicalities of procedural compliance within a large and complex military organisation.  
Legitimacy 
There was a notable consensus amongst participants that procedures generally represented 
the safest means of conducting an activity; "If we all followed procedures, outside of 
mechanical failures on aircraft, human factors wouldn’t happen" (Aircrew). Participants 
mostly agreed that "we have to follow the procedure, we can’t go out on your own remit and 
start doing ‘ah we feel this is the way to do it’; you have to follow policy" (Engineer, junior). 
Some explanation for this was articulated, as "many of these rules we've got in place have 
been brought about because of accidents happening in the past, i.e. lessons learned" 
(Engineer, junior). The implementation of policy and procedures in response to 
recommendations from accident or incident investigations were common examples cited 
within the focus groups. These data were interpreted as indications that procedures were 
followed, not simply because they were mandated, but because the procedures were seen 
to have high cultural legitimacy amongst aviation employees.  
These findings are congruent with published insights which hold that a high level of 
acceptance and adherence to safety rules is a characteristic of aviation culture (Hopkins, 
2010). However, some have shown that this may vary by function/profession, where 
maintenance engineers have been cited as asserting the importance of individual flexibility in 
rule interpretation (Gill & Shergill, 2004). The view that procedures were developed through 
learning from accident investigations reflects learning from experience, a common aspiration 
in aviation. Learning from experience describes an organisation's attempt to reduce the 
likelihood of human errors by refining procedures and policy through using information 
gathered from investigations of accidents and incidents, therefore outlining routines for 
solutions to recurring problems (Weichbrodt, 2015). 
The effect of social desirability bias cannot, however, be discounted in this finding - the 
organisation has displayed a notable interest in 'failure to follow procedure' in recent years 
and imposes sanctions (such as disciplinary actions) on non-compliance. It is possible that 
focus group participants may have been influenced by this knowledge, and so voiced 
opinions that were in line with the organisational policy. However, this concern was in part 
ameliorated as there were several instances where participants described examples where 
shortcuts could be introduced into the work process, thus suggesting that procedures and 
policies were not followed in all instances. These shortcuts were cited as occurring through 
behaviours taught to juniors by more experienced personnel, particularly engineers; "A lot of 
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the shortcuts that the younger supervisors take is because the... Chief or PO (supervisor) 
has taught them that". Plausibly, older or more senior personnel may be more likely to have 
experienced times where tasks were not so highly proceduralised and had greater 
autonomy.  
While this process of teaching and learning is likely to be key to improving junior personnel's 
skills, there are some potential safety implications. Senior or experienced engineers may 
have a better conceptual knowledge of the systems they work with as they operate at higher 
functional levels, which junior personnel may not have. More experienced personnel are also 
likely to have amassed skills and experience which junior personnel have not yet gained. 
The safety implications of this transfer of shortcuts were acknowledged; “The PO knows the 
whole system-what shortcuts they can take and why. Whereas the guys with less experience 
only know the short cut, not what it’s shortcutting - they forget to do one thing and it all goes 
wrong" (Engineer, supervisor). It is of interest that references to shortcuts were only 
identified in engineering group transcripts; two potential reasons for this were hypothesised. 
Firstly, engineering activities often require fault analysis, which do not always follow set 
procedures. Secondly, aircrew checklists and flight procedures are commonly cross checked 
by several crew and performed in strict sequences; it may be that there are fewer 
opportunities to deviate from these rigid checklists.  
Employee buy-in to policy and procedures is important as safety rules and barriers can only 
fulfil their purpose if they are being adhered to (Lawton, 1998). However, compliance 
typically requires the expenditure of time and effort, and within aviation accident 
investigations it is often concluded that non-compliance was a major contributory factor to 
the incident (Dahl, 2013; Dekker, 2003). Therefore, it is possible that while strong cultural 
acceptance of procedures is important in compliance, this may not be the sole factor 
influencing employee behaviour. Within the theme of policy and procedures, several other 
factors were identified as influencing non-compliance, and were grouped under the sub-
theme of barriers to compliance.  
Barriers to Compliance 
Focus group participants suggested that although “people are trying to follow procedures”, 
there were situations in which compliance was deemed either impossible or difficult to 
achieve. These barriers were sub-divided into two main areas of discussion; (a) a lack of 
knowledge and (b) dislocation between the expectation of compliance and reality of 
everyday work. This sub-theme occurred in both aircrew and engineering focus groups. 
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Lack of Knowledge 
Participants described frequent examples of a perceived lack of knowledge of the policy or 
procedures applicable in specific situations "I don’t think everybody necessarily knows 
exactly what procedures or what policies or regulations are necessarily applicable to what 
you’re doing all the time" (Engineer). This cited lack of knowledge was attributed to four main 
factors.  Firstly, the sheer volume of policy "Each week more policy comes out and 
everyone’s expected to read it and take it in. It just seems to go on and on" (Aircrew). 
Secondly, the disparate nature of the guidance within written documentation made it difficult 
to locate "It’s not all in one place, it’s spread around. It’s in multiple locations". The third 
factor was described as a perception of an almost constant rate of change within policy and 
procedures "It’s always getting amended and changes made to it" which resulted in 
difficulties keeping up to date. Finally, concerns with the method of communication (often 
email) and poor information technology infrastructure were cited as affecting the ability to 
access policy and procedures, occasionally leaving personnel unaware of recent changes or 
updated documentation. The FAA has experienced an intense “pace of concomitant change” 
(Ministry of Defence, 2012, p4) to their regulation and policy in recent years, driven by 
changes to regulation made under the Military Aviation Authority (described in Chapter 1). 
This is likely to have had policy and procedure implications and may partially explain the 
presence of the barriers cited by military naval aviation participants' in this study. 
 
Similar barriers have been reported previously, with a large volume of prescriptive 
documentation seen as characteristic of aviation (Drury & Johnson, 2013). The burden of 
this documentation lies in the fact that it needs to be written, verified and then updated and 
maintained synchronously (Drury & Johnson, 2013), a process which would arguably be 
made more difficult if the information is not centralised. However, this bureaucracy is 
important within aviation to avoid changes that may be unsound or have unintended 
consequences (Drury & Johnson, 2013). Similar findings have been cited amongst railway 
workers having difficulty in locating complex rules (Elling,1987, cited in Dahl, 2013), and 
miners who were not aware of procedures that existed in written documents (Laurence, 
2005). 
The result of this perceived inability to keep pace with current policy and procedure were 
highlighted by participants as unintentional violations, the likelihood of missing an important 
rule; "Not knowing the rule? There’s so many different rules and regulations, you going down 
missing the one that might be the important one, because you didn’t know". (Aircrew). This 
risk of unintentional violations through a lack of knowledge has been previously identified 
(Laurence, 2005). However, these unintentional violations have often been blamed on an 
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inappropriate attitude or lack of motivation toward compliance, rather than knowledge of the 
rules that govern work (Dahl, 2013), suggesting a possible lack of understanding about the 
structural and organisational barriers that employees face when attempting to comply with 
policy and procedures. As the actual knowledge of rules and procedures was not tested in 
the current study it is unclear whether this is a real deficit, or a perceived one. 
Dislocation Between Expectation and Reality 
The second sub-division of barriers to compliance was broadly characterised as a claimed 
dislocation between the practical reality of meeting task requirements and adherence to 
procedures. Participants expressed the perception that "If people followed procedures to the 
letter, they wouldn’t get things done as quickly as everybody claims to get it done” (Engineer, 
junior). Participants gave descriptions of a lack of appreciation of the extra time burden 
created by adhering to the policy and procedures "A lot of this policy adds time on to jobs 
[agreement] which I don’t really think is taken into account" (Engineer) which suggested that 
task planning may require better consideration of the time burden. A further dislocation was 
highlighted through descriptions of inconsistent, inaccurate or inadequate procedures which 
often resulted in a difference between the way in which tasks were planned and how they 
were conducted. This was transparently a source of frustration, “There were several 
occasions where you could actually find two bits of contradictory, um, information, so what 
we were doing was applying common sense” (Engineer). 
This dislocation between expectation and reality was said to partly arise from procedures 
being written by people not familiar with the work environment: “They (the people writing 
procedures) don’t necessarily have the competency and the experience to actually write the 
regulations that they’ve been asked to write" (Aircrew). The increased burden of these poorly 
written procedures was said to manifest amongst those frontline staff tasked with actually 
applying the rules "And then we are exhaustively trying to implement those and it’s not 
surprising that actually when you are actually at the coal face, there are huge amounts of 
effort being exhausted by everyone” (Engineer). These experiences were interpreted as 
reflecting a possible disconnect between senior policy makers and those who translate and 
apply policy to every-day work. Frustration and resistance might be expected from 
employees who perceived this process as wholly 'top-down', with little autonomy over how 
these policies are then enacted (Lamvik et al., 2009). 
The result of this dislocation of expectation/task planning and reality was described by 
participants as manifesting in locally accepted ways of working, which would then assume 
the status of custom and practice “A lot of it has become the norm so you don’t think about it, 
it becomes second nature and you don’t even think you are bending the rule because it’s 
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what you’ve always done” (Engineer). These ‘norms’ were taught to others, over time 
creating a situation where “Potentially people doing that may not know that that’s something 
that they shouldn’t be doing. Or they might, but not really consider the implications” 
(Engineer). Significantly, the formation of these norms in this way was identified by 
personnel as a source of uncontrolled risk “You’ve got routine violations, standardised 
norms, that kind of thing, that is an unknown risk decision” (Engineer, supervisor).  
The situation described above corroborates published findings where organisational 
measures to promote safety, such as personal protective equipment and procedures may be 
ill-fitted to field (or frontline) situations as a consequence of being devised by people with 
little recent exposure to frontline activities (Lamvik et al., 2009). As procedures change, and 
policy is updated, it is important to make sure that these can be performed as documented 
as the creation of 'norms' is widely held to increase the potential for error and unintended 
consequences (Reason, 1997). Unfortunately, these 'norms' often go undetected until an 
accident has occurred, and are then described as violations. Norms are generally built on 
the premise that past success is taken to guarantee future safety (Dekker, 2003). People in 
these situations may not recognise the widening gap between how things are done, and how 
they are formally prescribed, which has been referred to as 'practical drift' (Weichbrodt, 
2015). As these local practices become shared and accepted, they may have the unintended 
consequence of negatively affecting the perceived purpose and importance of procedures - 
indeed if many procedures are seen to be inadequate or inappropriate, this may reduce the 
confidence in any procedures in the organisation (Drury & Johnson, 2013). To combat this, 
involving operational personnel in regular reappraisal of procedures has been identified as a 
way of assuring the applicability and usefulness of procedures (Hale & Borys, 2013). 
In summary, despite an apparent employee 'buy-in' to following procedures, a variety of 
difficulties faced by personnel that influenced compliance with policy and procedures were 
identified. The impact of these barriers on personnel is described and integrated within the 
third sub-theme, that of bureaucracy/accountability.  
Bureaucracy/Accountability 
Despite the legitimacy afforded to procedures, there was an almost contradictory view of 
much of the policy with which individuals were expected to comply. A cited perception was 
that the organisation placed the onus on the individual for keeping up to date with policies, 
despite a claimed incompatibility between time available and volume of material “If you’ve 
read them front to back it would probably take you three or four months.” (Engineer). The 
requirement for employees to provide signed affirmation that they had read and 
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understood current policy, despite this incompatibility, was interpreted by participants as 
the organisation transferring accountability toward operators/frontline personnel “I feel that 
accountability has become much more of an issue, with ever increasing document sets of 
rules and regulations and more stringent procedures and signing to say you’ve read 
everything is potentially going to see someone in the dock, you know personally 
responsible.” (Aircrew). This comment was interpreted as reflecting a concern that 
appeared to be generally shared across engineers and aircrew; "I think on all levels we 
are aware of accountability so, the decisions that you make, you will live and die by those 
decisions from higher authority" (Engineer). This accountability also manifested in signing 
for work processes "Every job you do, you sign to say you’ve done that job in accordance 
with that paperwork” (Engineer, junior), which participants often interpreted as ultimately 
placing all responsibility and accountability with the individual signing the form “Everything 
is signed for, all legally binding, if something has gone wrong and somebody has cut a 
corner, shall we say, and not followed the procedure, then they’ve not got a leg to stand 
on because the paperwork is there for you to follow” (Engineer, junior). 
This incompatibility between required awareness of policy and insufficient time or resources 
with which to fully achieve this manifested as sponsoring a sense of (non-compliant) 
personal vulnerability. It appeared to engender cases where participants were aware of, or 
suspected, a deficiency in their own knowledge. Whilst it was not suggested that personnel 
should not be accountable (see later discussion of the theme Individual & collective 
responsibility), there remained an underlying concern amongst participants of inadvertent 
non-compliance. Here, it is suggested that the organisation might be demanding more from 
its members than might be possible, given the constraints placed upon them, a situation 
cited by Wong and Gerras (2015) as existing within the US Army. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that a reliance on individual motivation and capacity to seek out new information 
(as is reportedly the case here), is a weak strategy for effective communication of changes 
(Dahl & Olsen, 2013).  
Descriptions of bureaucracy/accountability in the current study have been noted in published 
findings where bureaucratic routines, such as requiring workers signing to say that specific 
rules and procedures were known and understood, are common (Dahl, 2013; Fruhen et al. 
2013; Szymczak, 2014). Indeed, rules have been described as providing accountability 
through defining responsibility for tasks (Power, 2004) and are a key feature of bureaucracy. 
However, Dahl (2013) demonstrated that bureaucratic routines (i.e. getting employees to 
sign for work) were not sufficient to certify appropriate employee knowledge. Therefore, 
there appears a risk that if organisations rely on bureaucratic routines there is the possibility 
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that they may have a false sense of security regarding the level of knowledge and 
compliance by employees. Indeed, there is a fine balance between the creation of sufficient 
processes to control safety, and excessive bureaucratization (Weichbrodt, 2015). Potential 
negative side effects of accountability include risk aversion (O' Hara et al., 2014), less 
hands-on time for supervisors to advise, lead and teach team members (Lamvik et al., 2009) 
and transfer in liability for the cost of harm onto the workers themselves (Dekker, 2014). 
Thus, arguably, organisations require a realistic understanding of the level of bureaucracy 
which might be inherent within their own systems, and how this might affect employee safety 
behaviour.  
In summary, policy and procedures was identified as a key theme amongst military naval 
aviation personnel discussions around safety; while procedures were generally seen to be 
important, certain organisational level barriers to compliance were said to lead to increased 
perceptions of bureaucracy, accountability and personal vulnerability.  
4.3.2 Pressure 
Recounted experiences suggested that although non-compliance with safety policy and 
procedures would tend to be met with strong cultural, and institutional disapproval, sources 
of pressure allied to task completion were part of the everyday reality of work. This theme 
was identified across all twelve focus groups, and was considered to be a defining influence 
in shaping the culture of safety amongst military naval aviation employees. The theme of 
pressure was comprised of two sub-themes; firstly, organisational pressure arising from a 
focus on goal achievement and, secondly, pressure arising from an inter-dependence of 
function.  
Goal Achievement 
A strong influence within participant accounts on how safety was understood was the 
perception that the primary aim of employees was to support organisational output, known 
within the FAA as operational capability. However, this was also described as being balanced 
with ensuring high standards of flight safety. The operational capability referred to by 
participants can range from supporting demands in a theatre of war “The reason we’re here 
is defence of the country” (Engineer), search and rescue or humanitarian activities and 
peace-time training exercises to maintain levels of competent and experienced personnel 
"You’ve got a flypro (flying programme) to meet or training to meet or even an operational 
programme to meet” (Engineer). It was clear that most participants viewed the FAA as 
different to civilian aviation organisations “We’re not a profit-making organisation, we’re all 
about operational capability” (Engineer, supervisor). In several cases, it was observed that 
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this separation from civilian organisations was used by participants as a justification for 'their' 
way of organising safety.  
Supporting these organisational goals was described as fundamental “We are in the military, 
we have to be operationally effective, we have to have that capability” (Aircrew).  To achieve 
these goals while remaining safe, the focus of discussion was on managing risks; this in 
itself was seen as an integral part of the military aviation role, with risk aversion seen to be a 
hindrance to organisational output. In balancing the sometimes-conflicting goals of 
operational capability and safety, personnel described themselves as risk managers, with 
the responsibility to determine the appropriate actions or mitigations. Consideration of risk in 
military, as compared to civilian, contexts has not yet received much attention in the 
published literature (Falconer, 2006a) and may provide a unique insight in the understanding 
of risk management. As compared to civilian organisations, for whom profit may create the 
greatest counterpoint to safety, in the FAA risk was often related to a greater ability to 
produce capability to support defence and humanitarian efforts. Indeed, in the military, risks 
may be judged acceptable in relation to the gains that are made in relation to operational 
capability (Turner & Tennant, 2009).  
The ability to manage risks and maximise operational capability was said to be negatively 
affected by shortfalls in equipment; “Money definitely seems to be a problem, cut backs or 
not having the equipment” (Engineer); "Maybe we haven’t actually got the equipment to do it, 
or not have some of the kit, that’s really frustrating"(Engineer) and human resource "There’s 
fewer of us as well, there just aren’t the people around” (Aircrew). These shortfalls presented 
as aggravating pressure at both team and individual levels, leaving less 'slack' with which to 
deal with unexpected situations. To compound this issue, participants described resources 
as not being matched with the overall output required “We don’t want to reduce our output at 
all, and the resource is getting less” (Aircrew).  
Time pressure was a cited contributor to the tension between fulfilling both safety and 
operational goals; "They think they are thinking safety, but there is, I think there is just too 
many hidden pressures sometimes. It comes to that point where they are just too blinded by 
everything that needs to be done that, they’re not trying to be unsafe-but I think they are just 
so blinded by ‘we have got to get this finished tomorrow’ that they can’t take that step back" 
(Engineer). This focus on goal achievement, described through first-hand experience, is 
likely to reflect an enhanced disposition to sacrifice secondary objectives in some situations.  
However, unlike combat situations, where worthwhile sacrifices might be acceptable (Bird, 




Failure to achieve these operational goals was cast as risking reputation damage, both to 
the individual "You don’t want to be the one to turn round and who says we can’t do it" 
(Engineer, junior); or the team. Indeed, "People feel they need to be doing stuff to get the 
good reports” (Aircrew), a situation which was said to sponsor a ‘can-do’ attitude which was 
cast to be at odds with cited institutional directives to the contrary. By extension, it seemed 
that individual or team status might be enhanced by goal achievement in the face of 
adversity, which may be indicative of an underlying military culture (Bird, 2003). This was 
evidenced in the data where it was suggested that “(This may be) indicative of how we 
recruit and select people and promote their careers" (Aircrew). Comparable findings on a 
Swedish military sample suggest that, provided neither new pilots or senior command were 
observing, a certain amount of rule breaking was informally rewarded (Larsson et al., 2005). 
The 'can-do' culture identified here has previously been recognised (Falconer, 2006a; 
Hopkins, 2006). However, this phrase does not always denote negative connotations and, 
particularly in military organisations, when coupled with a command system which expects 
orders to be obeyed, this attitude may be key to the functioning of the system (Hopkins, 
2006).  
Trade-offs related to tension between realising both operational/production objectives and 
safety objectives is widely acknowledged within the safety culture/climate literature, and has 
been evidenced across a variety of industries (Christian et al., 2009; Mearns et al., 2004; 
Nordlof et al., 2015; Weyman & Clarke, 2003). Arguably, when high performance is the 
principle criterion for the front line, safety may be perceived as sacrificial as an effect of 
managerial judgement (Westrum & Adamski, 2009) with a resultant reduced attention to 
safety rules that impede progress (Bosak et al., 2013). Safety requires a significant reliance 
on finite resources (human, material and time) at a time where many sectors experience a 
shortfall in these resources (Mearns et al., 2004). Frazier et al. (2013) linked ‘work pressure’ 
to the degree of management concern for safety, explaining that management create the 
operation schedule, and so have a direct impact on safety/production conflict. 
While the pressures experienced by personnel thus far were evidenced within both aircrew 
and engineer data, the second sub-theme of interdependence of function was specific to 
engineering participant discussions.  
Interdependence of Function 
Engineering personnel cited numerous experiences where they felt pressured specifically by 
aircrew, for example "When I was onboard we had pilots coming out to do walk-rounds 
before we had finished our servicing, because they had to make their flypro (flying 
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programme)" (Engineer, junior). This description was interpreted by the researcher to relate 
to the interdependence between engineering and aircrew functions. For aircrew to fulfil their 
function (fly the aircraft), the engineers must first successfully complete their task (make the 
aircraft ready to fly). Furthermore, the engineers performing the servicing of the aircraft are 
typically junior (rating) engineers, whilst aircrew are typically of a higher rank (officers). In 
this military system, therefore, this is the equivalent of senior management placing implicit 
pressure on junior staff by walking around their workplace and questioning them about 
progress.  
Some engineers did acknowledge that aircrew were not typically unreasonable "All we 
needed to do was say 'can you just let us finish our servicing please Sir?' And that would 
have probably have been fine. But as it was, everybody got all headless chickens and, 
running around and trying to get it all done.” (Engineer, junior). Thus, it would appear that 
this pressure may partially arise from within the engineers themselves, with some degree of 
assumption about the level of urgency implied by aircrew actions. Given that they will 
depend on the serviceability of the aircraft in flight, seems unlikely that the aircrew would 
deliberately pressure the engineers into a position where safety may be compromised, 
however they may be unaware of the implicit pressure caused by their presence on junior 
personnel. This sub-theme of interdependence of function has not been explicitly identified 
within the safety culture and climate literature. However, a similarity was observed in Baker's 
(1998) safety culture survey for aviation maintainers in which a factor referred to as 
'communication/functional relationships' contained questions regarding the level at which 
maintainers were shielded from external pressures when completing a task.  
In summary, a variety of sources of pressure were described by participants as affecting 
safety behaviour. Several were common to aircrew and engineers, while one 
(interdependence of function) was specific to engineering participants.  
4.3.3 Leadership and Safety Ownership   
The theme of leadership and safety ownership related to employee perceptions of the 
relationship between management/leadership and safety within the organisation. This theme 
was presented in participant accounts across all twelve focus groups, with a distinct 
separation between the characterisation of supervisory and senior management levels. 
Supervisory/line management  
Supervisors/line managers were presented as most influential in day-to-day business, being 
directly responsible for the safety of their teams and their output. Supervisors tended to be 
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cast as key role models, passing knowledge, safety behaviours and shaping the culture of 
future generations of supervisors “The different techniques that people have to supervise, 
and the way they’ve been taught, and the procedures that they follow, are passed down to 
the lads.” (Engineer, supervisor). The potential for poor safety behaviours to be passed 
down was acknowledged; “If you get someone who says the procedures are not important 
then if you get into a trend of doing that then when those lads become supervisors then they 
will say that that’s the way they’ve always done it.” (Engineer). Thus, it would appear that 
participants in this organisation take many of their cues regarding safe behaviour from their 
supervisors/line managers. Thus, these positions are likely to be key roles within the safety 
management system for both teaching and monitoring of appropriate safety behaviour. 
Other supervisory responsibilities ranged from watching out for more junior personnel, 
"Periodically [check] to make sure that he’s safe throughout it" (Engineer, supervisor), to 
regulating compliance with protective equipment and work procedures, to acting as a role 
model. Much of the strength of supervisor effect on the focus group participants was 
attributed to the small organisational distance between frontline personnel and their 
supervisors “On the shop floor you’re like the first line of defence to make sure nothing goes 
wrong, people rely on you to make sure its supervised and the job is done properly because 
you're middle management and higher management they are in offices so they need you to 
do your job properly" (Engineer, supervisor). The fact that senior and junior aircrew often 
flew aircraft together was cited as a possible reason for the strong influence of 
seniors/supervisors on junior aircrew.  
Underpinning the discussions was a belief that confidence and trust in supervisors/line 
management were key enablers for raising safety issues or concerns; “When your 
(managers) are like ‘fine yeah crack on’ you know - and they don’t make an issue out of it, 
that’s when you feel more comfortable being able to speak up” (Aircrew, junior). The degree 
to which participants were likely to admit an error was linked to how they had observed their 
supervisors react to similar situations in the past, particularly if it was felt that they had acted 
fairly or not. Unfortunately, participants described the risk of these supervisory functions 
being hindered by increasing bureaucracy “Well that stops you being on the shop floor 
supervising as much because you’re doing paperwork, you’re in the office” (Engineer, 
supervisor). 
The descriptions of reduced hands-on supervision described in the current study was 
somewhat reflective of other industries such as oil and gas, where a 'drift' in management 
practices saw managers spending increasing amounts of time on planning, handling 
procedures, reports and documents and less time on hands on work (Lamvik et al., 2009). 
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Work overload and production pressure have also been cited as hindering supervisor safety 
leadership (Conchie et al., 2013). The descriptions of supervisor effects on employee 
behaviour in this study corroborate previous findings in which role model behaviour and 
subsequent reinforcing behaviour was attributed to monitoring and control by supervisors 
(Flin & Yule, 2004; Thompson, Hilton & Witt, 1998). 
Senior Management  
In contrast to the lengthy and detailed discussions surrounding the importance of 
supervisors on employee safety, articulated first-hand knowledge of senior management 
ownership of safety was limited. These discussions appeared to be cast more as general 
impressions, which is likely to reflect the fact that few of the focus group participants held 
senior management positions (see Table 7). This is, perhaps, similar to many large, 
hierarchical organisations and so it was of interest to explore the methods by which 
participants interpreted senior management commitment to safety if not by first hand 
observation. Currently, little is known about how senior management actually influence 
safety in practice, despite being acknowledged as integral to setting the tone and tempo of 
activities (Flin et al., 2000).  
Participants appeared to have mixed perceptions as to the role and motivation of senior 
management in relation to safety. Some described senior management as having a good 
ownership of safety, observed through the resources dedicated to training, safety promotion 
and accident/near miss reporting. Others, however expressed disillusionment as to the 
motivation behind senior management commitment to safety. Impressions of senior 
management using safety as a "box ticking" exercise and becoming increasingly focused on 
the minutiae surrounding adverse incidents (rather than what the participants saw as the 
‘real' issues) were described as placing unwarranted pressure on frontline/supervisory staff. 
Although this might be seen as senior management becoming more aware of safety 
concerns, it was in this case interpreted by participants as management wanting to ensure 
that their 'backs were covered' and fostering risk averseness "The risk averse nature of the 
people higher up the echelons, all the way up and in between, they are not taking that risk 
on" (Aircrew).  
Similar observations to those reported here have been made in other large, bureaucratic 
organisations (Cabrera et al., 1997; Mearns et al., 2003) which may reflect the lack of 
transparency with which they operate. It is often difficult to see the reasoning behind 
decisions made at senior levels from frontline roles, and this may lead to assumptions being 
made about senior management motivations. The hierarchical structure might affect the 
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communication of these policies, such that the purpose of the policies may not 'filter' down to 
the frontline (Yule et al., 2007). Tappura et al. (2017) suggested that the key role of senior 
management in relation to safety is through ensuring the correct organisational policies are 
in place, operating as they should and providing sufficient resources to enact these policies.  
In summary, although the influence of managers and supervisors was described to be key to 
safety, much of this was attributed to supervisors/line managers, rather than senior 
managers. However, the lack of senior management participants within the focus groups 
may have limited the insight into this sub-population. 
4.3.4 Individual & Collective Responsibility 
The fourth theme was labelled as individual and collective responsibility, and was comprised 
of the sub-themes of perceived consequences and camaraderie. This theme was identified 
in seven of the twelve focus groups, both engineering and aircrew, although only in two of 
four junior engineering focus groups. Participants presented a high intrinsically motivated 
view of their individual responsibility for safety, in relation to personal safety, the safety of 
colleagues “We’re our brother’s keeper and look out for each other” (Aircrew), and the 
public. 
Perceived Consequences 
The high levels of personal responsibility inferred from employee experiences may stem 
from an appreciation of the severe consequences of military aviation that was evidenced in 
the data “These things are multi-million pound aircraft, and they are dangerous when they go 
wrong” (Engineer). Military aviation was portrayed by participants as inherently involving risk, 
which could not be completely eradicated, but rather managed appropriately “When those 
risks are made, predominately they are made with due risk assessment” (Engineer). This 
risk assessment was described as operating at macro (organisational) and micro (local risk 
assessments and risk-based decision making) levels. The risk of aviation activities was 
differentiated by the participants according to activity performed; flying was seen to be the 
activity associated with the highest consequence (to aircrew and the public). However, it was 
also acknowledged that work in the hanger (i.e. aircraft maintenance tasks) held certain risks 
as well, although potentially of a different type; lower severity but increased frequency.  
These findings corroborate those reported by Turner and Tennant (2009) who found that 
risks associated with military activities would not be acceptable in civilian companies, but 
were what allowed the military to achieve its objectives. Thomson (2015) suggested that in 
military environments there was an expectation of risk because of the nature of the 
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organisation, yet there may be a political/public perception that standards of safety should 
still be in some way comparable to civil standards.  
Camaraderie  
Separate from the hazardous nature of aviation was the second sub-theme that appeared to 
underpin how participants experienced individual responsibility for safety.  Here, small teams 
“On a flight you’re in a small group" (Engineer) and familiarity with others "You work with the 
same people day in day out” (Engineer) were described as being drivers for being mindful of 
one other’s safety as well as one’s own “You’ve got to kind of look after each other as well".  
This was interpreted by the researcher as a feeling of camaraderie, with groups of 
individuals taking on a moral responsibility for each other’s safety "I think you’ve got to be 
observant and look after each other as well, being switched on and thinking well someone 
could get themselves hurt". The particular responsibility of more senior or experienced ranks 
toward their juniors was apparent through cited examples "To an extent you are responsible 
for yourself but you might have a lad who’s a week 1 or week 2 trainee and it’s all new to him 
and they’re keen so they don’t look around" (Engineer, supervisor). 
Unsurprisingly, this camaraderie has been identified in other military samples, and has been 
referred to as 'fictive kinship', whereby groups of military personnel display close 
relationships that are created by shared experiences (Woodward & Jenkins, 2011).  
Camaraderie is said to be influenced by factors such as team size, member similarities, 
external competition and group success (Mitropoulos & Memarian, 2012); that it can create a 
sense of "belonging" in military personnel (Kirke, 2009; Veestraeten, Kyndt & Dochy, 2014); 
that it is integral to their functioning and that it reflects high group cohesion. It must be noted 
here that although the intrinsic motivation to work safely was apparent within the theme of 
individual and collective responsibility, this was not the sole factor related to this behaviour. 
The extrinsic motivation of legal responsibility and culpability, which was seen to operate 
predominately at the individual level, was keenly felt by many participants and was 
previously discussed within the sub-theme of bureaucracy/accountability. 
In summary, naval military aviation participants cited individual and collective responsibility 
as a key motivator for safety. The high consequences associated with aviation accidents, 
and high levels of camaraderie, which is typical of military organisations, appeared to foster 




The fifth headline influence on participant's perceptions of safety was communication within 
the organisation and was identified in nine group discussions (all four aircrew and five 
engineering groups). Two sub-themes were identified within communication, reporting and 
just culture. Top-down communication was described to exist in a variety of forms, including 
electronic communication (email), safety publications (quarterly and monthly), and through 
feedback from safety committees (held at unit level). However, while safety publications 
were perceived to be effective, there was some criticism of communication that relied on the 
hierarchical management structure "At squadron level your committee, especially in my 
experience, doesn’t pass on anything they’ve discussed down the chain". A more dominant 
aspect of this theme related to bottom-up lines of communication, through reporting of 
accidents/incidents/near misses.  
Reporting 
The FAA has a number of different methods for reporting, ranging from the formal air safety 
management system (an online tool for collating and managing safety reports), through to 
reporting logs (which are books in which people can write safety concerns that are then 
reviewed by safety representatives). An anonymous reporting mechanism is also available.  
Discussions between participants indicated that there was generally a positive, shared 
acceptance of the requirement to report accidents, incidents and near-misses "I think there 
always has been to quite a healthy degree, as far as my time being in, certainly from this, in 
talking about, discussing, reporting" (Aircrew). It was notable, however that these 
discussions were mostly held between participants of supervisory levels and above, with 
little detail appearing in focus group data from most junior personnel groups.  The reporting 
system was generally praised "We've got new reporting systems now and that resulted in a 
far more widespread knowledge of what's gone on" (Engineer), although some reservations 
from experienced individuals suggested that this system was being used to report events 
which were not safety related.  
While reporting of incidents, accidents and near-misses is made mandatory within the FAA, 
it is important that personnel believe in, and trust, the reporting process.  In this study, the 
acceptance of reporting as necessary appeared to be due partly to its perceived importance 
for facilitating learning "Other people's mistakes are really good learning tools" (Engineer) 
and "Every single one of them is reviewed for safety implications, making sure that action is 
taken from every occurrence" (Aircrew). Additionally, for some, the requirement to report 
near-misses and errors went beyond an organisationally driven requirement, to fall within 
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personal integrity "Integrity is a massive part of our job anyway, if you mess up you’ve got to 
put your hand up. You’ve got to at the end of the day." (Aircrew).  
The importance of communication of safety related information throughout an organisation is 
often cited as being integral to instilling a good safety culture (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007; 
Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Mearns et al., 2003) as it encourages trust between employees 
and management to identify and deal with hazards (Block, Sabin & Patankar, 2007). In this 
way, it is also practically necessary for identification of factors that may be embedded in the 
work environment or socio-technical systems. A good rate of quality incident reporting has 
often been used as an indicator of a well-functioning safety system (Fung et al., 2005). 
Although there was a general acceptance of the importance of reporting, a number of 
barriers were articulated, which enabled a contextualised understanding of reasons behind 
why participants might be less likely to report. The first of these was a notable concern over 
personal reputation “There’s just still the stigma of being labelled. You know, people start 
talking about it". There was also an expressed reserve toward reporting for fear of being 
seen as incompetent or as a trouble-causer "There’s very, very few people still within, I’ll say 
in all walks of life, that want to stick their heads above the parapet" (Engineer).  
These findings presented an interesting dichotomy where participants appeared to accept 
the need for reporting, however still appeared to believe that there may be negative impacts 
to themselves if they did report. Similar findings reported by Nordlof et al. (2015) showed 
that employees acknowledged reporting as important, yet admitted often avoiding it due to 
the embarrassment of admitting one's own mistake. Furthermore, findings from research in 
the UK railways suggests that a strong emphasis on reporting by senior management may 
not be enough to counter perceptions of blame and culpability associated with reporting by 
those on the frontline (Weyman et al., 2006).  
Just Culture 
The second sub-theme of communication was just culture, a term which is actively promoted 
in the organisation, and has thus become common terminology within participant discourse. 
A just culture is said to encourage healthy occurrence reporting by treating individuals in a 
fair, consistent manner and ensuring sanctions are appropriate (Ministry of Defence, 2009). 
Perceptions of the application of a just culture amongst the sample of personnel were mixed, 
particularly more so than many of the other sub-themes. Some perceived it to be functioning, 
as shown in the excerpts below:  
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"I think there’s a real understanding and feeling that actually if they, they might be very 
junior but if they do see something that is not right, rather than just to go along with it 
and say ‘oh well it’s probably be alright, there is a good understanding that anybody 
can stick your mitt up and say actually something is not right, stop and that you won’t 
get a hard time for doing that" (Aircrew); 
"We’ve got a robust system to highlight safety issues. We’ve got a just culture, not just 
a corporate term, we use it on a daily basis and tell the lads that if they make a mistake 
then that’s ok and they appreciate that" (Engineer, senior). 
However, others relayed scepticism in the application of the concept; 
"There is certainly a fear, I mean if you talk to the lads (junior engineers) there is a 
fear, well a fear of being done for doing something wrong, you know" (Engineer, 
supervisor). 
Broadly, a difference in perception was identified between the aircrew and engineer 
functions "But the maintainers-almost to a man- said yeah there is definitely a delta between 
what the aircrew are prepared to do, put their hands up, versus what we are prepared to do 
as maintainers" (Aircrew). One engineer supervisor described this further "When you get 
down to the lower levels of engineering I don’t think there is a perceived just culture on the 
shop floor for the engineers at all." The participant accounts appeared to show that aircrew 
had relatively high levels of confidence and trust in their supervisors and management while 
junior engineers were interpreted as having less confidence. Supervisors have been shown 
to play a key role in promoting workplace safety by affecting the level of fairness perceived 
by employees (Thompson, Hilton & Witt, 1998).  
Some of the noted differences in opinion on just culture were attributed to the formal 
structure of each function, with aircrew management structures tending to be 'flat', with a 
relatively shallow hierarchy gradient "I think also in aircrew it’s not the traditional military 
pyramid, it’s very top heavy and so you’ve got more of your peers judging you" (Aircrew). In 
contrast the engineering management structure has a much more defined difference 
between senior and junior ranks. Furthermore, the most senior personnel in the units tend to 
be aircrew, and so it could be that a lack of understanding of the engineering function might 
result in a different view of fault/responsibility when an incident involves an engineer, as 
compared to when it involves aircrew personnel.  
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4.3.6 Training & Experience 
The sixth identified theme related to participant's perceptions of training offered by the 
organisation, and the experience gained on the job, and how this impacted on safety. This 
theme was only identified in data from a sub-set of six groups, and did not contain any sub-
themes.  
Specific discussions amongst participants regarding training mainly surrounded mandatory 
Health and Safety (H&S) training, rather than aviation specific training. Participants 
appeared to view this type of training particularly cynically, which appeared to be related to 
the generic nature of the training and how it was delivered. This included aspects such as 
display screen equipment and manual materials handling training, delivered through e-
training and online tests. These were referred to predominately as box ticking exercises and 
of lesser importance than trade-specific or human factors training when related to flight 
safety. 
As an associated, but separate, focus data from aircrew groups revealed further insight into 
their concerns about experience and perceived erosion of skill over time. Aircrew 
participants described a perceived risk averseness at senior command levels which was 
seen to impact on their ability to train effectively and thus gain experience "I think there is a 
fear of blame and I think the knock-on effect of this is that people don’t fly the aircraft to its 
full ability, to expand the flight envelope" (Aircrew). These individuals cited resultant negative 
effects on their confidence as related to their perceived lack of experience. They appeared to 
fear that an inability to train in realistic scenarios might negatively impact their performance, 
should they encounter such situations in the future. 
The importance of training on safety has been identified within aviation studies (see, for 
example, O’Conner et al., 2011b), while in other meta-analytic studies it has generally been 
implied under the overall theme of ‘safety systems’ (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). 
Whilst the study did not measure either training or experience levels, the perception of 
aircrew that their skills were being eroded may be coloured by longer serving aircrew who 
are likely to have experienced different methods of training to those now employed. 
Arguably, understanding and acceptance of risk has probably changed over time, and it is 
likely that training methods that were acceptable in the past are no longer considered 
appropriate. The anecdotes and stories passed down between senior and junior aircrew may 
reflect a perception of ‘the good old days’. Furthermore, although participants interpreted 
what they saw as senior management risk averseness, this interpretation may only be based 
on a partial understanding of the intentions of senior managers, who may have to prioritise 
certain activities above others. 
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4.3.7 Organisational Commitment 
The final theme identified in the focus group data was one that appeared to be a common 
thread which was loosely related to several of the themes already mentioned. This related to 
how participants appeared to identify themselves as part of a group, with regards to their 
safety beliefs and practices and was labelled as organisational commitment. This theme was 
identified in eight of the twelve focus groups, across both engineering and aircrew. This 
organisational commitment appeared to typically be conceptualised at the level of the FAA 
rather than the level of the overall RN. This perhaps reflects how different the employees of 
the FAA consider it to be to the rest of the RN. Numerous references were made as to the 
superior safety performance of the FAA "We always tend to think we’re better than everyone 
else" (Aircrew) when compared to civilian aviation organisations and military aviation 
counterparts from other Services (i.e. RAF or Army). Participants appeared to take pride in 
this reputation, and not wanting to endanger it though unsafe activity "Safety reputation of 
the [organisation] is all important-we think we’re reasonably safe but not complacent" 
(Aircrew). This commitment to the organisation was interpreted as underlying the importance 
placed on flight safety, not as something that had to be complied with, but something that 
formed the basis for all activities within the organisation. This was reflected in several 
representative comments: 
"So, I don’t think it sits in a list of priorities, I find it’s just, it’s just something that you 
are always aware of. I find it’s in everything you do. Flight safety has to come within 
all uh considerations basically" (Aircrew); 
"I think that’s [the importance of flight safety] very real, within the [organisation], you 
know we are brought up from day one to understand what that means to us and how 
we should, you know, cherish that, it’s a good thing and so on" (Engineer). 
This shared belief was described as being taught to personnel from the start of their careers, 
such that it became entrenched in all aspects of work life. This was also described as being 
internalised, such that their personal pride in doing a job well, and safely, was explicitly 
related to supporting the positive overall safety reputation "There’s a pride to it, you know 
and you want to be able to go and do your job to the best of your ability".  
In summary, the seven themes identified across the twelve focus groups were, to a large 
degree, supported by published findings, although certain contrasts with the existing 
literature have been described. The following section integrated these findings into a broader 




The current study applied an embedded, context-focused analysis of employee accounts to 
explore influences on safety culture in the context of military aviation. This reflected 
alignment with the growing body of contemporary studies of organisational safety culture 
which have advocated the need to focus on, and gain insight into, context specific 
components prior to attempts at quantification (Brondino et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2013; 
Mearns et al., 2013). The process of identifying those constructs that employees felt 
influenced safety involved conducting focus groups (N=12 groups) with military naval 
aviation participants. Seven themes were identified; policy & procedures, pressure, 
leadership & safety ownership, individual & collective responsibility, communication, training 
& experience and organisational commitment. Globally, safety was presented as a deeply 
embedded, integral component of the participants' world view; safety issues were ascribed 
high status and importance within employee discourse and orientation to their work. Broadly, 
themes were distributed across aircrew and engineering focus groups, indicating a degree of 
agreement across the functions. However, the emphasis of each theme was sometimes 
slightly different between aircrew and engineers, which will further be discussed here.  
4.4.1 Policy & Procedures 
From the participants' descriptions, it was clear that there was a high degree of acceptance 
of, and compliance with, safety policies and procedures, to an extent that presented as 
greater than in most other employment sectors beyond aviation. Both aircrew and engineers 
emphasised consistent use of SOPs through their job (similar to findings from Patankar, 
2003) and saw compliance with these as key to determining safety behaviour (aligned with 
findings from Lawton, 1998). However, others have suggested that it is not simply enough to 
have compliance, but that voluntary safety participation is also important (Dahl & Olsen, 
2013), a factor not explicitly identified in the current study.  
 
The findings detailed in Section 4.3.1 identified a number of barriers to compliance with 
policy and procedures. These are particularly noteworthy, given that an important component 
of managing safety has been identified as monitoring the gap between procedures and 
practice (Dekker, 2003). It is noteworthy that much of the existing research in this area 
focuses on the individual, their safety motivation and attitudes toward compliance, rather 
than knowledge of the rules that govern work (Dahl, 2013).  However, the current findings 
would suggest that military naval aviation personnel were motivated to comply with rules, but 
that organisational barriers were a strong disincentive, acknowledging the potential for self-
serving bias here. Non-compliance can quickly lead to situations where even vital safety 
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procedures are no longer viewed as essential (INSAG, 2002), thus it is important to identify 
where procedures need to be altered, removed or reiterated (Hale & Borys, 2013) to address 
disincentives to compliance. 
 
Headline barriers to compliance in this study included claims that some procedures were not 
fit for purpose, perhaps due to a lack of insight on the part of their architects into the realities 
of the front-line context. Effective procedures on paper have been shown not to necessarily 
translate into procedures that are easily understood and applied by those who would use 
them (Blazsin & Guldenmund, 2015; INSAG, 2002). To combat this, involving operational 
personnel in devising safe systems of work is widely regarded as key to developing 
practicable and workable procedures (Hale & Borys, 2013) 
 
The perception that policy and procedures were constantly changing and increasing in 
volume has been acknowledged to result from the temptation within organisations to rely on 
increased expansion of procedural documents in the wake of accident investigations (Hale & 
Borys, 2013; Hopkins, 2010), a situation said to be particularly common in the UK (Dekker, 
2014). Questions have been raised as to whether increased regulation and proceduralisation 
always improve safety (Bieder & Bourrier, 2013; Hallowell & Gambaste, 2009) or whether 
they just add to bureaucracy. Power (2004) labelled this process the 'bureaucratisation' of 
the safety agenda and warned that the intensified focus on auditable trails of documentation 
can create a vicious circle whereby multiplication of rules leads to increased dependence on 
the rules as a means of avoiding responsibility, and increased time spent on auditing the 
functioning of this process. This has the potential to lead to a misplaced focus on process, 
rather than on controlling or dealing with hazards. Arguably these findings might indicate that 
it is important for the FAA management to ensure that creation of, and compliance with, 
policy and procedures is safety, rather than process, focused.   
 
A focus on proceduralisation has also been criticised for incentivising a preoccupation with 
numbers/targets and strict compliance, where a wider focus on equipment design, 
leadership styles or inadequate work organisation may be more appropriate (Grote & 
Weichbrodt, 2013). Therefore, it is arguably important at the organisational level to ensure 
that new procedures are not the default action after incidents occur, but that all possible 
mitigations are also explored (such as better design or changes to work processes). 
 
Although many of the cited experiences in relation to policy and procedures were common to 
aircrew and engineers, the descriptions of informal teaching of non-standard shortcut 
behaviour was observed to arise only in data from the engineering groups. While it is not 
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suggested that senior aircrew never teach junior aircrew shortcuts, the findings here are 
comparable to those detailed by Van Avermaete & Hakkeling-Mesland (2001). These 
authors reported that aviation maintenance personnel tended to see themselves as 
personally responsible for the airworthiness of the aircraft and cited the importance of using 
their experience and skill to ensure this, even if it required deviation from procedures. 
Interestingly, in contrast, managers within that organisation viewed the maintainer's primary 
role as following formal procedures in order to maintain safety (Van Avermaete & Hakkeling-
Mesland, 2001).  
4.4.2 Pressure 
A notable feature in the current study was the juxtaposition of the high status of safety with a 
variety of competing demands, pressures and barriers with some (perceived to be lower risk 
activities) at risk of being treated as sacrificial to meet operational demands. However, a 
strong emphasis on operational safety, and safety of others, while at the same time being 
prepared to increase personal exposure to risk likely reflects the strength of shared high-
value purpose that has been found in other cohesive groups working under extreme 
conditions (such as the emergency services, O'Hara et al., 2014).  
 
While not necessarily seen as mutually exclusive, the ability to work as safely and as 
productively as possible were observed to engender some degree of tension, which may 
reflect a safety-production incompatibility (McLain & Jarrell, 2007). This is a common thread 
in many safety culture assessments, often assessed under the label of 'work pressure' (Flin 
et al., 2000). When high performance is the principle criterion for the front line, policy may 
get violated as an effect of managerial judgement (Westrum & Adamski, 2009). In the 
military aviation context, this was characterised as maintaining operational capability in the 
face of both personnel and material resource shortfalls and was said to sponsor a ‘can-do’ 
attitude. Although reduced spending budgets and problems with retention and recruitment of 
experienced personnel is unlikely to lessen the pressure felt by military aviation personnel, 
from an organisational perspective it is important to consider existing evidence which shows 
that less conflict between safety and production goals increases safe work behaviour 
(McLain & Jarrell, 2007) and that work pressure has been correlated with risk taking and 
accidents (Weyman, Clarke & Cox, 2003). This is thought to occur as workers are 
incentivised to take short cuts (O'Dea et al., 2010) which places them closer to the 
boundaries of safe performance (Mitropoulos & Cupido, 2009). Addressing these key areas 
that are seen by personnel as creating pressure might arguably be seen as an important 
consideration for the FAA management in terms of areas to consider allocating resource to.  
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4.4.3  Leadership & Safety Ownership 
Management ownership of safety is the only component over which there has been universal 
agreement within safety climate/culture research (Flin et al., 2000). The primacy of this factor 
is supported by indications of predictive relationships with safety behaviours (Cheyne et al., 
1998; Christian et al., 2009) and is suggested to be a key component of safety initiatives 
(Brown, Willis & Prussia, 2000; Yule, Flin & Murdy, 2007; Zohar, 1980). Indeed, participative 
management has been shown to increase workgroup compliance (Mearns et al., 1997; 
Simard & Marchand, 1997) and result in fewer injuries (Michael, Guo, Widenbeck & Ray, 
2006). Other key identified supervisory behaviours are supportive leadership styles, the 
willingness to initiate safety discussions and give positive feedback in terms of safety 
behaviour (Niskanen, 1994; Simard & Marchand, 1994). The identification of leadership and 
safety ownership in the current study showed consistency with established insights from the 
area of safety culture/climate. 
 
Scepticism amongst participants in this study appeared to be levelled at senior management 
who were not seen to "walk the walk" (i.e. follow through on their views that safety is the 
most important factor by increasing resources or reducing demands where safety was 
potentially compromised by these), corroborating findings reported by Biggs et al. (2013). 
Arguably these frustrations may be further exacerbated if senior managers are perceived not 
to have experienced the pressures faced by frontline personnel and therefore don't 
'understand' the reality of trade-offs in everyday situations. These findings related to 
negative perceptions of senior management in the current study must, however, be 
interpreted in light of the fact that they may, in part, reflect the lack of direct observation of 
senior managers' behaviour. In the absence of actual observation of behaviour or knowledge 
of decision-making processes, affective processes are likely to dominate how personnel will 
form perceptions of senior management (Guldenmund, 2010b). Therefore, employees may 
tend to use other indicators from the workplace in an inferential manner (such as where 
resources are being spent, or stories from peers/supervisors) to develop a view on what is 
important to senior management (Cabrera et al., 1997; Mearns et al., 2003). This has the 
potential for misunderstanding/misinterpretation of the true intentions of senior management, 
and so should be interpreted with caution.   
 
There were few senior officers within the sample, partially due to the sampling strategy, but 
also due to the difficulty with accessing these personnel for research. Other researchers 
experienced similar difficulties; Fruhen et al. (2013) suggested that the limited amount of 
research on senior management participants in safety studies may reflect difficulty of 
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access, or plausibly interest in, and commitment to, the subject matter. Zohar and Luria 
(2005) cautioned that the views of safety at the top of on organisation can vary considerably 
from those at other management levels, and this is an acknowledged limitation of the current 
study. Interestingly, Fruhen et al (2013) showed a self-serving bias in senior management, 
where individuals were seen to overestimate their influence over safety outcomes. This self-
serving bias is likely to be a consideration, regardless of what level is investigated; it is 
particularly likely that frontline individuals place blame on management, while management 
are likely to blame frontline individuals for safety issues. A mixture of both of these is most 
likely to reflect reality within the organisation. 
4.4.4  Individual & Collective Responsibility 
The participants in the current study presented a high, intrinsically motivated view of their 
individual responsibility for safety. That is, they felt that it was their responsibility to look after 
themselves and their colleagues. This was partly attributed to the high levels of camaraderie 
which has been observed in other military samples (Woodward & Jenkins, 2011), as 
personnel arguably may be more keenly aware of the safety of those they have an affinity 
with/care about. Group cohesion has been positively linked to safety climate (Kelly et al., 
2015), safety climate strength (Luria, 2008), compliance and normative behaviour (Simard & 
Marchand, 1997) as well as feelings of personal responsibility and ownership of safety 
(Clarke 2010; Geller et al., 1996). The trust between team members in small teams, as 
described in this study, is particularly valued in the military context because individuals often 
must rely on the performance of others in a wide variety of high risk, high tempo, physically 
and mentally demanding situations (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996).  
 
Although camaraderie was presented positively amongst participants in this study, high 
group cohesion and camaraderie have also been shown to negatively impact on safety. Peer 
pressure, coupled with a 'can-do' culture may override an individual's willingness to admit to 
being unable to complete a task by making individuals feel less able to speak up against 
group 'norms' (Falconer, 2006a). Thraldsen et al. (2010) provided an interesting parallel to 
the current study's population, researching oil and gas employees who often worked on the 
same isolated platform for a long period, with the same crew. These authors suggested that 
although trust in workmates had a positive function and effect on safety performance, it 
could also lead to blind rule following, too much trust, a lack of independent checking and 
relying on the effective performance of others. Given the focus group setting of the current 
study, it might be argued that participants might be less likely to raise any concerns or 
examples of negative impacts of their peer group on safety, and this may be a limitation of 
the current approach. 
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4.4.5  Communication 
While the importance of communication of safety issues through reporting was discussed by 
both aircrew and engineers, the underpinning concept of just culture appeared to show 
differences between aircrew and engineer experiences. Just culture has been held to require 
trust in the role of fairness of the organisation toward its management (Fruhen et al., 2013) 
and the role in fairness of management toward employees. Identified differences in 
management structure between aircrew and engineers was highlighted in the focus group 
data as a possible cause for experiences, which corroborates findings reported by Fruhen et 
al. (2013) in which a 'flat' hierarchy in air traffic control used communication as a means to 
enact positive safety while a more traditional hierarchy structure controlled safety through 
use of accountability. Additionally, there has generally been a strong focus on creating a just 
environment amongst pilots and cabin crew in civilian aviation. This is known as crew 
resource management and focuses on interpersonal communication, leadership, and 
decision making aboard the aircraft (Helmreich, Merrit & Wilhelm, 1999) but has yet to 
receive as much attention in the engineering sphere.  
4.4.6 Training & Experience 
While much of the discussion related to training revolved around dissatisfaction with non-
flight related mandatory H&S training, ensuring that employees are well trained has two 
practical impacts on safety. Firstly, a lack of training has been shown to be related to 
increased numbers of errors, and thus can directly impact employee safety behaviours 
(Diaz-Cabrera et al, 2007; Hudson et al., 2002; Lawrie et al., 2006; Lu & Shang, 2005). 
Secondly, training is likely to lead to increased confidence and the ability to cope in high 
pressure or unusual circumstances, sometimes known as resilience (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 
2007). Used to inform employees of risks in the workplace, a higher frequency of safety 
training has been positively associated with more favourable safety climate (Lu & Shang, 
2005). Military aviation participants appeared to consider experience as declining over time, 
due to restrictions in, for example, flying time/variety of flying manoeuvres. However, it is 
unclear whether this reflects an actual decline/deficit, or a potentially 'rose-tinted' view 
expressed by older/more experienced personnel.  
4.4.7  Organisational Commitment 
The final identified theme in the research, organisational commitment, appeared to reflect a 
level of personal pride in the safety reputation of the FAA, and a sense of individual 
'belonging' to the FAA. Although not widely reported in safety culture and climate research 
(Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000), similar findings have been interpreted from civilian 
aviation research studies. Firstly, Patankar (2003) identified a factor labelled 'Pride in 
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company' and secondly Fruhen et al. (2013) reported that safety improvements were seen to 
create a sense of pride amongst a sample of air traffic controllers. Block, Sabin and 
Patankar (2007) built on Patankar's 'pride in company concept' within a further aviation 
organisation and showed that two drivers of safety outcomes were organisational 
affiliation/identity and proactive management. The impact of this pride/commitment on safety 
and safety behaviour are, as yet, unclear.  
4.4.8 Summary  
Factors such as the hierarchical structure, bureaucratic nature and social system of the FAA 
appeared to affect the understanding and experience of military aviation personnel with 
relation to flight safety, safety culture and risk decision making. These findings have detailed 
a contextualised set of experiences in which personnel interpret their work environment and 
undertake potentially high-risk operations on a daily basis. In addition to providing a data 
driven foundation for the quantitative phase of the study, the findings from this exploratory, 
qualitative study may play an important role in interpretation of future quantitative findings. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to explore participant accounts of norms, values, attitudes and 
behaviour in relation to safety, with a particular focus on structural and socio-technical 
elements that could be considered to constitute core influences on workplace safety culture. 
To achieve this, the study used focus groups to generate data, achieving the objective of 
sponsoring open and free discussion of the prevailing safety culture(s), therefore meeting 
objective one.  
 
The study met objective two (identification and articulation of a set of core constructs 
considered to characterise headline influences on military aviation workplace safety culture), 
through a thematic analysis of the data. Seven themes were considered to be the most 
salient, core influences on safety within the organisation. These were; policy & procedures, 
pressure, leadership & safety ownership, individual & collective responsibility, 
communication, training & experience and organisational commitment. A summary of the 
primary features of these themes is provided below. 
 
• Procedures were presented as having strong cultural legitimacy, that is they were 
generally viewed by personnel as being both necessary and appropriate. However, a 
range of notable barriers to compliance were identified.  
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• Policy was viewed by personnel fairly cynically, with levels of accountability and 
bureaucracy perceived to have increased in recent years. This was said to have left 
personnel feeling personally vulnerable in the event of unintentional violations.  
• The dominant source of pressure experienced by personnel was an over-arching 
requirement to deliver operational capability, the type of which was arguably not 
reflected in most civilian sectors, with the exception perhaps of the emergency 
services. 
• Adequate provision of resources, including personnel, equipment and time were 
described as key to the ability of personnel to work safely. 
• Supervisors were cast as role models, leading by example and teaching behaviour, 
both in positive and negative aspects (i.e. encouraging either compliance or short 
cuts). 
• In contrast, the motivations of senior management were viewed rather cynically. 
• The ways in which the concept of just culture was applied to the workforce appeared 
to vary by function; aircrew participants appeared confident that they would be 
treated fairly on making an error, but this perception was not necessarily shared by 
engineering participants.  
• There was a strong, overriding sense of organisational commitment, personnel were 
proud to belong to the FAA and took pride in its good safety reputation.  
 
The findings from the thematic analysis were compared and contrasted with published 
findings within Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of the current Chapter (meeting the final objective of the 
study). A notable proportion of the themes identified in this study are supported by published 
literature, however the way in which they are operationalised within the FAA are considered 
to be specific to this military naval aviation population.  
The findings suggest that the influences on safety in the FAA are multi-faceted, and are 
potentially influenced by the hierarchical, military organisational structure, the aviation 
context and the highly cohesive nature of this population. These findings were considered to 
provide a sound basis for development of a quantitative safety climate measurement tool, 





Chapter 5: Ranking Priorities for Safety Improvement (Study 2) 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Purpose of the Project and Rationale 
Effective safety management relies on the ability of organisations to implement safety 
systems, determine their effectiveness through monitoring of risk management performance, 
learn from past events and identify vulnerabilities to determine priorities for improvement.  
Feedback from, for example, accident/incident reporting systems, audits, safety committee 
actions and employee concerns raised through workshops, focus groups and safety climate 
surveys can all inform organisational learning. Evidence-informed strategic decision making 
within organisations is crucial as it relates to determining where to allocate often finite 
resources to those risks/hazards/interventions which may have the greatest impact in 
improving safety. To achieve this some form of priority setting is required (Centre for 
Environment & Risk Management (CERN), 1997). 
 
As a complement to Study 1, it was decided to explore what frontline personnel saw was the 
priorities for intervention, and to explore the extent to which their perspectives and views 
varied across different segments of personnel. Published findings indicated that the results 
of ranking exercises are prone to vary depending on the ranking method selected and 
design of the task (Fisher et al., 1968; Mullen, 1999; van den Fels-Klerx et al., 2017). In 
recognition of this, the study compared the results of three widely applied priority ranking 
techniques.  Findings are of relevance to the current study, but also to the wider literature on 
the strengths and limitations of ranking techniques.  
5.1.2 Aims 
The aims of the study were to: 
1. Characterise employee perspectives on the relative primacy of headline influences 
on safety in the FAA.  
2. Compare the performance of three widely used alternative methods of ranking 
priorities and comment on their fit with the FAA requirements for a prioritisation method.  
 
5.1.3 Objectives 




1. To identify and define a set of themes that could be considered to characterise core 
components/influences on safety climate in the FAA. 
2. To identify and compare the product of three alternative, widely applied ranking 
methods. 
3. To provide comment on the strengths, limitations and performance of alternative 
methods for eliciting employee views on priorities for safety management, improvement or 
intervention.   
4. To provide comment on the utility of safety issue priority ranking with respect to its 
potential role and contribution to risk management.  
5.1.4 Background 
Accessing employee safety perspectives using multi-dimensional safety climate surveys  has 
been widely adopted, initially within the major hazards sectors, and now more broadly across 
many sectors. Proponents of this approach have suggested that such tools are particularly 
amenable to the development of safety profiles, that they allow statistical testing of 
differences between organisations or functional units within a single organisation, are 
intuitive/simple to use and allow organisations to identify areas of weakness (Alhenmood et 
al., 2004; Guldenmund, 2007; Zohar, 2010). A recognised limitation of safety climate/culture 
surveys is that, while providing a rating on each constituent scale, they offer little information 
about the importance of each construct (scale) relative to the others. These surveys treat 
each component as discrete and unrelated, and so the relative performance of each 
component can only be inferred from the comparison of aggregated ratings from each scale.  
 
However, aggregating ratings into rankings in this manner (i.e. ranking scales by mean 
responses) has acknowledged shortcomings; it is arithmetically possible for group means to 
correlate highly with rating order, but that little to no positive correlation exists at the 
individual level (Russell & Gray, 1994). Therefore, they are held to have the potential to 
produce atypical aggregated ranks to the individual components and so might not reflect the 
individual's views to any degree.  Subsequently this could make it difficult to determine the 
degree of agreement between individuals as to the accuracy of this ranking (Antonak & 
Livneh, 2000).  
 
When using ratings each item is absolute and so the scoring functions used by respondents 
are not calibrated (Bockenholt, 2001). This means that one respondent's 5 could be another 
respondent's 3 (on a 1-5 scale), some may use the entire rating range (1-5) and others may 
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limit their responses to a part of the rating scale (rating no items above a 3). The difficulty in 
this lack of calibration further complicates the decision on how to combine these responses 
in order to get an overall ranking of each multi-item scale.   
 
Some have suggested that shortcomings of using rating scales might be addressed through 
the use of ranking methods (Bock & Jones, 1968), an approach that has been widely 
adopted within the area of risk management. Unlike ratings, ranking allows respondents to 
consider items in relation to each other, calibrating each item against the other items. 
Rankings force respondents to differentiate more incisively between items than do rating 
methods (Maio, Roese, Seligman & Katz, 1996), which could be seen as an advantage 
when prioritising areas for safety improvement. Ng (1982), in support of ranking methods, 
cited a study by Rankin and Grube (1980) which recommended the use of ranking above 
ratings as a means to help respondents discover their own implicit hierarchy in relation to 
related concepts (in their case, values). The use of ranking methods has, however, received 
little attention in the safety culture/climate area (Brockenholt, 2001). 
 
If it is accepted that an insight into ranking priorities for intervention may be valuable to 
safety practitioners, this gives rise to a question regarding how stable and robust ranking 
methods are in identifying safety priorities. As applies to the testing of aggregated survey 
data from safety climate measures, the quality and robustness of the data generated by 
ranking methods requires careful consideration of the approach taken. Experimental findings 
have suggested that different elicitation methods can significantly affect ranking outcomes 
(Ali & Ronaldson, 2012). If the choice of technique leads to different orderings, this is said to 
run the risk of different conclusions being drawn, dependent on how the ratings are 
manipulated and combined (Fisher et al., 1968; Mullen, 1999; van den Fels-Klerx et al., 
2017).  
 
Conceived of as a lead indicator, the FAA has for several years used an in-house designed 
tool to periodically assess personnel perspectives on safety 'culture' (Zar et al., 2002). The 
method underpinning the tool is not a safety climate/culture assessment in the widely-
encountered employee survey format, rather it is a ranking task designed to elicit employee 
views with respect to identifying priorities for improvement. The tool, a priority sorting task 
based on the Q method, mirrors the technique advanced by O'Reilley, Chatman and 
Caldwell (1991) to determine whether a potential employee would 'fit' in to an organisation 
by using a sorting task to compare an individual's 'culture' to an organisation's 'culture'. 
Adapted for use in the safety domain, the tool used by the FAA is described in more detail in 
128 
 
Section 5.1.5, but essentially represents a ranking task, with twenty-one items referenced to 
different aspects of safety.  
5.1.5 Techniques for Ranking Priorities  
The requirement to establish priorities can occur at various levels; governments need to 
decide how to reduce risks in areas such as healthcare, the environment and transport 
(CERN, 1997) while organisations may need to monitor/prioritise local hazards and risks. 
This is often achieved using risk registers, which have priority setting as a central feature; 
these are tools for risk management, and typically use some form of subjective ranking or 
rating method. Risk registers operate at a macro level as they can be used to inform policy 
options and identify how best to deploy resources (Baker et al., 2014) and allow monitoring 
of changes over time. The following section details how comparative risk ranking has been 
used in practice to prioritise risks. 
Plant Health Risk Register 
The UK's Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) utilises a risk 
register model to manage and prioritise risks of pests and pathogens, allowing systematic 
consideration of risks to tree health and bio-security in the UK (Barnett & Weyman, 2016). 
However, it was noted that different combinations of likelihood and risk factor scores may 
equate to the same overall risk measure and therefore it may be more difficult to determine 
the priority level of different risks (Baker et al., 2014).  To inform this risk register model, 
DEFRA utilises the judgement of experts to deal, in part, with the uncertainty of how these 
identified risks may be reduced through mitigation (Barnett & Weyman, 2016) and aid in 
prioritisation. However, significant variability between experts has been seen as a result of 
heuristic biases and differences in knowledge domains of the experts (Barnett & Weyman, 
2016) and so use of experts in risk ranking has acknowledged limitations. 
United States (US) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Originally rooted in efforts to establish safe limits of exposure to toxic substances, the US 
EPA uses risk ranking to characterise the nature and magnitude of risks to human health 
from numerous environmental stressors (National Research Council, 1994). This 
government body produced a guidance document to inform state and local risk ranking 
exercises to promote scientifically robust deliberations, using comparative risk rankings. The 
importance of this was thought to lie in creating robust methods ensured that small risks did 
not receive unwarranted attention and the expense of neglecting large risks (Fischhoff & 
Morgan, 2013). The EPA suggested that priority setting often occurs within institutional, 
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social, political, technological and economic realities, therefore risk ranking is inherently a 
subjective process (EPA, 1993).  
European Union (EU) Risk Ranking Method (RRM) 
The EU RRM was developed to promote consistency for ranking the risks of chemicals 
manufactured in the EU according to their potential risks to both humans and the 
environment (Hansen et al., 1999). The EU RRM utilises variables such as environmental 
exposure and effect as well as human health rankings to create an aggregated risk ranking 
and importantly highlights the use of the professional judgement of experts to address the 
uncertainty surrounding some of the risks of chemical exposure (Hansen et al., 1999). 
According to these authors, through using the EU RRM, EU states are able to create their 
own risk registers and therefore draw up appropriate risk management mitigation strategies. 
 
Each of the three examples of the use of comparative risk ranking in priority setting has 
acknowledged, at some point in their development, the importance of ensuring that the 
methods used to rank risks was scientifically robust and transparent (Hansen et al., 1999). 
Following this acknowledgement, if a comparative ranking method was to prove useful in the 
safety culture and climate arena, the robustness, reliability and utility of the output of the 
method in relation to setting priorities for safety management must be assured. The current 
study therefore proposed to conduct a systematic comparison of alternative, widely applied 
comparative ranking techniques to characterise headline influences on safety in a military 
aviation context. 
5.1.6  Review of Ranking Techniques 
In the first instance, a review of alternative ranking techniques was undertaken, including the 
method currently used by the FAA (a Q-Sort). In general, options existed to use either 
individual ratings (independent ratings) or aggregated (group) ratings and typical techniques 
used in this area included: 
 
Individual ratings:  
1. Non-comparative approaches such as subjective rating scales (principally Likert and 
Thurstone).  
2. Comparative approaches such as Q-Sorts, magnitude estimation, direct ranking, the 




1. Delphi method which combines rating and ranking (mixed method approach). 
A short summary of each of these approaches is outlined below, with particular focus on their 
application within published safety research. 
Non-comparative Approaches 
The most widely encountered strategy for quantifying attitudes/perceptions, both in the 
safety domain and wider psychological research, is using multi-item scales which are then 
averaged or summed to produce a numerical score (Ho, 2016).  This approach is considered 
non-comparative; each item is evaluated one at a time, with the respondent asked to make 
an absolute judgement about the extent to which that item reflects their 
attitude/perception/belief/value (Oppenheim, 2000). Non-comparative response formats are 
typically a bounded scale such as a Likert scale (e.g. 5-point scale from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree) or Thurstone scales (where each of an array of anchors has a numerical 
value indicating the respondent’s degree of response, from which an average is computed). 
In the safety domain Likert rating scales tend to be the preferred method due to their 
simplicity (Oppenheim, 2000). 
 
The advantages of a non-comparative (rating) approach are held to be that it is intuitive and 
easy to administer, that it allows collection of information in a standardized manner (Rattray 
& Jones, 2007) and is relatively quick and simple to use (Scheibe et al., 2002).  Data 
gathered in this way is amenable to a wide range of statistical analyses, allowing group 
comparisons using means and standard deviations (Guldenmund, 2000; Oppenheim, 2000; 
Russell & Gray, 1994) which rankings generally do not.  
 
However, rating scales have been criticised as being particularly susceptible to ‘yea saying’ 
(where there is a tendency to agree or disagree with all statements) and primacy/recency 
effects, where people are more likely to choose the first category or last category (Chan, 
1991). Significant skewing (creating ceiling and floor effects) of the data might occur if items 
are all seen as either important or un-important (DeCarlo & Luthar, 2000). Paradoxically, the 
advantage of being easy to complete has also been cited as a driver of reduced data quality, 
response sets and restricted ranges (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985). There is little consensus as to 
whether an even or odd number of response points for rating scales should be used, with 
advocates arguing that respondents may have neutral views (and thus require a neutral mid-
point) and critics raising the issue of increased potential for acquiescence (Robinson, 2018). 
The impact of unreliable or low validity rating scales on research findings is large (Robinson, 
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2018) and so robust psychometric development of tools using rating scales is integral to their 
utility.  
Comparative Approaches 
In contrast to some of the limitations of the non-comparative method described above, 
comparative methods are held to be more robust against uniform bias (Aday, 1996; Brown & 
Maydeu-Olivares, 2013) and are said to increase validity in their characterisation of the 
target being rated (Serfass & Sherman, 2013). Here, instead of considering items 
independently, respondents are required to consider each item in relation to every other 
item. This is held to encourage respondents to consider their answer more carefully (Prasad, 
2001) while allowing them to still interpret statements with their own understanding. 
 
However, the principle criticisms of comparative approaches are that they are known to be 
time-consuming and often difficult for respondents, demanding concentration which can be 
particularly problematic if there is a long list of items to compare (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985). 
The comparative approaches reviewed for consideration in this study were Q-sorting, 
magnitude estimation, direct rank ordering, the method of paired comparison, repertory grid 
and the Delphi method. Each of these is discussed in turn.  
 
Q-Methodology (Q-Sorts) 
Developed in the 1930s (McKeown & Thomas, 1988), Q-Methodology was devised as a 
means by which to quantify subjective concepts through consideration of an individual’s 
pattern of responses (Coogan & Herrington, 2011). When used as a ranking method, a Q-
sort requires respondents to 'sort' statements in reference to a criterion (most/least agreed or 
most/least like me) in a distribution that ensures fewer statements are places at the 
extremes, with greater numbers in the middle (neutral) position (McKeown & Thomas, 1988). 
This method has been adapted and used in organisational culture research (Chatman, 1989; 
Ryan & Schmit, 1996) to compare an individual's values to an organisational value profile in 
order to determine the degree to which the individual’s values 'fit' with the wider 
organisational values. This was achieved by comparing the two value profiles and, if large 
differences were seen, these were said to indicate specific areas in which there was a lack 
of 'fit' (Caldwell & O'Reilley, 1990). Unlike traditional Q-methodology (as is used in 
personality testing), using Q-Sorting as a ranking technique does not utilise the factor 
analysis of an individual’s Q-Sort, but is similar in many ways to direct ranking, but using a 




Q-Sort ranking is widely used in psychology research (Serfass & Sherman, 2013) and unlike 
in direct ranking, several items can be given the same rank. It has therefore been described 
as more flexible and able to capture the dilemmatic nature of everyday thinking (Walker, 
Simmons, Wynne & Irwin, 1998) than, for example, the direct ranking method. However, Q-
Sorting has been criticised for being particularly susceptible to order effects (Serfass & 
Sherman, 2013) and, when ranking many items, might be too cognitively complex to 
generate reliable results (Dziopa & Ahern, 2011). Critics also highlight that having a forced 
distribution for the responses may compel respondents to make discriminations that they 
might otherwise not be inclined to make or exaggerate the difference between the 
statements (Eyvindson et al., 2015). A description of the FAA's safety culture monitoring tool 
based on the Q-Sorting method is provided below.   
 
 The FAA Flight Safety Q-sort 
The FAA utilise a tool that was developed in 2002 by the Centre for Human Sciences, with 
the stated aim of measuring safety culture (Zar et al., 2002). The items contained within this 
tool, however, show notable similarity with safety climate tools (Flin et al., 2000; Weigmann 
et al., 2004; Zohar, 2010) and much of the literature on which the tool was based related to 
safety climate rather than safety culture. The Flight Safety Q-Sort is a paper and pen 
exercise that requires respondents to sort a 21-item statement set (Table 1, Appendix C) two 
times. Respondents rate each of the 21 items on a seven-point scale using a forced-free 
distribution containing seven 'piles' (the frequency of each pile is a 2, 2, 4, 5, 4, 2, 2 quasi 
normal distribution characteristic of the Q-method, Block, 1978). Respondents are instructed 
to first consider what their 'ideal' unit might look like and second to consider what their 
'actual' unit is like, thus completing a sort of the 21-items twice. 
 
 At the end of the sorting process a profile for the individual's perception of an 'ideal' 
organisation and their 'actual' organisation are compared by considering the placement of 
items on the 'ideal' and 'actual' sorts (Block, 1978).  Where aspects of an individual's 'ideal' 
organisation are ranked higher than their 'actual' organisation this was suggested to highlight 
areas of flight safety concern (Zar et al., 2002). During analysis of the historical data 
collected using this tool, a high degree of non-adherence to the forced distribution scale and 
low levels of concordance between individuals with regard to areas of concern were 
identified as limitations of the method (Ashford, 2016). The large number of items, some of 
which display significant redundancy (see items in Table 1, Appendix C), were identified as a 
potential source of confusion amongst respondents (Ashford, 2016). Section 5.2.3 further 
details the process by which the items contained within the FAA Flight Safety Q-Sort were 
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refined for use in the current study, informed by the wider literature (Chapter 2) and 
qualitative findings from Study 1 (Chapter 4). 
 
Fixed Modulus Magnitude Estimation 
Magnitude estimation is a technique that has most widely been used in psychophysics to 
measure subjective sensations of objective variables such as brightness, warmth and 
loudness (CERM, 1997) but has also been utilised in attitude research (Welch, 1971). In 
fixed modulus magnitude estimation, typically, respondents are given one item (a stimulus or 
item) as a 'base statement' or 'reference stimulus' with a value, and then asked to rate all the 
other stimuli/items in comparison with the base/reference (Welch, 1971). For example, if a 
statement is considered double that of the base standard, then it will be allocated a number 
'2'. 
 
Supporters of magnitude estimation suggest that it is a simple and easy technique for 
respondents to grasp and displays good discriminatory capacity when compared to simple 
category scales (Welch, 1971). The production of ratio level data is also seen to be an 
advantage (Welch, 1971; Purdy & Pavlovic, 1992). However, critics of magnitude estimation 
cite the lengthy nature (Anderson, Basilevsky & Hum, 2013), high inter-individual variability 
of resultant data (possibly reflecting response biases in the ways people go about making 
estimations) and difficulties in displaying adequate test-retest reliability (Purdy & Pavlovic, 
1992) as limitations of this method. 
 
Direct Ranking 
Direct ranking requires respondents to rank objects, items or statements according to a 
criterion, with all of the items being presented simultaneously (Chalwa & Sondhi, 2011). For 
example, an individual is asked to rank five soft drinks (Coca cola, 7-up, Fanta, Pepsi and 
Sprite) from 1 (favourite) to 5 (least favourite). This technique has been extensively used in 
market research (Gracia & de-Magistris, 2016) and student test marking calibration (Curcin, 
Black & Bramley, 2009). This method has also seen use in the safety domain for ranking 
organisational priorities (Nordlof et al., 2012). 
 
Stated advantages of this approach are that it has intuitive appeal due to its apparent 
simplicity, that it is easy to set up and apply with a small number of items (Droba, 1932) and 
that it is more efficient than, for example, the paired comparison method (Curcin, Black & 
Bramley, 2009). However, it has been noted that as the method requires comparison of all 
items consecutively, the cognitive demand of the process will depend on the number of items 
in this list to be ranked (Seaton, 1974) and so may become unwieldy with large numbers of 
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items (Ali & Ronaldson, 2012; Nordlof et al., 2012; Scheibe et al., 2002; Thurstone, 1959). 
The resultant cognitive overload is held to have the potential for reducing test-retest 
reliability or reproducibility in rankings (Ali & Ronaldson, 2012; Weyman et al., 2006). Direct 
ranking has further been criticised for being difficult for respondents to use if the items are 
multi-faceted or multi-attributional (Bock & Jones, 1968). Unlike magnitude estimation, 
results from direct ranking can only be considered ordinal level data (Droba, 1932; Scheibe 
et al., 2002) and so the method has been suggested as limited when attempting to identify 
stand-out items or risks (Susel et al., 2016).  
  
The Method of Paired Comparisons 
The method of paired comparisons originates from the work of Thurstone (1927), and 
involves respondents being presented with pairs of items and asked to indicate which of the 
pair is preferred (CERM, 1997). Each item is compared against every other item, one pair at 
a time.  This information is then used to produce a scaled ranking of the items (Hunns & 
Daniels, 1980) as each full set of choices yields a preference score (Brown & Peterson, 
2009). The method of paired comparisons has been widely applied to perceptual and 
attitudinal topics such as perceptions of risk (Ostberg, 1980; Susel et al., 2016; Weyman et 
al., 2003), trust in government agencies (Pidgeon et al., 2003), patient safety priorities 
(O'Hara et al., 2012) and assessment of image quality (Mantiuk, Tomaszewska & 
Mantiuk,1981). 
 
Supporters of this method suggest that it is more robust than other ranking techniques as it 
allows calculation not only of the sequence in which items are ranked, but the relative 
distance between them (Oppenheim, 2000). The resultant ranking is in the form of a ratio 
rather than an ordinal scale (Purdy & Pavlovic, 1992) as it is based on the number of times 
each item dominates the rest (Susel et al., 2016). As it is possible to determine the relative 
distances between the items, this has often been used to indicate the degree of 
discrimination between them (Droba, 1932). Proponents of this method also cite its simplicity 
as an advantage as only two items are compared at a time (Bernard, 2012; Chalwa & Sodhi, 
2011). Furthermore, the method has been shown to have good test re-test reliability (Bock & 
Jones, 1968). Although most ranking methods are amenable to statistical testing of between-
person agreement (concordance), the method of paired comparisons allows further 
statistical testing to assess the degree of internal consistency (within respondents, Brown & 
Peterson, 2009).  
 
However, critics of the method claim that the requirement to compare each item with every 
other item means that only a limited number of items can be used; generally, a maximum of 
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nine items (36 paired judgements) for a complete paired comparisons design is 
recommended (Chalwa & Sodhi, 2011; Ock et al., 2016; Weyman et al., 2006). An 
incomplete design is possible and permits a larger item set, however this also significantly 
increases the required sample size (Wilson & Corlett, 1995). This method has also been 
criticised for being time consuming to complete (Scheibe et al., 2002), with some authors 
reporting few differences in results when compared with rating scales (Fisher et al., 1968).  
 
Repertory Grid 
The repertory grid was invented by George Kelly, within his personal construct theory, to 
study personal and interpersonal systems of meaning, and has since been adapted for a 
broad variety of topics (Demsey & Neimeyer, 1995; Marsden & Littler, 1998). Repertory grid 
systematically assesses the relationship between a set of constructs and a set of elements 
and is normally a three or four stage process, with breaks between each stage for 
assimilation and integration of the data. Typically, a set of elements are determined which 
are then presented in groups of three, to which respondents are asked to explain ways in 
which any two elements are the same but differ from the third. This allows the development 
of constructs (which are described in bi-polar terms) on which the elements differ. Each of 
the elements can then be ranked or rated on each of the construct dimensions (Demsey & 
Neimeyer, 1995), and the resulting matrix analysed statistically using correlation and factor 
analysis (Calisir & Lehto, 2001).   
 
Yorke (1983) suggested that, when a ranking repertory grid is utilised, it is particularly 
susceptible to 'bunching' and therefore often does not provide fine discrimination between 
elements. While this method is particularly useful when exploring topics about which little is 
known, it focuses on the personal or local system of meaning, with no assumption that these 
generalise to other people (Demsey & Neimeyer, 1995).  
 
Delphi Method 
While the preceding methods have all involved individual ratings, the Delphi method aims to 
generate a structured group opinion (Goodman, 1987) through a prescribed set of 
procedures applied to a pre-determined expert panel (Powell, 2003). Typically conducted in 
up to three rounds, this method utilises a set of questionnaires. The first is generally 
unstructured and returns qualitative data which is used to create a set of items. These items 
are then quantified in further rounds through ranking or rating techniques (Powell, 2003). 
Between rounds the researcher provides feedback to the group members about the opinions 
and ratings of other group members, thereby encouraging a convergence of opinion. The 
classical Delphi method is characterised by: (i) an anonymous group of respondents, thereby 
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promoting free expression of ideas/opinions, (ii) iteration which allows respondents to refine 
views each round considering group opinions, (iii) controlled feedback during each round 
and (iv) statistical aggregation of views to allow quantitative analysis (Rowe & Wright, 1999).  
 
The Delphi method has been used for exploring policies and values (Scheibe et al., 2002; 
Skulmoski, Hartman & Krah, 2007), subjective safety management issues (Baker, 
Bouchlaghem & Emmitt, 2013) and perceptions of construction safety (Jebb, 2015).  
Supporters of this method have suggested that it allows rigorous capture of qualitative data 
(Rowe & Wright, 1999), allows achievement of consensus in areas of uncertainty or lacking 
in empirical evidence and can widen knowledge and stimulate new ideas (Powell, 2003). 
Proponents of this method have also suggested that the negative aspects of group 
interaction are minimised (social pressure, personal/political conflicts) while the advantages 
(such as gaining knowledge from a variety of sources and creative interaction) are 
maximised (Rowe & Wright, 1999). 
 
However, critics of the method have suggested that it requires extensive time commitment 
and may lead to a diluted version of individual opinions (Powell, 2003) due to encouraging 
conformity in views that may not exist otherwise (Bardecki, 1984; Goodman, 1987; 
Rohrbaugh, 1979). While those who take part may reach agreement, the process of doing so 
might render the consensus view unlike that held by people outside of the group. The 
recommended sample sizes using this method vary considerably, with homogenous groups 
said to require ten to fifteen people, whereas heterogeneous samples might require several 
hundred (Delbeq et al., 1975).   
Summary and Rationale for Chosen Methods 
While either ranking or sorting procedures can be applied to prioritise risks, these methods 
should display several features, including (Floyd & Footitt, 1999; Hansen et al., 1999): 
 
1. They must allow identification, assessment and development of priorities within the 
specific context in which it is to be used. 
2. They must be simple, unambiguous and straightforward to perform. 
3. They must consistently give the 'correct' answer such that, when aggregated, 
judgements should not produce a ranking that is atypical of individual judgements. 
4. That the chosen method should support the capacity to determine the degree of 




Each of the methods reviewed would, to varying degrees, facilitate a form of 
prioritisation/ranking and were considered for use in the current study. As the FAA already 
utilised a comparative ranking method (based on Q-Sorting), a Q-Sort method was included 
in the study. Decisions regarding the choice of which alternative methods to use were made 
partly on their capacity for comparing or corroborating prioritisation results, and partly on the 
technical aspects, strengths and limitations of each method, when compared with the others, 
guided by the features stated above.  
 
Magnitude estimation was initially considered an appropriate method as the output would 
have provided a ratio ranking, which would be an advantage when comparing results against 
an ordinal Q-Sort rank order. However, it was subsequently discounted due to its reported 
tendency toward high inter-individual variability which was likely to impact both on the ability 
to aggregate the data and gain acceptable consensus between raters.   
 
Repertory grid was discounted as a method as it would not allow comparison between 
individuals and appeared better suited to exploring individual systems of meaning and 
personal constructs than shared perceptions of safety priorities. The method was also not 
considered simple or unambiguous to perform, and given its known limitation when applied 
to generalisation, it did not fit with the aims of the study.  
 
The Delphi method, although robust, was discounted as it would have resulted in a group 
consensus decision regarding safety priorities, as opposed to individual rankings. Using this 
method, no comment could have been made on the degree of agreement between 
individuals, as the output is a decision made by consensus. Therefore, there would be no 
means of independently determining the degree to which personnel had a shared view on 
safety, which some of the other ranking methods would support.  
 
Direct ranking was considered appropriate for inclusion as it allowed consideration of 
concordance between individuals, it provided ordinal rankings which could be compared with 
the Q-Sort rank order, and could use the same discriminant criterion as a Q-Sort ranking, 
thus allowing a more direct comparison between the methods.   
 
The method of paired comparisons was also considered suitable for inclusion as it allowed 
for production of a ratio rank order, it allowed consideration of concordance between 
individuals (and additionally was amenable to calculation of intra-individual concordance) 




5.2.1  Ethical Approval  
Permission to undertake the study was granted by the University of Bath (Reference: Ethics 
17-132). MODREC was approached but determined that as one of the methods being tested 
was already in use by the organisation, the study did not require ethical consideration by 
MODREC (Reference email dated 20/03/17 from MODREC Secretariat to the author). 
5.2.2 Study Design 
The study was a within-subject, repeated measures design, with all respondents completing 
all ranking methods. Respondents each undertook three ranking/sorting exercises (direct 
ranking, Q-Sorting and the method of paired comparisons) on a single set of safety 
dimensions considered relevant to this population.  
5.2.3 Development of Materials 
Figure 3 graphically summarises the stages involved in the current study, each of which 


















Figure 3. Summary of the stages involved in the current study (where k is Kendall's 
coefficient of consistency, W is Kendall's coefficient of concordance and PC is paired 
comparison method). 
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Determination of the Item Set 
To determine the items which would be used, themes/dimensions from the FAA Fight Safety 
Q-Sort were considered alongside findings from Study 1 (Chapter 4) and the review of 
literature (Chapter 2). Although there were 21 items contained within the FAA Flight Safety 
Q-Sort, these were based on a smaller number of dimensions, each of which was 
represented by more than one item (Table 1, Appendix C). The dimensions/themes from 
Study 1, Chapter 2 and the FAA Flight Safety Q-Sort are summarised in Table 14, and were 
all considered potentially pertinent to a military aviation population. 
 
Table 14. 
Comparison of safety culture/climate themes/dimensions from Study 1, the FAA Flight Safety 
Q-Sort and the Review of Literature.  
Study 1 themes (Chapter 4) 
Themes from FAA Flight 
Safety Q-Sort  
Review of Literature 
(Chapter 2) 
Policy, rules and procedures 
Safety systems, procedures, 
policy 
Rules and procedures 











Risk perception/ consequences  Risk/hazard level 
Just culture, reporting and 
feedback 
Communication Reporting systems 
Training/experience Safety training  Training/education 
Organisational commitment   
 Working environment  
Pressure (resources) Resourcing Work pressure/resources 
  Competence 
  Safety systems 
 
Table 14 shows that the FAA Flight Safety Q-Sort contained eight dimensions, while Study 1 
(Chapter 4) and the review of literature (Chapter 2), identified eight dimensions and nine 
dimensions respectively. While there was considerable overlap between the dimensions, 
some were unique to each source and none of these is claimed to be definitive or 
exhaustive. Notably absent from the seven FAA Q-Sort dimensions were two aspects 
identified in the other sources. Both Study 1 and Chapter 2 identified 
competence/experience as having an important influence on safety (Study 1 showed that 
military aviation personnel discriminated between training and experience, and to be simply 
trained was not accepted as being competent to undertake the role, while Chapter 2 showed 
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competence to be considered a separate issue to training). Secondly, the dimension of 
pressure was identified in Study 1 and Chapter 2, with a key source of pressure for this 
population being a lack of human resources/manpower. Therefore, these two additional 
dimensions were considered important for inclusion, beyond the seven dimensions already 
currently in use.  
 
Therefore, the final list of nine dimensions to be included in this study were; individual 
actions/responsibility, management commitment/actions, priority of safety, safety training, 
communication, safety system/policy/procedures, working environment, human resources 
and competency/experience. 
Representation of Dimensions 
Once the dimensions to be used had been determined, the question arose as how to best 
represent these to the respondents. While the dimensions could simply be used as the list to 
rank, the use of a representative statement (Pidgeon et al., 2003; O'Hara et al., 2014) or 
pictorial representation (Ostberg, 1980; Weyman & Clarke, 2003) had previously been 
justified on grounds of reduced complexity and ease of completion. As the current 
dimensions in the study did not lend themselves to pictorial representation, a representative 
statement for each of the dimensions was considered a suitable way to simplify the ranking 
exercise for respondents.  
 
The chosen wording for representative items for each of the nine dimensions needed to be 
clear, unambiguous and reflect the essence of the overall dimension (Pidgeon et al., 2003). 
Items from the FAA Q-Sort tool, wording derived from findings from Study 1 and items from 
within existing safety climate tools (Chapter 2) were considered as potential representative 
items. From these, a list of four items per dimension were drafted (see Table 15). Items were 






List of safety items considered for inclusion in the study, with frequencies of each rated as 
'most representative' of the overall dimension during cognitive piloting. 
Individual actions/individual responsibility Frequency 
Personnel in my unit understand the concept of flight safety 1 
Everyone accepts that flight safety is their responsibility 1 
Individuals are empowered to take action in the interests of flight safety 2 
People here are clear about what their responsibilities for safety are 2 
Management commitment/management actions  
Unit level managers take the lead on flight safety issues 2 
The impact of change on flight safety is always considered by the 
organisation 
 
There is a just culture in my unit 1 
Suggestions to improve flight safety are always followed up 3 
Priority of safety  
Rules are not bent because of work pressure  
Flight safety is more important than cost saving measures 2 
Flight safety risks are never taken to ensure that a job is completed on time 3 
People do not take shortcuts, even when operational demand is high 1 
Safety training  
Everyone receives the correct level of flight safety training 1 
Everyone is fully trained to undertake the tasks that are required of them 
safely 
1 
Flight safety is an integral part of routine training 4 
Everyone here is sufficiently trained to undertake their tasks safely  
Communication  
Incidents that have flight safety implications are always reported  
It is easy to report safety concerns  
In my unit it is appropriate to question instructions when flight safety is at 
stake 
4 
Individuals are comfortable reporting their own mistakes 2 
Systems safety, procedures and policy  
Flight safety risks are considered in the normal planning/briefing cycle 3 
In my unit procedures are in place to promote flight safety awareness 3 
Procedures are properly designed to ensure safety  
Safety procedures are not just there to protect against legal action  
Working environment  
The work environment is always conducive to safe operations 2 
All the necessary equipment is provided to allow tasks to be carried out 
safely 
1 
My workplace identifies hazards and identifies risks 1 
Where I work, hazards are appropriately assessed and controlled 2 
Human resources  
The correct numbers of personnel are available on my unit 3 
There are enough people to do the job safely 3 
Manning is appropriate to meet operational demands  
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More people are made available to do their job if needed for safety reasons  
Competency/experience  
Competent personnel with the right levels of experience are available on my 
unit 
1 
People here are sufficiently competent and experienced for the jobs they 
are required to do 
4 
People here are always confident they have the right level of competency 
and experience for the job 
 
In general, people here are both competent and experienced enough to do 
their job safely 
1 
Cognitive Piloting of Item Sets 
The items in Table 15 were subjected to a cognitive pilot with a group of six military naval 
aviation safety experts using a method which was modified from the Delphi technique. 
Initially each of the six experts worked independently and was asked to choose which of the 
four items characterised best the essence of the respective dimension. Table 15 shows the 
frequency with which each item was chosen to represent each dimension. This 
demonstrated that there was limited agreement with regards to the most representative item, 
particularly for the dimensions of individual actions, working environment and management 
commitment. The second stage of the modified Delphi process was to facilitate a discussion 
session amongst the experts, to determine a consensus on one representative item per 
dimension. This was completed one month after the cognitive pilot with four of the original 
six experts (operational commitments meant that two respondents were unable to attend) 
and was facilitated by the researcher.  
 
In this discussion session, which took approximately sixty minutes, the respondents were 
first presented with the results shown in Table 15 and given cards on which each of the items 
were printed. One dimension at a time, respondents were asked to rank the items according 
to how much they reflected the overall dimension, discuss their rankings and come to a 
consensus as to the most appropriate item.  Respondents were asked to consider which 
item was the clearest, least ambiguous, and of most use from a safety management 
perspective. They were also asked to consider any semantic issues with the wording of the 
items for the FAA context and several changes were subsequently made; 'risks', were 
renamed as 'Flight Safety risks', and 'incidents' were replaced with 'occurrences'.  
 
Several dimensions, such as safety training, safety system and working environment 
appeared to be more amenable to encouraging consensus, and the ranking was performed 
quickly for these dimensions. However others, in particular management commitment, were 
not so easily defined, and the final item chosen required modification to its wording before all 
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respondents conceded that the item was appropriate to convey the meaning of the 
dimension. On completion of this process, the nine items considered to best represent the 
nine dimensions are shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 16. 
Safety dimensions and corresponding item used in the ranking exercises. 
Safety dimension Item 
Individual actions Everyone accepts that flight safety is their responsibility  
Management 
commitment 
Individuals are empowered by their management to take actions in the 
interests of flight safety  
Priority of safety People do not take flight safety risks, even when work demands are 
high  
Safety training Flight safety training is an integral part of all routine training  
Communication Occurrences that have flight safety implications are consistently 
followed up  
Safety system Flight safety risks are considered in the normal planning/briefing cycle  
Working 
environment 
Where I work, hazards are appropriately assessed and controlled  
Human resources There are enough people to do the job safely  
Competency 
/experience 
People here are sufficiently competent and experienced to do the jobs 
they are required to do safely  
 
Selection of the Discriminant Criterion 
When considering the discriminant criterion against which the respondents would be 
required to rank the items, it was acknowledged that the facet which the items were ranked 
on would likely have a significant impact on determining discrepancies. During the cognitive 
piloting of the item set, it was noted that the experts considered each of the dimensions of 
importance when considering safety in a workplace, thus it appeared reasonable to assume 
that the presence of each dimension in a workplace might indicate one in which safety was 
considered important. However, as already noted in Study 1, the dimensions did not always 
appear to be equally visible to participants in different units/functions.  Therefore, as a 
potential discriminant criterion it was considered appropriate to ask respondents to consider 
the degree to which each of the items was representative of their current workplace (i.e. 
which were most observed, and which were less so). Respondents should, arguably, 
reasonably be expected to observe their workplaces and make a subjective judgement of the 
degree to which the different dimensions were either present or absent. The reference 
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criterion therefore asked respondents to rank the nine items according to how much like their 
current work unit each statement was. This ranged from 'Most like my current unit' to 'Least 
like my current unit'.   
5.2.4 Materials 
Presentation of the Items 
The lack of availability of computing facilities for many of the sample population meant that 
paper and pen data collection methods were required. Each ranking/sorting method was 
presented to respondents in the form of a booklet. In all cases, the first page of the booklet 
contained instructions on how to complete the exercise. In the case of the direct ranking and 
Q-Sort exercises, the second and third pages of the booklet contained the nine items and 
the answer grid respectively. In the case of the paired comparison method, each pair of 
items was presented on a separate page, resulting in a thirty-seven-page booklet. While it is 
acknowledged for the method of paired comparisons that respondents would be able to 
'check back' on their previous answers they were instructed to complete the booklet 
sequentially, without returning to previous questions. No respondents were observed to be 
'checking back' during the data collection sessions. 
Order Effects 
To minimise order effects across the sorting/ranking tasks, the presentation of the three 
methods was counterbalanced across respondents using a Latin square design (Table 2, 
Appendix C). To minimise item order effects within each method, four versions of booklet for 
each method were made, each with a different presentation order for the items (as 
recommended by Serfass & Sherman 2013; Weyman & Clarke, 2003). This was particularly 
important in the case of the method of paired comparisons due to the highly repetitive nature 
of the task. Randomisation of the order of items was less crucial in the Q-Sort and direct 
ranking methods, but was conducted to align with the method of paired comparisons. In the 
case of the paired comparison booklets, paired items were presented equally often forward 
and backward (in line with recommendations made by Sjoberg, 1967) to avoid potential bias 
(Blasius, 2012). 
Workload Measures 
Comparative approaches have been criticised for being cognitively complex when compared 
to simple ranking exercises, particularly with larger numbers of items. To determine the 
subjective workload induced by each of the ranking methods, the NASA task load index 
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(TLX) was used (see Appendix C for NASA-TLX). This multi-dimensional scale, developed in 
1988 by Hart and Staveland has been widely used in naval military (Gould et al., 2009; 
Bridger & Bennett, 2011), army aviation (Hill et al., 1992) and military aviation (Bittner, Byers, 
Hill, Zaklad, & Christ, 1989) contexts as an indicator of subjective workload. The NASA-TLX 
consisted of six sub-scales which represented a variety of independent clusters of variables 
considered to constitute workload experienced by people undertaking tasks (Hart, 2006). 
These variables are (i) mental demands, (ii) physical demands, (iii) temporal demands, (iv) 
frustration, (v) effort and (vi) performance. Respondents were asked to rate the magnitude of 
demand (on a scale of 0 to 100, marked to the nearest 5) on a bi-polar scale for each 
dimension (in line with Hill et al., 1992). The NASA-TLX has undergone appropriate validity 
and reliability testing (Hart, 2006) and is often used as individual sub-scales, sometimes 
referred to as the raw NASA-TLX (Byers, Bittner & Hill, 1989; Hendy, Hamilton & Landry, 
1993).  
5.2.5 Quantitative Pilot Trial 
The item set was piloted with five FAA personnel, using the booklets devised for the study. 
Each person was asked to comment on the clarity of the completion instructions and on any 
ambiguity associated with the meaning of the nine items. All respondents stated that the 
instructions were clear, that they understood the items and that the items were discernibly 
different. To further check the suitability of the item set, within-respondent consistency was 
assessed for the paired comparison responses, i.e. to assess the discriminant properties of 
the item set, and the presence of intransitive triads of the type A>B>C>A. All respondents 
achieved acceptable internal consistency (k>0.70, see Section 5.2.8). 
5.2.6 Sample 
Respondents were recruited on an opportunity basis, from one squadron at each of two 
locations, from teams of personnel who were accustomed to working together (personnel 
were from the same watch/shift or flight crew). Prior information of the study was 
promulgated to potential respondents via squadron communication channels using a 
participant information sheet (Appendix C). Access to the participant sample was granted by 
the Chain of Command and data collection sessions were organised to limit disruption to 
operational activities. The sampling was targeted, in that personnel with a variety of ranks 
(junior ratings, senior ratings and officers) from the two major functions in the FAA (aircrew 
and engineers) were invited to participate. Data collection was undertaken on five separate 
occasions over a two-month period. A total of forty-five respondents participated in the study 





Demographic details of sample.  
Location Function Rank 
1 (N=13) Aircrew (N=5) Officer (N=5) 
Engineers (N=8) Senior rating (N=3) 
Junior rating (N=5) 
2 (N=24) Aircrew (N=10) Officer (N=10) 
Engineers (N=14) Senior rating (N=8) 
Junior rating (N=6) 
Note: N= number of respondents 
5.2.7 Procedure 
On the day of testing, respondents were fully briefed about the study (both verbally and in 
writing, see Appendix C), encouraged to ask questions and finally invited to participate. 
Volunteers signed informed consent forms prior to participating (Appendix C). 
Questionnaires were intended for self-completion, however the researcher remained 
available in case respondents had any questions. Time to attend the briefing and data 
collection sessions was scheduled within work time to ensure that additional demands were 
not placed on respondents. Each session took approximately thirty minutes, comprising a 
total of one and a half hours in total, over three sessions.  
 
Respondents completed the ranking exercises at three time points; at the start, the middle 
and at the end of the working day, with at least four hours between sessions. On conclusion 
of each ranking exercise respondents completed the NASA-TLX and after the final session 
respondents also answered several short de-brief questions. This de-brief gathered 
information regarding whether respondents understood the point of the exercise they had 
completed, what aspects of their work environment they were thinking about when doing the 
exercise, and whether there were any safety dimensions that were not included which 
should have been.  
5.2.8 Data Analysis  
Respondents were required to rank nine safety statements according to a bi-polar criterion of 
Most like my unit to Least like my unit, using three methods; the direct rank ordering method, 
a Q-Sort method and the method of paired comparisons.  
 
To test the consistency of responses it was important to determine the degree of consensus 
between respondents and the different ranking methods afforded variable scope for 
achieving this. All three methods allowed calculation of between-person concordance while 
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only the method of paired comparisons was also amendable testing of within-respondent 
consistency. Description of these analyses are detailed below.  
Method of Paired Comparisons 
Calculation of Within Respondent Consistency (k)  
Unlike the Q-Sort and direct rankling methods, the method of paired comparisons allowed for 
calculation of consistency within each respondent. Within this method inconsistencies might 
occur, for example, when a judge ranks item A above item B and item B above item C, but 
then ranks item C above item A. This situation is known as an intransitive triad (Kendall, 
1948) and may occur when items are ambiguous or lack a 'just noticeable difference' 
(Thurstone, 1959) such that respondents cannot distinguish between the items.  
 
To test whether any respondents displayed inconsistent responses, Kendall's coefficient of 





Where: R=sum of rows (number of times an item was selected as more 'like my unit' than its 
comparison item); r = mean of R; N= number of items in set. 
 
Varying from 0 (completely inconsistent) to 1 (completely consistent), a threshold k value of 
0.7 or higher was set as an acceptable criterion (Cromer et al., 1984). If more than 10% of 
respondents were seen to exhibit poor consistency (k<0.70) then the method would be seen 
to be unsuitable for analysis (Bock & Jones, 1968). Following the Case V method 
(Thurstone, 1927) respondent internal consistency was assessed by calculating the number 
of intransigent triads present in each response set.  
 
A total of four out of the forty-five response sets (8%) within the paired comparison method 
exhibited a lack of consistency (k<0.70) and so were excluded from the analysis. The 
corresponding data for these respondents for the direct ranking and Q-Sort methods were 
also removed. Data from two respondents were removed as they did not complete all three 
data collection sessions (these respondents were unable to attend the final session due to 
operational or medical reasons unrelated to the study), while a further two data sets had to 
be removed as respondents did not adhere to the response format requirements (one in 
direct ranking and one in the Q-Sort). This left a total of thirty-seven respondents whose data 
was subjected to further analysis. The final number of response sets was in excess of the 




The method of paired comparisons also allowed construction of a scale derived from the 
frequency with which each item on the scale was ranked higher than all other items. In line 
with methods detailed by Thurstone (1927) and replicated in Ostberg (1980), Weyman and 
Clarke (2003) and O'Hara et al. (2014), respondent data sets were aggregated to create a 
frequency table. These were completed for all response sets and the frequencies were then 
converted into judgement proportions (Weyman & Clarke, 2003), after which they were 
transformed into standardised arcsine deviates (Ostberg, 1980). These arcsine deviates 
were then finally transformed by referencing these to the item most often ranked as 'least 
like my unit' (rank 1) to produce an interval scale with the lowest ranked item as the lowest 
point on the scale. 
All Methods 
Calculation of between respondent concordance (W) 
The output of both the direct ranking and Q-Sort methods could be tested for between 
respondent concordance (W) directly, however ranking for the method of paired 
comparisons, further data processing was required. This was achieved by calculating the 
total number of times each item was 'preferred' to all other items in each response set. A 
rank of 1 was assigned to the item 'Most like my current unit', with each subsequent rank 
being assigned to the item next most 'Like my unit'. The item with a rank of 9 was considered 
by respondents to be 'Least like my current unit'. 
 
To determine the extent to which respondents showed agreement (concordance) over the 
rank order of the safety culture items, Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W) was 
calculated (Gisev, Bell & Chen, 2013) for each of the three ranking/sorting methods 





Where S=Sum of squares of rank sums; M=number of respondents; N= number of items in set. 
 
Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W) scores vary between 0 (no agreement) and 1 
(complete agreement), and it was noted that with large numbers of raters even low W values 
can be significant (Gisev et al., 2013). There is no commonly accepted means of interpreting 
W values, however they can be interpreted in a similar way to kappa values (Landis & Koch, 
1977, Table 18). Others have suggested that W values of less than 0.5 should be considered 
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moderate to low, while values of greater than 0.5 indicate good concordance (Gearhart, 
Booth, Sedivec & Schauer, 2013).  
 
Table 18. 
Interpretation of kappa values, drawn from Landis and Koch (1977). 
Value Interpretation 
<0.00 Poor 
0.00-0.20 Slight  
0.21-0.40 Fair  
0.41-0.60 Moderate 
0.61-0.80 Substantial 
0.81-1.00 Almost perfect 
 
The different statistical techniques to which each of the ranking/sorting methods were 
amenable is summarised in Table 19. 
 
Table 19. 
Summary of statistical treatments applicable to the three ranking methods. 
 







Direct ranking ✓ 0 indicates no agreement, 1 
indicates complete agreement 
between respondents. 
Q-Sort ✓ 
Paired comparisons ✓ 
Within Respondent 
Consistency (k) 
Direct ranking x 0 indicates completely 
inconsistent, 1 indicates 
completely consistent. 
Threshold of 0.7.  
Q-Sort x 
Paired comparisons ✓ 
Item scaling Direct ranking x Ordinal scale 
Q-Sort x Ordinal scale 
Paired comparisons ✓ Interval scale 
 
Analysis of Workload Measures - NASA-TLX  
To determine the presence of inter-method differences in workload the Friedman test was 
used on results from the six NASA-TLX sub-scales. This non-parametric statistic is used with 
repeated measures on ordinal data and identifies differences between groups (Field, 2009).  
150 
 
5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Between Respondent Concordance (W)  
Between respondent concordance (W) was calculated to consider the extent to which 
respondents showed agreement over the rank order attributed to the nine safety statements. 
The results from this analysis for the three methods is shown in Table 20, with the Chi2 value 
used to test for significance (Ferguson, 1981). 
 
Table 20. 
Co-efficient of concordance (W) for all response sets (N=37). 
Method Co-efficient of 
concordance (W) 
Chi2 value Significance 
Direct ranking 0.271 80.216 0.0001 
Q-Sort 0.256 75.704 0.0001 
Paired comparison 0.325 96.000 0.0001 
 
Results showed that that overall agreement for the three ranking/sorting methods was 
statistically significant (p<0.01). When compared to the criterion in Table 20, this agreement 
would be labelled as fair while when interpreted against Gearhart et al.'s (2013) criterion, 
each W was less than 0.5, and so could be considered to show moderate to low 
concordance. The highest agreement was observed for the method of paired comparisons 
(W=0.325), the direct ranking method showed the next highest level of agreement 
(W=0.271) whilst the Q-Sort method showed the lowest level of agreement (W=0.256). 
5.3.2 Exploration of Sub-Population Concordance 
Several authors have reported differences in views on safety between personnel of varying 
managerial levels (Lee, 1996; Weyman & Clarke, 2003) and occupational groups (Fleming, 
Flin, Means & Gordon, 1998; Rundmo, 1992, 1996).  It was of interest to explore whether 
agreement as to the rank order of the safety dimensions varied by sub-group within the 
current sample group, i.e. whether some groups showed higher levels of concordance than 
others. The demographic data gathered in this study permitted identification of sub-samples 
for function (aircrew and engineers) and rank (junior and senior engineers). The 
homogenous nature of Aircrew ranks meant that this cadre could not be meaningfully 




The co-efficient of concordance (W) was calculated for each of the sub-groups. When 
compared by function, agreement within the aircrew and engineer groups (Table 21) 
generally showed moderate, statistically significant concordance. Most were lower than the 
0.5 threshold set by Gearhart et al. (2013), other than for the paired comparison method for 
aircrew respondents (W=0.503). Particularly low concordance was noted for the method of 
paired comparison within the engineer sub-population (W=0.265).  
 
Table 21. 
Co-efficient of concordance for Aircrew (N=15) and Engineers (N=22). 
Function Method Co-efficient of 
concordance (W) 
Chi2 value Significance 
Aircrew Q-Sort 0.461 55.312 0.0001 
Direct ranking 0.407 48.89 0.0001 
Paired comparison 0.503 60.305 0.0001 
Engineers Q-Sort 0.461 55.312 0.0001 
Direct ranking 0.407 48.89 0.0001 
Paired comparison 0.265 46.705 0.001 
 
When separated by rank (see Table 22 for comparison between junior and senior 
engineers), agreement amongst junior engineers was particularly low for all three 
ranking/sorting methods (ranging between W=0.139 and 0.196), and was generally non-
significant. In contrast, concordance between senior engineers was higher, all being 
statistically significant, with one result over the threshold set by Gearhart et al. (2013) for 
good concordance (paired comparison method). Although only exploratory, these findings 
tentatively indicate that there might be less agreement regarding the rank order of safety 
dimensions between junior engineers than the other sub groups.  
 
Table 22. 




concordance (W) Chi2 value Significance 
Junior  
 
Q-Sort 0.196 17.270 0.027 
Direct ranking 0.139 12.194 0.143 
Paired comparison 0.145 12.717 0.122 
Senior  
 
Q-Sort 0.344 30.316 0.0001 
Direct ranking 0.406 35.758 0.0001 




5.3.3 Comparison of Rank Order Across the Methods  
The statistically significant between-respondent concordance over the rank position of the 
safety dimensions within each of the three ranking methods is suggestive of shared views on 
the ordinal salience of the safety dimensions. Therefore, it was considered appropriate to 
further explore the rank order for each method in relation to the criterion of how much 'Like 
my unit' each of the dimensions were ranked. To formally test the degree of agreement on 
the level of rank order, a Friedman's test was applied. The results (Table 23) indicated that 
there was no significant difference between the three methods with regards to rank order. 
This would indicate that the three methods provide an essentially equivalent rank order.  
 
Table 23. 
Friedman's test statistics between aggregated rank order position of the safety climate 
dimensions across the three ranking methods.  
Method Mean Rank Chi2 Significance (p) 
Q-Sort 1.89 
1.333 0.513 Direct ranking 1.89 
Paired comparisons 2.22 
 
When the mean rank orders of the safety culture/climate dimensions were compared across 
the three methods (Table 24), a number of similarities were apparent. Firstly, individual 
actions (Everyone accepts that flight safety is their responsibility) was ranked highest in all 
three methods, indicating that this was 'Most like my unit'. This may be interpreted as a high 
degree of personal responsibility for safety being particularly salient amongst this sample as 
a positive feature of their workplace. Similarly, human resources (There are enough people 
to do the job safely) was consistently ranked lowest, indicating that respondents perceived 
this to be 'Least like my unit'. Thus, it would appear that the most saliently negative issue 
related to safety amongst these respondents was the fact that they perceived a shortfall in 
the amount of personnel who were available. This might indicate an area of concern for the 
respondents, and therefore may be interpreted as a priority.  The consistent ranking of these 
two items at the extremes of the rank orders suggests that these are the most obvious to 
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7 Priority of safety 
 








Priority of safety 




Note: 1= most like my unit and 9 = least like my unit. 
 
Safety training (Flight safety training is an integral part of all routine training) was ranked as 
second 'Most like my unit' across all three ranking/sorting methods, suggesting that 
respondents perceived the organisation as effectively managing safety training in relation to 
the other areas of safety climate. Two other dimensions received consistent rank orders 
across the three methods, with management commitment (Individuals are empowered by 
their management to take actions in the interests of flight safety) being ranked fourth, and 
communication (Occurrences that have flight safety implications are consistently followed 
up) ranked sixth out of nine dimensions. Whilst there is consistency, the positions of these 
dimensions in the middle third of the rank orders may suggest that these are perhaps less 
salient than some of the other statements. 
 
Of further interest are the two dimensions of priority of safety (People do not take flight 
safety risks, even when work demands are high) and competence/experience (People here 
are sufficiently competent and experienced to do the jobs they are required to do safely) 
which were ranked seventh and eighth out of nine. Although there was not complete 
consensus across the methods, it would appear that there might be areas of concern in the 
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levels of competency/experience of personnel and the negative effect of work demands on 
safety behaviour amongst the military aviation respondents.  
5.3.4 Subjective Workload Measures 
The NASA-TLX scales were utilised to determine the subjective workload imposed by the 
three ranking/sorting methods. Each of the six scales, shown in Table 25, have values 
ranging from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating either low demand/effort/frustration or good 
performance and 100 indicating high demand/effort/frustration or poor performance. In 
general, the ranking/sorting methods were rated as below 50% for all scales, indicating that 
the methods were relatively benign in terms of the perceived workload imposed. The 




Freidman's statistical test results for the NASA- TLX sub-scales.  
NASA-TLX 
subscale 




Direct Ranking 34 (20) 1.97 
0.110 0.946 Q-Sort 34 (23) 2.04 
Paired Comparison 30 (18) 1.99 
Physical 
demands 
Direct Ranking 8 (5) 1.89 
1.690 0.430 Q-Sort 9 (6) 2.07 
Paired Comparison 8 (5) 2.04 
Temporal 
demands 
Direct Ranking 16 (12) 1.95 
3.120 0.210 Q-Sort 16 (15) 1.86 
Paired Comparison 19 (15) 2.19 
Performance 
success 
Direct Ranking 31 (19) 2.14 
1.541 0.463 Q-Sort 28 (18) 1.89 
Paired Comparison 30 (18) 1.97 
Effort Direct Ranking 28 (20) 1.93 
0.417 0.812 Q-Sort 29 (19) 2.07 
Paired Comparison 26 (18) 2.00 
Frustration Direct Ranking 19 (19) 1.85 
9.376 0.009 Q-Sort 16 (13) 1.80 
Paired Comparison 27 (24) 2.35 
Where SD= standard deviation  
 
The majority of the NASA-TLX sub-scales showed no significant difference between ratings 
attributed to the three methods, with the exception being 'Frustration'. On this scale 
respondents rated the paired comparison method as significantly more frustrating to 
complete (p<0.01) compared to the remaining two methods. The method of paired 
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comparisons requires respondents to compare each item with every other item individually, 
and so it is likely that this frustration arose from either the repetitiveness of the method, or 
the length of the exercise (there were 36 pairs of items to compare).  
5.3.5 Respondent De-brief  
Respondents were asked to provide feedback about the ranking exercises in a written de-
brief. When asked 'Did you understand what you were required to do for the ranking 
exercise?', all respondents indicated in the affirmative, suggesting that there were no 
difficulties with understanding how to complete the exercises. When asked to detail any 
specific experiences that they may have used when deciding how to rank the safety 
dimensions on each of the exercises, seven respondents provided feedback. Of these, five 
indicated that no specific instances were used (indicative examples of feedback include "No 
particular instances come to mind, I merely used the day to day routine of squadron life in 
my answers" and "Just examples I have seen on squadron and how they are challenged and 
dealt with").  Two individuals suggested that the lack of available people and experienced 
personnel were experiences that they used, highlighting that this was usually due to 
detachments (i.e. travelling away with a ship) or other duties.   
 
When asked to detail any further areas which they felt were applicable to flight safety which 
had not been captured in the nine safety dimensions, eight respondents provided answers. 
Here, four suggested that an item on the availability and suitability of equipment (including 
survival equipment) was required. Two respondents highlighted fatigue, one suggested 
human factors and one suggested an item relating to whether people feel rushed when 
completing jobs.  
5.3.6 Summary of Findings 
The purpose of this study was to characterise employee perspectives on the primacy of 
headline influences on safety in the FAA through comparing and corroborating findings from 
three widely used comparative ranking methods. The findings showed that there was broadly 
statistically significant, fair agreement amongst personnel regarding the rank order to which 
nine safety related statements were ascribed as being 'most' or 'least' like the respondents' 
units.  
 
The three methods (Q-Sort, direct ranking and the method of paired comparisons) produced 
statistically similar aggregated rank orders of the nine statements). These findings somewhat 
contrast with previous assertions that the choice of ranking elicitation technique can strongly 
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affect ranking outcomes (Ali & Ronaldson, 2012; Fisher et al., 1968; Mullen, 1999; van den 
Fels-Klerx et al., 2017), as this did not appear to be the case in the current study.  
 
The dimension individual actions (Everyone accepts that flight safety is their responsibility) 
was consistently ranked as being ’Most like my unit'. In contrast, human resources (There 
are enough people to do the job safely) was consistently ranked as 'Least like my unit'. 
Priority of safety (People do not take flight safety risks, even when work demands are high) 
and competency/experience (People here are sufficiently competent and experienced to do 
the jobs they are required to do safely) were ranked relatively negatively. On the whole, 
there were no significant differences in subjective workload between the three ranking 
methods, however respondents found the method of paired comparisons significantly more 
frustrating to complete than either the direct rank ordering or Q-Sort methods.  
5.4 Discussion 
The study revealed that military aviation respondents could make consistent discriminations 
between nine dimensions which were considered to influence safety and risk decision 
making when using three ranking techniques (Q-Sorting, direct ranking and the method of 
paired comparisons). This would suggest that the dimensions were meaningful to the 
respondents. The level of agreement between respondents about the rank order of the 
safety statements was low to moderate, with no clear evidence that any one method 
displayed better agreement than the other two. This corroboration between different 
methods might suggest that confidence in the aggregated rank order of the safety 
dimensions is reasonably high. 
5.4.1 Comparison of Ranking Methods 
In light of existing concerns regarding observations that the method of ranking can be shown 
to affect responses it was noteworthy that the current study showed no significant effect on 
the overall rank order in which nine safety dimensions were placed by the respondents. This 
would suggest that there was little to differentiate the three methods when using them to 
prioritise dimensions for safety improvements, where the objective was to derive a simple 
ordinal ranking. 
Strengths, Limitations and Performance of the Ranking/Sorting Methods 
Given the similarities in rank orders ascribed by each method, it could be argued that any of 
the three methods could be used by the FAA to gain an understanding of how their 
personnel view aspects of safety in their workplaces, and where improvements may best be 
targeted. However, each of the Q-Sort, direct ranking and method of paired comparisons 
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have acknowledged strengths and limitations, and the ways in which these manifested in the 
current study are briefly discussed below in relation to their utility for FAA purposes. 
Q-Sort 
The FAA Flight Safety Q-Sort originally contained twenty-one items to sort. However, this 
number of (largely redundant) items have previously been suggested as a potential source 
of confusion amongst respondents (Ashford, 2016)  and so for the purposes of the current 
study the complexity of the tool was reduced by limiting the number of items to be sorted to 
reflect the smaller number of underlying dimensions (see Table 1, Appendix C). This also 
allowed a more direct comparison of the Q-Sort method with the other methods (direct 
ranking, method of paired comparisons).  
 
No concerns were raised by respondents about understanding how to apply the Q-Sort 
method and findings from the NASA-TLX showed that the perceived workload of the method 
was considered relatively low. It was noted, however, that one data set had to be removed 
from the analysis due to a respondent not conforming with the forced distribution answer 
grid. This may have resulted from an incomplete understanding of the instructions, or that 
the respondent was unwilling/unable to rank the safety dimensions according to this 
distribution. 
 
Q-Sort ranking allowed the respondents to rank items which they perceived to be similar at 
the same rank (Eyvindson et al., 2015), within the bounds of the forced distribution where 
fewer statements were placed at the extremes, and more in the neutral/middle of the ranks. 
It is possible to use a free distribution with Q-Sorting, such that participants can place any 
number of items at any place along the continuum. However forced sorting is held to have 
the advantage that as items assigned to the middle (neutral) categories tend to be 
considered relatively less important, yet require discriminations that raters can find difficult, 
maximising the number of items in the middle reduces the difficulty faced by respondents 
(Block, 1978). Nevertheless, this method may also force respondents to make 
discriminations they otherwise would not make between items.  
 
Data collection for the Q-Sort method was relatively simple and economical, with 
respondents often completing the exercise in approximately fifteen minutes. This method 
was amenable to statistical calculation of between-person agreement, which indicates the 
degree of 'shared' views, however only ordinal ranks could be furnished using the Q-sort 
method, such that no comment could be made regarding the relative difference between 




Like the Q-Sort method, respondents typically perceived the direct ranking method to impose 
low workload and reported no difficulties with completion. One response set had to be 
removed as the individual had placed several items in a 'tied' fashion; possibly indicating a 
preference to rank several items at a similar level. This tentatively supported criticisms that 
this method may force people to make unrealistic discriminations between items (Eyvindson 
et al., 2015). The method did appear simplistic to apply, with straightforward written 
instructions which were easy to devise, and economical data collection. The suggested 
efficiency of the method (Curcin, Black & Bramley, 2009) was borne out in the time taken to 
complete; although not specifically measured, individuals completing the direct ranking task 
were observed to complete the exercise relatively quickly, typically in under approximately 
ten minutes. Direct ranking has been criticised for low reproducibility (i.e. test-retest 
reliability); although this was not tested in the current study, the high concordance with Q-
Sort and paired comparison rank orders might tentatively suggest that this may not be an 
issue for the item set used in this study  
 
Direct ranking is amenable to statistical calculation of between-person agreement, which 
indicates the degree of 'shared' views. However, like the Q-Sort method, although the rank 
order of dimensions obtained using this method afforded ordinal rankings, this did not allow 
calculation of the relative distance between the items (Droba, 1932; Scheibe et al., 2002) 
and so was not able to consider if any of the items stood out from the others (Susel et al., 
2016). Thus, limited inference could be made about the relative position of each dimension 
in the rank order other than directionally (higher/lower, more/less positive). 
Paired Comparisons 
While all three ranking methods allowed consideration of the degree to which a 'shared' view 
was held, only the method of paired comparisons was also amenable to calculation of intra-
rater consistency. This allowed for comment on the ability of respondents to meaningfully 
discriminate between the items/statements to be made, as a higher number of triadic 
relationships are often observed to occur within data when the items being compared are too 
similar (Brown & Peterson, 2009). The fact that 92% of respondents showed acceptable 
intra-rater consistency suggests that the safety dimensions utilised in this study were 
discernible concepts to respondents.  
 
While the direct ranking and Q-Sort methods are limited to producing an ordinal ranking, the 
method of paired comparisons is designed to produce an interval scale. An advantage of this 
is that it afforded additional insight with respect to the 'distance' on a continuum between one 
159 
 
item and the next. There was no a priori item chosen to anchor the interval scale in the 
current study and so consideration was given to the rankings shown in Table 24. The 
statement relating to human resources was consistently the lowest ranked dimension. The 
interval scale was therefore calibrated to this item by setting the statement related to human 
resources as zero, and transforming the values of the other items in relation to this, by 
calculating their relative distance from the human resources statement (following methods 
described by Cromer et al., 1984).  This resulted in the distribution of the safety dimensions 
on the scale demonstrated in Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4. Representation of interval scale indicating the relative position of safety items in 
relation to 'Least like my unit' (0) and 'Most like my unit' (6.2) for all respondents.  
 
Relative to the lowest ranked dimension (human resources), individual actions (Everyone 
accepts that flight safety is their responsibility) was ranked at the opposite end of the interval 
scale (with a scale rating of 6.2). Competency/experience (People here are sufficiently 
competent and experienced to do the jobs they are required to do safely) and priority of 
safety (People do not take flight safety risks, even when work demands are high) were 























items (Communication, safety system, management commitment, work environment and 
safety training) clustered together toward the mid-point of the scale, with little differentiation 
between them. Interestingly, Anselmi, Fabbris, Martini and Robusto (2018) found that this 
method tended to be most reliable at the highest and lowest ranks, and less so in middle 
ranked items. These authors postulated that respondents found it easy to identify the 
extreme ranked items, but that the middle items required more effort to rank, and therefore 
were more unreliable. 
 
The method of paired comparisons therefore had the advantage of providing deeper insight 
into the relative salience of the items when compared to the Q-Sort or direct ranking 
methods. In relation to using this method to inform safety managers, therefore, it may 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the degree to which certain items are different to 
the others. This could therefore be used to infer what issues may best be addressed to 
improve safety. Similar conclusions regarding differentiation regarding relative positions of 
items were noted by Anselmi et al. (2018).   
 
However, the administrative burden of the method of paired comparisons lay in the number 
of comparisons which were required (36 in this study) which increased the time requirement 
(often taking the whole allocated thirty minutes to complete), and booklet size. These 
findings were in line with those demonstrated by Aloysius et al. (2006) who indicated that the 
method of paired comparisons generated decisional conflicts, were more effortful and less 
desirable to use than other methods.  Arguably, this is likely to be the reason that this 
method was considered by respondents to be the most 'frustrating' of the methods. 
Furthermore, the number of potential items that could be ranked using this method was 
limited (without the added complexity of an incomplete design) to a maximum of nine entities 
(Chalwa & Sodhi, 2011; Ock et al., 2016; Weyman et al., 2006). While an incomplete design 
was an option, it would have had the disadvantage of increasing the required sample size. 
Therefore, this method was appropriate for ranking the nine safety dimensions, but would 
arguably not be suitable for ranking the original twenty-one items from the FAA Flight Safety 
Q-Sort. 
Summary 
Although the final order of ranking did not appear to be affected by the method of ranking 
used (when comparing three widely used alternative methods), the method of paired 
comparisons had several advantages over the Q-Sort and direct ranking methods. The 
results from the method of paired comparisons afforded a more nuanced insight into the 
relative priority given to the influences of safety. The most noticeable of these was the 
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interval scale generated using the method of paired comparisons (see Figure 4) which 
allowed consideration of the relative distance of the dimensions from each other as well as 
stand-out items, and those items which showed little discrimination from each other.  
However, the Q-Sort and direct ranking methods were significantly less 'frustrating' for 
respondents to complete, required a lower time burden on respondents, and were simpler to 
administer during data collection.  
Comparison of concordance of individual and aggregated rank order 
Although not a primary aim of the study, in light of the modest concordance of aggregated 
rank order (detailed in Table 20) an exploratory analysis of the concordance of rank order at 
the individual level was undertaken. Results from this analysis (Friedman's test of rank order, 
Table 4 in Appendix C) showed that unlike the aggregated rank order, at the individual level 
significant differences (p<0.05) were seen between the three ranking methods for all nine 
safety dimensions. Post hoc tests (Wilcoxon's test with Bonferonni adjustment) revealed that 
these significant differences occurred between the Q-Sort and both the direct ranking 
method and method of paired comparisons. However, no significant differences were seen 
between the direct ranking method and method of paired comparisons. The only exception 
to this was the dimension of individual responsibility which showed no significant differences 
in rank order between all three ranking methods.  
 
These findings raised two issues worthy of discussion. Firstly, the findings corroborated the 
previous assertion that individual responsibility was the dimension on which military naval 
aviation personnel showed strong agreement on, ranking it as 'most like' the situation in their 
units. Secondly, the lack of concordance between ranking methods at the individual level, in 
contrast to the significant agreement shown at the aggregated rank order level, raises 
questions regarding whether the group ranking is representative for each method. This is 
similar to the criticisms levelled at the aggregation of rating scales (Russell & Gray, 1994), 
and requires consideration in future studies.  
5.4.2 Utility of Ranking Methods: Role and Contribution to Risk Management 
Sound risk ranking is essential to efficient safety management (Fischhoff & Morgan, 2012). 
To determine prioritisation of safety dimensions for safety improvement, the findings from 
this study interpreted as dimensions of concern those seen to be least evident in the 
workplace. Whilst it is acknowledged that this is an assumption, both the previous qualitative 
study (Chapter 4) and a review of the literature (Chapter 2) would indicate that each of the 
dimensions could reasonably be expected to be evidenced in a workplace in which safety 
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was considered important. Therefore, by inference, if respondents showed agreement as to 
which dimensions may be 'least like' what they observed in their workplace, this might 
indicate areas in which the organisation should target their resources to effect safety 
improvements.  
 
With respect to the rank order of influences on safety, having sufficient personnel available 
(human resources) was consistently the most negatively ranked dimension. In contrast, 
observation that individuals accepting that flight safety was an individual responsibility, was 
consistently ranked the most likely dimension to be observed in the workplace. These 
findings plausibly suggest that respondents can consistently identify which safety influence is 
displayed most and least noticeably within their units and that it may be easiest to identify 
the extremes of the ranks (i.e. the best and worst aspects of workplace safety).  
 
Two further dimensions, priority of safety and competency/experience, were typically ranked 
in seventh and eighth position out of nine, with high agreement as to the position of these 
dimensions. Arguably, these influences on safety are likely to be particularly salient to 
participants. However, the ranking of the remainder of the safety dimensions (safety training, 
management commitment, communication, working environment and safety system) 
appeared to vary to a greater degree between individuals. These findings reflect alignment 
with Anselmi et al. (2018) who suggested that ranking methods (particularly the direct 
ranking method) tended to show the highest reliability at the top and bottom positions of the 
rank order, with greater variability in the middle ranks. Exploration of the paired comparison 
data further corroborates these findings, as the dimensions of individual responsibility, 
human resources, priority of safety and competency/experience were stand out items (see 
Figure 4) while others (safety training, management commitment, communication, working 
environment and safety system) appeared to 'cluster' together toward the middle of the 
interval scale, and therefore showed less discrimination from each other.  
 
Taken together, and interpreted from the viewpoint of organisational prioritisation, the 
findings from the study suggest that there were a small number of dimensions which may be 
particularly salient to military aviation personnel, and thus require prioritisation by the FAA. 
Priorities for improvement may therefore lie in addressing issues of availability of human 
resources, work pressure and competency/experience. This analysis did not determine what 
the effects of these dimensions being less evident in the workplace were likely to be, but 




In contrast, military aviation employees viewed their colleagues as having a high degree of 
individual responsibility for safety. The fact that some dimensions (safety system, 
communication, working environment and management commitment) showed little 
discrimination and variable aggregated rank order would indicate that there might be little 
utility in prioritising these for safety improvement, as these appeared to show less 
agreement, and therefore might vary more widely across workplaces. These findings should, 
however, be interpreted in light of the limited sample size (37 respondents) and limited 
workplace variation (only two locations were sampled), such that the generalisability of these 
findings to the wider FAA population is unknown.   
 
The current findings can be almost directly contrasted with those reported by Biggs, Banks, 
Davey and Freeman (2013) where employees in a construction firm were shown to have 
ranked aspects of individual responsibility for safety as least evident, and the organisation 
ranked as having a clear responsibility for safety. These differences may perhaps highlight 
the importance of interpreting results with an understanding of the respondent sample. In the 
case of the current study, frontline military aviation personnel were used, while Biggs et al. 
(2013) used a sample of safety leaders. Each group may, arguably, have provided 
responses which are self-serving. In the current study, the dimension individual responsibility 
is perhaps the only one over which frontline individuals have control, while they have little 
control over aspects such as human resources, priority of safety and 
competence/experience.  In contrast, Biggs et al.'s (2013) sample of senior managers may 
have preferred to blame poorer safety standards on frontline personnel, and consider the 
organisation to be more committed to safety than frontline staff might.  To determine whether 
this was indeed the case, the current study could be repeated, with the sample group being 
comprised of senior safety managers, and the results then compared with the current 
findings. 
5.4.3 Concordance Between Individuals and Groups of Personnel 
Between-respondent agreement across the sample was found to be fair; when functional 
demographic groups were considered separately, however this agreement generally showed 
increased levels when sub-groups were considered separately. This was found to be the 
case for aircrew and senior engineers who displayed higher levels of agreement than did the 
group of junior engineers. Although issues of restricted sample size are acknowledged, 
these findings would tentatively support previous assertions that perceptions of factors 
affecting safety were prone to vary by functional and hierarchical groups within organisations 
(in line with Fleming, Flin, Means & Gordon, 1998; Lee, 1996; Rundmo, 1992, 1996; 




Unlike aircrew and senior engineers, junior engineers showed relatively low levels of 
concordance regarding the rank order of dimensions within their group.  It could be that the 
groups of junior engineers lacked shared experience due to fewer years of working together 
than the other groups. These individuals may simply not have had sufficient time working 
together to create a shared view on the safety items.  Similar findings have been reported by 
Nordlof et al. (2012) who suggested that agreement regarding safety priorities was higher 
between counterpart managers in different organisations than between managers and safety 
delegates from the same organisation. These authors reported that managers consistently 
ranked prioritisation of the work environment higher than did safety delegates, potentially 
reflecting that managers may have been more optimistic about improvements in safety 
climate than employees (Forth, Bewley & Bryson, 2006). These varying perceptions between 
employees within a single organisation may also reflected their different roles and 
frameworks which they used to interpret the work environment (Lave & Wenger, 2003). 
 
5.4.4 Limitations/Future Research 
The findings from this study provided insight into employee perspectives on safety standards 
in their workplace.  The discriminant criterion for the ranking was the degree to which each 
safety dimension was 'like' or 'not like' the respondents' units. Those ranked as being 'least' 
observed in the workplace were assumed to reflect behaviours/dimensions that could require 
prioritisation for improvement.  
 
However, it was acknowledged that the discriminant criterion against which the dimensions 
were ranked would likely have a large impact on the priority order in which the items were 
placed. The study did not consider the importance which personnel attributed to the different 
dimensions, and therefore assumed a degree of equivalence in the contribution of each 
toward safety. Some degree of importance may be inferred from the rankings in that, for 
example, the high concordance that sufficient available people were not considered as 
evident may reflect the importance with which this dimension is accorded (respondents 
agreed and ranked this item as a stand-alone negative item). However, this assumption 
would benefit from further empirical testing regarding the level of importance the 
respondents ascribe these dimensions. This may perhaps be achieved by using an 
alternative discriminant criterion of 'most important in supporting safe behaviour' to 'least 
important in supporting safe behaviour' within the unit.  
 
The sample did not include senior management ranks; it might therefore be of interest to 
investigate and compare how senior naval aviation staff view the degree to which these 
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safety dimensions are evident in their units, and consider how similar or different this may be 
to the views of the frontline personnel. The study did not consider the test-retest reliability of 
the three ranking methods; however this would be important prior to introducing any of these 
methods for further data gathering. Although each data collection session was separated by 
at least four hours, it is possible that respondents were able to recall the rank order used in 
previous data collection sessions. It may have been more robust to complete data collection 
once per day for three days, however this was not acceptable to the squadron management 
who facilitated access to respondents for the study.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The aims of this study were to elicit FAA personnel views on priorities for safety culture / 
climate enhancement, and to compare the performance of alternative elicitation techniques 
in terms of the rank order produced, their ease of use and their potential contribution to 
informing senior decision making over setting priorities for improvement. 
To address the first aim, a set of nine dimensions of safety climate / culture were identified 
on the basis of findings from the literature review (Chapter 2), the qualitative findings from 
Study 1, and the extant climate element prioritisation tool used within the FAA. These 
dimensions were considered to characterise core influences on safety and were each 
represented by a suitable brief descriptor. The nine safety influences appeared to be 
meaningful to military aviation personnel in that they could make stable and consistent 
distinctions between them. These were therefore considered important dimensions to 
consider for inclusion in a safety climate tool for this population (Studies 3 and 4). 
 
The second objective was to compare the product of three alternative ranking methods. 
Findings revealed that: 
• Each produced a statistically significant degree of agreement (concordance) across 
raters regarding the order of importance.  
• No statistically significant differences between Q-Sort, method of paired comparisons 
or direct ranking were detected at the level of rank order. 
The final objective (to provide comment on the utility of safety issue priority ranking with 
respect to its potential role and contribution to risk management) was met through the finding 
that there was high agreement over priorities for improvement: 
• Staffing levels: Respondents ranked the phrase 'There are enough people to do the 
job safely' to be 'least like' the unit. 
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• The dimensions of priority of safety (People do not take flight safety risks, even when 
the work demands are high) and competency/experience (People here are 
sufficiently competent and experienced to do the jobs they are required to do safely) 
were ranked second and third in most need of attention and improvement. 
The findings highlighted human resources (staffing levels), priority of safety and 
competency/experience as areas of safety management that employees consider should be 
priorities for intervention and improvement. 
Future research might seek to build on these findings by exploring not only what employees 
perceive as their current situation, but additionally whether there is agreement as to which of 
these dimensions is the most important in developing and maintaining a safe military naval 
aviation working environment. Future research might also seek to conduct a similar study 
amongst senior management may indicate whether the views articulated in this study are 





Chapter 6: Quantitative Exploration of Variables Impacting on 




6.1.1 Purpose of the Project and Rationale 
A core aim of this thesis was to explore and understand the basis for military aviation 
employee observations of behaviour in relation to safety and the contextual factors that 
might be most salient influences on this. The initial qualitative phase of the research (Study 
1, Chapter 4) yielded rich, employee-driven insights with which to contextualise safety 
culture within the organisation.  However, although well suited to exploring cultural elements, 
qualitative inquiry is inherently limited by the generalisability of the conclusions which can be 
drawn beyond the participant sample. Furthermore, it does not allow for creation of 
quantifiable safety profiles which may be used to assess change over time, support 
comparisons between different demographics or provide the organisation's safety managers 
with a means of systematically diagnosing areas for safety improvement. In the current 
economic climate, this is of increasing importance as resources are limited, requiring safety 
managers to prioritise where resources might best be allocated in order to improve or 
maintain safety within the organisation. Chapter 5 (Study 2) explored the utility of using three 
alternative comparative ranking techniques to gain insight into employee perceptions of 
safety priorities. Further research is required to develop these methods to ensure 
robustness, with the aim that they might be used as part of a ‘toolkit’ that the FAA could use 
to gain insight into employee perspectives of safety within the organisation.   
 
Study 3 aimed to develop a quantitative measure of safety climate, complementary to the 
comparative ranking techniques trialled in Study 2, by using both the rich qualitative data 
obtained in Study 1, and findings from Study 2, to inform the development of a 
psychometrically robust safety climate tool. Methodologically, the study reflected alignment 
with contemporary safety culture/climate studies (notably Brondino, Pasini & DaSilva, 2013; 
Huang et al., 2013; Mearns et al., 2013), an approach which has yet to be taken by military 
safety culture/climate studies (discussed in Chapter 3).  
6.1.2 Aim 
To identify a finite set of components that can be considered to characterise headline 




1. Based on the themes identified in Study 1 (Chapter 4), important safety factors 
highlighted in Study 2 (Chapter 5) and published findings (Chapter 2), develop a set of 
scalable items which will form the basis of a questionnaire suitable for self-completion by 
FAA personnel.  
2. To explore the underlying factor structure of variables that characterise safety climate 
in a military naval aviation population.  
3. Compare and contrast the derived factor structure with published findings in aviation 
and other, similar, industries. 
4. Consider the scope and appropriateness of using the revealed component structure 
as the basis for developing a set of psychometric safety climate scales (undertaken in Study 
4, Chapter 7).  
6.1.4  Background 
Normative quantification of workplace safety climate using organisation-level psychometric 
questionnaires has become a widely accepted technique for accessing employee 
perceptions of safety standards and conditions within their organisation (Harvey et al., 2002; 
Guldenmund, 2007). Safety climate has variously been described as an indicator of the 
underlying culture (Flin 2007; Guldenmund, 2000), a snapshot of employee perceptions 
(Guldenmund, 2007; Seo et al., 2004) and the structural/socio-technical context in which a 
safety culture persists (Olive, O'Conner & Mannan, 2006). In view of these descriptions, in 
this chapter, the term safety climate will be used in reference to quantitative, psychometric 
measures of perceptions about safety, whilst safety culture will be used in reference to 
deeper qualitative enquiries such as the approach taken in Study 1 (Chapter 4). 
 
As was outlined in Chapter 2, while a small number of safety climate tools developed based 
on civilian populations have adopted grounded approaches, military safety climate tools 
have generally reflected the theoretically driven, top-down approach e.g. the CSAS and 
MCAS (Baker, 1998; Ciavarelli & Figlock, 1997) and the questionnaire developed for use in 
the ADF by Falconer (Falconer, 2006a).  The current thesis therefore took a different 
approach to the two military aviation measures detailed above. Rather, the approach 
reflected alignment with more organic perspectives rooted in employee accounts, using 
qualitative insights as a foundation for developing a safety climate measurement tool rather 




6.2.1 Ethical Approval  
Permission to undertake the study was granted by both MODREC (reference 
648/MODREC/15) and the University of Bath (15-194). 
6.2.2 Perspective and Approach 
To support the aims and objectives of the study, a quantitative approach was utilised. This 
was designed to complement previous insights (Chapters 4 and 5), and consider the 
generalisability of these findings to a larger sample of military aviation participants. The 
method was developed following insights from established organisation-level psychometric 
study practice (Diaz, Cabrera & Isla, 1997; Evans et al., 2007; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; 
Mearns et al., 2013; Zohar, 1980). Reflecting conventions within the safety climate domain, 
an exploratory analysis was conducted on scaled responses to a questionnaire comprised of 
statements to which respondents were asked to indicate their degree of (dis)agreement.  
 
6.2.3 Questionnaire Development 
Based on the themes generated in Study 1, insights from Study 2, and taking into account 
previous literature, a large battery of items/statements was generated (N~100). To start the 
development process, the constructs from the thematic analysis were used as a basis for 
clustering items. Where possible, use of terminology and examples (direct quotes and 
paraphrases) given by employees (from Study 1) were used to develop items or modify 
existing items from the tool tested in Study 2 (Chapter 5) and in the wider literature (Chapter 
2), to reflect a grounded approach to item development.  
 
A referent shift approach was taken regarding item wording. That is, each statement required 
the respondent to focus on the general behaviour of others in the workplace, rather than 
focusing on their own individual behaviour. This necessitated the respondents considering 
perceptions which may be shared by those around them, rather than focusing on individual 
attitudes or behaviour. This approach deliberately reduced the scope for undesirable self-
serving attribution bias and attempted to access the shared behaviour and attitudes that 
authors have suggested comprise the 'cultural' aspect (Kines et al., 2011). An example of 
this referent shift approach would be 'Operational demands mean sometimes people here 
have to take short cuts' as compared to the self-referent question 'Operational demands 
mean sometimes I have to take short cuts'. The order of presentation of the questions was 
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randomised by item content in an effort to avoid order effects (Lavrakas, 2008; Oppenheim, 
2000). 
Item Format  
Reflecting alignment with comparable measures in other domains, items were configured as 
statements and required respondents to rate their degree of agreement with each statement 
using a five-point Likert scale containing the semantic anchors of 'Strongly agree', 'Agree', 
'Neither agree nor disagree', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree'. The Likert scale has been 
shown empirically to produce distributions that allow it to be analysed as interval data 
(Carifilo, 1978) although this has been debated more recently (Guldenmund, 2007). This 
format tends to be familiar to respondents and is easy and quick to complete (Oppenheim, 
2000).  
Expert Appraisal and Cognitive Pilot 
The original pool of items were further tailored to the military aviation context through 
discussion with a panel of experts with insight into managing safety and risks in military 
aviation (N=3). Terms which experts judged to be ambiguous, confusing or inappropriate for 
the context were revised or removed. For example, the designation Senior management was 
changed to Squadron management, managers was changed to supervisors and demands 
was changed to operational demands. Redundant items were removed to reduce the 
number of items to a more manageable total.  
 
The item set were also further subjected to a cognitive pilot (N=8) with personnel drawn from 
a range of departments and ranks. The aim was to identify and resolve any drafting, 
semantic or sense making issues that required resolution e.g. irrelevant, redundant or 
otherwise difficult to understand questions. At the completion of the cognitive pilot, 78 items 
were retained for use (the full set of 78 items can be found in Appendix D), which fell within 
recommended limits to avoid poor response rates (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982). As 
participants were given time in work to participate in the study, operational concerns meant 
that data collection would need to be completed in a session lasting no longer than fifteen to 
twenty minutes, and piloting of these items showed that this timeframe could be achieved.  
6.2.4 Procedure 
Data collection was undertaken on three separate occasions between August 2015 and 
December 2015, at the two air stations which were the principle locations for the majority of 
personnel within the FAA. Given operational, technological and budgetary constraints, it was 
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not possible to sample personnel who were operating from vessels at sea, those overseas, 
or those at smaller, geographically distant sites. Due to the variation in computer access 
experienced by military personnel, the potential for an on-line survey to introduce sample 
bias existed (lower ranks of personnel were less likely to have regular access to computing 
facilities than those of more senior rank). A traditional hard-copy (paper) administration of the 
survey was therefore adopted. Research with military participants completing the Armed 
Forces Continuous Attitude Survey utilising either email or posted questionnaires has 
typically achieved low response rates and thus in the interest of maximising response rates, 
a managed (manual distribution and collection) approach was applied.  
 
Access to personnel was negotiated through the Chain of Command, initially by the project 
sponsor (the Flight Safety organisation), and then by the researcher. Information in the form 
of the participant information sheet (contained in Appendix D) was provided to potential 
participants through the regular establishment-wide weekly briefs and through advertisement 
on safety notice boards. This allowed widespread dissemination of information prior to the 
data collection visits which typically took place during scheduled safety stand-downs 
(allocated time given to departments exclusively to use for safety-related activity). 
 
Potential participants were verbally briefed, with the researcher providing information 
regarding the informed consent process, study aims and requirements and assurances on 
confidentiality of results. Participants completed the informed consent forms (in Appendix D) 
and were then invited to complete the questionnaire (Appendix D). The researcher was 
available nearby to field any questions during completion time, which took approximately 15 
to 20 minutes. 
6.2.5 Sample 
Participants were volunteers, drawn from an opportunity sample of military naval aviation 
personnel aged over 18 years. While not a stratified quota sample, the approach to 
recruitment aimed to capture an embracing array of demographics and aimed to avoid any 
notable structural imbalance.  
 
There is limited agreement amongst researchers regarding sufficiency of sample sizes for 
principle components analysis, however a summary of available recommendations is 






Summary of sufficient sample sizes for principle components analysis. 
Author(s) Recommendation 
Everitt (1975) Participant to variable ratio of 10:1 
Nunnally (1978) Participant to variable ratio of 10:1 
Cattell (1978) Participant to variable ratio of 6:1 
Comrey (1978) Minimum sample size of 200 
Gorsuch (1983) Participant to variable ratio of 5:1, minimum sample of 100 
Kline (1986) Minimum sample size of 200 
Cohen (1992) Minimum sample size of 393 to detect small to medium effects 
between two independent groups  
Ferguson and Cox (1993) Minimum sample size of 100 
Hair et al. (1998) Participant to variable ratio of 5:1, minimum of 100 
Cooper and Phillips (2004) Participant to variable ratio of 7:1 
 
In light of these varying guidelines, it was calculated that for a battery of 78 items, a sample 
of approximately 450 respondents would produce a participant to variable ratio in excess of 
5:1, meeting most of the recommendations from 
Table 26. A sample size of ~ 450 also equated to approximately 10% of the overall 
population of the FAA.  
 
In total, 462 questionnaires were completed; of these obtained response sets, pre-analysis 
checks (further detailed under Section 6.2.6) resulted in twenty-one data sets being removed 
due to missing data, excessive skew or kurtosis. This left a sample of 441 complete datasets 
for analysis (see Table 27 for demographic details of the sample used for the analysis). 
 
Table 27. 
Demographics of the sample after pre-analysis checks (N=441) on all response sets.  
 Overall N=441 
Aircrew 
N=103 
Junior ratings N=6 
Senior ratings N=21 
Officers N=76  
Engineers 
N=284 
Junior ratings N=198 




Junior ratings N=32 
Senior ratings N=12 
Officers N=10 
Note.  N=number of respondents. * Due to the small number of respondents, the 'Other' category was 
truncated to include Air Traffic Control and Support personnel. Demographics on male/female data 
was not collected due to the small number of female personnel in the FAA (<10%), leading to possible 




The modest sample sizes from certain demographics, in part, reflect the structure of the 
organisation; aircrew tend to have a flatter hierarchical structure, with fewer personnel in 
junior ranks compared with engineers. By contrast the engineering branch conforms to the 
more traditional hierarchical military structure, with a large proportion of junior personnel 
compared to senior personnel. 
6.2.6 Data Analysis 
The analysis had two main objectives:  
 
1. To explore and understand the component structure of a set of variables/components 
considered to characterise safety climate in this population.  
2. To identify a suitable set of items on each of the variables/components to support 
further development of a tailored, empirically derived tool to measure safety climate 
(undertaken in Study 4, Chapter 7). 
 
To achieve these objectives, selection of the most appropriate data analysis method involved 
comparing the merits of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and principle components analysis 
(PCA). Both techniques are widely used when attempting to discover variables that form 
coherent sub-sets and display some independence to each other (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2014). These sub-sets (called factors or components) are thought to reflect some underlying 
process that creates correlations among variables. EFA and PCA are often used 
interchangeably, with both being exploratory techniques. In many cases, the difference 
between these techniques is seen to be small (Meyers, Gamst & Guarino, 2016; Thompson, 
1992) however, theoretically PCA is conceptually simpler than EFA. PCA attempts to 
summarise sets of correlated variables (thus is considered empirical) while EFA is more 
theoretically complex as this method conceptualises factors as causes that underlie or drive 
the correlations (Meyers et al., 2016). The difference between these techniques is described 
as relating predominately to the variance that is analysed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014); in 
PCA all the variance in the observed variables is analysed, whereas in EFA only shared 
variance is analysed.  
 
Where the primary aim of the data analysis method is to identify a smaller set of dimensions 
referenced to the common variance, PCA has been suggested to be the preferred method 
(Gorsuch, 1974; Stevens, 1992) and as such has been adopted by a number of safety 
culture/climate studies (Cheyne et al., 1998; Prussia et al., 2004; Yule et al., 2007; Keren et 
al., 2009; Huang et al., 2013). The method of PCA was therefore chosen as the most 
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appropriate analysis method for the present study, with the analysis conducted using SPSS 
v22.  
Method of Factor Rotation 
To achieve a simple and parsimonious structure, an orthogonal (varimax) rotation was used 
under the assumption that the components would stand independently of each other (in line 
with Huang et al., 2013; Meyers et al., 2016). An orthogonal rotation supported the eventual 
aim of producing a set of scales on which to measure safety climate of the organisation. 
However, as the analysis was exploratory, an oblimin rotation was also conducted, to 
consider any differences in factor structure between the two rotation methods.  Factors with 
an eigenvalue of one or greater were considered for retention (Ferguson & Cox, 1993), and 
the number of factors checked through use of a scree plot (Furr, 2011). This allowed the 
researcher to determine which factors best accounted for the most variance in the data, 
while retaining the most parsimonious solution. 
Pre-analysis Checks 
Before commencing the PCA, a number of pre-analysis checks were performed on the data 
(see Evans et al., 2007; Ferguson & Cox, 1993 for recommended procedures). Double data 
entry methods were used to conduct a random 10% check on data entry quality, with an 
observed error rate of 0.24%. The data was checked for missing values, and response sets 
with more than 10% of missing data were excluded from the analysis (as recommended by 
Evans et al., 2007). This resulted in removal of 12 data sets, leaving a sample of 450. 
Systematic bias in response missing data for each item was considered, however no 
patterns in the missing data were observed. A further nine participants were removed due to 
incomplete demographic data, leaving a sample of 441 for analysis.  
 
An assumption of PCA is that variables conform to a normal distribution, thus requiring 
consideration of skewness and kurtosis of items (Ferguson & Cox, 1993). Any items with 
values of greater than 1 (or -1) were removed from further analysis.  Detailed statistical 
analyses results are shown in Appendix D (removed items detailed in Table 1 of Appendix D 
are shown in bold). A summary of the items removed due to high skewness/kurtosis can be 







Items removed due to high skew or kurtosis.  
Number Item 
Q1 People I work with think safety is very important 
Q7 Generally, teams work well together in this organisation 
Q16 People here fully understand the risks associated with the work that they are 
responsible for 
Q17 Safety decisions are made at the appropriate level 
Q22 People feel confident that they can question instructions when there may be 
safety issues 
Q26 If someone reports a safety concern here, I am confident it will be addressed 
Q30 Where I work hazards are appropriately assessed and controlled 
Q36 People here are clear about what their responsibilities for safety are 
Q38 Managers here would rather know about safety issues than not know 
Q39 Where I work there is a Just Culture that ensures people are treated fairly 
Q44 Managers are open to safety concerns raised by employees 
Q45 My workplace identifies hazards and assesses risk 
Q51 People here can easily identify the relevant safety procedure for their job 
Q65 Most people are confident enough to speak up if they identify a safety issue 
Q69 I am confident my line management will act in the interests of our team in terms 
of safety 
Q72 Command here places appropriate focus on safety 
Q73 People sometimes turn a blind eye to less important safety procedures 
Omission of Low-correlating or Multi-collinear Items 
Items which correlated weakly (R<0.1), or extremely (R>0.9) were considered for removal 
from analysis (Field, 2005), with only one item (Q21, 'I am regularly kept awake at night due 
to thinking about my job') being removed due to low correlation with any other items.  
Assessment of the Appropriateness of the Data 
To determine the appropriateness of the data set for PCA, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
test for sampling adequacy and Bartlett's test of sphericity were conducted; results of these 
are shown in Table 29. The KMO was greater than 0.5 (Kaiser, 1974 in Field, 2005) and 
Bartlett's test was significant (Ferguson & Cox, 1993; Field, 2005), therefore signifying the 




Results of KMO and Bartlett's test of sphericity statistics. 
KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy .952 
Bartlett's test of Sphericity 




Partial Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
On completion of the exploratory analysis, it was important to consider whether the model 
identified through PCA was viable for validity testing in the form of a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA). This was important because collecting data on a subsequent sample of 
participants would impose resource demands on the organisation, and as such it was 
prudent to consider whether this was likely to be purposeful. To support this, a PCFA was 
undertaken on the data gathered from the initial sample (Gignac, 2009). Several goodness 
of fit measures were calculated, including the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), Normed Fit Index (NFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) utilising formulae 1-4 contained in Appendix D (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Bentler, 1990; 
Gignac, 2009; Tucker & Lewis, 1973).  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Principle Components Analysis 
An initial PCA, based on eigenvalues of greater than 1, extracted 11 factors (see Appendix 
D, Table 2 for the total variance explained, Table 3 for the component matrix and Table 4 for 
the rotated solution), accounting for 57.3% of the total variance explained.  The first 
component accounted for a total of 31% of the variance and contained 14 items. Three items 
were considered the minimum number required for retention of a component (Costello & 
Osborne, 2005; Raubenheimer, 2004) with five of the eleven components not meeting this 
threshold.  Examination of the scree plot (Figure 1 of Appendix D) suggested that between 
five and nine components were present.  
 
Results from the exploratory oblique (direct oblimin) rotation (Table 5, Appendix D), were 
compared with that of the orthogonal rotation (Table 4, Appendix D). While the oblique 
rotation returned an eleven-factor model, this rotation resulted in a factor structure which did 
not allow for interpretable factors, unlike the varimax rotation solution. As the objective of the 
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PCA was to derive a simple, interpretable factor structure, the varimax solution was adopted 
in this case (in line with recommendations made by Ferguson & Cox, 1993; Field, 2005). 
Removal of low loading items 
At this point, consideration was given to items with low loadings on the components. This 
was done to allow a 'cleaner' and more parsimonious factor structure to emerge. The sample 
size in the current study supported setting this threshold at R<0.4 (advocated by Field, 2005) 
and removed items are shown in Table 30.  
 
Table 30. 
Items removed due to low loading (R<0.4).  
Number Item 
Q9 Operational safety has a high priority here 
Q10 Supervisors/managers rarely check that people are working safely 
Q12 People here are only interested in safety aspects of their own jobs, not other 
people's 
Q14 There is timely feedback from the outcome of safety investigations 
Q23 Safety will become less of a priority for Senior Leadership in the future 
Q54 People have a clear understanding of the safety procedures for the job 
Q55 When there is pressure people will not compromise on what they see as safety 
critical issues 
Q61 The Senior leadership in the FAA mean it when they say safety is the highest 
priority 
 
Treatment of Cross-loading Items 
Items that loaded onto more than one factor (R>0.40) were considered on a case-by-case 
basis, with items judged for suitability by considering the face validity with the other items 
loading onto the factor. In these cases, the researcher determined which factor each item 
should be assigned to. These cross-loading items will be discussed under each component 
in the following sections.  
 
To explore the latent components in relation to the theoretical concepts outlined in Chapter 
2, the findings from the Studies 1 (Chapter 4) and 2 (Chapter 5), a series of forced solutions 
were completed on the data, informed by the results of the scree plot. These were 
conducted in an iterative manner to explore which might produce the most simple and 
parsimonious model, while retaining the maximum amount of explained variance. Here 
judgement was key to the process, interpretability and scientific utility was used to guide the 
process of the PCA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). Thus, items were retained or removed 
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based on a combination of knowledge of existing safety culture/climate theory and 
interpretability of factor loadings and factor structure returned by the forced solution PCAs.  
 
Following a number of iterations, the final PCA solution comprised of six components, 
containing 41 items and accounting for 55.2 % of the explained variance, shown in Table 31 
below (further details and the rotated solution can be found in Tables 6 and 7 of Appendix D).  
 
Table 31. 
Initial Eigenvalues and Rotation Sums of Squared loadings. 
Component 










1 13.97 34.07 34.07 5.94 14.48 14.48 
2 2.29 5.58 39.65 5.33 12.99 27.47 
3 2.13 5.20 44.85 3.60 8.78 36.24 
4 1.70 4.15 48.99 2.76 6.74 42.98 
5 1.37 3.33 52.33 2.59 6.33 49.31 
6 1.16 2.83 55.16 2.40 5.85 55.16 
 
Section 6.3.2 contains discussion of each of the components in Table 31 in turn, detailing the 
factor loadings of the items within each component and discussing how these compare and 
contrast with the existing safety culture/climate literature. To name the six constructs and 
identify their 'meaning', the content of the items that loaded onto each component were 
considered.  
6.3.2 Naming and Interpretation of Constructs 
Component 1: Management Commitment to Safety & Organisational Learning 
Component 1 (Table 32) accounted for 14.5% of the variance, containing 14 items. When 
considering constituent items, these each related to perceptions of management behaviours 
in relation to safety. The items reflected employee perceptions of various levels of 
management, from supervisors and line management (close proximity to respondents), 
through to squadron management (more distant from respondents). Items also reflected 
management behaviours in encouraging safe work practices, listening to staff and being 





Items loading onto Component 1.  
Number Item Loading 
5 The Squadron Management encourages safe working practices .660 
4 Managers are willing to listen to staff when it comes to the best way to 
do something 
.656 
66 Line management looks out for us here .647 
20 Managers are quick to act on safety concerns when we report them .639 
28 The Squadron Management is good at finding the right balance 
between addressing safety concerns and the requirement to achieve a 
task 
.607 
78 There is poor communication about safety issues that may affect me .606 
29 My supervisor/manager encourages me and my team to learn from 
safety events 
.596 
64 If a genuine error is made (resulting in an accident or near miss), 
management will always be supportive 
.593 
25 Personal safety has a high priority here .548 
47 The squadron management here do a good job balancing operational 
requirements against safety 
.541 
35 Good safety behaviour is positively recognised by the line management 
here 
.541 
3 There is support from Management in safety critical situations .485 
27 People here are kept informed about the outcomes of meetings which 
address safety issues 
.462 




While the overall focus within Component 1 was on management and its various safety 
functions, there appeared to be two sub-groupings of items. The first of these related to how 
management was perceived as taking care of safety, balancing priorities and looking out for 
its employees, shown in Table 33, and were interpreted as representing perceptions of 
management's commitment to safety. When compared to findings reported in Chapter 4, the 
items in Table 33 mapped onto the theme of Leadership and safety ownership and the 
dimension of Management commitment (Individuals are empowered by their management to 








Items considered to reflect perceptions of 'Management commitment to safety'. 
Component 
sub-theme 
Items  Mapping Study 
1 themes  
Management 
commitment 





Line management looks out for us here 
The Squadron Management is good at finding the right 
balance between addressing safety concerns and the 
requirement to achieve a task 
If a genuine error is made (resulting in an accident or near 
miss), management will always be supportive 
Good safety behaviour is positively recognised by the line 
management here 
The squadron management here do a good job balancing 
operational requirements against safety 
There is support from Management in safety critical 
situations 
 
The second sub-grouping of items were interpreted as being related to perceptions of 
management functions which supported organisational learning. While management plays a 
key role in the top-down enforcement of policies /procedures and informing priorities of work, 
it must also effectively garner and foster feedback from employees. Items shown in Table 34 
included aspects of management listening to, and communicating with, employees, allowing 
and encouraging feedback and acting on safety concerns that have been raised. The items 
in Table 34 best mapped onto the theme of communication from both Studies 1 and 2. The 
content of the items contained on Component 1 led to this component being labelled 





Items considered to reflect perceptions of 'Organisational learning'. 
Component 
sub-theme 




Managers are quick to act on safety concerns when we 
report them 
Communication 
Managers are willing to listen to staff when it comes to 
the best way to do something 
My supervisor / manager encourages me and my team 
to learn from safety events 
There is poor communication about safety issues that 
may affect me 
People here are kept informed about the outcomes of 
meetings which address safety issues 
My supervisor/manager encourages questions from 
workers about safety matters 
 
One item did not appear to 'fit' into either sub-theme (Personal safety has a high priority 
here), and so it was noted that this item required consideration as to whether to retain or 
remove this item at later stages of the analysis/scale development.  
Component 1 - Fit with Published Findings 
Component 1 was well supported by published findings, as a general theme of management 
was seen to be common to all aviation safety climate research (O'Conner et al., 2011b; 
Weigmann et al., 2004) and other sectors (Dedobbeleer & Beland, 1998; Ek, 2006; Flin et 
al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; Seo et al., 2004). The naming of themes with similar foci 
varies between studies; including management style and communication (Harvey et al., 
2002), management attitudes toward safety practices (Alhemood et al., 2004), line 
management commitment (Fung et al., 2005), perceptions of management (Sexton et al., 
2006), management safety practices (Lu & Tsai, 2008), management safety priority and 
commitment to safety (Kines et al., 2011), management concern (Frazier et al., 2013), 
supervisory care (Huang et al., 2013) and safety commitment/communication (Ghahramani  
& Khalkhali, 2015). A management component within safety climate questionnaires was 
seen to date back to seminal safety climate research in the 1980's where Dov Zohar (1980) 
identified management commitment as a prerequisite to successful safety initiatives.   
 
Beyond being the most commonly identified component, management commitment to safety 
has most often been the factor identified as explaining the largest percentage of the 
explained variance in safety climate measurement tools (Guldenmund, 2007). This is 
corroborated in the current study where it accounted for 14.5% of the explained variance. 
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This is perhaps to be expected where order is primarily determined by management as 
employees will interpret much of the 'state of safety' within in the organisation through 
observation of management safety behaviours (Guldenmund, 2010a). Furthermore, 
managers have far reaching effects as they control the human and material resources made 
available for certain activities and therefore are key to balancing (or not, as the case may be) 
the often-competing demands of safety and output. Employees of managers committed to 
safety have been shown to be more likely to expend efforts toward safety themselves (Guo, 
Yiu & Gonzalez, 2016). 
 
Middle level managers are thought to play an intermediary role between senior and frontline 
staff, communicating safety priority from the former to the latter (DeJoy, 1994; Mearns, 
Rundmo, Gordon & Fleming, 2004; Simard & Marchand, 1994). At the same time, managers 
act as a conduit for information from frontline personnel to senior managers. This 
communication loop was the foundation for Reason's model (1997) of a 'learning' culture 
described in Chapter 2.  While Reason's model has limited empirical evidence, Christian et 
al. (2009) showed positive relationships between safety climate and employee safety 
knowledge while management commitment to safety has been shown to have a predictive 
relationship with safety behaviours (Cheyne, Cox, Oliver & Tomas, 1998). 
 
Semantic separation of levels of management on questionnaire items was achieved through 
using either 'My supervisor/manager' and 'Squadron management' (Guldenmund, 2010b; 
Kines et al., 2011).  Despite this separation, however, Component 1 contained items relating 
to both levels of management. This might suggest that there was no clear discrimination 
between these management levels for respondents, although it should be noted that most 
personnel surveyed would have had little opportunity to observe senior management 
behaviour. Alternatively, it may have been that management practices were perceived as 
shared across all management levels (as was proposed by Kines et al., 2011).  
Component 2: Normative Behaviour  
Component 2 (Table 35) accounted for 13% of the explained variance and contained twelve 
statements which largely related to negative safety behaviours, such as taking shortcuts, 
supervisors not checking work before signing off on it and ignoring others' unsafe acts. 
Component 2 was therefore interpreted as reflecting the social (un)acceptability of negative 
safety behaviours amongst colleagues and supervisors. The nature of these behaviours 
reflects 'norms'; the accepted way of doing things that typically tends not to be in line with 
183 
 




Items loading onto Component 2. 
Number Item Loading 
Q50 




Taking a short cut to get work done quickly is seen as acceptable, as 
long as nothing happens 
.659 
Q46 Managers turn a blind eye to rule bending .651 
Q74 Operational demands mean sometimes people have to take shortcuts .642 
Q60 
Supervisors here sometimes encourage others to bend the rules or 
amend the procedure to achieve a task 
.641 
Q42 Supervisors sometimes sign off without checking .573 
Q48 People regularly get distracted when doing safety critical jobs .526 
Q43 People here are not comfortable reporting their own mistakes .513 
 Cross loading items  
Q62 If people see others breaking a rule they tend to turn a blind eye .615 
Q59 
People make mistakes because they are trying to do too many jobs at 
once 
.434 
Q56 Some safety procedures are only there to protect management's back .453 
Q76 




One item (Q43, People here are not comfortable reporting their own mistakes), did not 
appear to fit well with the content of the other items on Component 2, and would have more 
face validity with the items in Component 4 (Reporting); this was noted for future 
development of the tool. There were several items which loaded highly (R>0.40) onto more 
than one Component (these are shown in italics in Table 35). Of these, one item referred to 
rule bending (Q62), two related to procedures/rules (Q56 and Q76) and one referred to 
making mistakes when trying to complete more than one job at a time (Q59). 
 
When the normative behaviour component was compared to findings from Study 1, the items 
appeared to be related to a number of different themes from the qualitative phase (see  
Table 36). These themes included leadership & safety ownership, individual & collective 
responsibility, policy & procedures, and pressure. When compared to findings from Study 2, 
the items within normative behaviour appeared to map across most consistently to the 
dimensions of priority of safety (People do not take flight safety risks, even when work 
demands are high) and Individual actions (Everyone accepts that flight safety is their 
184 
 
responsibility), the former of which was a particularly salient dimension to military aviation 




Component 2 themes, items and Study 1 theme mapping. 
Component 
theme 




People here take shortcuts when they think there is little 
or no risk involved Policy & procedures 
 Taking a short cut to get work done quickly is seen as 
acceptable, as long as nothing happens 
Managers turn a blind eye to rule bending 
Leadership & safety 
ownership 
 
Supervisors sometimes sign off without checking 
Supervisors here sometimes encourage others to bend 
the rules or amend the procedure to achieve a task 
If people see others breaking a rule they tend to turn a 
blind eye 
Some safety rules are only there to protect 




People here are not comfortable reporting their own 
mistakes 
Operational demands mean sometimes people have to 
take shortcuts 
 People regularly get distracted when doing safety 
critical jobs 
 People make mistakes because they are trying to do 
too many jobs at once 
If people followed all the safety rules they would not get 




Component 2 - Fit with Published Findings 
Normative behaviour predominately reflected those behaviours which would not conform to 
the prescribed procedures/tasks and thus are presumably likely to incur some level of risk.  
In Study 1, personnel cited a high adherence to rules and procedures as normal, considering 
them both necessary and the safest way to do a task. However, examples were given for 
why personnel might not be able to comply with these, and two items contained on 
Component 2 directly illustrate some of these reasons (Q74, ‘Operational demands mean 
sometimes people have to take shortcuts’ and Q8, ‘Taking a short cut to get work done 
quickly is seen as acceptable, as long as nothing happens’). Dekker (2003) identified non-
adherence to procedures as a key contributor to aviation accidents, suggesting that a gap 
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between policy and practice was common, and could give rise to 'norms' of behaviour. The 
tension between following rules and procedures in the face of work pressure is an area 
commonly identified as a 'trade-off' across various industries (Weyman & Clarke, 2003) and 
maintaining the balance between them has been suggested as key to a positive safety 
culture (Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI), 1993). 
Increased cost reduction and organisational restructuring has been suggested as having a 
significant impact on safety behaviour when time or resources are stretched (Flin et al., 
2000). 
 
Component 2 is analogous to published findings on safety climate measures related to 
rules/procedures or risk (Flin et al., 2000, Guldenmund, 2000), variously labelled as risk 
taking (Lu & Tsai, 2008; Frazier et al., 2013; Fung et al., 2005), risk taking behaviours and 
risk perceptions (Harvey et al., 2002), and positive safety practices (Ghahramani & 
Khalkhali, 2015, represented by items such as 'Stop working due to safety concerns' and 
'Availability of enough people to do the job safely').  Lu and Tsai (2008) reported two factors; 
one labelled 'Co-worker safety practices' (including items such as 'My co-workers encourage 
others to be safe' and 'My co-workers follow safety rules') and the other 'safety attitudes' 
(includes items such as 'I ignore safety regulations to get the job done' and 'I will ignore safe 
working procedures for convenience'). The items in Component 2 are interpreted here as 
being more related to risk taking behaviours which have been shown to be influenced by 
knowledge, training, and an individual's sense of personal responsibility for safety (Flin & 
Yule, 2004). 
 
 Component 3 - Training and Experience 
Component 3 contained 6 items (see  
Table 37) and accounted for 8.8% of the variance in the PCA.  Items all appeared to relate to 
perceptions of personnel's levels of training or experience. Three of the items made 
reference to colleagues having sufficient training or experience to conduct their jobs safely, 
while two items made reference to supervisory availability and experience. One item cross 
loaded on to both Component 3 and Component 4 (reporting), and referred to personnel 
working safely even when supervisors were not there to observe their work. The general 
theme of this Component was therefore interpreted as being related to the level of 
competence of personnel within the organisation, a combination of both training and 
experience. Within the FAA this is better known as Suitably Qualified and Experienced 
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Personnel (SQEP) which illustrates the fact that in this organisation both training 
(qualifications) and experience is required to be considered competent. 
Table 37. 
Items loading onto Component 3. 
Number Item Loading 
Q32 
In general, supervisors are sufficiently experienced to meet the required 
level of supervision 
.808 
Q41 People are sufficiently experienced for the jobs they are required to do .769 
Q33 Everyone here  is sufficiently trained to undertake their tasks safely .740 
Q52 There are always supervisors available to give advice  
Q19 
People here are not always confident that they have the experience to 
do the job 
.532 
 Cross loading items  
Q37 




Items on Component 3 mapped directly onto the theme of Training/experience (within Study 
1) which was identified as a key influencer of safety culture in Chapter 4. These items also 
appeared to map clearly onto the Safety training (Flight safety training is an integral part of 
all routine training) and competency/experience (People here are sufficiently competent and 
experienced to do the jobs they are required to do safely) dimensions utilised in Study 2 
(Chapter 5).   
 
Component 3 - Fit with Published Findings 
Both training and experience have been identified as key to influencing safety culture (Flin et 
al., 2000; O'Conner et al., 2011b). Variants of this theme have been labelled as safety 
training (Lu & Tsai, 2008), general training (Frazier et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2013), safety 
involvement and training (Ghahramani & Khalkhali, 2015), training/standards (Flin et al., 
2000) and competence (Keren et al., 2009). Several authors have proposed that training 
underpins safety culture (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007; Lawrie et al., 2006) because it can 
determine employee work performance (Graham, Ramirez, Finlay, Hoy & Richards, 1996). 
Higher levels of training have also been shown to predict actual safety behaviour (Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004; Reber & Wallin, 1984), correlate positively with safety climate scores (Lu & 
Shang, 2005) and correlate negatively with accident rate (Smith, Cohen, Cohen & 




Component 4: Reporting 
Component 4 accounted for 6.7 % of the variance and contained five items (Table 38). Three 
items related directly to aspects of reporting, whether people in the organisation report safety 
related occurrences and unsafe acts as well as errors made by colleagues, thus Component 
4 was labelled as reporting. Two items cross loaded onto either Component 3 (training & 
experience, Q37, People here always work safely, even when they are not being supervised) 
or Component 2 (normative behaviour, Q62, If people see others breaking a rule they tend to 
turn a blind eye). When considered against the other components identified thus far, there 
was some conceptual overlap between Component 4 and that of management commitment 
to safety/organisational learning and normative behaviours. Organisational learning depends 
on feedback from front-line staff, which often occurs in the form of reporting of errors or 
safety occurrences. Similarly, if personnel consider reporting to be worthwhile, it may 
become the 'norm' to report such occurrences. It is, however, interesting, that this 
component was identified separately in the PCA.  
 
Table 38. 
Items loading onto Component 4. 
Number Item Loading 
Q6 If people here saw an unsafe act they would report it .707 
Q18 Most people in my workplace report safety related occurrences .695 
Q34 If I thought no one would know, I would not report a colleague's error .551 
 Cross loading items  
Q37 People here always work safely, even when they are not being 
supervised 
.420 
Q62 If people see others breaking a rule they tend to turn a blind eye .425 
 
Items contained in Component 4 were directly related to the theme of 'Communication' 
described in Chapter 4 (Study 1) which, despite the organisation's reporting system being 
described as time-consuming to use and providing little feedback to the reporter, was seen 
to be key in facilitating learning. Component 4 was also observed to link most closely to the 
Communication dimension in Study 2.  
Component 4 - Fit with Published Findings 
Within published literature, reporting of safety concerns or errors has been identified as 
important, and has either been categorised as part of the safety system (Flin et al., 2000), or 
as a standalone safety climate item (Frazier et al., 2013). Reporting of incidents is said to be 
an individual responsibility in organisations with a positive safety culture, and is a key aspect 
of Reason's (1997) safety culture model as an enabler of the learning account. The concept 
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of a 'reporting culture' as described by Reason (1997) forms part of an organisational risk 
management strategy to provide early warning of potential risks, however this can be 
hindered if reporting is associated with blame and culpability (Nordlof et al., 2015; Weyman 
et al., 2006). To counter this, and encourage reporting, Reason (1997) advocated the 
adoption of a 'Just culture', a message which is adopted in the Nimrod Review (Ministry of 
Defence, 2009) and promulgated through the FAA (see Study 1 findings, Chapter 4). A just 
culture is suggested to be one in which people are encouraged and supported to volunteer 
safety related information in a context where acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is 
made clear (Reason, 1997).  
Component 5: Human Resources 
The fifth component identified in the PCA accounted for 6.3% of the explained variance and 
contained four items (see Table 39). Three of the items referred directly to the availability of 
personnel resource; whether there were enough people to complete jobs safely, (Q68), 
whether they would be re-tasked if required for safety reasons (Q2) and whether the 
manning levels could support operational demands (Q57). One of the items (Q59, People 
make mistakes because they are trying to do too many jobs at once) was seen to cross-load 
onto Component 2 (normative behaviour) which is a potential consequence of a lack of 
adequate human resources (or the work pressure caused by this). All four items were 
interpreted as referring to aspects of human resources and so this was chosen as the label 
for Component 5. 
 
Table 39. 
Items loading onto Component 5. 
Number Item Loading 
Q68 There are enough people to do the job safely .715 
Q2 More people are made available to do a job if needed for safety reasons .670 
Q57 Manning is appropriate to meet operational demands .668 
 Cross loading item  




Study 1 identified a number of sources of pressure placed on military aviation personnel, of 
which a lack of human resources was one, and therefore it was the theme of pressure to 
which the items on Component 5 were aligned. This also directly mapped onto the human 
resources dimension (There are enough people to do the job safely) from Study 2 and was 
the most salient (most negatively ranked, being judged least 'like' the workplace) influence 
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on safety for military aviation personnel (see Chapter 5).  A lack of personnel resource was 
acknowledged as an organisational challenge within all of the focus group discussions 
(Chapter 4), with personnel describing "being asked to do more with less", thus placing 
increased pressure on the remaining personnel. In the current global economy, this pressure 
is perhaps unsurprising, but is important; increased pressure on personnel could lead to 
shortcuts being taken or personnel being overloaded and distracted, either of which would 
potentially negatively affect overall safety.  
Component 5 - Fit with Published Findings 
Issues of personnel resource tend to be identified alongside other workplace pressures on 
most safety climate measures, rather than separately (Guldenmund, 2000). A notable 
exception to this was Olsen (2008) whose component 'Staffing' appeared similar to the 
current findings. Olsen (2008)'s study population was that of healthcare professionals; a 
sector which has been suggested to be particularly susceptible to inadequate staffing levels. 
Guldenmund (2007) identified manpower planning as part of the management system, from 
policy making, through to work schedules and the amount of people available to do a job, 
and highlighted the negative effect that inadequate resource may have on safety behaviours. 
This is therefore, perhaps, one of the most integral aspects of safety and risk management 
as it has a number of knock-on effects on competence and training, work scheduling, work 
output and pressure. 
Component 6: Process and Bureaucracy 
The final component in the PCA accounted for 5.9% of the variance and contained five 
items. At the heart of this final component appeared to be issues surrounding the 'red tape' 
involved with reporting safety concerns (Q63 and Q70), and whether procedures are seen to 
be simply process measures to allocate culpability (Q71 and Q56). Table 40 shows these 
items and their factor loading, with this component being labelled as process/bureaucracy.  
These items show an interesting contrast to those in the reporting component; the items on 
Component 6 refer not to whether reporting was seen important, but rather whether it was 
easy to do. 
 
Item 56 (Some procedures are only there to protect management's back) was observed to 
cross load with equal weighting onto Component 2 (normative behaviour, R=0.453), 
however when considering the items on each component, it was determined that there was 
more face validity for retaining item 56 on Component 6. The final item within this component 
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referred to the incompatibility with safety procedures and the time allocated to complete 
tasks (Q76), which also cross-loaded onto Component 2 (R=0.484).  
 
Table 40. 
Items loading onto Component 6. 
Number Item Loading 
Q63 There is too much paperwork involved with reporting safety concerns .777 
Q70 It is too bureaucratic to report all safety concerns .712 
Q71 Safety rules / procedures are only there to protect against legal action .611 
 Cross loading items  
Q76 
If people followed all the safety rules they would not get the job done in 
time 
.462 
Q56 Some procedures are only there to protect management's back .473 
 
When the constituent items on Component 6 were considered against the themes detailed in 
Study 1, it was determined that they mapped onto two themes (see Table 41), 
communication and policy and procedures, specifically the sub-theme of cultural legitimacy.  
Given the high levels of legitimacy afforded to procedures by personnel in Study 1, it would 
be expected that ratings on the items in Table 41 would be positive, indicating positive 
perceptions of procedures. When compared to findings from Study 2, there were no 
comparable dimensions (Chapter 5). 
 
Table 41. 
Component 6 themes, items and Study 1 theme mapping. 
Component 
theme 




There is too much paperwork involved with reporting 
safety concerns 
Communication 
 It is too bureaucratic to report all safety concerns 
Safety rules / procedures are only there to protect 
against legal action 
Policy & procedures 
Some procedures are only there to protect 
management's back 
 
Items Q63 and Q70 related to the theme of communication, specifically barriers to reporting. 
It is of interest that these items did not load onto the same factor as items within Component 
2 (Q34, If people here saw an unsafe act they would report it, Q18, Most people in my 
workplace report safety related occurrences and Q43, People here are not comfortable 
reporting their own mistakes). At first glance these items would appear to be related; they 
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are all nominally related to the topic of reporting. However, the difference between these is 
that one set related to the perceived importance of reporting (those loading on Component 
4), and the other set related to the perceived ease of reporting (those loading on Component 
6). These two, it is argued, are not necessarily the same - personnel may acknowledge the 
importance of reporting, however the actual implementation of the reporting system may 
either support or hinder actual reporting. Ideally, reporting systems should be intuitive and 
easy to access/complete in order that the act of reporting near misses or accidents does not 
become an unnecessary burden on already busy employees. 
Component 6 - Fit with Published Findings 
Process/bureaucracy related to two aspects of the safety system (procedures and reporting) 
and had not been specifically identified as a separate component within any safety climate 
studies reviewed in this thesis.  The conceptual foundation of this component can, however, 
be linked to the concept of bureaucratization of safety (Dekker, 2014) which refers to the 
escalating number of administrative layers which govern how safety is managed and where 
individuals are increasingly held accountable. Regulation of safety in the UK military aviation 
sphere was centralised after the publication of the Nimrod report (Ministry of Defence, 2009), 
and it has been acknowledged by the industry regulators (Military Aviation Authority, 2014b) 
that this process has resulted in considerable, widespread changes to policy and process. 
This reflects similar increased regulation within other UK sectors (Dekker, 2014). It is 
reasonable to conjecture that this may have been interpreted by FAA employees as 
unnecessarily increased safety process. Power (2004) discussed similar themes in relation 
to risk management, where he suggested that the rise in accountability and culpability 
associated with risk management resulted in significant secondary risk management and 
burgeoning internal control mechanisms used to detail accountability at each decision-
making stage. 
Summary 
In summary, an exploratory PCA revealed six components which were considered to 
characterise safety climate within the FAA. These findings were interpretable with reference 
to published findings, and the component process & bureaucracy was considered to be a 
novel component.  
6.3.3 Partial Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Using results from the PCA analysis (Bartlett's χ2=11974.625, df=1770; Goodness of fit 
χ2=1446.946, df=1165, contained in Table 8 of Appendix D), the PCFA returned encouraging 
results (RMSEA=0.023, NFI=0.88, TLI=0.99 and CFI=0.97). These values were all 
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suggestive of a good model fit (Bentler & Bonett, 1980, Bentler, 1990; Gignac, 2009; Tucker 
& Lewis, 1973) and so it was determined that the safety climate components determined by 
the PCA in this study would benefit from a confirmatory factor analysis using an independent 
sample of participants. This further analysis is detailed in Chapter 7 (Study 4). 
 
6.4 Discussion  
The PCA revealed six nameable constructs which were characterised as (i) management 
commitment to safety & organisational learning, (ii) normative behaviour, (iii) 
training/experience, (iv) reporting, (v) human resources and (vi) process/bureaucracy. Table 
42 provides an overall summary of how these six components aligned with findings from 
Studies 1 (Chapter 4) and 2 (Chapter 5). 
 
Table 42. 
Overall mapping of Study 3 components, Study 2 dimensions and Study 1 themes. 
Study 3 components Study 2 dimensions Study 1 themes 
Management commitment 




System safety, procedures 
& policy 
 
Leadership & safety ownership 
Communication 
Normative behaviour Individual actions/ 
individual responsibility 
Priority of safety 
Individual & collective 
responsibility 
Leadership & safety ownership 
Policy & procedures 
Pressure 
Training & experience Safety training 
Competency/experience 
Training & experience 
Reporting Communication Communication 
Human resources Human resources Pressure 
Process/ bureaucracy  Policy & procedures 
 Working environment  
 
Table 42 shows that when the findings from the current study are mapped across to Study 1 
and 2 findings, there is notable similarity between some of the components (e.g. 
training/experience, reporting and human resources) while other components map to 
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multiple dimensions/themes (e.g. normative behaviour, process/bureaucracy and 
management commitment to safety & organisational learning). This may highlight the 
complex nature and interaction of safety climate variables in this context, and 
similarities/differences between the findings from the studies are discussed in more detail in 
the following section.  
6.4.1 Management commitment to safety & organisational learning 
Component 1 (management commitment to safety & organisational learning) reflected the 
importance of perceptions of management and their commitment to safety and mapped onto 
similar concepts in both Studies 1 (Leadership & safety ownership) and 2 (Management 
commitment). Component 1 contained 14 items which all referred to different aspects of 
management responsibility, so it was perhaps unsurprising to note that this component also 
mapped across to other themes (see Table 42) from Studies 1 and 2 (e.g. safety system and 
communication respectively). This arguably reflects the complexity and breadth of the formal 
influences that management has over safety activities.  
 
Formally, management influence safety through resource allocation (Guo et al., 2016), 
implementation of policy and procedures and compliance monitoring (Hale & Borys, 2013), 
communication of safety priorities (Mearns, Rundmo, Gordon & Fleming, 2004; Simard & 
Marchand, 1994), investigation of accidents and subsequent application of mitigation 
measures (DeJoy, 1994) and supporting safety performance (Buttrey et al., 2010).  
Empowered leadership has been shown to lead to improved employee safety participation, 
but this relationship was mediated by collaborative team learning (Martínez-Córcoles et al., 
2012).  Similar factors have been identified and labelled as 'safety prioritisation' (Tharaldsen, 
Olsen & Rundmo, 2008), 'unsafe work behaviour' (Farrington-Darby et al., 2005; Flin, 2007; 
Seo, 2005), and ' peer support' (Frazier et al., 2013). This collaborative learning can arise 
from observation of colleagues and then use of these observations to determine the 
acceptability and meaning of safety-related behaviour (Dooley, 1996; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). This is supported by previous safety climate research in which group-level practices 
are shown to affect safety accident risk (Zohar, 2000).  
6.4.2 Normative Behaviour 
The second component identified through the PCA was named normative behaviour, and 
accounted for similar levels of explained variance (13%) as Component 1 (14%). While 
Component 1 was interpreted as reflecting the formal influences on safety, Component 2 
was thought to reflect informal influences within the organisation. Items within normative 
behaviour mapped across to a number of themes from Study 1 (individual & collective 
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responsibility, leadership & safety ownership, policy & procedures and pressure) and two 
dimensions from Study 2 (individual actions, priority of safety). Consideration of items within 
Component 2 showed a variety of influences that may arise from colleagues/peers which 
may encourage/discourage employees from working safely, as well as informal behaviour by 
managers.  
 
Military groups have often been characterised by their strong team-work and cohesive work 
units, group loyalty and respect for colleagues (Tinoco & Arnaud, 2013). This cohesiveness 
has been linked to personal ownership of safety (Clarke 2010; Geller et al., 2001) but also 
with peer pressure and unwillingness to speak up against group norms (Falconer, 2006b). It 
may be this cohesiveness which underpins the prominence with which the component of 
normative behaviour appears to have; watching and learning safety behaviour from what 
others do around them may be particularly important in a group of people who 'look out' for 
each other.   
6.4.3 Training and Experience 
Component 3, training and experience was mapped across directly to similar 
dimensions/themes observed within Studies 1 and 2 (see Table 42). Indeed, safety training 
has widely been identified as a reflection of competence (Flin et al., 2000; O'Conner et al., 
2011b), a predictor of safety behaviour (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Lawton, 1998; Reber & 
Wallin, 1984) and being significantly related to errors (Bazargan & Guzhva's (2011). 
However, in a similar factor analytic study of safety items, authors such as Glendon and 
Litherland (2001) reported that items related to training were not retained in their 
construction safety climate scale, and thus conjecture that not all safety climate factors are 
stable across industries. In contrast with components contained within many safety climate 
tools, which focus exclusively on training (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000), the current 
study would suggest that there is also an apparent importance of experience, appearing 
across both the qualitative themes and quantitative components. In Chapter 4, aircrew 
specifically discussed the differences between training and experience in that training was 
seen as generally sufficient, but that a lack of resources may lead to a lack of experience for 
them in certain situations.  
6.4.4 Reporting and Process/Bureaucracy 
It was of interest that items related to reporting were identified in the current study to 
differentially load onto two components, reporting (Component 4) and process/ bureaucracy 
(Component 6). Studies 1 and 2 contained themes/dimensions related to communication 
which were seen to overlap with components 4 and 6 in the current study. The proposed 
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reasons for this are discussed further here. In Study 3, items retained on the component 
reporting referred to the importance of reporting unsafe acts, errors and safety occurrences. 
Two items within process/bureaucracy also described reporting, but these items focused on 
the organisational process by which people report, and whether it was easy to do so. The 
differentiation between these two subtle aspects of reporting triangulates on some findings 
reported in Study 1, in which personnel appeared to universally accept the importance of 
reporting safety occurrences (to enhance the organisational learning), but also detailed a 
number of barriers which would stop them from reporting these safety occurrences. Similar 
barriers have been described in civilian helicopter emergency services (Chesters, Grieve & 
Hodgetts, 2016) and aviation ground handlers (Ek & Akselsson, 2007).  
 
Accident/near miss reporting has been identified as an integral part of the 'safety system' 
(Block, Sabin & Patankar, 2007) and is a key feature in Reason's safety culture model 
(1997).  In aviation particularly, reporting has high salience (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007; 
Jausen, Silva & Sabatini, 2017) as it promotes organisational learning (Edmonson, 1996). 
However, despite an industry-wide drive toward confidential and non-punitive reporting 
systems, several authors have noted the high degree of under-reporting of safety 
occurrences in aviation (Gilbey et al., 2015), potentially due to  organisational barriers such 
as inadequate resource allocation, inadequate feedback/usability (Jausen, Silva & Sabatini, 
2017; Lawton & Parker, 2002), inadequate information technology, workplace barriers such 
as peer influence and bureaucracy (Atak & Kingma, 2011) and  individual barriers such as 
fear of consequences, lack of competence and lack of knowledge (Hale & Borys, 2013).  
6.4.5 Human Resources 
Study 1 (Chapter 4) highlighted a number of different sources of pressure which were 
described as influencing safety behaviour, including secondary roles, lack of resources 
(equipment and personnel) and interdependence of aircrew and engineering functions. While 
several items related to these pressures loaded onto a number of the components identified 
in the PCA, items related to the availability of personnel to complete and supervise work 
safely loaded onto a separate component (Component 5), which is labelled here as human 
resources. One of the items shown to cross-load reflected the possible effects of inadequate 
personnel resource, namely that people make mistakes because they are trying to do too 
many things at once.  
 
Although this component is not typically identified as a separate construct within the wider 
safety culture/climate literature (other than the cited study by Olsen, 2008), similar items are 
often contained in themes labelled as pressure (Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). In the 
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revised US Navy safety climate tool suggested by O'Conner et al. (2011a), there is a 
component labelled 'availability of resources', which refers to general resources, without 
detailing personnel resource as a separate item.  Within the current organisation, the finding 
that these items loaded onto a separate component might suggest that it is a key one of 
interest. This is corroborated findings from Study 2, where a lack of human resources was 
identified as a stand out safety concern, while in Chapter 4, focus group participants 
discussed the tension between being expected to maintain a certain level of output, despite 
having fewer people. Along with many modern industries, the UK Armed Forces have been 
placed under pressure to reduce their operating costs, and the Strategic Defence Security 
Review (SDSR) of 2010 detailed a required reduction in personnel resource as a key means 
to achieve this.  
6.5 Conclusions 
This study aimed to identify a finite set of components considered to characterise headline 
influences on workplace safety climate in the FAA.  This aim was achieved through 
identification of six components: management commitment to safety & organisational 
learning, normative behaviour, training/experience, reporting, human resources and 
process/bureaucracy. 
 
A set of seventy-eight scalable items in a self-report questionnaire format was completed by 
a sample of FAA personnel (meeting objective one). In order to explore the factor structure of 
variables that characterise safety climate in a military naval aviation population, a principle 
components analysis was undertaken. This revealed a pattern of six components that 
accounted for 55.1% of the total explained variance (meeting objective two).  
 
In order to meet objective three, the identified components were compared and contrasted 
with published findings within Sections 6.3 and 6.4 of this Chapter. Findings were supported 
by, and interpretable with reference to, established research findings.  
In relation to consideration of the scope and appropriateness of using the revealed 
component structure as the basis for developing a set of psychometric safety climate scales 
(objective four), results from a partial confirmatory factor analysis suggested that further 
development and validation of the safety climate scales was appropriate. This was 




Chapter 7: Towards the Development of a Safety Climate Tool for 
use in Military Naval Aviation (Study 4) 
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Purpose of the Project and Rationale 
The following chapter builds on findings from Study 3 (Chapter 6) where an exploratory 
analysis of questionnaire items resulted in the development of a provisional multi-
dimensional model of safety climate amongst naval aviation personnel. The aim was to 
further refine this through validation of the factor structure identified in Chapter 6 and 
assessment of the psychometric properties of the constructs to produce a set of safety 
climate scales. This culminated in an exploration of the discriminant properties of the scales, 
through exploring the profiles of an array of military naval aviation personnel structural 
demographics e.g. by function (role) and rank.  
 
The chapter provides an account of the confirmatory analysis performed, and an exploration 
of demographic differences using respondent ratings on the safety climate proto-scales. This 
was undertaken to advance knowledge in this area of research through identifying the 
potential group safety climate profiles. Findings were interpreted with reference to insights 
derived from the empirical qualitative evidence gathered (from Chapter 4), the exploratory 
ranking study (Chapter 5) and published findings (Chapter 2).  Development of a climate tool 
of this type was held to provide the FAA with the ability to benchmark employee 
perspectives, characterise differences by demographic group, and use this information to 
identify priorities and direct resource allocation for intervention and improvement of safety.   
7.1.2 Aims 
1. To determine the validity of the six-factor solution identified in Study 3 and explore 
the scope for using this to produce a safety climate assessment tool for use in a military 
naval aviation context.  
2. To develop these derived constructs into a set of sub-scales with the capacity to 
profile and benchmark safety climate, provide a relative indicator of change over time and 
detect demographic differences.  
7.1.3 Objectives 
1. Determine the validity of the component structure identified in the PCA by 




2. Reliant on an acceptable model, refine the output of the CFA to produce a set of 
scales that possess high face validity and exhibit good reliability properties.  
3. Explore the capacity of the developed construct scales to profile and discriminate 
between different groups of employees. 
7.1.4 Background  
Safety climate scales and measurement tools are held to be useful to (i) provide an 
evidence-based approach to gathering feedback on employee perceptions of safety-related 
corporate priorities, emphasis and custom and practice, behavioural norms in relation to 
safety systems and the practical utility and functional status of those systems; (ii) act as a 
diagnostic tool in distinguishing between organisational units in detecting safety climate 
differences, and (iii) for evaluating the effect of interventions (Kines et al., 2011). The 
capacity to recognise and understand differences in perceptions of safety climate amongst 
different groups embodies the potential for safety managers to adopt a targeted approach to 
intervention, thereby concentrating scarce resources. 
7.2 Method 
The PCFA completed in Chapter 6 indicated that further data collection with a second 
sample of personnel was appropriate as findings were indicative of a good model fit 
(RMSEA=0.023, NFI=0.88, TLI=0.99 and CFI=0.97).  
7.2.1 Ethical approval  
Permission to undertake the study was granted by both MODREC (reference 
648/MODREC/15) and the University of Bath (15-194). 
7.2.2 Sample 
Data was collected from a second sample of participants using the 78-item questionnaire 
detailed in Chapter 6. FAA operational considerations meant that the same data collection 
method detailed in Study 3 could not be used. Instead, a sample of volunteers was drawn 
from monthly safety training courses which were run by the organisation's Flight Safety 
team, and data collection was facilitated by this team rather than by the researcher. Military 
naval aviation personnel from across the UK attend this training as part of their career 
development.  
 
There is no universally agreed requirement for sample size for CFA, however Hoyle (2000) 
and Tabachnick and Fidell (2014) both recommended a sample of at least 200 participants.  
Given the initial sample of 441 personnel for the PCA, a sample of approximately 300 
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personnel was deemed to be acceptable for undertaking the CFA. In total 330 personnel 
completed questionnaires, of which nine data sets were removed as they had more than 
10% of their data points missing, leaving a final sample of 321 data sets. Of these, 
demographic data for 211 respondents was not collected due to administrative issues and 
non-response to these questions by respondents. It is possible that the administration of the 
questionnaires by course administrators may have led respondents to doubt the 
confidentiality of their data.  The available demographic information for respondents from the 
second sample used for the CFA is shown in Table 43. When compared to the respondent 
sample for the PCA (Table 27, Chapter 6), the distribution of participants across the groups 




Demographics of the sample for respondents who provided demographic data (N=118), 
(entire sample N= 330, demographic data were not available for 212 respondents).  
 N=118  
Aircrew 
N=32 
Junior ratings N= 2 
Senior ratings N= 7 
Officers N= 23  
Engineers 
N=86 
Junior ratings N = 69 
Senior ratings N = 16 
Officers N = 1 
7.2.3 Procedure 
Steps were taken to keep the procedure for data collection as similar as possible to that 
used in Study 3 (Chapter 6). Data collection was undertaken between March and August 
2017 and typically took place on the first day of the course. Questionnaires were 
administered and collected by a member of the course delivery team and sent to the 
researcher. Participants were given time during the course to participate and the 
questionnaire took approximately 15-20 minutes to complete.  
7.2.4 Data Analysis 
CFA is used to test whether a pre-determined factor structure fits the data, and is considered 
a more sophisticated technique than PCA (Mearns et al., 2013). Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2014) suggested that, when used in the latter stages of the research process, this method 
can be used to corroborate theory about the underlying relationship amongst variables. In 
CFA, a theoretical model is set up, and the data is then analysed to determine how well they 
'fit' the theoretical model. In the current study, CFA was considered appropriate because the 
200 
 
author wanted to test the theory of the underlying factors identified in Study 1 and to 
determine whether safety climate was a multi-dimensional construct amongst this 
population. Furthermore, the CFA is an important step in refining and revising questionnaires 
(Mearns et al., 2013).  
 
AMOS 23 software was used to perform the CFA, using the six-factor model containing forty 
one items which was developed in Study 3 (Chapter 6). These components, and constituent 
items are contained in Appendix E (Table 1).  Table 44 shows the internal reliability statistics 
(Cronbach alpha) for each component. Any missing values were replaced with the mean of 
the item ratings (as recommended by Hoyle, 2000). 
 
Table 44. 
Six components from PCA, showing internal reliability (Cronbach alpha α) of each 
component. 
PCA Component (Chapter 6) Number of 
items 
Cronbach alpha (α) 
1 - Management & organisational learning 14 0.908 
2 - Normative behaviour   8 0.898 
3 - Training & Experience   6 0.841 
4- Reporting 4 0.804 
5 - Human resources 4 0.710 
6 - Process/bureaucracy 5 0.786 
 
Goodness of Fit Indices 
A range of measures of model fit (goodness of fit indices) were consulted to inform the 
acceptability of the model fit to the data. This process allowed for assessment of the 
relationship between the measures (i.e. the items/indicators) and the constructs they were 
designed to measure (Hoyle, 2000). Fit indices are grouped into two categories - absolute fit 
indices and incremental fit indices (Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008).  Absolute fit indices 
determine how well an a priori model fits the sample data (Hooper et al., 2008), while 
incremental fit indices compare the proposed model to a baseline model (Bentler & Bonett, 
1980). Absolute fit indices use the chi-square value in the model in its raw form while the 
incremental fit indices do not. Using the raw chi-square statistic is the traditional method, 
however it has been suggested that this holds several limitations (Hooper et al., 2008) 
including (i) that it assumes multivariate normality and deviations will incur rejection of the 
model even if it is correctly specified and (ii) its sensitivity to sample size. Therefore, a 
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combination of both was utilised in a systematic manner (in line with Hooper et al., 2008 & 
Hoyle, 2000). 
Absolute Fit Indices 
The absolute fit indices utilised were the chi-square (χ2), the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), 
the Root Mean Square Residual (RMR), the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) and the closeness of fit (PCLOSE) index.   
 
A large value, significant result for the χ2 index indicates good model fit (Furr, 2011). Large 
samples tend to return large values which are significant (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993) and so 
this index was combined into a ratio with the degrees of freedom (DF), creating the CMIN/DF 
ratio (Byrne, 2010). A CMIN/DF ratio of lower than 5 is considered to indicate good model fit 
(Byrne, 2010).  
 
The GFI is a measure of the relative amount of variance and covariance in the sample data 
and varies from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating better model fit (Byrne, 2010). Typically, 
a GFI of greater than 0.90 is considered to indicate acceptable model fit (Bentler, 1990; 
Byrne, 2010; Hoyle, 2000). The RMR represents the average residual value derived from 
fitting of the model, with smaller values indicating a good model fit; values of 0.05 or less are 
considered acceptable (Byrne, 2010). The RMSEA indexes the degree of discrepancy 
between observed and implied covariance matrices per degree of freedom (Hoyle, 2000) 
and was recently identified as one of the most informative indices (Byrne, 2010).  The 
threshold of good model fit for the RMSEA has been debated, with values of less than 0.06 
said to indicate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and values of lower than 0.05 as indicating 
very good fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; MacCullum & Austin, 2000).  The final goodness of fit 
index, PCLOSE had a threshold of 0.05 to indicate a good model fit (Byrne, 2010; Joreskog 
& Sorbom, 1996). 
Incremental Fit Indices  
The most commonly used incremental fit index is the CFI. CFI values can range from 0 to 1, 
with higher values indicating better fit (Bentler, 1990). Some authors recommend a threshold 
of 0.90 to indicate good fit (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Bentler, 1990, Mearns et al., 2013) whilst 
others argue that this value should exceed 0.95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
 
The absolute and incremental fit indices, along with the criteria for good model fit described 





Summary of goodness of fit indices for CFA with criteria for good model fit. 
Index Indicator of good model fit 
χ 2 Low value, non-significant result 
CMIN/DF  Less than 5 
GFI Greater than 0.90 
RMR Less than 0.05 
CFI Greater than 0.90 
RMSEA Less than 0.05 (with 95% Confidence interval) 
PCLOSE Greater than 0.05 
 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
The CFA was run with forty-one items within six components, as identified by the PCA 
detailed in Chapter 6. Testing the hypothesised underlying factorial structure on all forty-one 
items showed poor fit (χ2 =1387.938, DF =724, p<0.001; GFI =0.827, CFI =0.879, RMSEA= 
0.053), although two indices were acceptable (CMIN/DF = 1.917; PCLOSE= 0.100). The 
hypothesised model containing standardized estimates can be found in Figure 1 of Appendix 
E, and the full list of indices in Table 46. 
 
Table 46. 
Goodness of fit indices for hypothesised model, 6 factors and 41 items, showing poor model 
fit (Model 1, Appendix E).  
Index Results 
χ 2 1387.938, DF=724, p<0.0001 




RMSEA (CI) 0.053 (0.049-0.058) 
PCLOSE 0.100 
 
These findings showed that the hypothesised six factor model derived from the PCA could 
not be confirmed through CFA on an independent sample. However, modification indices 
showed correlation errors for a number of items (likely due to similar item content), 
Therefore, a series of exploratory models were run, by re-specifying the model taking these 
factors into account. This process of re-specification is common in most applications of CFA 
and involves either freeing fixed parameters or fixing free parameters (Hoyle, 2000). This led 
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to slight improvements in the model (Table 47) which comprised of six factors and thirty-nine 
items (Management 12 and Norm 4 were removed due to kurtotic data). Here, the CFI value 
approached a good model fit, as did RMSEA and RMR values.  
 
Table 47. 
Goodness of fit indices for re-specified model, 6 factors and 39 items, showing improved 
model fit indices (Model 2, Appendix E).  
Index Results 
χ 2 1230.850, DF=685, p<0.0001 




RMSEA 0.050 (0.045-0.054) 
PCLOSE 0.543 
 
It was noted that the human resources component displayed poor standardised estimates on 
two of the items (0.50 and 0.55) as did one item on the process/bureaucracy component 
(0.42) and one on the normative behaviour component (0.54), and these items were 
removed (in line with Hoyle's, 2000 recommendations for model re-specification). The 
removal of two human resources items left a scale with only two items, which is not suitable 
(Openheim, 2000) and so the decision was made to remove the entire human resources 
component from the re-specified model. This process of optimising parameter estimates is 
iterative, and so incremental attempts to increase these were continued, until parameter 
estimates offered no appreciable improvement in the estimation criterion (as recommended 
by Hoyle, 2000). 
 
Table 48. 
Goodness of fit indices for final re-specified model, 5 factors and 32 items, showing 
acceptable model fit. 
Index Results 
χ 2 712.290 DF=448, p<0.0001 









 The goodness of fit indices for the final, re-specified model are shown in Table 48, with the 
indices showing an acceptable model fit for this five-factor, thirty-two item safety climate 
model. The standardised residuals for the model are shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Standardised estimates (N=483) for the final, re-specified model (GFI=0.882, 
CFI=0.936, RMSEA=0.043).  
7.3.2 Refinement of the Scales and Exploration of Demographic Differences 
Once an acceptable re-specified model was successfully completed, the study then looked 
to develop each of the components, and their constituent items, into a set of proto-scales. 
The aim was to produce a safety climate tool which could be used by the FAA to profile the 
safety climate of different groups. Firstly, determination of the internal reliability of each of 
the proto-scales was undertaken, as well as item analysis within each sub-scale. The results 
from these analyses are shown in Table 49. This showed that the internal reliability of each 
scale was acceptable (α>0.70), and that removal of any of the items was not necessary (as 
deletion did not increase the alpha).  While the internal reliability of the scales was 
addressed, for full scale development beyond the proto-scales described here, there is need 
for demonstration of test-retest reliability, as well as further validation. These steps were not 
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undertaken due to operational restrictions on availability of personnel to undertake these 
final steps during the timescales of the current thesis.  
Table 49. 
Re-specified safety climate tool, with constituent items and internal reliability (Cronbach 
alpha α) for each climate scale, including Cronbach alpha (α) if item deleted. 
Component 1 - Management & organisational learning (α= 0.909) 
α - if item 
deleted 
Mgt1 Managers are willing to listen to staff when it comes to the best way to do 
something 
0.890 
Mgt2 The Squadron Management encourages safe working practices 0.895 
Mgt3 Line management looks out for us here 0.891 
Mgt4 Managers are quick to act on safety concerns when we report them 0.892 
Mgt5  The Squadron Management is good at finding the right balance between 
addressing safety concerns and the requirement to achieve a task 
0.889 
Mgt6 There is poor communication about safety issues that may affect me 0.893 
Mgt7 My supervisor / manager encourages me and my team to learn from safety 
events 
0.892 
Mgt8 If a genuine error is made (resulting in an accident or near miss), 
management will always be supportive 
0.895 
Mgt9 Personal safety has a high priority here 0.892 
Mgt10 The squadron management here do a good job balancing operational 
requirements against safety 
0.893 
Mgt11 Good safety behaviour is positively recognised by the line management 
here 
0.889 
Mgt13 People here are kept informed about the outcomes of meetings which 
address safety issues 
0.895 
Mgt14 My supervisor/manager encourages questions from workers about safety 
matters 
0.892 
Component 2- Normative behaviour (α= 0.819)  
Norm1 People here take shortcuts when they think there is little or no risk involved 0.745 
Norm2 Taking a short cut to get work done quickly is seen as acceptable, as long 
as nothing happens 
0.769 
Norm5 Supervisors here sometimes encourage others to bend the rules or amend 
the procedure to achieve a task 
0.772 
Norm6 Supervisors sometimes sign off without checking 0.763 
Norm7 People regularly get distracted when doing safety critical jobs 0.790 
Component 3- Training & Experience (α= 0.830)  
Tr1 In general, supervisors are sufficiently experienced to meet the required 
level of supervision 
0.730 
Tr2 People are sufficiently experienced for the jobs they are required to do 0.720 
Tr3 Everyone here is sufficiently trained to undertake their tasks safely 0.745 
Tr4 There are always supervisors available to give advice 0.798 




Component 4- Reporting (α= 0.779)  
Rep1 If people here saw an unsafe act they would report it 0.652 
Rep2 Most people in my workplace report safety related occurrences 0.612 
Rep3 If I thought no one would know, I would not report a colleague's error 0.761 
Rep4 If people see others breaking a rule they tend to turn a blind eye 0.599 
Component 5- Process/bureaucracy (α= 0.783)  
Pro1 There is too much paperwork involved with reporting safety concerns 0.769 
Pro2 It is too bureaucratic to report all safety concerns 0.720 
Pro3 Safety rules / procedures are only there to protect against legal action 0.736 
Pro4 If people followed all the safety rules they would not get the job done in 
time 
0.730 
Pro5 Some procedures are only there to protect management's back 0.721 
 
Ratings from items within each sub-scale were combined to create a summated rating for 
each respondent. These summated ratings were then used as dependent variables, and the 
presence of a predictive relationship explored with respect to the independent variables of 
function (aircrew/engineer) and rank (junior and senior ratings/junior and senior officers). 
This analysis was based upon a sub-sample of the complete response set collected across 
Studies 3 and 4 (N=483) for whom demographic information was available (detailed in Table 
50).  
Table 50. 





Junior officers N= 34 
Senior officers N= 94 
Engineers 
N=355 
Junior ratings N = 259 
Senior ratings N= 96 
Note: N= number of respondents 
Summated ratings for the safety climate scales were checked for normality using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the results of which are displayed in Table 51. All five safety 
climate scales showed non-normal distributions (p<0.05), so non-parametric statistics were 





Results from Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality. 
Safety climate scale Statistic df sig 
Management & organisational learning 0.118 169 0.0001 
Normative behaviour 0.127 169 0.0001 
Training & experience 0.154 169 0.0001 
Reporting 0.144 169 0.0001 
Process/bureaucracy 0.082 169 0.0080 
 
Exploration of Safety Climate Profile by Organisational Function 
A key aspiration of this study was to produce a safety climate measurement tool that could 
discriminate between different groups, if differences in safety climate perceptions were 
present.  Within this organisation, the a priori hypotheses related to differences in 
perceptions of safety climate between engineers and aircrew, as well as between different 
ranks. Although these individuals are all part of the wider military, the technical training that 
they receive is different, as is their immediate work environment. Aircrew operate 
predominately inside the aircraft before and during flight, with safety consequences likely to 
be immediate. In contrast, engineers perform a variety of maintenance activities prior and 
subsequent to the flight, with safety consequences less likely to be immediately apparent (for 
example, a panel left unsecured will be dangerous during flight, but probably not 
beforehand). 
Published findings have shown differences between flight crew and maintenance crew on 
perceptions of management (Gill & Shergill, 2004; Patankar, 2003). The exploratory 
qualitative analysis detailed in Chapter 4 revealed that potential sub-cultural differences 
between aircrew and engineers were perceived in regard to the presence of a 'just culture' 
(Reason, 1997). There is, therefore, evidence from both the published literature and the 
current research to indicate that differences in safety climate perceptions may be expected 
between aircrew and engineers (performing different functions) and so the following a priori 
hypothesis was proposed:  
Hypothesis 1: Ratings of the five safety climate proto-scales will vary by function.  
Mann-Whitney U tests between aircrew and engineers on each of the five safety climate 
scales were performed, with the results shown in Table 52. Here it can be seen that there 
were statistically significant differences (p<0.05) between aircrew and engineer responses 




Descriptive statistics and test for significant differences on each of the five safety climate 
scales between Aircrew (N=127) and Engineers (N=353). 











Aircrew  52.0 5.8 322.48 10587 0.0001 
Engineer 45.7 7.6 202.87 
Normative behaviour Aircrew  17.5 3.3 279.03 15942 0.0001 
Engineer 16.0 4.0 222.16 
Training & experience Aircrew  17.8 3.1 272.62 17970 0.001 
Engineer 16.5 3.8 228.62 
Reporting Aircrew  15.6 2.3 316.07 12817 0.0001 
Engineer 13.6 2.9 213.31 
Process/bureaucracy Aircrew  15.9 3.6 285.35 16797 0.0001 
Engineer 14.4 3.6 224.19 
Note: the factor rating range for each scale were; management & organisational learning (13-65), 
normative behaviour (5-25), training & experience (5-25), reporting (4-20) and process/bureaucracy 
(5-25). 
 
Table 52 shows that aircrew demonstrated more positive ratings (i.e. more positive safety 
climate perceptions) on each sub-scale than did engineers. 
Exploration of Safety Climate Profile by Rank 
Rank, in the military sphere, has its equivalence in the civilian world in management level, 
which has been shown to influence safety climate responses (Arboleda et al., 2003; Fung et 
al., 2005; Weyman et al., 2003). In a comparable population, Falconer (2006a) found rank to 
have a key influence on safety culture within ADF aviation personnel. Safety has often been 
described as affected by power relations (Antonsen, 2009a) which is strongly linked to 
management level/rank. Furthermore, within the FAA, the work undertaken by the different 
ranks varies considerably, with the junior ratings performing frontline engineering tasks, 
managed and supervised by the senior ratings. The officers are typically in charge of higher 
level management and planning than either junior or senior ratings. Typically, aircrew are 
comprised predominately of officers, and on Squadrons the most senior executive personnel 
(such as Commanding and Executive Officers) are aircrew personnel. Given published 
findings showing differences in safety climate profiles in employee groups of different 
management levels, the following a priori hypothesis was proposed:  
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Hypothesis 2: Ratings of the five safety climate proto-scales will vary by rank.  
When considering differences by rank, given the hierarchy structures of the aircrew and 
engineering branches, there were no junior or senior rates of aircrew, and no officers for 
engineers. Given this structure, and the already observed significant differences between 
aircrew and engineers, significant differences in rank were only tested within each of the 
functional groups, and not between them. Thus, engineer ranks were junior and senior 
ratings, while aircrew were separated into junior and senior officers. Results from these 
analyses are shown in Table 53 (engineers) and Table 54 (aircrew).  
Table 53. 
Differences on the safety climate scales by rank for engineers (Ratings). 









Junior  167.8 10658.5 0.202 
Senior  183.1   
Normative behaviour 
Junior  176.9 12238.0 0.984 
Senior  177.2   
Training & experience Junior  188.0 98.27.5 0.002 
Senior  150.8   
Reporting  
Junior  166.9 9758.5 0.002 
Senior  203.8   
Process/bureaucracy 
Junior  169.6 10525.0 0.037 
Senior  194.9   
 
Table 53 showed that there were significant differences between junior and senior engineers 
on the sub-scales of training & experience, reporting and process/bureaucracy. There were 
no significant differences on the two remaining safety climate sub-scales between the 




Differences on the safety climate scales by rank for aircrew (Officers). 







Junior  49.1 1076.0 0.007 
Senior  68.8   
Normative behaviour 
Junior  54.1 1159.0 0.279 
Senior  61.9   
Training & experience Junior  65.1 1481.0 0.765 
Senior  62.9   
Reporting  
Junior  52.9 1206.0 0.039 
Senior  68.0   
Process/bureaucracy 
Junior  54.6 1261.5 0.068 
Senior  68.1   
 
Table 54 showed that significant differences between aircrew senior and junior officers were 
seen on the sub-scales of management and organisational learning and reporting, while 
there were no significant differences according to rank on the remaining three safety climate 
sub-scales. 
These findings showed that of the ten pairings (5 sub-scales for junior and senior rank 
comparisons of both aircrew and engineers), five showed statistically significant differences, 
while five did not. Ratings of normative behaviour did not vary by rank, management & 
organisational learning, training & experience and process & bureaucracy showed mixed 
results, while ratings on reporting showed significant differences across ranks of both 
aircrew and engineers.  
Testing for an Interaction between Function and Rank 
The data were not normally distributed (Table 2, Appendix E, Shapiro-Wilk showed p>0.05 
for all five sub-scales) and a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine the 
interaction between the effects of rank and function was considered. However, for four of the 
safety climate scales (management commitment & organisational learning, normative 
behaviour, training & experience and reporting, Levene's test for homogeneity of variance 
was statistically significant (p<0.05), with group sizes varying at a ratio of greater than 1:5. 
Logarithmic transformation of the data was not able to improve results to Levene's test for 
homogeneity of variance, and therefore these data were not considered appropriate on 
which to undertake a two-way ANOVA.  However, the mean normalised ratings on each of 
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the five subscales was plotted by function and rank (see Figure6). This shows the general 
trends discussed previously, that aircrew ratings tended to be more positive than engineers, 
and that ratings from more senior rank groups tend to be more positive than those of the 
junior ranks. The notable exception to this is the ratings on the training/experience sub-
scale, in which engineer senior ratings indicated significantly less positive responses than 
did junior engineering ratings.  
 
Figure 6.  Mean normalised ratings for five safety climate sub-scales, by function and rank 
where JR= junior ratings, SR=senior ratings, JO=junior officers and SO = senior officers.  
 
7.4 Discussion 
The aim of Study 4 was to enhance confidence in the six-factor solution identified in Study 3 
(Chapter 6) and explore the scope for using this to form the basis of a safety climate 
assessment tool for use in military aviation. The hypothesised six-factor model, based on 
forty-one items, did not produce a satisfactory model fit when subjected to a confirmatory 
factor analysis. However, through iterative re-specification, it was determined that poor 
model fit was predominately the result of a small number of non-concurrent items. When 
these were removed from the model, the fit for a five-factor model containing thirty-two items 
was classifiable as 'good'. The five retained factors were management commitment & 
organisational learning (12 items), normative behaviour (5 items), training & experience (5 
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These components formed five safety climate sub-scales which were each shown to 
possess acceptable internal reliability. O'Conner et al. (2011a) suggested that identification 
of a reliable factor structure that is consistent with existing theory supports the claim of 
construct validity of the questionnaire. As the discussion in Chapter 6 detailed how these 
variables compared to findings from the published literature, the comparability of the 
constructs shown in Figure 5 to other military, aviation and non-aviation will not be repeated 
here, but will be integrated into the central discussion within Chapter 8. Instead, the following 
discussion will focus on the demographic profiles on the safety climate sub-scales, and how 
these findings related to established findings in the safety culture and climate literature.   
7.4.1 Demographic Profiles on Safety Climate Sub-scales 
Contrasts by Function  
While it is generally acknowledged that safety climate is shared by groups of people, early 
work in the safety arena posited that this was likely to be homogenous throughout an 
organisation (Hofstede, 1991; Schein, 1990). However, others argue that differentiation 
within organisations is more realistic (Alvesson, 1985, 2002; Martin, 1992; Parker, 2000), 
with the possibility arising that there may be multiple sets of attitudes and perceptions toward 
safety in the same organisation (Antonsen, 2009a). The different social structures, work 
environments and structural features experienced by different groups is thought to be key to 
creating different perceptions amongst groups (Richter & Koch, 2004; Zohar, 2010). 
It was hypothesised that the two functional groups, aircrew and engineers, might differ in 
their perceptions on each of the five safety climate proto-scales. This hypothesis was 
supported across all five sub-scales, with aircrew ratings being statistically (p<0.05) 
significantly more positive than those of the engineers.    
When considering the constituent items of each scale, this would suggest that: 
1. Aircrew considered their management to be more receptive to concerns when raised, 
supportive of genuine errors and likely to recognise good safety behaviour than did 
engineers. 
2. Engineers perceived there to be more short-cut taking, less reporting of mistakes and 
increased distraction during safety critical tasks than did aircrew. 
3. Aircrew perceived their colleagues/supervisors to be more adequately experienced 
and trained to conduct work safely than did engineers. 
4. Engineers tended to be less positive toward the process of reporting and procedures 




However, it is important to consider the mean values and standard deviations for each of the 
scales, which generally showed positive ratings. Thus, engineer mean ratings may have 
been significantly less positive than that of aircrew, but they remained relatively positive. 
Significant differences between aircrew and engineers in relation to aspects of management 
commitment have been identified in previous research, where flight crew and maintenance 
crew displayed significant differences (Dixon, 2012; Gill & Shergill, 2004; Patankar, 2003). In 
a comparable population of the UK's Royal Air Force (RAF), Dixon (2012) concluded that 
aircraft engineers had the least positive views on safety culture (Dixon's term) than other 
trades (aircrew, battle space management personnel). In contrast, results presented by 
Patankar (2003) and Gill and Shergill (2004) showed the opposite; both publications 
reported maintenance crew having the highest level of trust in their supervisors when 
compared to flight crew and engineers.  
When considering differences on the normative behaviour sub-scale, sub-cultural differences 
have been found previously, with findings from a military sample (Falconer, 2006a) indicating 
aircrew regarding deviations from procedures to be more unsafe than engineers. However, 
several civilian studies have reported the opposite, with maintenance engineers reportedly 
having a stronger emphasis on adhering to procedures, regulatory procedures and safety 
practices than other occupational groups (Gill & Shergill, 2004; Patankar, 2003).  
Responses to training & experience showed that, although mean ratings for both groups 
were above the mid-point, engineers ratings were, on average, statistically (p<0.05) 
significantly lower than those of the aircrew. A lack of training has been shown to be related 
to increased error incidence, and decreased confidence in one's abilities (Lawrie et al., 2006; 
Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007). During the qualitative phase of this research it was aircrew who 
appeared to be more concerned with their eroded training and experience, rather than 
engineers. No comparisons could be found in the corresponding safety culture/climate 
literature when comparing occupational groups on the component of training, however Gill 
and Shergill (2004) discuss 'safety education' as an integral aspect of safety climate. 
Low ratings on the process/bureaucracy component would suggest that respondents 
perceived rules and procedures as existing to protect management and apportion culpability, 
as well as perceiving the reporting system as involving too much paperwork. It was 
hypothesized that responses to this component may vary according to functional group. This 




Contrasts by Rank 
It was hypothesised that ratings on the five safety climate scales would show differences by 
rank. In contrast with the results for function, the findings seen between ranks were rather 
more fragmented, and will therefore each will be discussed in turn.  
Management Commitment & Organisational Learning  
Significant differences were seen between aircrew of different ranks on this sub-scale, but 
not between engineers of different ranks. This would suggest, in line with deductions made 
by O’Conner et al. (2011b), that on this sub-scale, engineers presented a more shared view 
than did the aircrew.  
These findings were consistent with the majority of safety climate studies that considered 
rank or management level (Dixon, 2012; Harvey et al., 2002; Falconer, 2006a, b; Fung et al., 
2005). In civilian studies, significantly more positive views on safety climate in management 
or supervisor levels as compared to worker (or shop floor) staff were reported (Alhemood et 
al., 2004; Fung et al., 2005; Harvey et al., 2002; Prussia et al., 2004). Across these studies 
there was a general trend for those of more senior rank, or higher management level, to 
have responses that rated more positively on safety climate scales. This may reflect how 
individuals at different hierarchical levels conceptualise work safety (Clarke, 1999) however, 
Grote and Kunzler (2000) recommended caution in assuming that these more positive 
ratings at senior levels somehow indicate increased levels of safety. Rather, they suggested, 
differences between shop floor and management levels may be due to attributional bias; one 
expects managers to attribute more positive attitudes to themselves (self-serving) than those 
on the shop floor, particularly if they are the ones who oversee these safety measures.  
It is also important to interpret these findings considering the management of safety within 
organisations where top down management initiatives (Glendon & Stanton, 2000) and 
uneven power relations (Antonsen, 2009a) are likely to affect the social construction of 
safety culture. Often management initiatives to improve safety culture are targeted at those 
in frontline roles, as, arguably, these are often those in which errors occur. However, these 
are also the personnel who have the least control over the processes and procedures 
(Dekker, 2014) and have the least oversight of the wider operations. Within the current 
organisation, the officers are typically in charge of higher-level management and planning 
than either junior or senior ratings. The increasingly positive safety climate ratings at higher 
ranks may also be due to a better understanding of what the overall organisation is aiming to 




Rank was not seen to have a significant effect on ratings of this sub-scale for either aircrew 
or engineer respondents. This would suggest that, on this scale at least, there is a degree of 
shared views between ranks in each of the groups, although not between functions (as 
significant differences between aircrew and engineers were found). Although indirectly 
influenced by organisational factors, this scale related directly to the behaviours that military 
aviation personnel observed in colleagues and supervisors, and so possibly reflects the 
informal structure of the organisation. O'Conner et al. (2011a) suggested that the lack of 
differences that they observed between ranks may have resulted from the fact that even the 
senior aviators often still fly aircraft or assist with hands-on engineering, and thus remain 
directly involved in safety activities, which can be observed by the workforce.  Given that 
different ranks of engineers and aircrew work closely together daily within their function (but 
not between functions), these close working relationships may help to create a shared view 
on what behaviours are considered acceptable. These findings would support those reported 
in Chapter 4 where there was a high degree of camaraderie, and a strong sense of 
responsibility for safety which occurred across individuals.   
In the military, and particularly in military aviation, critical performance depends on good 
teamwork and coordination (Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Converse, 1993); having shared 
mental models (i.e. common cognitive representations of procedures, responsibilities and 
accepted behaviour) is particularly important for successful performance. To achieve this, 
there must be a degree of team learning taking place which requires ongoing social 
interaction and exchange between members (Veestraeten, Kyndt & Dochy, 2014). 
Individuals within groups undergo similar structural influences and encounter the same 
salient occurrences, and it is these that are thought to lead to the team members developing 
shared beliefs and interpretations (Van den Bossche et al., 2006). Thus, if in military groups, 
the influence of colleagues’ behaviour is key to team learning, a positive group view of safety 
may be beneficial. However, as Edmondson (1999) highlights, a lack of trust in these teams 
may inhibit questioning of team practices, and admitting to mistakes. Therefore, a negative 
view of safety (or adoption of unsafe norms) may be particularly harmful in the military, as 
these views are likely to be reinforced through these highly cohesive groups.   
Training/Experience 
Senior engineers had more negative ratings on this scale than did junior engineers, whilst 
aircrew showed no differences according to rank.  Training and experience is a key aspect of 
safety climate, as it is often synonymous with competence (Flin et al., 2000). These findings 
were in contrast with those reported by Falconer (2006a) who showed that more senior rank 
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was related to more positive views of training aspects of safety climate. However, two 
explanations are proposed for this finding; firstly, in line with O'Conner et al. (2011a), it may 
be that the most junior engineers are generally inexperienced, thus not provide an accurate 
assessment of the safety climate in relation to training and they may not recognise gaps in 
their training or experience as more experienced (senior) individuals might. Secondly, if one 
considers the qualitative findings detailed in Chapter 4, engineers who were supervisors 
stated that increased pressure on their time meant that they were forced to spend less time 
supervising their sub-ordinates. It is possible that these supervisors might perceive this to 
lead to a lack of training or experience in junior personnel. 
Reporting 
Both engineers and aircrew showed rank differences about reporting – junior ratings 
evidenced the most negative ratings, followed by senior ratings. Aircrew senior officers 
showed more positive ratings than did junior officers. These findings corroborated those 
reported by Fung et al. (2005) who showed that supervisors had the strongest sense of 
responsibility related to reporting, with workers commonly thinking this was not their concern. 
Supervisors were said to have a duty to report accidents and keep good communication with 
sub-ordinates, which may explain these results (Fung et al., 2005). However, more senior 
personnel also tend to be those who are responsible for accident investigation and allocation 
of punitive measures, while junior personnel are, arguably, more likely to be the ones being 
investigated. Under-reporting has been shown to be strongly affected by the degree to which 
supervisors enforce safety rules while production pressure was related to more negative 
attitudes toward reporting and led to less accurate reporting (Probst & Graso, 2013). 
Process/Bureaucracy 
Aircrew of different ranks did not show different ratings on the process/bureaucracy scale, 
while junior engineer ratings were significantly more negative than those of senior engineers. 
This is of interest as it would suggest that junior engineers might perceive process & 
bureaucracy particularly negatively, while being the individuals who must adhere strictly to 
procedures in frontline tasks and potentially be best placed to report incidents or near miss 
events.  These findings are also interesting when interpreted in relation to the findings in 
Chapter 4 where one of the barriers to complying with procedures was cited to be the 
bureaucratic burden of a vast amount of policy and regulation. The hierarchical nature of the 
military means that much of the communication is cascaded through command chains where 
senior personnel communicate changes in policy to their sub-ordinates. It may therefore be 
that more senior personnel have a wider understanding of policy and procedures, whereas 
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junior personnel may not have this overview and therefore do not have an appreciation of 
the importance of certain aspects of the policy. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The aims of Study 4 were twofold; firstly to determine the validity of the six-factor solution 
identified in Study 3 and secondly to explore the scope for using this for the basis of a safety 
climate assessment tool with the capacity to profile and benchmark safety climate. 
Using confirmatory factor analysis, the six-component model was compared with data from a 
second independent sample (meeting objective one). At the point of initial appraisal this 
revealed a poor model fit. Scope for re-specification of the model was determined to be 
appropriate. This produced a good model fit for a five-factor model, comprised of thirty-two 
constituent items. The five factors identified were management & organisational learning, 
normative behaviour, training & experience, reporting and process & bureaucracy. The 
confirmatory factor analysis provided the basis for the development of a set of five proto-
construct scales (objective two), each possessing an acceptable degree of internal 
consistency (Cronbach alpha >0.70).  
Finally, to address the third objective, an exploration of the discriminant properties of the set 
of five scales indicated the capacity to detect differences between different groups of 
personnel, which suggested that these proto-scales potentially possessed effective 
discriminant qualities. The nature and direction of differences were corroborated by 
qualitative findings from Study 1 and published findings. Aircrew were seen to have 
statistically significantly more positive perceptions of safety climate than did engineers. 
Differences by rank showed a general trend toward more positive perceptions of safety 
climate by senior personnel than junior personnel. The two notable exceptions to this were: 
o No differences seen between ranks in relation to normative behaviour, 
o Senior engineers showed less positive perceptions of training & experience 
than did junior engineers.   
The foundation scale development work conducted in this study was considered to provide a 




Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusions  
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an integrated discussion of the key findings from the four empirical 
studies, including how these findings were related to both the research objectives and the 
existing knowledge in the area. An overview of the key practical and theoretical contributions 
made by the research is followed by a summary of its strengths and limitations, and 
recommendations for future research.  
 
The main purpose of the research was to contribute to the safety culture and climate 
literature, while providing the sponsor organisation (the RN’s FAA) with practical knowledge 
and insight into variables impacting on safety and volitional risk taking amongst its 
employees. To achieve this, the research firstly set out to explore and characterise the 
influence of workplace culture, climate and structural elements on safety and risk decision 
making amongst military naval aviation personnel. Secondly, from the perspective of 
organisational learning, the research aimed to consider how to support enhanced resilience 
to failure through exploring the scope for developing sector-specific, quantifiable leading 
indicators with the capacity to detect weaknesses in safety climate and identify priorities for 
improvement. The study population of FAA personnel was predominately comprised (by 
proportion) of two specialisations; aircrew (responsible for piloting and navigation of the 
aircraft) and engineers (responsible for the routine maintenance and repair of aircraft and 
associated technology/ancillary equipment). The research approach was based on 
established theory and practice, informed by contextual insight, and grounded in employee 
experiences. The approach purposively adopted a sequential mixed-method design and 
utilised a consolidated theoretical framework for conducting the empirical studies. 
 
8.0.1 Summary of empirical chapters 
Shortcomings with safety climate tools developed in military aviation settings were identified 
(Chapter 2), specifically that they utilised top-down approaches to characterising important 
safety culture/climate components, which did not appear to stand up to statistical scrutiny. 
The current research sought to address these shortcomings through adoption of 
contemporary approaches evidenced within civilian aviation safety climate studies, which 
have emphasised a bottom-up, contextualised approach. Furthermore, novel investigation 
into comparative ranking techniques considered the utility of employing ranking methods to 
inform organisational safety priority setting, complementary to more traditional safety climate 
measure development using rating scales.   
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The aim of Study 1 was to explore participant accounts of norms, values, attitudes and 
behaviour in relation to safety, in order to inductively generate insight into core influences on 
workplace safety culture in the FAA. This aim was met through adoption of a qualitative 
approach to data generation and analysis. Seven themes were considered to be the most 
salient to military naval aviation participants, including policy & procedures, pressure, 
leadership & safety ownership, individual & collective responsibility, communication, training 
& experience and organisational commitment. 
 
The aim of Study 2 was to elicit FAA personnel perspectives on priorities for intervention to 
enhance safety culture, and secondly to determine the relative merits of widely used 
alternative ranking techniques. The latter was of interest with respect to ease of use, the 
utility of the output and to determine whether the order of priority elicited was prone to vary 
between methods. Comparison of the performance of Q-Sort, direct ranking and the method 
of paired comparisons showed that while the method of ranking did not appear to 
significantly affect the rank order produced, the method of paired comparisons afforded a 
more nuanced view of the findings. However, participants found it the most tedious and 
frustrating to complete. Three issues were identified as potential priorities for intervention; 
human resources (staffing levels), priority of safety and competency & experience. Future 
work is required to build on these findings before a ranking tool could be considered for 
widespread use in the organisation.  
Studies 3 and 4 built on findings from Studies 1 and 2, with the aims of quantitatively 
identifying a finite set of components which characterised headline influences on workplace 
safety climate through both exploratory (Study 3) and confirmatory (Study 4) methods, using 
independent samples. These aims were partially met, with a six-component model identified 
using PCA. The resultant CFA showed a poor model fit with this six-component model, 
however, re-specification of the model resulted in a good model fit for a five-component 
model, containing thirty-two constituent items. The five components showed acceptable 
internal consistency and the capacity to detect differences between different groups of 
personnel.  
The findings from these empirical chapters, and the learning which is provided by these in 
relation to the existing literature are discussed further in the following sections.  
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8.1  Discussion and interpretation of Key Findings 
8.1.1 Factors Influencing Safety and Risk Decision Making in the Military Naval 
Aviation Context 
The empirical findings revealed a number of key influences on safety and risk decision 
making amongst military naval aviation personnel. These were interpreted through reference 
to published findings within the respective chapters, with a core focus on aviation and other 
high risk industries. The key influences from the current research are discussed in this 
chapter against key influences reported in studies from aviation (Table 55) and other high 
risk industries (Table 56).  
The Influence of Management on Safety 
The role of managers as a key influence on employee safety behaviour was identified in 
Study 1, with reference to issues of leadership and safety ownership. Findings from Study 3 
complemented this in revealing the latent factor, management commitment and 
organisational learning. Interestingly, findings from Study 2 indicated that personnel did not 
rank management commitment as a particular priority that needed addressing in their 
workplaces, which might indicate a relative strength of this dimension in the FAA.   
 
The findings that management play a key role in setting the cultural profile of safety is 
unsurprising given its universal identification within safety culture and climate research (see 
reviews by Choudrey et al., 2007; Clarke, 2000; Farrington-Darby et al., 2005; Flin et al., 
2000; O'Conner et al., 2011b; Seo et al., 2004; Weigmann et al., 2004). Indeed, while 
naming conventions exhibit variability, irrespective of the method of enquiry, all studies 
reviewed contained at least one factor with management as a focus.  While detection of the 
key influence managers on safety culture and climate was therefore expected, there 
appeared to be a number of particular ways in which this influence manifested in the military 
naval aviation context. For this discussion, these have been grouped into three main areas: 
 
a. Managers as role models, 
b. Managers as conduits for organisational learning, 
c. Managers as priority setters. 
Managers as Role Models 
The theme of leadership and safety ownership (Study 1) was sub-divided into frontline 
personnel perceptions of (i) supervisors and (ii) senior managers, which revealed greater 
articulation (by volume) and depth of discussion about supervisors than senior managers. 
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While the motivation and rhetoric of senior managers tended to be viewed rather cynically, 
supervisors were widely portrayed by personnel as playing a key role in influencing 
subordinate safety behaviour, both positively and negatively. In this way, supervisors were 
interpreted as setting the 'tone' of safety, instructing and influencing sub-ordinates about the 
value of safety related behaviour.  
 
Examples cited in Study 1 reflected several informal mechanisms; how supervisors 
established and reinforced 'norms', widely accepted ways in which more junior (or less 
experienced) staff were expected to work. Echoing findings reported in Buttrey et al.'s (2010) 
study of US aviation personnel, several examples were cited which described how short-cuts 
could be introduced into the work process and transferred from more experienced personnel 
to their sub-ordinates through informal teaching/instruction methods. Examples were also 
given of more formal management behaviours, such as ensuring compliance with wearing 




Comparison of aviation safety culture models after confirmatory factor analysis with the results of the current study. 
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Comparison of other high risk sector safety culture models after confirmatory factor analysis with the results of the current study. 
Authors Current research Huang et al. (2013)  Griffin & Neal (2000) Pousette, Larsson & Torner 
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Both positive and negative aspects of this role model behaviour were captured in Study 
3 where items such as 'The squadron management encourages safe working practices' 
and 'Good safety behaviour is positively recognised by the line management here' 
loaded onto the component of management commitment and organisational learning, 
while negative items such as 'Managers turn a blind eye to rule bending' and 
'Supervisors sometimes sign off work without checking' loaded onto the normative 
behaviour component. The items contained within management commitment and 
organisational learning were interpreted as formal safety behaviours while items 
contained within normative behaviours appeared to be those that occurred outside of 
the formal management process; those that happened when 'no one was watching'.  
 
Managers have been reported as playing an important role in communicating 
expectations and defining acceptable safety by a wide range of sources (see for 
example Conchie et al., 2013; Flin & Yule, 2004; Michael et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 
1998). This has widely been assumed as an important safety leadership component, in 
part because it has been found to be a good predictor of desired behaviours amongst 
employees (Michael et al., 2006) and has been linked to the occurrence of fewer 
injuries (Bahn, 2013). Indeed, leadership style is almost universally regarded as having 
a direct influence on employee safety behaviour (Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2012).  
 
A widely-encountered facet of safety culture/climate research focuses on the nature 
and quality of leader-member exchange (LMX), i.e. the relationship between 
employees and their managers/supervisors (Yagil & Luria, 2010). Formally, managers 
fulfil the role of implementing policy and procedures and subsequent compliance 
monitoring (Hale & Borys, 2013), thus having a direct influence over the practices that 
occur on the front line (Bahn, 2013). However, this might also extend to more subtle 
forms of communication, such as not wearing PPE when required or ignoring employee 
safety transgressions, each of which may infer the level of safety commitment of the 
manager to employees. In military teams the quality of LMX has been shown to be 
affected by rank (recruits and non-commissioned officers tended to have higher quality 
relationships than recruits and officers), arguably as a by-product of the different 
responsibilities of each group (Maksom & Winter, 2009). 
Managers as Conduits of Organisational Learning 
A further way in which managers were perceived to influence safety amongst military 
aviators was through their handling of accident and incident reporting and investigation, 
as well as how they facilitated safety related communication between senior 
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management and frontline personnel. This role as a conduit for communication has 
been identified as a key component for fostering a workforce that reports errors, near 
misses and unsafe conditions (Antonsen, 2009b; Conchie et al., 2013; Reason, 1997). 
In this context, management style and practices can operate as either facilitators or 
barriers to organisational learning. 
 
In Study 1 participants described how, what they characterised as, good managers 
were seen to deal with issues such as errors, accidents and incidents in such a way as 
to allow subordinates to feel confident about raising safety concerns in the future. 
Specifically, whether personnel were happy to admit to an error was often said to be 
reliant on perceptions and beliefs regarding how their supervisors had reacted to 
similar situations in the past. This was corroborated in Studies 3 and 4 where items 
such as 'Managers are quick to act on safety concerns when we report them' and 'If a 
genuine error is made (resulting in an accident or near miss) management will always 
be supportive' were represented on the management commitment & organisational 
learning component. Table 55 and Table 56 reflect similar components; Huang et al. 
(2013) reported similar features within their safety climate component of supervisory 
care (e.g. 'Gives me positive feedback when I perform safely', 'Discusses ways to 
improve performance after non-routine or unusual jobs' & 'Effectively communicates my 
concerns to the company'). In aviation, Block et al. (2007) referred to relational 
supervision (containing items such as 'My supervisor can be trusted' & 'My suggestions 
about safety would be acted upon if I expressed them to my supervisor'). 
 
The need for, and benefits of, a fair and consistent approach to dealing with errors was 
highlighted by Reason (1998) and was further recognised in the Nimrod Review 
(Ministry of Defence, 2009). Named a just culture, this was characterised as a situation 
where people were encouraged and supported to provide safety-related information, 
with a clear distinction made between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour 
(Reason, 1998). Just culture was posited in response to a previous shift in focus from a 
blame culture to a no blame culture (Dekker, 2009; Reason, 2000). The first of these is 
generally acknowledged to be excessively punitive, but the latter is said to be equally 
undesirable as it could endorse potentially reckless acts that require strict sanction 
(Dekker, 2009).   
 
Conceptually, a just culture approach is meant to balance learning and improving with 
accountability; however, it’s application is thought to likely encounter some practical 
difficulties. Fundamentally this hinges upon the assumption that what is ‘just’ can be 
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established in some objective manner. As Dekker (2009) noted, establishing such can 
prove challenging under a wide range of circumstances. Moreover, it can be important 
to consider issues of volition (did the person know what they were doing might lead to 
negative consequences). A volitional act, with a complete understanding of the 
consequences contrasts with well-intentioned but inappropriate acts involving an 
incomplete understanding of causality. 
 
While in extremis, recourse to the legal system may determine whether an employee's 
actions prior to an accident were reasonable, more often it is the senior managers and 
leadership within an organisation or profession who determine this. As Antonsen 
(2009a) noted, the power relationship, routinely combined with a reluctance to deal with 
deeper causal factors, can lead to a risk that managerial orientation is self-serving and 
prone to lay accountability on frontline individuals.  Where such bias is transparent, or 
believed to be present, motivation to report errors or safety issues and participate in 
safety improvements may be affected.  In marked contrast to what authors such as 
Reason seem to have proposed, it is also apparent that some organisations have 
interpreted calls for a just culture as justification for a compliance culture i.e. with 
justice referenced to determination of (non)compliance with rules and procedures. 
Therefore, calls for a just culture are important, but are not a panacea and require 
significant management and transparency of the process.  
Managers as Priority Setters 
A further way in which managers were seen to have an impact on safety in this 
research was through their role in setting operational priorities, indicating to employees 
the relative importance of safety in relation to other organisational goals. In Study 1 this 
manifested in discussions about the pressures being faced by front-line personnel, 
particularly in situations where there was strong time sensitive performance pressure 
from external sources (e.g. combat or exercise situations). This tentatively indicated the 
tendency to sacrifice personal safety to deliver what personnel viewed as their primary 
objectives (operational capability). Furthermore, in Study 2, priority of safety was 
ranked as a salient aspect in need of prioritisation for improvement.  
 
The findings from Study 2 corroborated those from Study 1, where personnel described 
that although senior managers were observed to cite safety as the dominant discourse, 
this was often incompatible with the practicable constraints imposed by the reality of 
every-day work. Normal work was claimed to be characterised by a limited availability 
of resources, which was in notable tension with the espoused expectation that work 
teams would maintain, if not improve, their operational output while maintaining safety. 
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These findings were further supported by those from Studies 3 and 4, where several 
items related to aspects of priority setting (e.g. 'The squadron management are good at 
finding the balance between addressing safety concerns and the requirement to 
achieve a task' & 'The squadron management here do a good job balancing 
operational requirements and safety') formed part of the management commitment and 
organisational learning component.  
 
The above might indicate for the FAA that the role played by managers in setting 
organisational priorities should be carefully monitored and managed, particularly with 
respect to the implicit messages that their actions can transmit to those working in 
frontline roles. Where manager/supervisor priorities and actions explicitly or implicitly 
induce unsafe work practices, particularly where this contrasts with safety rhetoric at   
senior management levels, it is foreseeable that this could sponsor confusion, cynicism 
and mistrust at the frontline. Supervisors control how locally allocated resources are 
applied and how organizational messages are translated into daily activities (Mearns et 
al., 2004; Simard & Marchand, 1994), however this is unlikely to be the root of the 
problem; rather it is likely that tensions and trade-offs become most visible at these 
management levels (DeJoy, 1994).  
 
In the published literature, senior management is held to be key to supporting frontline 
managers through ensuring sufficient policies and resources are in place (Tappura et 
al., 2017) while resource allocation has been acknowledged as having a strong 
influence on how safely people can work (Guo et al., 2016). Essentially, by determining 
where resources are allocated and setting safety priorities, senior managers act as 
choice architects, creating the context in which line managers/supervisors are 
influenced to make decisions that involve safety and risk (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). By 
making an option (in this case a 'safe' or lower risk option) the default choice, easy to 
undertake and supported by positive incentives, people can be influenced to make that 
decision above other (less safe/higher risk) choices (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).  
However, this choice architecture created by senior managers in organisations exists 
within a bounded world, impacted by, for example, government budget allocations, 
national security priorities and political pressures.   
 
The importance attributed to management behaviour on safety within the FAA echo 
findings from both military aviation and commercial aviation (detailed in Table 55) as 
well as other high risk industries (see Table 56). Managers in those sectors culturally 
placed emphasis on safety as an overriding priority, along with managers in the oil and 
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gas (Kvalheim & Dahl, 2016) and mining (Weyman et al., 2003) sectors. However a 
similarly strong management emphasis on safety was not noted in studies completed 
within industries such as gas distribution (Blazsin & Guldenmund, 2015), commercial 
fishing (Brooks, 2015), grain processing (Walker, 2010) and steel manufacturing 
(Nordlof et al., 2015).  
Policy, Rules and Procedures  
The theme/component of policy and procedures was characterised throughout the 
current research findings in a number of ways. In Study 1, operational personnel 
described rules and procedures in ways which indicated high cultural legitimacy; i.e. 
they were seen as necessary for dealing with complex systems such as aircraft and so 
compliance was considered important. Published findings from similar (aviation) 
studies are congruent with the view that there may be an underlying cultural 
acceptance about the importance of procedures across the aviation sector, with both 
Patankar (2003) and Hopkins (2010) characterising aviation employees as rule 
followers. Kao et al. (2009, Table 55) reported a similar component (rule compliance). 
 
Despite this, there was a widely-encountered perception (Study 1) that within the FAA 
there was an ever increasing volume of policy and procedures that was in a constant 
state of flux. Coupled with the commonly held perception that this was driven by a 
focus on accountability by senior management, concern was raised by personnel that 
burgeoning procedures were becoming overly burdensome. This has previously been 
reported to raise questions of practicality and workability of procedures, and has the 
potential to reduce subsequent attention to cumbersome documents (Drury & Johnson, 
2013). Some corroboration of this was provided within Study 3 where two items loading 
onto the component of process/bureaucracy related to the perception that rules and 
procedures were only there to protect against legal action or protect management's 
back.  This suggested that there might be a tension between the acceptance of 
procedures and the perceived increase in accountability described by personnel.  
When compared to findings contained in Table 55 and Table 56, no studies explicitly 
appeared to have characterised a similar dimension, however similar concepts are 
considered by Power (2008) in relation to secondary risk management.  
 
Burgeoning proliferation of policy and process can be seen by employees as passing 
the responsibility and accountability (for non-compliance) to frontline employees, and 
can give rise to cynicism regarding the purpose of poorly configured policy and 
procedures and the motivations of their authors (Szymczak, 2014). Bureaucratic 
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routines (such as making employees sign to say they have read policy or completed 
certain procedures) have been found to be an inadequate measure to ensure 
appropriate knowledge (Dahl, 2013) or assure competence, raising the question of their 
utility beyond audit purposes. In contrast, making policy and procedures relevant and 
easy to comply with (Hale & Borys, 2013) has been described as key to facilitating 
compliance, again reflecting aspects of Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) choice 
architecture.  
 
The research did not consider different types of procedures/policy; however it is 
reasonable to assume that there may be some which were seen by employees as 
essential, and others that were seen as sacrificial. Furthermore, this may vary with 
context and prevailing conditions/priorities, thus could be perceived as relatively fluid.  
Nevertheless, the importance of procedures and policy in aviation organisations is 
likely to be enduring; the very nature of the work requires a degree of 
proceduralisation, whether when piloting the aircraft, or undertaking maintenance on it. 
The presence of fewer, high quality procedures are said to be important, as an increase 
in volume of rules and regulations to cover every aspect of work is ultimately more 
likely to lead to less comprehension amongst employees (Laurence, 2005). The 
importance of these findings for the FAA lay in ensuring that adequate procedures were 
in place to guide work, but that this was balanced with the importance of ensuring 
additional procedures were not seen as the default option to tackle issues which might 
more appropriately be addressed through other means (such as organisational or 
structural influences). More highly engaged employees have been shown to be more 
motivated to work safely (Nahrgang, Morgeson & Hofmann, 2011); enabling employees 
to be involved in the review and writing of policy and procedures may be one such way 
of engaging employees in this process. 
Reporting Incidents and Unsafe Conditions  
Personnel orientation to reporting of incidents and unsafe conditions followed a similar 
pattern as that described for policy and procedures. While qualitative findings indicated 
that personnel were aware of the need to report errors, accidents and incidents (Study 
1), when relevant questionnaire items were analysed quantitatively (Study 3), items 
relating to the belief that following procedures/reporting safety incidents was important 
were observed to cluster together (Reporting) but appeared to be discrete from items 
relating to barriers/disincentives to reporting (Process/bureaucracy). These findings 
suggested that there might be a potential difference between whether personnel 
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believed that reporting was important, and their perceived ability to overcome 
barriers/disincentives to report errors and safety issues. 
 
There was considerable variation across comparison studies (Table 55) with respect to 
incident reporting, with only Mearns et al. (2013) referring directly to reporting. Other 
studies referred to communication (Block et al., 2007; Evans et al., 2007), or accident 
investigation (Kao et al., 2009) which arguably overlap with the current study's 
concepts of management commitment & organisational learning. When considering 
findings from other high risk industries (Table 56), aspects of reporting appeared to be 
more often captured under the umbrella term of communication (Griffin & Neal, 2000; 
Olsen, 2008; Pousette, Larsson & Turner, 2008) and organisational learning (Olsen, 
2008). This is perhaps unsurprising, as reporting of safety incidents and errors is a 
form of communication by which employees tell managers about safety issues and 
hazards that they face. 
 
Within wider aviation research, there have been claims that, despite an industry-wide 
drive toward confidential and non-punitive reporting systems, a high degree of under-
reporting of safety occurrences remains (Gilbey et al., 2015). Organisational barriers 
such as insufficient time (Wiele & Rantanen, 2015), inadequate information technology, 
workplace barriers such as peer influence and bureaucracy (Wiele & Rantanen, 2015) 
and cultural barriers such as fear of consequences/retribution (Johnson, 2002), a lack 
of competence and lack of knowledge (Jausen et al., 2017) have, variously, been cited 
as underlying causes of under-reporting.   
 
A number of these concerns were found to be present in the focus group accounts 
(Study 1), notably a fear of stigma (being ridiculed as either a trouble-maker or 
incompetent) and slow and complicated reporting processes. Published accounts 
tended to cast organisational barriers as significantly more likely to negatively impact 
on reporting behaviour than either workplace or individual factors (Jausen et al., 2017), 
despite common management beliefs to the contrary. Such barriers are not unique to 
aviation, reporting systems in healthcare have also often been cited as complicated 
and providing inadequate/inappropriate feedback (Lawton & Parker, 2002). Ensuring 
ease of use of the reporting system (Jausen et al., 2017) was described as a key factor 
to maximising use of safety occurrence reporting.  
 
These findings might suggest that the FAA should focus on ensuring that the structural 
and social context within the organisation is amenable to supporting reporting. 
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Focusing on making reporting easy, standardising the way in which different functions 
(such as aircrew and engineering) address errors and therefore inculcate a just culture 
would appear two practical important areas for the organisation to focus on improving 
through removing barriers to reporting and potentially improving the quality/quantity of 
reports. 
Training and Experience  
A fourth influence on safety and risk decision making which was identified through the 
empirical studies was that of training and experience. Discrimination between training 
and experience was made in Studies 1 and 2 with aircrew, in particular, suggesting that 
getting enough hands-on experience in airframes was key to affording them confidence 
in their roles - particularly in unusual or exceptional circumstances. During the initial 
phases of Study 2, flight safety subject matter expert advisors maintained that training 
and experience were two discrete safety dimensions, arguing that an operative could 
be fully trained, but not have the experience to complete a task safely and therefore be 
considered competent. This was corroborated by the study participants who appeared 
to clearly discriminate between training and competency/experience in relation to 
whether they were evident in their workplace (see Figure 4 in Chapter 5).   
 
However, in Study 3 items related to training and experience were observed to cluster 
on the same factor (training/experience). It is possible that this reflected the underlying 
method used for each study. In Study 3, the PCA effectively clustered items which were 
answered in similar ways to each other, while separating them from other clusters of 
items. Thus, responses to items relating to training and experience may have been 
answered more similarly to each other than compared to how items on other 
components (such as management commitment) were answered. However, the 
qualitative and comparative methods used in Studies 1 and 2 may also have allowed 
for greater levels of discrimination between training and experience, even though these 
might be seen as related concepts. This reflects the importance of employing mixed 
methods in studies of safety culture and climate in developing a holistic perspective. 
 
Four of the six aviation comparison studies (Table 55) contained a factor related to 
training. Findings reported by Mearns et al. (2013) suggested that items related to 
reporting and learning were related in their study, being co-located on a single factor. 
Block et al. (2007) titled their component training effectiveness (containing items such 
as 'We receive an adequate amount of safety training' & 'I am adequately trained to 
conduct all of my job duties and responsibilities'). Training was also identified as an 
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important safety culture/climate component in studies of remote utility companies 
(Huang et al., 2013) and manufacturing/mining sectors (Griffin & Neal, 2000) whilst not 
in studies within the construction (Pousette, Larsson & Torner, 2008) or Norwegian 
healthcare (Olsen, 2008) sectors. However, it is plausible that items relating to training 
may have loaded onto other factors in these studies, however few of the publications 
detailed a full list of all items, thus limiting the degree to which comparison with the 
current findings could be undertaken. 
 
A focus on both training and experience has practical implications for the FAA in 
relation to how these may influence safe behaviour and skills of employees. Ensuring 
that employees are well trained has two impacts on safety; firstly, a lack of training has 
been shown to be related to increased numbers of errors, and thus can directly impact 
employee safety behaviour. Secondly, training is likely to lead to increased confidence 
and the ability to cope in high pressure or unusual circumstances (Lu & Shang, 2005) 
which is sometimes known as resilience (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007). Used to 
inform employees of risks in the workplace, a higher frequency of safety training has 
been positively associated with more favourable safety climate ratings (Lu & Shang, 
2005). However, experience may also impact on behaviour, either encouraging safe 
work practices or encouraging shortcutting when experience is seen as more important 
than rule following.  
Performance Pressure  
Performance pressure (essentially, time pressure arising from organisational goal 
fulfilment with linkages to sufficiency of resources) was identified as a discrete theme in 
Study 1. In Study 2, similar components were contained within two separate 
dimensions, priority of safety and human resources. Of these, human resources was 
ranked least evident of the dimensions, after priority of safety (Study 2), potentially 
indicating that these were seen by participants as requiring high prioritisation for 
improvement. Study 3 appeared to corroborate the salience of human resources as an 
influence on safety as items relating to this clustered on a single component containing 
four items.  Items reflecting other sources of pressure loaded variously onto the 
components of normative behaviour and management commitment & organisational 
learning (Study 3). It is postulated that this dispersion of aspects of pressure across 
these components may reflect where these sources of pressure may manifest. For 
example, some pressures come from colleagues and peer pressure (normative 
behaviour) whilst others are created by, or related to, management roles (management 




When considering studies from comparable industries (Table 56) both Griffin and Neal 
(2000) and Huang et al. (2013) identified equipment as a separate safety climate 
dimension.  Although a lack of equipment (resources) was identified as influencing 
safety in the current research (Study 1), questionnaire items relating to equipment were 
not retained in Study 3. It may be that shortages of equipment could be more integral to 
some naval aviation functions (such as engineers) than others; if so, this may have 
affected the importance which respondents attributed to the questionnaire items. In 
contrast, equipment effects on safety are likely to be particularly more salient to Griffin 
and Neal and Huang et al.’s sampled populations (manufacturing/mining and utility 
companies respectively).  
 
The pressure to remain operationally effective in the face of resource shortfalls could 
be said to create potential conflict between achieving operational objectives and 
occupational/employee safety objectives. While the safety and integrity of the aircraft 
presented as being of the highest priority amongst participants, the main concern was 
that FAA personnel might be confronted with conflicting demands to achieve time 
pressured end-states, but also work safely.  
 
Noted across a variety of industries (Christian et al., 2009; Mearns et al., 2004; Nordlof 
et al., 2015; Weyman & Clarke, 2003), where goal realisation is the principle criterion 
for the front line, it is foreseeable that safety policies and rules may get violated 
(Westrum & Adamski, 2009) with reduced attention to those that impede progress 
(Bosak et al., 2013). Conflict between safety and output can originate at both the 
organisational level (balancing expenditure and resources) and the individual level 
(short term cost-benefit of safe behaviours). Therefore, the importance of these 
findings to the FAA lay initially in identification of areas of pressure (such as a lack of 
resources) and then consideration of how these may influence employee safety 
behaviour.  Findings from Study 1 indicated that risks to the aircraft were seen as 
particularly unacceptable (potentially due to their role in operational capability) while 
personal safety was not cited as having such dominance. Furthermore, some risks 
(e.g. when conducting search and rescue to save a life) were seen as more acceptable 
than others (e.g. taking an unnecessary risk in a training environment was seen as less 
acceptable).  
 
Table 55 and Table 56 indicated that few of the comparison studies explicitly identified 
a similar component to human resources, with the exception being Olsen (2008). This 
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author reported a factor termed staffing (containing items such as 'We work in crisis 
mode trying to do too much, too quickly' & 'We have enough staff to handle the 
workload'). Olsen (2008) suggested that this factor was not common across all 
healthcare facilities which were surveyed, but was identified in those which had 
recently undergone cost cutting measures, and therefore were likely to be understaffed.  
Individual and Collective Responsibility  
Identified initially in Study 1, it was apparent that a key motivator amongst military naval 
aviators to work safely was an acceptance that all individuals within the FAA were 
responsible for safety. This presented as being driven by a strong sense of personal 
responsibility for one’s colleagues and as such was therefore interpreted as 
camaraderie. Work teams (of approximately six to ten individuals in many cases) were 
described as watching out for each other's personal safety, to make sure that they did 
not put aircraft and other personnel at risk.  The salience of this construct/dimension 
was corroborated in Study 2, where individual responsibility was consistently ranked 
most evident of the dimensions. Nevertheless, it was considered important to ensure 
that although FAA individuals felt responsible for safety, that this should not only apply 
to frontline personnel. The lack of senior management participants in the current 
research did not allow generalisation of findings to this group, therefore it is unclear 
whether this perceived importance of individual responsibility extended to senior 
management personnel. This was identified as an important consideration for future 
research. 
 
It seems reasonable to speculate that the high levels of perceived personal 
responsibility for safety may reflect the visible link between behaviour and 
consequence in the aviation context.  Aircrew were directly responsible for the safety of 
personnel on-board their flight, while engineers were responsible for the aircrew, and 
both have responsibility for the safety of the public. The consequences of poor safety 
are perhaps particularly obvious to these personnel. Similar findings of personal 
responsibility for safety were reported amongst professions such as fire-fighters (DeJoy 
et al., 2017) and paramedics (O'Hara et al., 2014).  
 
When items which related to aspects of individual responsibility were included in Study 
3 ('People I work with think safety is very important' and 'People here are only 
interested in safety aspects of their own jobs, not other people's'), these were removed 
due to displaying high skew values (Ferguson & Cox, 1993). It was noted that all items 
relating to individual responsibility were highly positively skewed, and on consideration 
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of the distribution of responses on these items, it was noted that there was very little 
variance in the data, i.e. there were very few people who rated these items negatively. 
Critical consideration of findings related to the influence of individual and collective 
responsibility over safety within this research may lead to concluding that this is a 
cultural variable, on which many of the personnel in the organisation agree.  Support 
for this lay in Study 1 findings, and the high levels of agreement in Study 2 regarding 
the saliency of individual responsibility for safety. The positively skewed questionnaire 
items reflecting individual responsibility also demonstrated high kurtosis in responses, 
indicating that there was a high level of agreement amongst respondents to these 
items on the questionnaire (Chapter 6), which may reflect a high 'shared' view on these 
items (i.e. most personnel answered these questions in the same way).  
 
However, it is also possible that the items and dimension of individual responsibility 
could be susceptible to social desirability bias. The group setting of the qualitative 
phase (Study 1) may have motivated personnel to express opinions that were in line 
with what would be expected of them by the organisation, rather than true perceptions. 
The external referent nature of the discussions and items (i.e. referring to the behaviour 
of others, rather than oneself) was used in an attempt to moderate this effect, but social 
desirability bias cannot be ruled out. However, the ranking responses (Study 2) and 
questionnaire responses (Study 3) were anonymous, and so the impact of social 
desirability is arguably less likely in these studies than in the focus groups (Study 1).   
 
On balance, findings from the wider safety culture/climate literature would support the 
conclusion that the concept of individual responsibility is likely to be an important 
influence on safety within the FAA. Similar themes have been described variously as 
personal involvement, individual responsibility or individual empowerment (Choudrey et 
al., 2007; Clarke, 2000; Farrington-Darby et al., 2005; Seo et al., 2004). In a military 
organisation such as the FAA this could reasonably be expected to motivate behaviour; 
indeed trust, comradeship, a sense of belonging (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Veestraeten 
et al., 2014) and citizenship behaviour (Case-Campbell & Martens, 2009) are held to 
characterise military teams. Furthermore, if naval aviation employees feel supported 
within the work environment (i.e. colleagues will help and 'back you up'), it is likely to 
have a positive effect on safety performance, as has been reported within healthcare 
populations (Turner et al., 2012). Parallels between military and healthcare contexts 
include situations where time critical demands may exist in opposition with safety (for 
example, search and rescue/humanitarian activities and emergency care respectively). 
Employees who have a high level of trust in each other (Kelly et al., 2015) and groups 
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with high cohesion (Luria, 2008) have been shown to demonstrate more positive safety 
climates and good safety compliance, as employees felt comfortable to share ideas, 
knowledge and support (Geller, 1994; Geller, Roberts & Gilmore, 1996; Yagil & Luria, 
2010).  
 
In the FAA personnel typically train, live and work together in relatively close proximity 
(either aboard ships or on dedicated airbases) and the high degree of social interaction 
which is likely to arise might arguably lead to higher levels of care for each other's 
wellbeing and safety (supported by findings reported by Burt et al., 2008). Equally, 
however, negative norming effects may also potentially occur. Personnel can learn bad 
habits from co-workers, they can conform to more risky work practices where these are 
norms and high group cohesiveness can over-ride an individuals' willingness to admit 
to errors or speak up against group norms (Falconer, 2006b). The implications for the 
FAA are that positive and negative safety behaviours may equally be likely to be shared 
and spread within the population, and once set in, these may be difficult to alter at an 
organisation level. Therefore, it might be important to encourage the positive aspects of 
camaraderie/cohesiveness while minimising the potential negative effects.  
Organisational Commitment  
A theme identified in Study 1 that has received little attention within the safety culture 
and climate literature was that of organisational commitment. FAA personnel were 
noted often to compare themselves favourably with other branches of the UK Armed 
Forces, and expressed a high number of comments relating to pride at belonging to the 
FAA.  Although the frequency with which this theme appeared within the focus group 
data suggested it to be one which was widespread (and therefore very likely to be a 
cultural feature) it was interpreted as relating to the broader reference of pride and 
belonging to the FAA, rather than necessarily limited to safety per se.  
While most of the comparative studies (within  Table 55 and Table 56) did not identify a 
similar component, Patankar (2003) in his study of civilian aviators reported pride in 
company while Block et al. (2007) reported finding organizational affiliation as a safety 
climate component. It is possible that, as this component is not strictly focussed on 
safety (but rather on a more general organisational concept), that safety focussed 
studies might be unlikely to identify it. The anecdotally strong military ethos, coupled 
with informal rivalry between the Defence aviation organisations (the FAA, the RAF and 
the Army Air Corps) may underpin the identification of this as a separate component in 
the current research.  
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While a single item within Study 3, intended to reflect the concept of organisational 
commitment (People here take pride in doing things safely), was initially found to load 
weakly onto the normative behaviour component (Study 3) it was not retained in the 
six-factor exploratory model. The item exhibited high positive skew characteristics 
(although it did not warrant immediate removal) which suggested that there was 
relatively little variation in employees’ responses (with positive views for most 
respondents). The implications of high levels of personnel commitment to the FAA is 
suggested to be two-fold. On a positive note, commitment is important in relation to 
improving employee engagement (Nahrgang et al., 2011), however this may also 
encourage peer pressure as employees attempt to 'fit in' to the organisation.  
Summary of Factors that Influence Safety and Risk Decision Making in Military Naval 
Aviation 
In summary, there were six main factors found to influence safety and risk decision 
making within the FAA. Each was interpretable with reference to published findings and 
the comparisons drawn in Table 55 and Table 56 would suggest that there are some 
commonalities between the safety culture and climate components/factors detailed in 
the current research, both across aviation studies and other high risk industries. 
However, the unique factors reported also give insight into particular issues which 
different populations may consider important to safety. 
8.1.2 Indicative Effects of Function and Rank on Perceptions of Safety Climate 
and Safety Culture 
In addition to determining key influences on safety and risk decision within the FAA, the 
research set out to explore the influence of the structural and socio-technical 
environment on ratings of safety climate. One school of thought, principally within 
foundation work in this area, held that culture and climate within organisations was 
homogenous (Hofstede, 1991; Schein, 1990) while others have posited that 
differentiation between groups, i.e. sub culture/climate differences within organisations 
is more realistic (Alvesson, 1985, 2002; Frost et al., 1991; Martin, 1992; Parker, 2000; 
Pidgeon, 1998). When considering safety climate Zohar (2014) argued that the 
structural features of the organisation were key to creating shared perceptions, and 
that these structural features might differ according to, for example, job role or position 
in the organisation. Thus, the current research sought to explore whether different 
cultures or climates might arise as different groups evolve and establish norms and 
ways of working in relation to risk in response to local proximal social arrangements 
arising from organisational structures. It was important that during development of a 
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safety climate tool for the FAA, that the scales could demonstrate their ability to 
discriminate between groups who differed in their views on safety climate. 
Qualitative Findings 
Given the exploratory nature of Study 1, no systematic attempt was made to test any 
hypotheses relating to differences in views on safety culture arising from function or 
rank. However, consideration was given to the distribution of the themes that were 
identified, detailed in Table 13 (Chapter 4). This distribution revealed three themes 
common to all twelve focus groups; policy & procedures, pressure and leadership & 
safety ownership. The themes of individual & collective responsibility and training & 
experience were only present in seven and six groups respectively. Interestingly, there 
were no themes which were unique to either the aircrew or engineering groups, or from 
those only containing junior personnel. When considering the content of each theme, 
there were few unique contrasts in the ways in which different groups of personnel 
discussed them, indicating fairly consistent views regarding most of the themes 
identified in Study 1. 
 
The one exception to this, which was tentatively held to indicate a cultural difference, 
related to a sub-theme of communication, that of 'just culture'. This concept was 
interpreted as referring to personnel being encouraged and supported to provide safety 
related information in a context where acceptable and unacceptable behaviour was 
made clear (in line with both Reason, 1998 and The Nimrod Review, Ministry of 
Defence, 2009). Findings showed that aircrew generally believed that the concept was 
well accepted and enacted within their function. However, doubts were raised about 
whether a just culture was enacted amongst the engineer function. It was of interest to 
note that these views were consistently expressed by aircrew participants during the 
focus groups, whereas perceptions voiced by engineers were more variable (Study 1). 
Some senior engineering personnel suggested that junior engineers were happy to 
report issues, while others acknowledged that this demographic was not as likely to 
report errors easily or with confidence. Interestingly, the groups of junior engineers 
(Study 1, groups 9-12) described, at length, barriers to reporting and how having (what 
they described as) good managers made them more likely to report errors. However, 
few junior personnel specifically openly raised concerns over the lack of adherence to 
the principles of a just culture by their management. 
 
If, indeed, there was a difference in the way aircrew and engineers dealt with the 
consequences of errors, this has the potential to have an impact on organisational 
239 
 
learning as there is a foreseeable potential for under-reporting of incidents or near 
misses. As Study 1 was exploratory, this insight was acknowledged to be preliminary, 
but some suggestions as to why these different views may exist is offered here for 
discussion.  
 
The first of these suggestions related to the ways in which work was undertaken by 
each function. Aircrew inherently worked as part of a crew, typically containing two or 
three team members who undertook flight duties together. Many of the aircrew tasks 
required checking and cross-checking by multiple crew members. During these checks, 
errors might be identified by any of the crew members, and it is in the interests of 
immediate safety that these are highlighted and addressed.  By comparison, a high 
proportion of the engineering tasks involved maintenance, these tasks were 
undertaken by one or two personnel and then checked and counter-signed by 
supervisors on completion. It is possible that there was less scope to check that every 
aspect of the procedures had been followed (as it is the end result, rather than the 
process that is verified), thus it may be more likely that maintenance errors may remain 
undetected.  
 
Furthermore, although engineering may be inherently procedural, diagnosing and fixing 
engineering issues may not always be possible by simply adhering to set procedures 
(e.g. fault finding), and so errors may be more 'hidden' in engineering activities. The 
presence of aircrew errors may be more immediately obvious and hazardous, whereas 
errors made by engineers may not be realised until some time has elapsed. It must be 
stated, however, that at no point during the research was it suggested that engineers 
may knowingly put colleagues in danger. In addition, there is a long tradition of 
teaching crew resource management (CRM) to aircrew (such a pilots and cabin crew in 
civilian organisations) which aims to improve communication and team work between 
pilots and crew. The use of CRM amongst engineers is less prevalent, although an 
equivalent to CRM for engineers, known as maintenance resource management does 
exist (Siddiqui, Iqbal & Manarvi, 2012). 
 
Alternatively, different views on just culture may have arisen as a product of the 
management structure of the different functions. The engineering function has a more 
traditional hierarchical structure, with a large range of ranks. In contrast, aircrew have a 
much 'flatter' hierarchical structure, and most of the cadre are of officer rank. Therefore, 
the hierarchical gradient between ranks is likely to be steeper within the engineering 
than aircrew functions. The flatter hierarchy gradient within the aircrew function may 
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arguably be conducive to aircrew feeling that they would be treated more fairly by those 
considered to be colleagues, than engineers might when being judged by their 
superiors. Further exploration and systematic identification of these potential 
differences, and the reasons underlying them, were identified as avenues for future 
research. Recommendations for ways in which this could be achieved are contained 
within Section 8.4.2. 
 
It should be noted that there are some limitations in the method used in Study 1 which 
caveat this potential sub-cultural difference. Firstly, the focus groups were split by 
function (aircrew and engineers) due to the way in which personnel were recruited and 
assumptions made about the benefits of open conversation if separated by naturally 
occurring boundaries. There was therefore no opportunity to engage with mixed groups 
of aircrew and engineers, which might have drawn out contrasts between the functions. 
There is, however, some supporting quantitative evidence from Study 4 that views on 
management commitment & organisational learning varied between aircrew and 
engineers; this scale contained items designed to tap perceptions of a just culture.  
 
Safety sub-cultures have previously been identified by Gill and Shergill (2004) who 
reported differences in perceptions between maintenance engineers and air traffic 
controllers regarding whether rules should be rigidly followed or be flexible. Similarly, 
Patankar (2003) reported differences between flight operations personnel and 
maintenance personnel on rating scales of pride in company, safety opinions and 
supervisor trust, which he suggested showed evidence of sub-cultural views. McDonald 
et al. (2000) reported evidence of a professional sub-culture amongst aircraft 
technicians in which similar views within the aircraft technician function were reported 
across different companies. In contrast, only a minority of authors have argued that 
aviation culture is likely to be purely homogenous (Hopkins, 2010).   
 
If the current research was conducted on aircrew and engineers from another 
comparable military aviation organisation (such as the RAF) and similar findings were 
reported, this may then be taken as evidence to support a professional subculture (as 
shown by Rollenhagen et al., 2013 in nuclear power plants). No qualitative studies on 
safety culture within aviation could be identified in Chapter 2, and this therefore 
represents an area which requires more attention in future.  
 
The relatively homogenous nature of the views on safety gathered during the focus 
groups may have arisen from the similarity of flight safety specific training given to all 
241 
 
personnel and the almost universal acknowledgement of the high hazard nature of 
military aviation within the FAA. In addition, while safety culture was the specific focus 
of this research, this was situated within a wider military culture which could reasonably 
be expected to have a strong influence on the individual's world views. However, 
methodologically, the quantitative phases of the research (Studies 3 and 4) were more 
suited toward systematically exploring potential differences in views than was the 
qualitative research phase; the quantitative studies set out to characterise safety 
climate, and explore differences in demographic profiles, and thus were more 
amenable to looking at differences between groups.   
Quantitative findings 
An a prior hypothesis for Study 4 was that differences on the safety climate scales 
might be found in relation to two demographic profiles; function (aircrew/engineers) and 
rank (junior/senior). These hypotheses were based on findings from Study 2 and a 
number of published studies in the area (Dixon, 2012; Falconer, 2006a; Gill & Shergill, 
2004; Patankar, 2003). Figure 7Figure graphically shows mean normalised ratings for 
each of the proto-sales on the safety climate tool developed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Results are shown for both junior and senior engineers and aircrew, with the presence 
of significant differences indicated. It should be noted that the purpose behind this was 
to determine whether the scales had the capacity to discriminate between different 
groups, and thus the set of contrasts explored in this research was indicative rather 
than exhaustive. 
 
Aircrew safety climate ratings were more positive than ratings for engineering 
personnel across all five safety climate dimensions (Figure 7) while the differences 
between senior and junior personnel (when separated by function) showed less 
definitive results. This was interpreted not as reflecting fundamentally different 
perspectives on safety i.e. safety culture, but rather perhaps indicating that different 
shared experiences might affect perceptions of safety climate. Some possible reasons 





Figure 7. Normalised results (to allow comparison between sub-scales, ratings are 
expressed here as a percentage of total summated rating) for safety climate scales by 
function (aircrew and engineers) and rank (junior and senior), showing significant (sig) 
and non-significant (n/s) differences (p<0.05).  
Differences by Function: Aircrew and Engineers 
Figure 7 showed that there were significant differences between aircrew and engineers 
on all five of the proto-scales, with aircrew scoring more positively (p< 0.05) than 
engineers in all cases.  This would suggest that aircrew considered their management 
to be more receptive to safety concerns, more supportive of genuine errors and more 
likely to recognise good safety behaviour than engineers might consider their 
management to be. Engineers, in contrast, perceived more short-cut taking and 
increased distraction, as well as less positive views of reporting than aircrew. However, 
it is important to note that mean ratings across all proto-scales were generally positive; 
although engineer's ratings of safety climate were significantly lower than those of 

























































The organisational structure of these two functional groups may be relevant to 
interpreting the findings from the research reported here.  Aircrew tend to form a higher 
proportion of senior management than do engineering personnel, with a greater 
proportion of senior and junior officers amongst aircrew. In contrast, there are a high 
proportion of junior rating engineers on each squadron, relative to senior rating 
engineers or engineering officers. Other researchers have noted that senior staff may 
provide responses that are self-serving (Biggs et al., 2013; Grote & Kunzler, 2000), and 
perhaps for this reason often display the most positive safety climate responses when 
compared with junior staff (Alhemood et al., 2004; Fung et al., 2005; Harvey et al., 
2002; Prussia et al., 2004).  
The potential implications of these findings to the FAA are two-fold. Firstly, if junior 
employees consistently have less positive perceptions of the safety climate, it is 
important to consider reasons why this might be the case. It could be that these 
personnel are at the most risk of experiencing the tension between safety and 
operational demands; if so this may be the demographic most likely to take short cuts 
or compromise safety in the presence of competing demands. The second implication 
is a methodological one; if the FAA continues to survey its personnel for views on 
safety climate, it is important to ensure a stratified sample that would encompass both 
senior and junior personnel, aircrew and engineers, to gain a balanced view of the 
state of safety climate within the FAA. 
The nature of the work undertaken by the different functional groups is also likely to be 
relevant when interpreting the research findings.  While it is true that both aircrew and 
engineers work to an array of standard operating procedures, pressure from different 
sources may affect their ability to comply with these procedures. Study 1 (Chapter 4) 
suggested that engineers, specifically, got frustrated with not being able to access the 
correct spares or tools to undertake tasks, which in turn may have led to 'work-arounds' 
or short cuts being taken to allow the work to continue. It is considered possible that 
there was less flexibility for aircrew to be able to deviate from normal procedures, or 
indeed take a short cut in their work.  
The presence of differences across professional boundaries were consistent with 
findings in the wider aviation literature (Dixon, 2012; Gill & Shergill, 2004; Patankar, 
2003). However, the direction of these differences varied; the current findings were 
consistent with Dixon's (2012) RAF sample (where aircrew had more positive 
perceptions of safety climate than did engineers), while both Gill and Shergill (2004) 
and Patankar (2003), reported more positive views amongst maintenance engineers 
than flight crew in civilian populations. Gao et al. (2015) observed a number of 
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differences between aviation employees in various functions (pilots, cabin crew, 
engineers, ground operators) in relation to dissatisfaction with a lack of feedback from 
safety reports. These authors suggested that sub-climates might be attributed to the 
distinctive natures of the occupations, different management and policies. Falconer 
(2006a), reported that ADF pilots considered deviations to procedures to be more 
unsafe than did ADF engineers.  
Differences by Rank: Junior and Senior Personnel 
A comparison of safety climate ratings by rank of employee using a combined aircrew 
and engineer sample was precluded due to the previously discussed differences 
between aircrew and engineer functions which would likely confound any exploration of 
ranks between these groups. Furthermore, the large difference in sample size (259 
junior engineers and only 96 senior aircrew) between these groups precluded direct 
comparison. Therefore, comparisons of rank were only made between junior and 
senior personnel, within each of the functions. As Figure 7 showed, the differences by 
rank were not as straightforward as those observed by function. In general, however, 
where differences were found, they tended to reveal senior personnel having more 
positive perceptions than junior personnel. This was the case for management and 
organisational learning (aircrew only) and process/bureaucracy (engineers only).  
 
However, differences between junior and senior ranks of both aircrew and engineers 
would suggest that perceptions of reporting may be particularly prone to differ by rank. 
Arguably, senior personnel might be more likely to be those investigating or dealing 
with incidents, while junior personnel were perhaps the least likely to have anything to 
do with this, unless they were being investigated. This had potential implications for the 
FAA, as many of the junior personnel were likely to be on the front-line/shop floor 
where the detection and rectification of errors may be particularly important to ensuring 
safety. A difference between what senior personnel believe to be happening regarding 
reporting (i.e. people do report) and reality (i.e. junior personnel know it is important but 
are not willing to report) might lead to a false sense of security on the part of more 
senior personnel if reporting rates are low.  
  
However, a key finding that did not fit the pattern of more positive responses amongst 
senior personnel was observed on the training/experience sub-scale. Here, senior 
engineers showed the least positive ratings of all groups. This may suggest that these 
senior engineers had greater reservations about the levels of training and experience 
amongst colleagues than did other demographics. This might either reflect a greater 
degree of insight into training/experience shortfalls at more senior engineering 
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management levels, or an actual shortfall in trained or experienced personnel. This 
could highlight an important area for the FAA to consider for further investigation, as 
this may need to inform recruitment and training for this cadre.  
 
The findings of Studies 2 and 4 corroborated with each other, with a higher level of 
agreement observed within sub-populations (separate groups of aircrew and 
engineers) than within a mixed function group. However, it was notable that this did not 
seem to be the case for the sample of junior engineers in either study; this group 
showed particularly low levels of agreement when compared to either senior engineers 
or aircrew. Speculatively, it seems possible that this lack of agreement amongst junior 
engineers might reflect a lack of shared time together to create a common view on 
safety. Alternatively, given the suggested importance of supervisors on safety 
behaviour, this might reflect the influence of different supervisors on junior engineers, 
thus creating divergent views on what the safety climate was perceived to be in various 
units.  
 
Numerous studies have shown that people of different rank/grade (Adamshick, 2007; 
Desai et al., 2006; Dixon, 2012; Falconer, 2006a) or management level (Alhemood et 
al., 2004; Harvey et al., 2002; Fung et al., 2005; Pidgeon, 1998; Prussia et al., 2004) 
varied in their ratings of safety climate. Often a high proportion of the items within 
safety climate tools relate to aspects of management responsibility, thus this could 
indicate self-serving/attribution bias on the part of senior personnel/management (as 
was evidenced by Grote & Kunzler, 2000).  Alternatively, these differences could reflect 
differences in conceptualisations of safety at a variety of ranks/grades (Clarke, 1999) or 
alternatively reflect a greater insight into the range of safety initiatives throughout the 
organisation at more senior levels.   
Summary 
In summary, findings from this research indicated modest evidence of sub-cultural 
differences. In contrast, ratings of safety climate were shown to vary by both function 
and rank. Thus, structural and socio-technical aspects of the work environment may 
have affected how military aviation personnel experienced safety on a day-to-day-
basis. However, there was limited evidence to suggest that this necessarily extended 
as far as reflecting different underpinning beliefs about safety between groups. The 
importance of the insight gained through this research lay in a better understanding of 
the impact of context on views on safety, and potentially therefore safety behaviour, of 
employees. These implications were, however, limited by the fact that there was no 
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subsequent qualitative phase after Study 4; this might have enhanced the findings 
further by allowing the researcher to investigate in depth potential reasons behind 
these observed differences in safety climate perceptions. This would have 
strengthened the findings, and was captured as a recommendation for future research 
detailed in Section 8.4.2. 
8.2 Practical Contributions to Knowledge and Practice 
While Section 8.1 addressed the first research aim of this thesis, the following section 
detailed how the findings from the four empirical studies contributed to the second aim; 
an increased understanding of factors that may influence organisational learning 
through identification and application of leading indicators to identify priorities for 
improvement. The following discussion detailed how the findings from this applied 
research made practical contributions to knowledge and practice, particularly in relation 
to considerations for the FAA for practical measures for improvement. 
8.2.1  Policy and Procedures 
Taken collectively, the results of this research indicated that military naval aviation 
employees understood and accepted their own role in safety, including the importance 
of complying with policy/procedures and error/incident reporting. However, barriers to 
compliance were also identified in Study 1, some of which were then corroborated 
through Study 3, and these barriers were interpreted as representing practical areas 
that require addressing. One of these barriers included claims of a large volume of 
disparate policy and procedures that were constantly changing, inconsistent or 
inadequate; raising questions of practicability and workability. Study 3 identified 
process/bureaucracy as a safety climate component in its own right. This component 
displayed the lowest (most negative) safety climate ratings in Study 4, which might 
have suggested that while perceptions of the safety climate tended toward being 
positive, there were concerns with the perceived bureaucracy behind reporting and 
process/procedures. 
 
Given that most tasks within the FAA were, to a greater or lesser degree, defined 
through policy and procedures, the safety system must inherently assume that these 
are being adhered to. Organisational barriers (e.g. poor procedures, poor 
responsiveness to required changes) appeared influential on whether these 
assumptions in the studies were enacted in employee behaviour. All the barriers 
identified by personnel have potential negative effects on safety behaviour, as they can 
result in the adoption of norms or informal ways of working due to the difficulties and 
penalties (whether actual or perceived) associated with compliance. Thus, it was 
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important for the FAA to be aware of these barriers, in order to hope to address them. 
By as far as practicable removing barriers/disincentives to compliance, the FAA may in 
turn reduce the burden of effort on frontline personnel, therefore making safe choices 
the easy, efficient and productive choice (Battmann & Klumb, 1993).   
 
Suggested practical measures that the FAA could take to address some of the 
identified barriers included (i) a review of policy/procedures to consolidate disparate 
information and (ii) better signposting to relevant policy and procedures, both of which 
could assist employees with identification of those pertinent to their activities. Ensuring 
that procedures can be performed as documented and within the prescribed timescales 
could better be achieved through engaging the experience of frontline individuals 
(Drury & Johnson, 2013; Hale & Borys, 2013; Lamvik et al., 2009) rather than relying 
on policy/procedure architects who have little recent experience of frontline activities. 
The importance of these findings for the FAA lay in ensuring that adequate procedures 
are in place to guide work, but balancing this with the importance of ensuring additional 
procedures are not the default action to tackle issues that might more appropriately be 
addressed through other means (such as organisational or structural issues). 
8.2.2 Performance Pressure 
Through the empirical studies a number of sources of performance pressure were 
identified which presented as having the potential to negatively influence safety 
behaviour and risk taking. The practical contributions of this to the FAA lay in the 
identification of key aspects of the organisational context which may influence safety 
behaviour, a relationship which has been shown to exist in other sectors (McLain & 
Jarrell, 2007). A trade-off between operational objectives and safety objectives is widely 
acknowledged within the safety culture/climate literature (Christian et al., 2009; Mearns 
et al., 2004; Nordlof et al., 2015; Weyman & Clarke, 2003). 
 
Study 1 identified pressure as key to influencing safety; here personnel identified 
discrepancies in the balance between resources (human, time and equipment) and 
expected output. Safety requires a significant reliance on resources and insights from 
goal conflict research has suggested that this kind of incompatibility was likely to lead 
to workers prioritising some goals at the expense of others (McLain & Jarrell, 2007). 
Findings from Study 2 indicated that personnel had concerns with the priority afforded 
to safety, and there was strong agreement that a lack of human resources was 




Study 3 partially supported these findings, with human resources being identified as an 
important component, however this was then not retained in the final safety climate 
model (Study 4). As pressure has been cited as leading workers to take shortcuts 
(Mitropoulos & Cupido, 2009; O'Dea et al., 2010), it suggested to be important that the 
FAA further investigate these perceptions of resource pressures in order to identify 
what impacts this might have on employee safety behaviour. By identifying specific 
resource shortfalls, or adjusting output accordingly, it is proposed that this may go 
some way to supporting, rather than dis-incentivising, safe behaviour. Furthermore, 
further research is required to determine possible reasons for, and implications of, a 
lack of personnel resource, as this would help to guide prioritisation and target 
improvements (see Section 8.4.2 for further details on proposed ways in which this 
could be achieved).  
8.2.3 Influence of Leadership and Peer/Colleagues on Safety 
Both leadership and normative behaviours (i.e. informal behaviours observed in others) 
appeared to be strong influencing factors on safety and risk taking within this 
population, accounting for equal amounts of explained variance within the quantitative 
principle component model (derived in Study 3). From a practical perspective, this 
might suggest that a dual focus is required. Firstly, the importance of ensuring high 
quality relationships between supervisors and employees appeared to be key, with 
Study 1 demonstrating how safety behaviours (both positive and negative) can be 
passed down from more to less experienced individuals. However, high levels of 
camaraderie potentially meant that conforming with group behaviours might also be 
integral to maintaining the high cohesion that was indicative of this military population 
(Study 1). Thus, assuring means by which to enhance coherence between the formal 
and informal aspects of work should be considered as an important practical aspect for 
the FAA to address. This might indicate that the role played by managers in setting 
organisational priorities should be carefully considered. If managers are explicitly or 
implicitly influencing frontline individuals to work less safely in the face of resource 
constraints, this may not necessarily reflect the overall priority of safety as directed by 
senior management. 
8.2.4 Development of Safety Climate Measures for Use by the FAA 
Practical contributions arising from this research were the foundation work for the 
development of a bespoke FAA safety climate measure (Studies 3 and 4), and 
exploration of ranking methods as a means of gaining employee perspectives on 
priorities for safety improvement (Study 2). With regard to the safety climate tool, 
further development is required (detailed in Section 8.4.2), however it showed 
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encouraging psychometric robustness, and allowed production of different 
demographic profiles, indicating that the scales possessed the capacity to discriminate 
between different groups with the potential to hold different views on safety climate. 
Study 2 showed that three ranking methods could be used to consistently indicate 
safety priorities as ranked by frontline personnel. In particular, findings from the method 
of paired comparisons allowed a nuanced exploration of stand out dimensions of safety 
that could be used to guide allocation of FAA resources toward safety improvements. 
 
Chapter 2 identified several criticisms of three existing safety climate measures used 
by military organisations. Firstly, a lack of psychometric development (in the case of the 
measure utilised in the ADF) and secondly the instability of factor structure of the CSAS 
and MCAS and lack of replication of the original proposed factors.  All three of these 
measures were developed in a top-down manner, with components being specified in 
an a priori fashion, yet none of the hypothesised factor structures were statistically 
supported. The safety climate measure developed in the current study is held to 
represent an advance over existing military safety climate measures through adopting 
an exploratory, bottom up approach to measure development (Study 1), producing a 
measure which showed acceptable psychometric properties, using both exploratory 
and confirmatory statistical techniques (Studies 3 and 4).  
 
The findings from Study 4 gave an indication of how the safety climate measure might 
be used to highlight weaknesses in safety policy and practices within the FAA and 
direct where further investigation into the requirements for improvements could be 
targeted (in line with practices recommended by Huang et al., 2013 & Kines et al., 
2011). However, this measure should not be used in isolation, but should be followed 
by a further data gathering phase which could focus on investigating the weaknesses 
highlighted by the safety climate measure. This could be combined with the use of a 
ranking procedure (such as explored in Study 2) and further through conducting focus 
groups or workshops (as used by Mearns et al., 2013) to generate rich qualitative data 
to complement the quantitative findings from the safety climate measure and discover 
reasons underlying the quantitative results.  
Summary 
It must be noted that to address all the concerns detailed above, considerable resource 
would be required and therefore prioritisation will likely depend strongly on the costs 
associated with these issues. For example, although human resources (personnel) was 
shown to be a shared concern (a common thread in Studies 2 and 3) for employees, 
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the organisation may find addressing issues of communication of safety priority or 
competency/experience (identified in Study 2) more manageable and therefore choose 
to allocate resources to these areas.  
 
Each of the empirical studies highlighted potential areas of concern that could be 
addressed by the organisation. As the research did not include outcome measures, it 
has not been shown that amelioration of these concerns would necessarily lead to 
improvements in safety performance. However, the wider body of literature has shown 
a relationship between employee safety behaviours (safety participation, compliance 
and motivation) and safety climate (Christian et al., 2009; Clarke, 2006; Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004; Johnson, 2007; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Thus, it would appear reasonable 
to assume that improvements to the factors that influence safety and risk decision 
making (Studies 1 & 2) and aspects of safety climate (Studies 3 & 4) would be likely to 
support positive employee safety behaviour. The findings from this research should 
also be interpreted considering other organisational safety metrics already in existence, 
such as accidents and incidents and safety audit findings; measures of safety climate 
can only ever provide one view, and should be interpreted carefully. However, the 
importance of this is that it allows the organisation to gather employee views which 
may otherwise not be captured through existing safety performance metrics.  
 
8.3 Theoretical Contributions to Knowledge and Practice 
8.3.1 Safety Culture and Climate 
Given the maturity of work in the area of safety culture and climate, discovery of new 
constructs was considered improbable, however there was still considerable scope to 
enhance understanding and practice in relation to safety culture and climate in the 
military naval aviation context, including how the identified constructs manifested and 
played out in a given context such as the FAA. The research reported here used a mix 
of methods to provide insight into constructs which were relevant to this population and 
context, to consider why this might have been, and how they might have manifested in 
the workplace. While reflecting alignment with more recent civilian studies, this 
approach has not previously been used within a military aviation context.  
 
This approach aimed to address a number of previously cited limitations of safety 
culture/climate studies, that in employing top-down approaches to determining salient 
safety culture/climate dimensions/constructs were at risk of producing item batteries 
essentially based on the best guesses of researchers (Cox & Flin, 1998; Weyman et 
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al., 2006), thus embodying the potential to ignore/overlook/underplay important 
contextual dependent variables (Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2011). By allowing employee 
experiences to guide insight into the most salient influences on safety, the research 
aimed to combat concerns expressed by Guldenmund (2010a) that limiting the scope 
of inquiry to only common or core themes may result in the bounded, circular rationality 
that the components of safety climate/culture are measured as merely what 
researchers imagine them to be. 
 
The research sought to characterise core influences on workplace safety culture, which 
was achieved through Study 1, and developed into a safety climate measure in Studies 
3 and 4. Study 1 corroborated findings from the literature in identifying a set of themes 
that were interpretable in light of published findings, but with a structure and relative 
salience which was considered specific to this study, when compared to other factor 
structures derived from studies within civilian aviation and other high risk industries.  
 
The assertion that culture could be accessed through using climate surveys is partially 
supported by the current findings, as in several cases the themes and components 
identified in qualitative and quantitative studies showed compatibility across both. 
However, the ways in which these latent concepts may fit together often did not. Even 
after a more grounded approach to developing a safety climate questionnaire, this 
research raised further questions about the relationship of cultural variables (those 
which are shared across people) and the psychometric development of safety climate 
questionnaires whose statistical assumptions may preclude items on which there is 
general agreement. These were outlined further in the following section.  
8.3.2 Reflections on Method 
Several of the inconsistencies observed through the findings of the empirical studies 
may be related to the methods used for each. Two of these related to findings of 
human resources and individual/collective responsibility, which merit particular 
discussion. These dimensions/components were identified in the qualitative phase 
(Study 1); a lack of human resources was grouped along with other factors which 
related to pressures placed on personnel, while individual responsibility (i.e. ensuring 
safe behaviours because people were responsible for their own and their colleague's 
safety) was identified as a separate theme.  
 
In Study 3 the issue of pressure caused by a lack of human resources loaded onto a 
separate factor as part of the PCA, however this was removed from the final model 
(Study 4) in order to improve the model fit. In contrast, this pressure was included in 
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Study 2 where human resources ('There are enough people to do the job safely') was 
consistently ranked that 'least like' what was observed in the workplace. This may 
indicate that this component had high salience for study personnel, and that removing it 
during the CFA may mean that an aspect which was particularly important is removed. 
There may be, therefore, conflicts between the assumptions for PCA and CFA and the 
concept of shared employee views on safety.  
 
Similarly, individual/collective responsibility was identified as a theme in Study 1, 
however items related to individual responsibility (e.g. 'People I work with think safety is 
very important', 'People here are clear about what their responsibilities for safety are', 
'People here fully understand the risks associated with the work that they are 
responsible for') were all removed at an early stage from the PCA due to excessively 
(positively) skewed data. This may suggest two possibilities; the first is that military 
aviation personnel agreed that these items were so reflective of their organisation that 
there were few who would disagree. Alternatively, these items could be strongly 
affected by social desirability bias due to the high profile of safety across the aviation 
sector.  
 
Further support for this discussion was drawn from Study 2, where the safety 
dimension individual responsibility ('Everyone accepts that flight safety is their 
responsibility') was consistently ranked to be 'most like' the situation in a unit. The 
method of paired comparisons showed this to be a stand out item, which indicated high 
agreement between personnel. However, the assumptions of factor analytic techniques 
(such as PCA and CFA) required a certain degree of variability in the data, so removal 
of highly skewed data is a pre-requisite (Field, 2005). However, the question then arose 
that by doing this whether the process was simply removing the items which were the 
most reflective of 'cultural' components because they were items on which most people 
agree. 
 
A similar question had previously been raised by Guldenmund (2007) who suggested 
that quantitative safety climate/culture research was caught between the theoretical 
demands of statistics and the theoretical requirements of culture, however this author 
offered no further thoughts on this challenge. Wider consideration of published 
literature showed that the use of self-report questionnaires to solicit the perceptions of 
an external environmental variable, such as climate has been criticised as it requires 
people to engage in higher order cognitive processes which involve weighting, 
inference, interpretation and prediction (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). However, these 
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measures are often not verifiable by other means, and questionnaires remain as the 
predominant way in which researchers access abstract concepts such as safety culture 
or climate (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). Through use of mixed methods, the 
current research has sought to address some of these methodological limitations 
through using insights from different methods to complement the limitations of others. 
 
8.4 Strengths, Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research  
8.4.1 Strengths and Limitations  
This thesis has contributed to the body of safety culture and climate knowledge by 
addressing a number of gaps in the literature, and adopted an applied research 
approach in order to provide practical contributions to the improvement of safety within 
the FAA. Unlike previous safety culture/climate research in military contexts (such as 
the US Navy and the Australian Defence Force), the current research was driven 
initially by respondent experiences, rather than purely by theory or assumptions made 
by the researcher regarding elements of importance. This aligned this research, 
conducted in a military context, with contemporary thinking and applied methods used 
in civilian studies. 
 
The research adopted a mixed method, participatory approach to characterising safety 
culture and climate within a UK military naval aviation context. This allowed for 
triangulation and building up of a more comprehensive view than would be obtained 
using methods from a single approach. The qualitative phase (Study 1) afforded in-
depth contextual insights, which were then generalised to a wider population using 
quantitative means (Studies 3 and 4). In addition, the insights from the qualitative study 
allowed greater interpretation of the quantitative results than would have been possible 
otherwise. The mixed methods approach also allowed the thesis to reflect on the 
similarities and differences in findings from each study, in light of the strengths and 
limitations of each. 
 
The use of both exploratory (PCA) and confirmatory (CFA) techniques in initial safety 
climate scale development (Studies 3 and 4) increased confidence in the findings 
beyond that which would have been afforded through exploratory techniques alone. 
Good internal reliability for each of the five safety climate proto-scales (Cronbach alpha 
>0.70) and demonstration of the capacity of each to detect demographic differences 
went some way toward demonstrating the reliability and discriminant properties of the 
scales, both of which were positive with regard to future scale development. The 
254 
 
relatively large sample of participants (equating to approximately 10% of the target 
population in the case of the quantitative phases) which represented a mix of functions 
and ranks in Studies 1, 3 and 4 was held to add credence to the findings of this 
research. 
 
This research was requested and supported by the study organisation, and a 
participatory approach involving frontline individuals and flight safety subject matter 
experts at various stages to inform the research was seen as a core strength. This was 
an approach advocated by Guldenmund (2010b), who argued that safety culture 
inquiry should be carried out in close participation with the organisation to improve the 
quality of the inquiry. 
 
Through using insights from risk ranking research, the exploratory nature of Study 2 
provided support for the use of complementary methods to safety climate 
questionnaires to assist the organisation with eliciting personnel views on priorities for 
improvement. This widened the potential range of tools available to the FAA for gaining 
insight into influences on personnel safety although the requirement for further 
development of these is acknowledged. 
 
Despite these strengths, the research could be criticised on a number of points. Firstly, 
both the qualitative and qualitative participant samples were drawn predominately from 
groups of frontline and middle management personnel. It would have been useful to 
include interviews with more senior managers who may have had offered different 
perspectives, however the practical difficulty with which to access these individuals for 
any significant amount of time precluded this. 
 
Secondly, the group approach to qualitative data collection (Study 1), while justified in 
Chapter 3, may have inhibited some responses by employees, and elicited socially 
desirable responses, an aspect which is well acknowledged in safety research 
(Conchie et al., 2013). An ethnographic approach to considering influences on safety 
culture may have provided more in-depth insight than was afforded by the focus group 
discussion (Study 1), however the opportunity for this was limited given the operating 
environment, and non-military status of the researcher.  
 
The use of self-reported safety climate measures has been criticised for being 
subjective and greater insight and triangulation of findings may have been gained 
through analysis of, for example, procedural documents and/or other safety 
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communications in addition to the existing empirical approaches detailed in this thesis. 
However, the security restrictions which are imposed on this material meant that 
access to these data were limited for the purpose of conducting a higher research 
degree.  
 
Study 2 was limited by relatively small sample sizes which made consideration of 
differences between demographic groups to being exploratory. Furthermore, Study 2 
did not include a measure to indicate the relative importance of each of the safety 
culture/climate dimensions to participants. Therefore, there was an assumption made 
that all the nine dimensions were important to some degree, however further work 
would be required to corroborate this assumption.  The assumption that aspects ranked 
as ‘least like my current unit’ might indicate priorities for improvement may be criticised. 
Whilst the published literature (Chapter 2) and Study 1 indicated that the dimensions 
contained within Study 2 might all have been important in workplaces which valued 
safety, it was considered important to challenge this assumption in future studies 
utilising comparative approaches.  
 
With regard to the factor analytic studies, the sample for the CFA (Study 4) was not 
recruited in the same way as that for the exploratory PCA (Study 3) due to prevailing 
logistic considerations associated with access to personnel. This was partly due to 
changes in military personnel contacts with whom the researcher negotiated access to 
potential participants during the duration of the research (personnel in the RN tend to 
change jobs/roles every 24 months). This was also partly due to logistical limitations 
placed on the researcher due to travel/budgetary restraints set by the sponsor 
organisation (the RN) over the course of the research, which precluded the researcher 
personally facilitating data collection for Study 4. Furthermore, although the samples 
were compared by demographic variables, not all participants provided these details, 
so the possibility exists that there were some systematic differences between the two 
samples. Attempts were made to ensure the method of delivery was similar (i.e. paper 
questionnaires) and participants in all empirical studies were given time during the 
working day to participate.  
 
The scales developed in Study 4 should only be considered proto-scales as they 
require further internal and external validation, such as test-retest reliability and 
criterion/outcome validity. The sample size for Studies 3 and 4, while being large, were 
not sufficient to allow consideration of the development of demographic-specific safety 
climate scales (e.g. separate scales for aircrew and scales for engineers), thus for 
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scale development these groups were treated homogenously, which could be criticised 
in light of the demographic differences in safety climate perceptions noted in Study 4.  
 
The generalisability of the findings detailed in this thesis may be limited to a UK military 
naval aviation population as this was the sector with which the research was 
conducted. It is unclear how these findings may compare to other UK or non-UK 
military aviation organisations and although many aspects of safety culture/climate 
identified here do seem to overlap with civilian research, the way in which they are 
operationalised may be limited to the current context.  
8.4.2 Future Research Priorities  
The research reported here was conducted within the scope and limitations of a 
doctoral research program, and was shaped by the expectations and requirements of 
the sponsor organisation. In light of questions raised by the findings of the empirical 
studies, as well as the strengths and limitations of the research discussed above, 
several areas are suggested for researchers to extend upon in future research. 
 
Findings from Study 1 indicated a potential cultural difference in the way that personnel 
from different military naval aviation functions (namely aircrew and engineers) 
perceived the acceptability of reporting errors/ management support/fair treatment of 
people who inadvertently made errors (just culture). Potential reasons for this were 
postulated by the researcher and included: differences in the formal management 
structure of each function, the predominance of aircrew as senior officers on units and 
the ways of working of each function. Systematic exploration of these potential 
differences was identified as an area for further research. As there were no mixed 
function groups included in Study 1, future research could look to replicate the study, 
but include mixed function groups (containing participants from both aircrew and 
engineering functions). If this approach were to be taken, difficulties regarding the 
differences in rank (aircrew tend to be of higher rank than most maintenance 
engineers) affecting potential responses would need to be considered and managed. 
Alternatively, undertaking a series of semi-structured interviews (as compared to focus 
groups) with aircrew and engineering personnel might be appropriate for exploring 
cultural differences as it might reduce potential peer pressure affecting responses.  
 
Study 2 acknowledged that the choice of discriminant criterion against which personnel 
ranked different aspects of safety standards in their workplace was likely to have an 
impact on the rank order of these different aspects. In the case of Study 2 the chosen 
discriminant criterion was whether the items were ‘most like’ or ‘least like’ the 
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respondents’ units. However, this assumed that respondents might consider each of 
the items to be as important as each other. To test this assumption, future research 
could look to repeat Study 2, but ask respondents to rank the items against the criterion 
of ‘most to least important to positively influence safe behaviour in your unit’. This might 
provide further insight into those aspects of safety standards in their workplace that are 
seen to be most important in encouraging safe work practices. A further suggested 
alternative criterion might be 'most to least in need of prioritisation to improve safety'.  
 
A second limitation of Study 2 which might be addressed through future research was 
the lack of senior management participants within the sample. It would be of interest to 
compare and contrast the rankings of senior management personnel with those of 
frontline and middle management personnel. This could be undertaken by repeating 
Study 2, but purposively sampling personnel in senior ranks. A further limitation of 
Study 2 that might be addressed through further research would be the modest sample 
size (37 participants). Similar findings from a larger sample, potentially utilising only 
one of the three ranking techniques, would inform whether the findings from Study 2 
would be considered generalisable to a wider military naval aviation population in 
relation to safety priorities.  
 
While the most negatively ranked items in Study 2 (human resources, priority of safety 
and competency/experience) were interpreted as those requiring the highest 
prioritisation for improvement, future research is required to develop a more in-depth 
understanding of why these items might be the most negatively ranked, and whether 
military naval aviation personnel do, in fact, consider these to be priorities that require 
addressing to lead to safety improvements. This could be achieved through a 
qualitative study to explore the rationale behind personnel's ranking of the different 
safety dimensions contained within Study 2.  
 
Exploration of safety climate profiles across an array of demographics in Study 4 
revealed significant differences in ratings by both function and rank. Aircrew ratings 
tended to be more positive (i.e. reflecting more positive views of safety climate) than 
were ratings by engineers. When considered by rank, the general trend was more 
positive perceptions of safety climate amongst senior personnel, when compared to 
junior personnel's perceptions.  However, an interesting anomaly was that senior 
engineers showed significantly less positive views on training & experience than did 
junior engineers. Potential reasons for this were judged to include management 
structure and ways of working, as well as the potential for self-serving responses 
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provided by more senior personnel. However, these differences would be best explored 
systematically in future research through a further phase of qualitative inquiry to 
explore reasons behind the differences observed in the quantitative findings.  
 
Although the safety climate measurement tool developed in Studies 3 and 4 showed 
good reliability in terms of the internal consistency of the scales, further research is 
needed to demonstrate its stability over time (test-retest reliability). This would require 
the safety climate measure (shown in Table 49) to be administered to the same group 
of participants at two timepoints, preferably over a week apart (Oppenheim, 2000). 
Furthermore, future work is required to consider the criterion-related validity of the 
safety climate tool. This would require different approaches to address different 
criterion-related validity types: 
 
• Predictive validation would entail validating the safety climate tool against 
organisational safety outcomes, although this is acknowledged to be challenging in 
applied settings (Guldenmund, 2007, 2010a). However, options for achieving this 
include collecting self-reported accident/incident data (in line with Huang et al., 2013), 
recorded occupational accidents (such as completed by Zohar, 2000), safety behaviour 
(in line with Clarke, 2006; Griffin & Neal, 2000), or other organisational safety 
performance indicators, alongside questionnaire data to determine the degree of 
association between these variables. If completed longitudinally, future research could 
explore whether safety climate has any predictive validity with regard to accidents or 
safety behaviour, or whether accidents/safety behaviour might predict safety climate.  
• Convergent validity might be examined through administering another safety 
climate measurement tool (such as the NOQSAQ 50, Kines et al., 2011) alongside the 
measurement tool developed in Studies 3 and 4, and determine the correlation 
between both questionnaires (which, in theory, should be measuring similar 
constructs). 
  
Insights were only gained from two FAA demographics (aircrew and engineers) and 
future research also may benefit from considering wider inclusion of other roles within 
UK military naval aviation, such as air traffic controllers and support personnel. The 
generalisability of the findings from this research to other UK non-aviation (e.g. British 
Army, Royal Navy/Royal Marines) or aviation (e.g. Royal Air Force, Army Air Corps) 
military organisations is unknown. Given the different structures, operational focus and 
ethos across the different UK Armed Forces groups, it is suggested that the use of a 
similar phased approach to considering safety culture and climate in other UK military 
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organisations may provide insight into the degree of comparability of findings across 
military organisations within the UK Armed Forces.   
 
Section 8.2 contained a number of practical recommendations made to the FAA for 
improvements to various aspects of the safety system within the organisation. Future 
research should look to design and determine the efficacy of safety-related 
interventions taken to address some of the concerns raised in this research. This could 
include pre- and post-intervention measures of both subjective (e.g. using the safety 
climate tool to look at changes in perception, or employee feedback via 
workshops/focus groups/interviews) and objective (e.g. observation of safety 
behaviour, number of reports, number of incidents/injuries) data. A future study would 
need to identify both an experimental and control group who were exposed to similar 
level of hazards in which the same outcome measures could be applied. 
 
The current research was cross-sectional, however to facilitate a longitudinal approach, 
the FAA would benefit from conducting a safety climate survey at regular intervals, e.g. 
annually, which would allow the tracking of safety climate perceptions over time to 
determine changes. This method will likely be familiar to most in the organisation, and 
provides a structured method by which safety interventions could be applied and 
tracked over time.  
8.5 Conclusions  
• Findings from Studies 1 and 2 facilitated the articulation of factors that 
influenced safety and risk decision making which had high relevance for military naval 
aviation employees.  
o Operating rules and procedures were presented as having strong cultural 
legitimacy; they were widely viewed by operational personnel as both necessary and 
appropriate. However, barriers to compliance with these were identified, and 
practical recommendations for the FAA to consider were suggested to aid in the 
removal of these barriers.  
o Safety policy was viewed by participants fairly cynically, with accountability and 
bureaucracy perceived to have increased in recent years. This was said to leave 
employees feeling personally vulnerable in the event of unintentional violations. 
Review and consolidation of policy within the FAA was recommended to address 
these issues.  
o The dominant pressure experienced by participants was an over-arching 
requirement to deliver operational capability. Provision of resources, including 
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personnel, were described as key to the ability to work safely. The lack of human 
resources (i.e. personnel) was a shared concern for military naval aviation 
personnel, as was a lack of focus on the priority of safety. Further understanding the 
implications and impact of inadequate resources on safety was recommended to be 
a future research requirement for the FAA.  
o Supervisors were cast as key influences on safety, leading by example and 
teaching behaviour, both in positive and negative aspects (i.e. compliance or short 
cuts). In contrast, the motivations of senior management were viewed rather 
cynically. The impact of managers on resource allocation, priority setting and 
organisational learning were articulated within the findings from this research. 
o There was a strong, overriding sense of organisational commitment amongst 
personnel; they were proud to belong to the FAA and took pride in its positive safety 
reputation.  
• Five constructs (identified in Studies 3 and 4) were considered to characterise 
core elements of employee perspectives on influences on safety and risk decision 
making in the UK military naval aviation context. These were management commitment 
and organisational learning, normative behaviour, training and experience, reporting 
and process/bureaucracy. These components were identified first using a principle 
components analysis and then a re-specified model was determined to display 
acceptable model fit using a confirmatory factor analysis.  
• Foundation work on measure development aimed at characterising employee 
perceptions of safety climate has the potential for the basis of a tool that could be used 
to benchmark perceptions of safety climate and therefore inform organisational learning 
and intervention strategy. The FAA could use such a safety climate tool, once fully 
developed, to monitor safety climate longitudinally in comparison to the cross-sectional 
approach taken in this research.  
• When three comparative ranking methods (Q-Sorting, direct ranking and the 
method of paired comparisons) were used to rank influences on safety (Study 2), 
results from all three methods reflected a similar rank structure. This use of multiple 
techniques afforded additional confidence in the results, allowing insight into the 
headline areas for improvement (human resources, priority of safety and 
competency/experience), particularly when the three methods showed significant 
agreement in output/rank order of dimensions. While the method of paired comparisons 
was considered the most frustrating method to complete when compared to the other 
two, it displayed the highest levels of agreement and afforded the most nuanced insight 
into the relative importance of priorities to each other. 
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• While there was only modest evidence of sub-cultural differences between 
different aviation profession groups, perceptions of safety climate did appear to vary by 
function (aircrew and engineers) and rank of personnel (junior and senior). Aircrew 
were seen to have statistically more positive views toward safety climate elements than 
engineers, while junior ranks typically displayed less positive views than did senior 
personnel.  
• The use of multiple methods allowed consideration of the aims of the research 
from different viewpoints. However, some inconsistencies were found which may have 
been influenced by the methods utilised. In Study 1, a lack of human resources was 
found to affect views on safety, whilst participants cited high levels of individual 
responsibility for safety. Study 2 supported these findings, with these factors 
consistently ranked as 'least' and 'most' like the situation observed in respondent's 
units. However, in Study 3 items related to human resources and individual 
responsibility were removed from the PCA and CFA due to a lack of variability in the 
data. This may indicate that these components, while having high salience for 
personnel, were incompatible with the assumptions of the PCA and CFA techniques. 
There may be, therefore, a conflict between the assumptions for statistical techniques 
such as PCA and CFA and the assumption of shared world views inherent within the 
concepts of safety culture and climate.  
• Given the maturity of work in safety culture and safety climate, discovery of new 
constructs was considered improbable, however there was still considerable scope to 
enhance understanding and practice in relation to safety culture and safety climate in 
the military naval aviation context. There was further uniqueness in the combination 
and content of constructs from this study, when compared to findings from other 
aviation/high risk sectors, which were detailed in the integrated discussion of this 
research (Chapter 8). 
• The current research reflected a mix of methods, which used insights grounded 
in employee experiences to identify influences on safety, thus aligning with 
contemporary civilian studies. This bottom-up approach had not yet been applied by 
military safety culture or climate studies.  
• In-depth contextual insights were afforded by qualitative methods, while the 
quantitative methods allowed consideration of the generalisability of the findings and 
comparisons between groups to be drawn.  
• The scales identified in Studies 3 and 4 should only be considered to be proto-
scales as they require further reliability analysis (test-retest reliability) as well as 
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Appendix B-Study 1 
Method 




PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Investigating the antecedents to Safety Culture in 
the Fleet Air Arm.  
(MODREC Protocol No: 444/Gen/13)  
Invitation to take part 
We would like to invite you to participate in this study being undertaken by the Institute 
of Naval Medicine (INM) in support of the Royal Navy Flight Safety Centre (RNFSC). 
Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being undertaken and what your participation will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully. 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The aim of the research is to explore the attitudes and perceptions of Fleet Air Arm 
personnel towards safety within the Royal Navy in light of findings from Flight Safety 
Surveys that have been collected by the RNFSC for a number of years. The aim is also 
to explore the survey findings in more detail. Additionally the research aims to 
investigate any aspects of Flight Safety not adequately addressed by the Flight Safety 
Survey. This will inform the RNFSC with regards to requirements for resources for 
safety improvements, further elucidate the attitudes of FAA personnel toward safety. 
The ultimate aim is to support effective safety and risk management to ensure ongoing 
operational capability. 
Who is doing this research? 
This study is being undertaken by MOD personnel from the Institute of Naval Medicine 
(INM) on behalf of the Royal Navy Flight Safety Centre (RNFSC). 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You have been specifically invited to participate in this study as you are a member of 
the Fleet Air Arm. 
Do I have to take part? 
Participation in the study is voluntary. Any responses will be confidential. 
What will I be asked to do? 
A verbal brief of the project will occur, during which you will be asked to participate in a 
focus group, which is a group discussion regarding safety within your unit and 
organisation. This discussion will take approximately 60 minutes-this time  will be 
allocated within the course and will not affect the length of your course. You will be 
asked to consent to take part in the study, and the procedures will be explained to you. 
You will then be asked to participate in discussions regarding a number of safety 
related topics guided by the Researcher, but the aim is to achieve group discussion-so 
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you are talking with the group, not to the Researcher.  
This discussion will be recorded in order to allow for accurate transcripts of the 
discussion. These recordings will be transcribed, and anything that can identify 
individuals (names, units, roles) will be removed prior to analysis. Only the research 
team will have access to the original recordings and all content will be kept securely 
according to the Data Protection Act (1998). It is important that you know that your 
discussions are completely confidential and no one in the Chain of Command will see 
individual responses. 
What is the device or procedure that is being tested? 
An assessment of the attitudes and perceptions toward Safety Culture of Fleet Air Arm 
personnel is being undertaken. 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
The results from this study will inform the Fleet Air Arm on the reasons behind the 
findings of the Flight Safety Surveys. This will help them to understand where 
resources to improve safety should be placed. Additionally, other factors affecting FAA 
personnel’s attitudes toward safety will be explored. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no expected disadvantages or risks of taking part.  
Can I withdraw from the research and what will happen if I don’t want to carry 
on? 
You may withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason. If you have any 
concerns that arise from your participation and do not feel comfortable discussing them 
with the Principle Investigator, the details of the Independent Medical Officer 
(Psychologist) are included below. 
Are there any expenses and payments which I will get? 
No  
Will my taking part or not taking part affect my career? 
You should only participate if you wish to do so; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way with regards to either your career or on the Flight Safety 
Course. 
Whom do I contact if I have any questions or a complaint? 
If you have any questions concerning this study, please do not hesitate to contact the 
Principal Investigator or Independent Medical Officer (contact details below). 
What happens if I suffer any harm? 
In the event of you suffering any adverse effects as a consequence of your participation 
in this study, you will be eligible to apply for compensation under the MOD’s ‘No Fault 
Compensation Scheme’. 
Will my records be kept confidential? 
Records will at all times remain confidential and will be held for a minimum of 100 
years in conditions appropriate for the storage of personal information.  You have the 
right of access to your records at any time, and to ask for them to be destroyed. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This study is being funded by the UK MOD. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
A scientific protocol for this research has been approved by The Ministry of Defence 
Research Ethics Committee (MODREC). 
Further information and contact details. 
Contact Details of Principal Investigator:  
Ms Anthea Bennett (Higher Scientific Officer) 
Environmental Medicine and Science, Institute of Naval Medicine, 
Crescent Road, Alverstoke, Hants. PO12 2DL 
Telephone:  ;  
Email:             
 
Contact Details of Independent Medical Advisor (Psychologist): 
                         
Dr Shaun Kilminster  
Telephone:   
E-mail :            
 
 
Compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
This study complies, and at all times will comply, with the Declaration of Helsinki5 as 
adopted at the 52nd WMA General Assembly, Edinburgh, October 2000 and with the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning 
Biomedical Research, (Strasbourg 25.1.2005).  Please ask the Principal Investigator if 
you would like further details of the approval or to see a copy of the full protocol. 
 
  
                                               
5 World Medical Association (2000) Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical principles for medical research involving human 
subjects. 52nd World Medical Association General Assembly, Edinburgh, Scotland October 2000. 
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Informed Consent  
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Title of Study: Investigating the antecedents to Safety Culture in the Fleet Air 
Arm 
 
Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee Reference: 444/Gen/13 
 
 
• The nature, aims and risks of the research have been explained to me. I have 
read and understood the Participant Information Sheet and understand what is 
expected of me. All my questions have been answered fully to my satisfaction. 
 
• I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish 
to participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be 
withdrawn from it immediately without having to give a reason for my withdrawal. I 
also understand that I may be withdrawn from it at any time, and that in neither 
case will this be held against me in subsequent dealings with the Ministry of 
Defence. 
 
• I understand that the screening process to decide if I am suitable to be selected 
as a subject may include completing a medical screening questionnaire and/or a 
physical examination by a medical officer and I consent to this. 
 
• I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this 
research study.  I understand that such information will be treated as strictly 
confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection 
Act 1998. 
 
• I agree to volunteer as a subject for the study described in the information sheet 
and I give full consent to my participation in this study. 
 
• This consent is specific to the research described in the Participant Information 
Sheet attached and shall not be taken to imply my consent to participate in any 
subsequent experiment or deviation from that detailed here. 
 
• I understand that in the event of my sustaining injury, illness or death as a result of 
participating as a volunteer in Ministry of Defence research, I or my dependants 
may enter a claim with the Ministry of Defence for compensation under the 





I  ________________________________________________________________ 
 
agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my 
satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written 
above and the Participant Information Sheet about the project, and understand what 
the research study involves. 
 
 
Signed      Date       
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Witness Name  
 





I  _________________________________________________________________ 
 
confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks 
(where applicable) of the proposed research to the Participant. 
 
 




The information supplied above is to the best of my knowledge and belief accurate. I 
clearly understand my obligations and the rights of research participants, particularly 
concerning recruitment of participants and obtaining valid consent. 
 
Signature of Principal Investigator  
 
…………………………………………………… Date       
 
Name and contact details of Independent Medical Officer (if appropriate):  
 
Dr Shaun Kilminster 
Name and contact details of Principal Investigator:  
         
Institute of Naval Medicine  







Focus Group Proforma 
 
Introduction and warm up 
 
Moderator to explain: 
1.  The purpose of the group discussion session, the rationale underlying the 
research interest in safety culture. 
2. Participants will be made aware that they are under no obligation to take part-
they may leave the group at any point. 
3. Participants will be assured of anonymity and the requirement for all 
discussions to remain confidential. 
4. Participants will be informed that this discussion is not an investigation to 
identify individuals who may be involved in safety-related cases, rather to 
discuss attitudes towards safety in the Fleet Air Arm. Participants will be 
informed of the requirement for the researcher to report any actions spoken 
about that may be deemed criminal. Examples will be given and the agreement 
between the Investigator and the Royal Navy Flight Safety Centre (RNFSC) will 
be detailed. 
Focus group proforma 
 
• Tell me about safety within the Fleet Air Arm. 
o Has it changed over time, and if so, how? 
o What about safety at your unit-is it different? 
o Is it different working in the FAA now compared to, e.g. 5 years ago? 
▪ What has changed, what has not changed? 
• What are the main barriers to safety within your workplaces? 
o What do you consider to be the main factors that mean you cannot work 
safely? 
o What are the safety priorities for you? 
• What are the main contributors to accidents/incidents? 
o Can you give me an example of an accident you know about and what 
caused it? 
▪ Did you see any changes implemented after the accident? 
o Have the causes changed over time? 
o What are the big safety issues where you work? 
• How important are safety procedures to the way you work? 
• Do people bend/break the rules-can you give any examples? 
o What makes them bend/break rules? 
o What would people worry about if they chose not to follow the rules? 
o Everybody takes risks of some sort in daily life-if people in the FAA take 
risks, can you think why they might do that? 
• Is there anything more you feel I should have asked/you want to discuss with 
the group? 
 
Moderator to thank group for participation, reiterate requirement for discussions to 
remain confidential and provide sources of support if required.   
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Appendix C-Study 2 
Method 
FAA Flight Safety Q-Sort Items 
Table 1.  
Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm Flight Safety Q-Sort items. 
 
 Item Theme* 




2 Unit level managers take the lead on Flight Safety issues Management 
commitment/actions 
3 Rules are not bent because of work pressure Priority of Safety 
4 Everyone receives the correct level of Flight Safety 
training 
Safety training 
5 Incidents that have flight safety implications are always 
reported 
Communication 
6 Everyone accepts that flight safety is their responsibility Individual actions/ 
responsibility 
7 Individuals are empowered to take action in the interests 
of flight safety 
Individual actions/ 
responsibility 
8 Flight safety risks are considered in the normal 
planning/briefing cycle 
Safety systems 
9 The work environment is always conducive to safe 
operations 
Work environment 
10 Everyone is fully trained to undertake the tasks that are 
required of them safely 
Safety training 
11 In my unit procedures are in place to promote flight safety 
awareness 
Safety systems 
12 The impact of change on flight safety is always 
considered by the organisation 
Priority of Safety 
13 Flight safety is more important that cost saving measures Priority of Safety 
14 Flight safety is an integral part of routine training Safety training 
15 Suggestions to improve flight safety are always followed 
up  
Communication 
16 In my unit it is appropriate to question instructions when Communication 
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flight safety is at stake 
17 Individuals are comfortable reporting their own mistakes Individual actions/ 
responsibility 
18 Flight safety risks are never taken to ensure that a job is 
completed on time 
Priority of Safety 
19 All the necessary equipment is provided to allow tasks to 
be carried out safely 
Resourcing 
20 The correct numbers of competent personnel with the 
right levels of experience are available on my unit 
Resourcing 
21 There is a just culture in my unit Management 
commitment/actions 
 






Table 2.  
The NASA-Task Load Index (TLX) definitions, taken from Hart & Staveland (2006). 
 
Rating scale definitions 
Title Descriptions 
Mental demand How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g. 
thinking, deciding, calculating, remembering, looking, 
searching)? Was the task easy, or demanding, simple or 
complex, exacting or forgiving? 
Physical demand How much physical activity was required (e.g. pushing, 
pulling, turning, controlling, activating)? Was the task easy or 
demanding, slow or brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or 
laborious? 
Temporal demand How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace 
at which the task elements occurred? Was the pace slow and 
leisurely or rapid and frantic? 
Effort How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to 
accomplish your level of performance? 
Performance How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the 
goal of the task? How satisfied were you with your 
performance in accomplishing this goal?   
Frustration level How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed 
versus secure, gratified, content, relaxed and complacent did 






Presentation of the three ranking methods  
 
Table 3.  
Latin square design used in Study 2. 
 
Participant 1st administration 2nd administration 3rd administration 
1 PC DR QS 
2 DR QS PC 
3 QS PC DR 
4 QS DR PC 
5 PC QS DR 
6 DR PC QS 
7 PC DR QS 
8 DR QS PC 
9 QS PC DR 
10 QS DR PC 
11 PC QS DR 
12 DR PC QS 
13 PC DR QS 
14 DR QS PC 
15 QS PC DR 
16 QS DR PC 
17 PC QS DR 
18 DR PC QS 
19 PC DR QS 
20 DR QS PC 
21 QS PC DR 
22 QS DR PC 
23 PC QS DR 
24 DR PC QS 
25 PC DR QS 
26 DR QS PC 
27 QS PC DR 
28 QS DR PC 
29 PC QS DR 
30 DR PC QS 
31 PC DR QS 
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32 DR QS PC 
33 QS PC DR 
34 QS DR PC 
35 PC QS DR 
36 DR PC QS 
37 PC DR QS 
38 DR QS PC 
39 QS PC DR 
40 QS DR PC 
41 PC QS DR 
42 DR PC QS 
43 PC DR QS 
44 DR QS PC 
45 QS PC DR 





NASA-TLX Questionnaire  
 
These questions are about the ranking task you have just completed.  For each of the 
following scales, please mark a cross in the box which matches your experience of 





                      
     X                 
Very low       Very high 
 
Mental Demand 
How mentally demanding was the task? 
                      
                      
Very low       Very high 
 
Physical Demand 
How physically demanding was the task? 
                      
                      
Very low       Very high 
 
Temporal Demand 
How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task? 
                      
                      
Very low       Very high 
 
Performance 
How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to do? 
                      
                      
Perfect       Failure  
 
Effort  
How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance? 
                      
                      
Very low       Very high 
 
Frustration  
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed were you? 
                      
                      
Very low        Very high 
 




Participant information sheet 
 
University of Bath 
Department of Psychology 
Anthea Ashford 
02392768044, A.I.Bennett@bath.ac.uk 
Ethical approval code 17-132 
 
Exploring and characterising safety culture and risk decision making in the military   
 
Before you decide to take part in this study, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it would involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with friends, colleagues or your line manager. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
Background 
This study is being undertaken by the Institute of Naval Medicine (INM) and part of this work will 
form the basis of a Doctoral thesis undertaken by the Chief Investigator at the University of 
Bath. This is a study to look at the Flight Safety Q-Sort (currently completed by people on the Air 302 
course) and compare it to some different methods to determine which method might be best for the 
Flight Safety Centre to use as information on personnel’s views on safety and safety culture within their 
unit. This will help to inform the RNFSC with regards to areas of concern or good safety culture and 
support the Safety Management System of the Fleet Air Arm.  
 
Procedures 
You have been invited to participate because you are employed by the Royal Navy, within the Fleet Air 
Arm. To participate you should be over the age of 18. However, participation in the study is entirely 
voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether or not to do this.  If you do decide to take part, we would 
ask you to sign a consent form and give you a copy of this information sheet and the consent form to 
keep.  If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw from the study at any time.  If you decide 
not to take part, or to withdraw, you do not have to give a reason and there will be no negative 
impact on you, or your career. 
 
If you take part, we would ask you to complete three activities on one day, at the start and end of the 
work day and at lunchtime.  These will be completed in work time, and you will not be required to use 
your own free time. These are paper based activities and will ask you to rank various items, either as a 
whole or as pairs of items. The instructions for each will be provided for you, and you can ask questions 
if you are unsure. In total this will take approximately 1 h 15 mins, broken down into the three times 
(beginning, middle and end of day). Upon completion of the final activity (at the end of the work day) 
there will be a short de-brief session where we will tell you about the three methods and what we could 
expect to learn from each. You will have the opportunity to ask any questions.  
 
Your data 
All data collected in this study will be anonymised. There is no record that links the data collected from 
you with personal data from which you could be identified (i.e. the signed consent form). You may 
withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason, the details of the Chief 
Investigator are included for contact if this is the case. Your data will be withdrawn from the 
study at your request and there will be no impact on your career. 
 
If you have any questions at any time about the study, please do not hesitate to contact Anthea 
Ashford  on 02392768044, A.I.Bennett@bath.ac.uk. 
 
 
If you have any concerns related to your participation in this study, please direct them to the 





Informed consent  
 
CONSENT FORM 
Exploring and characterising safety culture and risk decision making in the military  
Confidential 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge 
        
DO YOU CONFIRM THAT YOU:   
 Are employed by the Fleet Air Arm        
□      
□ 
 Are over 18 years of age        
□      
□ 
  
HAVE YOU:   
 been given information explaining about the study?        
□      
□ 
 had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?         
□      
□ 
 received satisfactory answers to all questions you asked?         
□      
□ 
 received enough information about the study for you to make a decision  
about your participation?         
□      
□ 
 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND: 
that you are free to withdraw from the study and free to withdraw your data prior to 
publication 
 at any time?        
□      
□ 
 without having to give a reason for withdrawing?        
□      
□ 
 
I hereby fully and freely consent to my participation in this study 
 
I understand the nature and purpose of the procedures involved in this study. These have 
been communicated to me on the information sheet accompanying this form. 
I understand and acknowledge that the investigation is designed to promote scientific 
knowledge and that the University of Bath will use the data I provide for no purpose 
other than research.  
309 
 
I understand the data I provide will be kept confidential. My name or other identifying 
information will not be disclosed in any presentation or publication of the research.  
 I understand that the University of Bath may use the data collected for this project in a 
future research project but that the conditions on this form under which I have 
provided the data will still apply.   
 
Participant’s signature: _____________________________________  Date:  
________________ 
Name in BLOCK Letters: _____________________________________  
 
Final consent 
Having participated in this study 
 
I agree to the University of Bath keeping and processing the data I have provided during the course of 
this study. I understand that these data will be used only for the purpose(s) set out in the information 
sheet, and my consent is conditional upon the University complying with its duties and obligations 
under the Data Protection Act. 
 
Participant’s signature: _____________________________________  Date:  
________________ 
Name in BLOCK Letters: _____________________________________  
 
If you have any concerns related to your participation in this study please direct them to the Department 
of Psychology Research Ethics Committee, via Nathalia Gjersoe, Psychology Research Ethics Officer 






Friedman's test statistics between individual rank order position of the safety climate 
dimensions across the three ranking methods.  




Individual actions Direct Ranking 2.22 
6.514 0.039 Q-Sort 1.80 
Paired Comparison 1.99 
Management commitment Direct Ranking 2.27 
14.8 0.001 Q-Sort 1.53 
Paired Comparison 2.20 
Priority of safety Direct Ranking 2.42 
39.48 0.001 Q-Sort 1.22 
Paired Comparison 2.36 
Safety training Direct Ranking 2.30 
15.54 0.001 Q-Sort 1.55 
Paired Comparison 2.15 
Communication Direct Ranking 2.42 
25.46 0.001 Q-Sort 1.39 
Paired Comparison 2.19 
Safety system Direct Ranking 2.08 
15.08 0.01 Q-Sort 1.54 
Paired Comparison 2.38 
Working environment Direct Ranking 2.53 
28.77 0.001 Q-Sort 1.41 
Paired Comparison 2.07 
Manpower Direct Ranking 2.51 
48.69 0.001 Q-Sort 1.15 
Paired Comparison 2.34 
Competency/experience Direct Ranking 2.41 
42.93 0.001 Q-Sort 1.18 













Wilcoxon's statistical test results for the rank order of dimensions (* indicates significant 
difference). 


















Priority of safety -4.925 

















Safety system -2.904 




 (0.0001) * 





 (0.001) * 
Manpower -5.159 

















Appendix D- Study 3 
Method 
78 item questionnaire  
1 People I work with think safety is very important 
2 More people are made available to do a job if needed for safety reasons 
3 There is support from line management in safety critical situations 
4 Managers here are willing to listen to staff when it comes to the best way to do something 
5 The Squadron Management encourages safe working practices 
6 If people here saw an unsafe act they would report it 
7 Generally, teams work well together in this organisation 
8 Taking a shortcut to get work done quickly is seen as acceptable, as long as nothing happens 
9 Operational safety has a high priority here 
10 Supervisors/managers rarely check that people here are working safely 
11 My supervisor / manager encourages questions from workers about safety matters 
12 People here are only interested in safety aspects of their own jobs, not other people’s 
13 The safety equipment (for example PPE, harnesses) here works well 
14 There is timely feedback from the outcome of safety investigations 
15 There is some risk taking at my workplace that I think is unnecessary 
16 People here fully understand the risks associated with the work that they are responsible for 
17 Safety decisions are made at the appropriate level 
18 Most people in my workplace report safety-related occurrences 
19 People here are not always confident that they have the experience to do the job 
20 Managers are quick to act on safety concerns when we report them 
21 I  am regularly kept awake at night due to thinking about my job 
22 People feel confident that they can question instructions when there may be safety issues 
23 Safety will become less of a priority for Senior Leadership in the future 
24 The Watch Chief would stop people working due to safety concerns even if it meant not getting 
the job done 
25 Personal safety has a high priority here 
26 If someone reports a safety concern here, I am confident it will be addressed 
27 People here are kept informed about the outcomes of meetings which address safety issues 
28 The Squadron Management is good at finding the right balance between addressing safety 
concerns and the requirement to achieve a task 
29 My supervisor / manager encourages me and my team to learn from safety events 
30 Where I work hazards are appropriately assessed and controlled 
31 People here feel at risk when they are doing their jobs 
32 In general, supervisors are sufficiently experienced to meet the required level of supervision 
33 Everyone here  is sufficiently trained to undertake their tasks safely 
34 If I thought no one else would find out, I would not report a colleague's error 
35 Good safety behaviour is positively recognised by the line management here 
36 People here are clear about what their responsibilities for safety are 
37 People here always work safely, even when they are not being supervised 
38 Managers here would rather know about safety issues than not know 
39 Where I work there is a Just Culture that ensures people are treated fairly 
40 People here take pride in doing things safely 
41 People here are sufficiently experienced for the jobs they are required to do 
42 Supervisors sometimes sign off work without checking 
43 People here are not comfortable reporting their own mistakes 
44 Managers are open to safety concerns raised by employees 
45 My workplace identifies hazards and assesses risk 
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46 Managers turn a blind eye to rule bending 
47 The Squadron management here do a good job balancing operational requirements against 
safety 
48 People regularly get distracted when doing safety critical jobs 
49 Tools and equipment are maintained to a high standard in this organisation 
50 People here take shortcuts when they think there is little or no risk involved 
51 People here can easily identify the relevant safety procedure for their job 
52 There are always supervisors available to give advice 
53 Supervisors shield personnel from pressure 
54 People here have a clear understanding of the safety procedures for their job 
55 When there is pressure people will not compromise on  what they see as safety critical issues 
56 Some safety procedures are only there to protect management’s back 
57 Manning is appropriate to meet operational demands 
58 Operational capability is usually seen as more important than safety 
59 People make mistakes because they are trying to do too many jobs at once 
60 Supervisors here sometimes encourage others to bend the rules or amend the procedure to 
achieve a task 
61 The Senior Leadership in the FAA mean it when they say that safety is of the highest priority 
62 If people see others breaking a rule they tend to turn a blind eye 
63 There is too much paperwork involved with reporting safety concerns 
64 If a genuine error is made (resulting in an accident or near miss), management will always be 
supportive 
65 Most people are confident enough to speak up if they identify a safety issue 
66 Line management looks out for us here 
67 People here find it difficult to cope with pressure 
68 There are enough people to do the job safely 
69 I am confident my line management will act in the interests of our team in terms of safety 
70 It is too bureaucratic to report all safety concerns 
71 Safety rules / procedures are only there to protect against legal action 
72 Command here places appropriate focus on safety 
73 People sometimes turn a blind eye to less important safety procedures 
74 Operational demands mean sometimes people have to take shortcuts 
75 People here get frustrated by shortages of tools or equipment 
76 If people followed all the safety rules they would not get the job done in time 
77 People here are good at coping with pressure 




Participant information sheet 
 
Study title 
 Development of a Safety Culture questionnaire for use in the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air 
Arm. 
Invitation to take part 
We would like to invite you to participate in this study being undertaken by the Institute 
of Naval Medicine (INM) in support of Royal Navy Flight Safety Centre (RNFSC) 
objectives. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being undertaken and what your participation will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. You must be a 
minimum age of 18 years old to participate in this study. 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The aim of the research is to develop a questionnaire, specific to the Fleet Air Arm, that 
can be used to investigate the attitudes and perceptions of personnel toward aspects of 
safety within the Fleet Air Arm. This will help to inform the RNFSC with regards to areas 
of concern or good safety culture and support the Safety Management System of the 
FAA. The aim of this is to support effective safety and risk management to ensure 
ongoing operational capability. 
Who is doing this research? 
This study is being undertaken by MOD personnel from the INM on behalf of the 
RNFSC. 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You have been specifically invited to participate in this study as you are a member of 
the Fleet Air Arm.  
Do I have to take part? 
No, participation in the study is voluntary. Any responses will be confidential.  There will 
be no negative impact on you, or your career, if you choose not to participate. 
What will I be asked to do? 
You will be given information about the study via Squadron communication channels at 
least 24h prior to consenting. If you have questions, the contact details of the Chief 
Investigator are at the end of this information sheet. You will also be given time to ask 
questions on the day. If you would like to participate in the study, you will be asked to 
read and sign a consent form to say that you have read and understood this 
information and consent to take part in this survey. After this, you will be invited to 
complete the questionnaire. The first part will ask you questions about aspects of 
where you are based, what aircraft you work on and what rank you are. These will not 
be used to identify you in any way, but so we can ensure we have a variety of people 
answering the questionnaires. The second part will ask you questions relating to safety 
in your workplace - please answer honestly. The survey should take approximately ten 
to fifteen minutes to complete. Although we are asking you questions about what 
aircraft type you work on and where you are based, these will not be used to identify 
you as all of the results will be grouped together.  
A very small number of people will be asked to complete the survey twice, if this is the 
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case we will provide you with another questionnaire and details of when to fill it in. 
What is the device or procedure that is being tested? 
The purpose is the development of a questionnaire to measure attitudes toward safety 
culture to help the RNFSC understand what people in the FAA think about safety and 
how it is managed in the FAA. 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
There are no direct benefits, however your participation will help to ensure that the 
resulting questionnaire will be specific and useful to the FAA for use as an indication of 
safety attitudes in the Fleet Air Arm. This will support the Safety Management of the 
FAA. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no expected disadvantages or risks of taking part. 
Can I withdraw from the research and what will happen if I don't want to carry 
on? 
You may withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason, the details of the 
Chief Investigator are included for contact if this is the case. Your data will be 
withdrawn from the study at your request and there will be no impact on your career. 
Are there any expenses and payments which I will get? 
No 
Will my taking part or not taking part affect my Service career or medical care? 
No, choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way with regards to your 
career. 
Whom do I contact if I have any questions or a complaint? 
If you have any questions concerning this study, please do not hesitate to contact the 
Chief Investigator (details below).  
For any complaints, please contact the named civilian Medical Officer who is 
independent of the study (details below). 
What happens if I suffer any harm? 
In the event of you suffering any adverse effects as a consequence of your participation 
in this study, you will be eligible to apply for compensation under the MOD’s ‘No Fault 
Compensation Scheme’. 
Will my records be kept confidential? 
Experimental records will at all times remain confidential and will be held for a minimum 
of 100 years in conditions appropriate for the storage of personal information. You have 
the right of access to your records at any time, and to ask for them to be destroyed. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This study has been tasked by the RNFSC and is being funded by the UK MOD. Part 
of this work will form the basis of a Doctoral thesis undertaken by the Chief Investigator 
at the University of Bath. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the Ministry of Defence 




Further information and contact details. 
Contact Details of Chief Investigator:  
Mrs Anthea Ashford (Higher Scientific Officer) 
Environmental Medicine and Science, Institute of Naval Medicine, 
Crescent Road, Alverstoke, Hants. PO12 2DL 
Telephone:
Email:         
 
Details of Independent Contact for complaints:  
Dr Daniel Roiz de Sa (Civilian Medical Officer) 
Environmental Medicine and Science, Institute of Naval Medicine, 




Compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
This study complies, and at all times will comply, with the Declaration of Helsinki6as 
adopted at the 64th WMA General Assembly at Fortaleza, Brazil in October 2013. 
 
  
                                               
6 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki [revised October 2013].  Recommendations 
Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. 64th WMA General 





Title of Study: Development of a Safety Culture questionnaire for use in the Royal 
Navy’s Fleet Air Arm. 
 
Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee Reference : 648/MODREC/15 
 
 
• The nature, aims and risks of the research have been explained to me. I have 
read and understood the Information for Participants and understand what is 
expected of me. All my questions have been answered fully to my satisfaction. 
 
• I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish 
to participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be 
withdrawn from it immediately without having to give a reason. I also 
understand that I may be withdrawn from it at any time, and that in neither case 
will this be held against me in subsequent dealings with the Ministry of Defence. 
 
• I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this 
research study.  I understand that such information will be treated as strictly 
confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. 
 
• I agree to volunteer as a participant for the study described in the information 
sheet and give full consent. 
 
• This consent is specific to the particular study described in the Information for 
Participants attached and shall not be taken to imply my consent to participate 
in any subsequent study or deviation from that detailed here. 
 
• I understand that in the event of my sustaining injury, illness or death as a direct 
result of participating as a volunteer in Ministry of Defence research, I or my 
dependants may enter a claim with the Ministry of Defence for compensation 





I  ________________________________________________________________ 
 
agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my 
satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written 
above and the Participant Information Sheet about the project, and understand what 
the research study involves. 
 




Witness Name  




I  _________________________________________________________________ 
 
confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks 
(where applicable) of the proposed research to the Participant. 




The information supplied above is to the best of my knowledge and belief accurate. I 
clearly understand my obligations and the rights of research participants, particularly 
concerning recruitment of participants and obtaining valid consent. 
 
 
Signature of Chief Investigator  
 
 
…………………………………………………… Date       
 
Name and contact details of Chief Investigator:  
 
Mrs Anthea Ashford (Higher Scientific Officer) 
Environmental Medicine and Science, Institute of Naval Medicine, 
Crescent Road, Alverstoke, Hants. PO12 2DL 
Telephone:  Mil: 9380 68044;  Civ: 02392 768044 






Partial confirmatory factor analysis formulae 
 
 
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA):  
 





Normed Fit Index (NFI) 
 





Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 





Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
 












Table 1.  










1_People I work with think safety is very 
important 
450 -1.014 .115 1.966 .230 
2_More people are made available to do a job if 
needed for safety reasons 
449 -.591 .115 -.029 .230 
3_There is support from line management in safety 
critical situations 
444 -.792 .116 1.354 .231 
4_Managers here are willing to listen to staff when 
it comes to the best way to do something 
449 -.702 .115 .348 .230 
5_The Squadron Management encourages safe 
working practices 
448 -.794 .115 1.273 .230 
6_If people here saw an unsafe act they would 
report it 
450 -.653 .115 .460 .230 
7_Generally, teams work well together in this 
organisation 
449 -.779 .115 1.771 .230 
8_Taking a shortcut to get work done quickly is 
seen as acceptable, as long as nothing happens 
449 -.476 .115 -.334 .230 
9_Operational safety has a high priority here 449 -.621 .115 .504 .230 
10_Supervisors/managers rarely check that people 
here are working safely 
450 -.709 .115 .162 .230 
11_My supervisor / manager encourages 
questions from workers about safety matters 
450 -.356 .115 -.355 .230 
12_People here are only interested in safety 
aspects of their own jobs, not other people’s 
449 -.349 .115 -.407 .230 
13_The safety equipment (for example PPE, 
harnesses) here works well 
447 -.748 .115 .371 .230 
14_There is timely feedback from the outcome of 
safety investigations 
446 -.290 .116 -.118 .231 
15_There is some risk taking at my workplace that 
I think is unnecessary 
450 -.463 .115 -.492 .230 
16_People here fully understand the risks 
associated with the work that they are 
responsible for 
450 -1.015 .115 2.120 .230 
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17_Safety decisions are made at the 
appropriate level 
450 -1.058 .115 2.080 .230 
18_Most people in my workplace report safety-
related occurrences 
450 -.693 .115 -.103 .230 
19_People here are not always confident that they 
have the experience to do the job 
450 -.066 .115 -.971 .230 
20_Managers are quick to act on safety concerns 
when we report them 
450 -.609 .115 .879 .230 
21_I am regularly kept awake at night due to 
thinking about my job 
449 -.664 .115 -.610 .230 
22_People feel confident that they can question 
instructions when there may be safety issues 
450 -1.175 .115 1.816 .230 
23_Safety will become less of a priority for Senior 
Leadership in the future 
448 -.665 .115 .814 .230 
24_The Watch Chief would stop people working 
due to safety concerns even if it meant not getting 
the job done 
444 -.688 .116 .141 .231 
25_Personal safety has a high priority here 449 -.633 .115 .858 .230 
26_If someone reports a safety concern here, I 
am confident it will be addressed 
448 -.805 .115 1.604 .230 
27_People here are kept informed about the 
outcomes of meetings which address safety issues 
448 -.525 .115 -.369 .230 
28_The Squadron Management is good at finding 
the right balance between addressing safety 
concerns and the requirement to achieve a task 
447 -.606 .115 .248 .230 
29_My supervisor / manager encourages me and 
my team to learn from safety events 
449 -.791 .115 .994 .230 
30_Where I work hazards are appropriately 
assessed and controlled 
447 -.809 .115 2.132 .230 
31_People here feel at risk when they are doing 
their jobs 
450 -.665 .115 .549 .230 
32_In general, supervisors are sufficiently 
experienced to meet the required level of 
supervision 
450 -.999 .115 .698 .230 
33_Everyone here  is sufficiently trained to 
undertake their tasks safely 
450 -.892 .115 .813 .230 
34_If I thought no one else would find out, I would 
not report a colleague's error 
448 -.590 .115 -.105 .230 
35_Good safety behaviour is positively recognised 
by the line management here 
450 -.556 .115 -.162 .230 
36_People here are clear about what their 
responsibilities for safety are 
450 -.897 .115 2.109 .230 
37_People here always work safely, even when 
they are not being supervised 
450 -.292 .115 -.614 .230 
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38_Managers here would rather know about 
safety issues than not know 
450 -1.026 .115 1.797 .230 
39_Where I work there is a Just Culture that 
ensures people are treated fairly 
450 -1.003 .115 1.360 .230 
40_People here take pride in doing things safely 450 -.520 .115 .273 .230 
41_People here are sufficiently experienced for the 
jobs they are required to do 
450 -.694 .115 -.165 .230 
42_Supervisors sometimes sign off work without 
checking 
437 -.166 .117 -.799 .233 
43_People here are not comfortable reporting their 
own mistakes 
450 -.102 .115 -.815 .230 
44_Managers are open to safety concerns 
raised by employees 
449 -.814 .115 2.027 .230 
45_My workplace identifies hazards and 
assesses risk 
448 -.606 .115 2.149 .230 
46_Managers turn a blind eye to rule bending 449 -.603 .115 -.154 .230 
47_The Squadron management here do a good 
job balancing operational requirements against 
safety 
448 -.639 .115 .287 .230 
48_People regularly get distracted when doing 
safety critical jobs 
448 -.393 .115 -.676 .230 
49_Tools and equipment are maintained to a high 
standard in this organisation 
445 -.497 .116 -.588 .231 
50_People here take shortcuts when they think 
there is little or no risk involved 
450 -.146 .115 -.959 .230 
51_People here can easily identify the relevant 
safety procedure for their job 
450 -1.177 .115 2.680 .230 
52_There are always supervisors available to give 
advice 
450 -.712 .115 -.032 .230 
53_Supervisors shield personnel from pressure 450 -.076 .115 -.549 .230 
54_People here have a clear understanding of the 
safety procedures for their job 
450 -.783 .115 1.943 .230 
55_When there is pressure people will not 
compromise on  what they see as safety critical 
issues 
449 -.433 .115 -.296 .230 
56_Some safety procedures are only there to 
protect management’s back 
449 -.257 .115 -.733 .230 
57_Manning is appropriate to meet operational 
demands 
449 .607 .115 -.779 .230 
58_Operational capability is usually seen as more 
important than safety 
450 -.067 .115 -.713 .230 
59_People make mistakes because they are trying 
to do too many jobs at once 
450 .539 .115 -.373 .230 
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60_Supervisors here sometimes encourage others 
to bend the rules or amend the procedure to 
achieve a task 
450 -.502 .115 -.347 .230 
61_The Senior Leadership in the FAA mean it 
when they say that safety is of the highest priority 
450 -.606 .115 .188 .230 
62_If people see others breaking a rule they tend 
to turn a blind eye 
450 -.295 .115 -.507 .230 
63_There is too much paperwork involved with 
reporting safety concerns 
449 -.002 .115 -.689 .230 
64_If a genuine error is made (resulting in an 
accident or near miss), management will always be 
supportive 
450 -.522 .115 -.080 .230 
65_Most people are confident enough to speak 
up if they identify a safety issue 
450 -1.010 .115 .661 .230 
66_Line management looks out for us here 449 -.797 .115 .659 .230 
67_People here find it difficult to cope with 
pressure 
448 -.408 .115 -.263 .230 
68_There are enough people to do the job safely 450 .002 .115 -.981 .230 
69_I am confident my line management will act 
in the interests of our team in terms of safety 
450 -1.003 .115 2.047 .230 
70_It is too bureaucratic to report all safety 
concerns 
449 -.103 .115 -.663 .230 
71_Safety rules / procedures are only there to 
protect against legal action 
450 -.293 .115 -.710 .230 
72_Command here places appropriate focus on 
safety 
449 -.769 .115 1.613 .230 
73_People sometimes turn a blind eye to less 
important safety procedures 
450 .058 .115 -1.093 .230 
74_Operational demands mean sometimes people 
have to take shortcuts 
449 .205 .115 -.941 .230 
75_People here get frustrated by shortages of 
tools or equipment 
445 .687 .116 -.137 .231 
76_If people followed all the safety rules they 
would not get the job done in time 
450 -.071 .115 -.971 .230 
77_People here are good at coping with pressure 449 -.645 .115 .100 .230 
78_There is poor communication about safety 
issues that affect me 
448 -.543 .115 .198 .230 
Valid N (listwise) 402 





Table 2.  
PCA step 1, total variance explained 




Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 













































































12 .981 1.635 58.970 
      
13 .928 1.546 60.516 
      
14 .907 1.511 62.028 
      
15 .881 1.469 63.496 
      
16 .827 1.379 64.876 
      
17 .815 1.359 66.235 
      
18 .804 1.340 67.574 
      
19 .784 1.307 68.882 
      
20 .764 1.274 70.155 
      
21 .741 1.234 71.390 
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22 .709 1.182 72.571 
      
23 .703 1.171 73.742 
      
24 .688 1.147 74.890 
      
25 .673 1.122 76.012 
      
26 .657 1.096 77.108 
      
27 .638 1.063 78.171 
      
28 .634 1.057 79.228 
      
29 .604 1.007 80.235 
      
30 .588 .980 81.215 
      
31 .565 .941 82.156 
      
32 .555 .925 83.081 
      
33 .541 .901 83.982 
      
34 .532 .887 84.868 
      
35 .513 .855 85.723 
      
36 .508 .847 86.571 
      
37 .473 .788 87.359 
      
38 .466 .776 88.135 
      
39 .450 .750 88.885 
      
40 .427 .712 89.596 
      
41 .420 .701 90.297 
      
42 .406 .677 90.974 
      
43 .390 .650 91.624 
      
44 .380 .633 92.257 
      
45 .376 .627 92.884 
      
46 .370 .617 93.501 
      
47 .360 .600 94.100 
      
48 .352 .586 94.686 
      
49 .332 .554 95.240 
      
50 .323 .538 95.779 
      
51 .307 .512 96.290 
      
52 .303 .504 96.795 
      
53 .281 .468 97.263 
      
54 .269 .449 97.712 
      
55 .260 .434 98.146 
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56 .249 .415 98.561 
      
57 .230 .383 98.944 
      
58 .224 .373 99.317 
      
59 .216 .360 99.677 
      
60 .194 .323 100.000 
      






Table 3.  




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
46_Managers turn a blind eye to 
rule bending 
.701 
          
62_If people see others breaking a 
rule they tend to turn a blind eye 
.683 
          
28_The Squadron Management is 
good at finding the right balance 
between addressing safety 
concerns and the requirement to 
achieve a task 
.682 
          
4_Managers here are willing to 
listen to staff when it comes to the 
best way to do something 
.674 
          
50_People here take shortcuts 
when they think there is little or no 
risk involved 
.673 
          
47_The Squadron management 
here do a good job balancing 
operational requirements against 
safety 
.663 
          
25_Personal safety has a high 
priority here 
.660 
          
66_Line management looks out for 
us here 
.658 
          
29_My supervisor / manager 
encourages me and my team to 
learn from safety events 
.655 
          
40_People here take pride in doing 
things safely 
.650 
          
37_People here always work safely, 
even when they are not being 
supervised 
.647 
          
76_If people followed all the safety 
rules they would not get the job 
done in time 
.645 
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60_Supervisors here sometimes 
encourage others to bend the rules 
or amend the procedure to achieve 
a task 
.631 
          
3_There is support from line 
management in safety critical 
situations 
.627 
          
43_People here are not comfortable 
reporting their own mistakes 
.614 
          
41_People here are sufficiently 
experienced for the jobs they are 
required to do 
.613 .443 
         
27_People here are kept informed 
about the outcomes of meetings 
which address safety issues 
.610 
          
77_People here are good at coping 
with pressure 
.597 
          
74_Operational demands mean 





        
67_People here find it difficult to 
cope with pressure 
.587 
    -
.419 
     
54_People here have a clear 
understanding of the safety 
procedures for their job 
.584 
          
78_There is poor communication 
about safety issues that affect me 
.580 
          
48_People regularly get distracted 
when doing safety critical jobs 
.577 
          
33_Everyone here  is sufficiently 
trained to undertake their tasks 
safely 
.571 .420 
         
35_Good safety behaviour is 
positively recognised by the line 
management here 
.570 
          
58_Operational capability is usually 
seen as more important than safety 
.568 
          
20_Managers are quick to act on 
safety concerns when we report 
them 
.568 
          
42_Supervisors sometimes sign off 
work without checking 
.561 
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11_My supervisor / manager 
encourages questions from workers 
about safety matters 
.560 
          
18_Most people in my workplace 
report safety-related occurrences 
.560 
          
8_Taking a shortcut to get work 
done quickly is seen as acceptable, 
as long as nothing happens 
.552 
          
19_People here are not always 
confident that they have the 
experience to do the job 
.549 
          
55_When there is pressure people 
will not compromise on  what they 
see as safety critical issues 
.544 
          
10_Supervisors/managers rarely 
check that people here are working 
safely 
.531 
          
52_There are always supervisors 
available to give advice 
.523 
          
32_In general, supervisors are 
sufficiently experienced to meet the 
required level of supervision 
.523 .478 
         
34_If I thought no one else would 
find out, I would not report a 
colleague's error 
.522 
          
24_The Watch Chief would stop 
people working due to safety 
concerns even if it meant not 
getting the job done 
.521 
          
71_Safety rules / procedures are 
only there to protect against legal 
action 
.521 
          
70_It is too bureaucratic to report all 
safety concerns 
.520 
          
15_There is some risk taking at my 
workplace that I think is 
unnecessary 
.518 
          
9_Operational safety has a high 
priority here 
.518 
          
56_Some safety procedures are 
only there to protect management’s 
back 
.517 
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64_If a genuine error is made 
(resulting in an accident or near 
miss), management will always be 
supportive 
.515 
          
6_If people here saw an unsafe act 
they would report it 
.513 
          
5_The Squadron Management 




        
59_People make mistakes because 
they are trying to do too many jobs 
at once 
.509 
          
12_People here are only interested 
in safety aspects of their own jobs, 
not other people’s 
.508 
          
68_There are enough people to do 
the job safely 
.507 
          
2_More people are made available 
to do a job if needed for safety 
reasons 
.489 
          
61_The Senior Leadership in the 
FAA mean it when they say that 
safety is of the highest priority 
.485 
          
53_Supervisors shield personnel 
from pressure 
.468 
          
49_Tools and equipment are 
maintained to a high standard in 
this organisation 
.449 
          
23_Safety will become less of a 
priority for Senior Leadership in the 
future 
.434 
          
14_There is timely feedback from 
the outcome of safety investigations 
           
75_People here get frustrated by 
shortages of tools or equipment 
           
31_People here feel at risk when 
they are doing their jobs 
           




         
63_There is too much paperwork 
involved with reporting safety 
concerns 
    
.406 
      
13_The safety equipment (for 
example PPE, harnesses) here 
works well 
      
.589 
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Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 





Table 4.  
PCA model 1, rotated component matrix 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
29_My supervisor / manager 
encourages me and my team to 
learn from safety events 
.640 
          
20_Managers are quick to act on 
safety concerns when we report 
them 
.603 
          
35_Good safety behaviour is 
positively recognised by the line 
management here 
.595 
          
64_If a genuine error is made 
(resulting in an accident or near 
miss), management will always be 
supportive 
.591 
          
66_Line management looks out for 
us here 
.580 
          
4_Managers here are willing to 
listen to staff when it comes to the 
best way to do something 
.566 
          
5_The Squadron Management 
encourages safe working practices 
.555 
          
27_People here are kept informed 
about the outcomes of meetings 
which address safety issues 
.550 
          
28_The Squadron Management is 
good at finding the right balance 
between addressing safety concerns 
and the requirement to achieve a 
task 
.547 
          
78_There is poor communication 
about safety issues that affect me 
.540 
          
11_My supervisor / manager 
encourages questions from workers 
about safety matters 
.515 
          
25_Personal safety has a high 
priority here 
.479 
     
.451 
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47_The Squadron management 
here do a good job balancing 
operational requirements against 
safety 
.462 
          
24_The Watch Chief would stop 
people working due to safety 
concerns even if it meant not getting 
the job done 
.416 
         -
.413 
61_The Senior Leadership in the 
FAA mean it when they say that 
safety is of the highest priority 
           
50_People here take shortcuts when 




         
8_Taking a shortcut to get work 
done quickly is seen as acceptable, 
as long as nothing happens 
 
.680 
         




         
62_If people see others breaking a 
rule they tend to turn a blind eye 
 
.637 
         
42_Supervisors sometimes sign off 
work without checking 
 
.620 
         
60_Supervisors here sometimes 
encourage others to bend the rules 




         
74_Operational demands mean 




         
43_People here are not comfortable 
reporting their own mistakes 
 
.455 
         
76_If people followed all the safety 
rules they would not get the job 
done in time 
 
.415 
   
.415 
     
40_People here take pride in doing 
things safely 
           
23_Safety will become less of a 
priority for Senior Leadership in the 
future 
           
32_In general, supervisors are 
sufficiently experienced to meet the 
required level of supervision 
  
.790 
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33_Everyone here  is sufficiently 




        
41_People here are sufficiently 
experienced for the jobs they are 
required to do 
  
.727 
        
52_There are always supervisors 
available to give advice 
  
.516 
        
37_People here always work safely, 




        
54_People here have a clear 
understanding of the safety 
procedures for their job 
           
6_If people here saw an unsafe act 
they would report it 
   
.689 
       
18_Most people in my workplace 
report safety-related occurrences 
   
.675 
       
34_If I thought no one else would 






       
67_People here find it difficult to 
cope with pressure 
    
.694 
      
77_People here are good at coping 
with pressure 
    
.565 
      
19_People here are not always 
confident that they have the 





      
58_Operational capability is usually 
seen as more important than safety 
    
.453 
      
48_People regularly get distracted 





      
63_There is too much paperwork 
involved with reporting safety 
concerns 
     
.737 
     
70_It is too bureaucratic to report all 
safety concerns 
     
.713 
     
71_Safety rules / procedures are 
only there to protect against legal 
action 
     
.626 
     
56_Some safety procedures are 




   
.485 
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2_More people are made available 
to do a job if needed for safety 
reasons 
      
.620 
    
3_There is support from line 
management in safety critical 
situations 
      
.472 
    
9_Operational safety has a high 
priority here 
      
.471 
    
31_People here feel at risk when 
they are doing their jobs 
      
.439 
    
15_There is some risk taking at my 
workplace that I think is 
unnecessary 
      
.431 
    
57_Manning is appropriate to meet 
operational demands 
       
.753 
   
68_There are enough people to do 
the job safely 
       
.698 
   
59_People make mistakes because 
they are trying to do too many jobs 
at once 
       
.437 
   
53_Supervisors shield personnel 
from pressure 
        
.594 
  
55_When there is pressure people 
will not compromise on  what they 
see as safety critical issues 
           
13_The safety equipment (for 
example PPE, harnesses) here 
works well 
         
.743 
 
49_Tools and equipment are 
maintained to a high standard in this 
organisation 
         
.512 
 
14_There is timely feedback from 
the outcome of safety investigations 
         
.471 
 
75_People here get frustrated by 
shortages of tools or equipment 
           
12_People here are only interested 
in safety aspects of their own jobs, 
not other people’s 
          
.469 
10_Supervisors/managers rarely 
check that people here are working 
safely 
           
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 















Table 5.  





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
46_Managers turn a blind eye to rule 
bending 
.701 
          
62_If people see others breaking a 
rule they tend to turn a blind eye 
.683 
          
28_The Squadron Management is 
good at finding the right balance 
between addressing safety concerns 
and the requirement to achieve a 
task 
.682 
          
4_Managers here are willing to listen 
to staff when it comes to the best 
way to do something 
.674 
          
50_People here take shortcuts when 
they think there is little or no risk 
involved 
.673 
          
47_The Squadron management here 
do a good job balancing operational 
requirements against safety 
.663 
          
25_Personal safety has a high 
priority here 
.660 
          
66_Line management looks out for 
us here 
.658 
          
29_My supervisor / manager 
encourages me and my team to 
learn from safety events 
.655 
          
40_People here take pride in doing 
things safely 
.650 
          
37_People here always work safely, 
even when they are not being 
supervised 
.647 
          
76_If people followed all the safety 
rules they would not get the job done 
in time 
.645 
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60_Supervisors here sometimes 
encourage others to bend the rules 
or amend the procedure to achieve a 
task 
.631 
          
3_There is support from line 
management in safety critical 
situations 
.627 
          
43_People here are not comfortable 
reporting their own mistakes 
.614 
          
41_People here are sufficiently 
experienced for the jobs they are 
required to do 
.613 .443 
         
27_People here are kept informed 
about the outcomes of meetings 
which address safety issues 
.610 
          
77_People here are good at coping 
with pressure 
.597 
          
74_Operational demands mean 





        
67_People here find it difficult to 
cope with pressure 
.587 
    -
.419 
     
54_People here have a clear 
understanding of the safety 
procedures for their job 
.584 
          
78_There is poor communication 
about safety issues that affect me 
.580 
          
48_People regularly get distracted 
when doing safety critical jobs 
.577 
          
33_Everyone here  is sufficiently 
trained to undertake their tasks 
safely 
.571 .420 
         
35_Good safety behaviour is 
positively recognised by the line 
management here 
.570 
          
58_Operational capability is usually 
seen as more important than safety 
.568 
          
20_Managers are quick to act on 
safety concerns when we report 
them 
.568 
          
42_Supervisors sometimes sign off 
work without checking 
.561 
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11_My supervisor / manager 
encourages questions from workers 
about safety matters 
.560 
          
18_Most people in my workplace 
report safety-related occurrences 
.560 
          
8_Taking a shortcut to get work 
done quickly is seen as acceptable, 
as long as nothing happens 
.552 
          
19_People here are not always 
confident that they have the 
experience to do the job 
.549 
          
55_When there is pressure people 
will not compromise on  what they 
see as safety critical issues 
.544 
          
10_Supervisors/managers rarely 
check that people here are working 
safely 
.531 
          
52_There are always supervisors 
available to give advice 
.523 
          
32_In general, supervisors are 
sufficiently experienced to meet the 
required level of supervision 
.523 .478 
         
34_If I thought no one else would 
find out, I would not report a 
colleague's error 
.522 
          
24_The Watch Chief would stop 
people working due to safety 
concerns even if it meant not getting 
the job done 
.521 
          
71_Safety rules / procedures are 
only there to protect against legal 
action 
.521 
          
70_It is too bureaucratic to report all 
safety concerns 
.520 
          
15_There is some risk taking at my 
workplace that I think is unnecessary 
.518 
          
9_Operational safety has a high 
priority here 
.518 
          
56_Some safety procedures are only 
there to protect management’s back 
.517 
          
64_If a genuine error is made 
(resulting in an accident or near 
miss), management will always be 
supportive 
.515 
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6_If people here saw an unsafe act 
they would report it 
.513 
          
5_The Squadron Management 




        
59_People make mistakes because 
they are trying to do too many jobs 
at once 
.509 
          
12_People here are only interested 
in safety aspects of their own jobs, 
not other people’s 
.508 
          
68_There are enough people to do 
the job safely 
.507 
          
2_More people are made available 
to do a job if needed for safety 
reasons 
.489 
          
61_The Senior Leadership in the 
FAA mean it when they say that 
safety is of the highest priority 
.485 
          
53_Supervisors shield personnel 
from pressure 
.468 
          
49_Tools and equipment are 
maintained to a high standard in this 
organisation 
.449 
          
23_Safety will become less of a 
priority for Senior Leadership in the 
future 
.434 
          
14_There is timely feedback from 
the outcome of safety investigations 
           
75_People here get frustrated by 
shortages of tools or equipment 
           
31_People here feel at risk when 
they are doing their jobs 
           




         
63_There is too much paperwork 
involved with reporting safety 
concerns 
    
.406 
      
13_The safety equipment (for 
example PPE, harnesses) here 
works well 
      
.589 
    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 





Table 6.  
PCA  Final 6 factor solution, total variance explained 
 




Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 


















1 13.969 34.070 34.070 13.969 34.070 34.070 5.935 14.475 14.475 
2 2.289 5.582 39.652 2.289 5.582 39.652 5.326 12.990 27.465 
3 2.131 5.197 44.849 2.131 5.197 44.849 3.599 8.778 36.243 
4 1.700 4.146 48.994 1.700 4.146 48.994 2.764 6.741 42.984 
5 1.367 3.334 52.328 1.367 3.334 52.328 2.593 6.325 49.308 
6 1.162 2.834 55.162 1.162 2.834 55.162 2.400 5.854 55.162 
7 .991 2.417 57.579 
      
8 .926 2.258 59.837 
      
9 .901 2.198 62.034 
      
10 .858 2.093 64.127 
      
11 .779 1.900 66.028 
      
12 .716 1.746 67.773 
      
13 .709 1.728 69.501 
      
14 .689 1.680 71.181 
      
15 .682 1.664 72.844 
      
16 .664 1.620 74.464 
      
17 .650 1.585 76.050 
      
18 .612 1.492 77.541 
      
19 .603 1.470 79.011 
      
20 .569 1.388 80.399 
      
21 .554 1.352 81.750 
      
22 .528 1.289 83.039 
      
23 .514 1.254 84.293 
      
24 .491 1.198 85.490 
      
25 .478 1.166 86.656 
      
26 .448 1.092 87.748 
      
27 .442 1.079 88.827 
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28 .419 1.022 89.849 
      
29 .405 .988 90.837 
      
30 .393 .958 91.796 
      
31 .386 .941 92.737 
      
32 .382 .931 93.668 
      
33 .348 .848 94.515 
      
34 .328 .800 95.315 
      
35 .317 .774 96.090 
      
36 .294 .717 96.807 
      
37 .293 .714 97.521 
      
38 .275 .671 98.192 
      
39 .266 .650 98.842 
      
40 .254 .619 99.461 
      
41 .221 .539 100.000 
      







PCA  Final 6 factor solution, rotated component matrix 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5_The Squadron Management encourages safe 
working practices 
.660 
     
4_Managers here are willing to listen to staff 
when it comes to the best way to do something 
.656 
     
66_Line management looks out for us here .647 
     
20_Managers are quick to act on safety concerns 
when we report them 
.639 
     
28_The Squadron Management is good at finding 
the right balance between addressing safety 
concerns and the requirement to achieve a task 
.607 
     
78_There is poor communication about safety 
issues that affect me 
.606 
     
29_My supervisor / manager encourages me and 
my team to learn from safety events 
.596 
     
64_If a genuine error is made (resulting in an 
accident or near miss), management will always 
be supportive 
.593 
     
25_Personal safety has a high priority here .548 
     
47_The Squadron management here do a good 
job balancing operational requirements against 
safety 
.541 
     
35_Good safety behaviour is positively 
recognised by the line management here 
.541 
     
3_There is support from line management in 
safety critical situations 
.485 
     
27_People here are kept informed about the 
outcomes of meetings which address safety 
issues 
.462 
     
11_My supervisor / manager encourages 
questions from workers about safety matters 
.461 
     
50_People here take shortcuts when they think 
there is little or no risk involved 
 
.710 
    
8_Taking a shortcut to get work done quickly is 
seen as acceptable, as long as nothing happens 
 
.659 
    
46_Managers turn a blind eye to rule bending  .651     
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74_Operational demands mean sometimes 
people have to take shortcuts 
 
.642 
    
60_Supervisors here sometimes encourage 
others to bend the rules or amend the procedure 
to achieve a task 
 
.641 
    
62_If people see others breaking a rule they tend 










    
48_People regularly get distracted when doing 
safety critical jobs 
 
.526 
    
43_People here are not comfortable reporting 
their own mistakes 
 
.513 
    
76_If people followed all the safety rules they 
would not get the job done in time 
 
.484 
   
.462 
59_People make mistakes because they are 







32_In general, supervisors are sufficiently 




   
41_People here are sufficiently experienced for 
the jobs they are required to do 
  
.769 
   
33_Everyone here  is sufficiently trained to 
undertake their tasks safely 
  
.740 
   




   
19_People here are not always confident that 
they have the experience to do the job 
  
.532 
   
37_People here always work safely, even when 




6_If people here saw an unsafe act they would 
report it 
   
.707 
  
18_Most people in my workplace report safety-
related occurrences 
   
.695 
  
34_If I thought no one else would find out, I would 
not report a colleague's error 
   
.551 
  
68_There are enough people to do the job safely     .715  
2_More people are made available to do a job if 
needed for safety reasons 
    
.670 
 
57_Manning is appropriate to meet operational 
demands 
    
.668 
 
63_There is too much paperwork involved with 
reporting safety concerns 




70_It is too bureaucratic to report all safety 
concerns 
     
.712 
71_Safety rules / procedures are only there to 
protect against legal action 
     
.611 
56_Some safety procedures are only there to 
protect management’s back 
 
.453 
   
.473 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 






Table 8.  
Goodness of fit test for PCFA 
Goodness-of-fit Test 
Chi-Square df Sig. 









Six components from PCA, containing 41 constituent items and internal reliability 
(Cronbach alpha α) of each component 
 
Component 1 - Management & organisational learning ( α = 0.908) 
Mgt1 Managers are willing to listen to staff when it comes to the best way to do 
something 
Mgt2 The Squadron Management encourages safe working practices 
Mgt3 Line management looks out for us here 
Mgt4 Managers are quick to act on safety concerns when we report them 
Mgt5  The Squadron Management is good at finding the right balance between 
addressing safety concerns and the requirement to achieve a task 
Mgt6 There is poor communication about safety issues that may affect me 
Mgt7 My supervisor / manager encourages me and my team to learn from safety 
events 
Mgt8 If a genuine error is made (resulting in an accident or near miss), 
management will always be supportive 
Mgt9 Personal safety has a high priority here 
Mgt10 The squadron management here do a good job balancing operational 
requirements against safety 
Mgt11 Good safety behaviour is positively recognised by the line management here 
Mgt12 There is support from Management in safety critical situations 
Mgt13 People here are kept informed about the outcomes of meetings which 
address safety issues 
Mgt14 My supervisor/manager encourages questions from workers about safety 
matters 
Component 2- Normative behaviour  (α = 0.898) 
Norm1 People here take shortcuts when they think there is little or no risk involved 
Norm2 Taking a short cut to get work done quickly is seen as acceptable, as long as 
nothing happens 
Norm3 Managers turn a blind eye to rule bending 
Norm4 Operational demands mean sometimes people have to take shortcuts 
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Norm5 Supervisors here sometimes encourage others to bend the rules or amend 
the procedure to achieve a task 
Norm6 Supervisors sometimes sign off without checking 
Norm7 People regularly get distracted when doing safety critical jobs 
Norm8 People here are not comfortable reporting their own mistakes 
Component 3- Training & Experience (α =0.841) 
Tr1 In general, supervisors are sufficiently experienced to meet the required level 
of supervision 
Tr2 People are sufficiently experienced for the jobs they are required to do 
Tr3 Everyone here is sufficiently trained to undertake their tasks safely 
Tr4 There are always supervisors available to give advice 
Tr5 People here are not always confident that they have the experience to do the 
job 
Tr6 People here always work safely, even when they are not being supervised 
Component 4- Reporting (α =0.804) 
Rep1 If people here saw an unsafe act they would report it 
Rep2 Most people in my workplace report safety related occurrences 
Rep3 If I thought no one would know, I would not report a colleague's error 
Rep4 If people see others breaking a rule they tend to turn a blind eye 
Component 5 - Human resources (α =0.710) 
Man1 There are enough people to do the job safely 
Man2 More people are made available to do a job if needed for safety reasons 
Man3 Manning is appropriate to meet operational demands 
Man4 People make mistakes because they are trying to do too many jobs at once 
Component 6- Process/bureaucracy (α =0.786) 
Pro1 There is too much paperwork involved with reporting safety concerns 
Pro2 It is too bureaucratic to report all safety concerns 
Pro3 Safety rules / procedures are only there to protect against legal action 
Pro4 If people followed all the safety rules they would not get the job done in time 
















Figure 2. Model 2-Respecified model, 6 components 
Table 2.  
Tests for normality on five safety climate proto-scales 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Managementorglearn .082 454 .000 .979 454 .000 
Normativebehaviour .101 454 .000 .980 454 .000 
Trainexpsup .119 454 .000 .966 454 .000 
Reporting .113 454 .000 .971 454 .000 
Processburea .070 454 .000 .988 454 .001 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
